U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980

P. Peter Sarros

Description

This book explores the bilateral relations between the United States and the Vatican from 1975 to 1980, a turbulent period that had two presidents, three presidential envoys, and three popes. This previously untold story shows how the United States and the Vatican worked quietly together behind the scenes to influence the international response to major issues of the day. Peter Sarros examines the Iran hostage crisis, the tensions of the Cold War, the Helsinki process, and the Beagle Channel dispute, among other issues. These interactions produced a tacit alliance in the foreign policies of the United States and the Vatican even before the establishment of full diplomatic relations. This unique book is based largely on official documents from the archives of the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy of the United States to the Vatican, supplemented by Sarros's contemporaneous diaries, notes, and other unpublished sources.

The confidential consultations at the Vatican by three special envoys and by Sarros in his role as chargé and ambassador at the Vatican were critical in obtaining Vatican support on major international issues. The Vatican also derived substantial benefits from the partnership through U.S. support of Vatican initiatives in Lebanon and elsewhere, and by U.S. policies that gave Vatican diplomacy the flexibility to play a larger role in the international sphere. Sarros concludes that American diplomacy was successful at the Holy See during this period because it took advantage of the Vatican's overarching international strategy, which was to increase its influence through support for the global balance of power while blocking the expansion of Soviet power and communism in Europe. U.S.-Vatican Relations, 1975–1980 will be of interest to students and scholars of history and political science, especially in the fields of diplomatic relations and church history.

President Richard M. Nixon, imitating President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, reestablished direct contacts with the Vatican in 1970. After a hiatus of 20 years, Nixon named Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge as his Special Envoy to the pope. Lodge was an eminent American statesman, a war hero and had served two terms in the Senate and ran as Nixon’s vice presidential candidate in 1960. Lodge also served important diplomatic posts: as UN ambassador under Eisenhower, as Ambassador in Saigon under President Kennedy, and as Ambassador to Saigon, for a second time, and to Federal Republic of Germany under Johnson. He had met with the pope in in 1965 and 1967 to explore paths to peace in Vietnam, had collaborated closely with the Papal Nuncio in Saigon on peace initiatives, and had a special appreciation of Vatican diplomacy. Nixon by creating this channel for a dialogue with the pope and the Vatican recognized that the pope’s observations, judgments, and opinions were accorded extensive international prestige, which was reinforced by powerful Catholic institutions both ecclesiastical and secular throughout the world. Nixon’s mandate to Lodge also imitated FDR’s mandate to Ambassador Myron C. Taylor. Lodge was to visit the Vatican “from time to time” to exchange views on international issues of common concern to the United States and the pope and the Vatican. Lodge was authorized to maintain a permanent office in Rome, staffed by a Foreign Service Officer and a secretary. The mission remained tiny throughout 1975–80 and operated inconspicuously. It was valued greatly by the Vatican. The pope explicitly stated his satisfaction with the Special Envoy channel during his audience for Vice President Mondale on January 27, 1977.

Lodge was succeeded in October 1977 by President Carter’s appointee, David M. Walters, a successful Miami lawyer, prominent lay Catholic, and an important fundraiser for Carter during the election of 1976. He was named Personal Representative of the president and entrusted with visiting the Vatican from “time to time.” Walters resigned in August 1978 and in December 1978 was succeeded by Robert F. Wagner, the former mayor of New York City. Walters and Wagner retained me as their assistant. The office of the special mission, although physically separate from the American Embassy to Italy in Rome, depended on it for administrative support, and collaborated closely on matters that impacted the Vatican’s and the Catholic Church’s activities in Italy. As the officer-in-charge of a mini-embassy, in addition to assisting the Special Envoy in his comprehensive periodic exchanges of views with the pope and senior Vatican officials, I maintained day to day Vatican contacts; exchanged information on important international events; reported on Vatican policies on international issues; and as instructed consulted with the Vatican to obtain its support for specific U.S. policies. I also arranged papal audiences for senior American officials and congressional delegations and accompanied them to the Vatican.

Among our major activities during my first three years were: assisting in the visit of President Ford to the pope on June 3, 1975; reporting on the Vatican’s role in drafting the Helsinki Final Act, which marked the reemergence of the Holy See as an active participant in the European political scene for the first time since the Congress of Vienna in 1815; and monitoring and reporting on Vatican’s Ostpolitik, which endeavored to expand the modus vivendi (the accommodation) of the Church with the Communist governments in Eastern Europe that was inaugurated by John XXIII in 1961, preceding the Nixon/Kissinger policy of détente by over 15 years. We also reported on the reengagement of the Vatican in the Italian elections of 1976. This helped prevent the Communists from achieving their “historic compromise” of entering in the Government of Italy. This important Vatican effort paralleled our own strong and publicly enunciated policy against the “historic compromise.” Furthermore, I was active in persuading the pope not to condemn the Neutron Bomb. President Carter initially considered it as a means of restoring the military balance in Europe in the aftermath of the Soviet development and deployment of the SS-20 medium-range missiles that could hit targets throughout Europe. The other mission achievements related to coordinating with the Vatican the resettlement of South East Asian refugees and promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East and Lebanon, the war on drugs, and the Panama Canal Treaties.

Notwithstanding the success of our diplomatic activities, the mission maintained a very low public profile. As instructed by Lodge, I carried on my activities with “extreme tact and circumspection” and “religiously” avoided press interviews. We avoided discussion of ecclesiastical matters pertaining to the Catholic Church in the United States. This reflected the religious sensitivities in our country and also accorded with long-standing American diplomatic tradition. The mission operated in relative obscurity, sub rosa and by “stealth.” The entry to our office on the fourth floor of an old palazzo at Via di Porta Pinciana No. 4 was not adorned by the American eagle or the American Flag; we had no letterhead paper for our communications. These precautions successfully kept the mission off the public radar and attention. This was reinforced by the Department’s replies to the public regarding the mission. The boilerplate replies emphasized the obscurity of the mission by stating that Lodge had no official title, received no official salary, and his exchanging of information with the pope did not represent U.S. recognition of the sovereignty of the pope or the Vatican.

(Excerpted from chapter 1)

Prologue

1. The Year of Three Popes and the Transformation of U.S.-Vatican Relations

2. Beagle Chanel Mediation: Diplomacy and War Prevention

3. The Vatican, Italy, and Eurocommunism

4. Vatican Ostpolitik: Diplomacy of Rapprochement with communism

5. The Vatican and the Helsinki Process

6. The Pope, the Neutron Bomb, and NATO Modernization

7. The President, the Pope and the Crown of St. Stephens

8. The Vatican, The U.S. & Lebanon’s Civil War

9. The U. S., the Vatican & Middle East, and Jerusalem

10. The Pope & the Iranian Hostage Crisis: The Limits of Papal Power

11. The Vatican, Liberation Theology & the Central American Imbroglio

Epilogue

Bibliography

Index

Sujets

• International Relations
• 20th Century
• HISTORY
• POLITICAL SCIENCE
• Philosophie et théologie
• Religión
• Diplomacy
• State
• Politics
• Religion
• United States
• Diplomatie (homonymie)

Informations

• Publié par: University of Notre Dame Press
• Date de parution: 31 janvier 2020
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780268106836
• Langue: English

Extrait

U.S.–VATICAN RELATIONS, 1975–1980
ADST-DACOR D IPLOMATS AND D IPLOMACY S ERIES
Series Editor: M ARGERY B OICHEL T HOMPSON

Since 1776, extraordinary men and women have represented the United States abroad under widely varying circumstances. What they did and how and why they did it remain little known to their compatriots. In 1995, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) and DACOR, an organization of foreign affairs professionals, created the Diplomats and Diplomacy book series to increase public knowledge and appreciation of the professionalism of American diplomats and their involvement in world history. In this 67th series volume, PETER SARROS shows how the United States and the Vatican worked quietly together behind the scenes in a turbulent period to influence the international response to major issues of the time.
S OME O THER S ERIES T ITLES
H ERMAN J. C OHEN , Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent
P ETER D. E ICHER , Raising the Flag: Adventures of America’s First Envoys in Faraway Lands
B RANDON G ROVE , Behind Embassy Walls: The Life and Times of an American Diplomat
C AMERON R. H UME , Mission to Algiers: Diplomacy by Engagement
D ENNIS C. J ETT , American Ambassadors: The Past, Present, and Future of America’s Diplomats
R ODGER M C D ANIEL , In the Eye of the Storm: The Life and Times of U .S. Senator Gale McGee
W ILLIAM M ORGAN and C. S TUART K ENNEDY , American Diplomats: The Foreign Service at Work
D AVID D. N EWSOM , Witness to a Changing World
D AVID R AWSON , Prelude to Genocide: Arusha, Rwanda, and the Failure of Diplomacy
R AYMOND F. S MITH , The Craft of Political Analysis for Diplomats
J EAN W ILKOWSKI , Abroad for Her Country: Tales of a Pioneer Woman Ambassador in the U.S. Foreign Service
For a complete list of series titles, visit adst.org/publications .
U.S.-VATICAN RELATIONS, 1975-1980
A Diplomatic Study
P. PETER SARROS
An ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy Book
University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana
Copyright © 2020 by University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
undpress.nd.edu
All Rights Reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019952798
ISBN-13: 978-0-268-10681-2 (Hardback)
ISBN: 978-0-268-10684-3 (WebPDF)
ISBN: 978-0-268-10683-6 (Epub)
The opinions and characterizations in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily represent official positions of the United States government, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, or DACOR.
This e-Book was converted from the original source file by a third-party vendor. Readers who notice any formatting, textual, or readability issues are encouraged to contact the publisher at [e-mail]
To my parents, Basil and Helen Sarros, and to my Geneva High School teacher and mentor, Katharine F. White
CONTENTS
Preface
Acknowledgments

One The Year of Three Popes and the Transformation of U.S.–Vatican Relations
Two Beagle Channel Mediation: Diplomacy and War Prevention
Three The Vatican, Italy, and Eurocommunism
Four Vatican Ostpolitik: Diplomacy of Rapprochement with Communism
Five The Vatican and the Helsinki Process, 1975–1980
Six The Pope, the Neutron Bomb, and NATO Modernization
Seven The President, the Pope, and the Crown of St. Stephen
Eight The Vatican, the United States, and Lebanon’s Civil War
Nine The United States, the Vatican, the Middle East, and Jerusalem

Ten The Pope and the Iranian Hostage Crisis: The Limits of Papal Power
Eleven The Vatican, Liberation Theology, and the Central American Imbroglio
Epilogue

Notes
Bibliography
Index
PREFACE
This book recounts U.S. diplomatic efforts to enlist the power of the pope and Vatican diplomacy in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives from 1975 to 1980. I describe and analyze, by firsthand observations, eleven specific diplomatic encounters. These engagements were conducted by the U.S. special mission to the Vatican, using extensive exchanges of information and numerous official consultations with the pope and senior Vatican officials.
The study focuses on diplomatic activities, such as reporting, consultations, and representations, in pursuit of the presidential mandate that established the special mission to the Vatican in 1970 under Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge: “The President wishes Ambassador Lodge to discuss issues on which clarification of the US position is desirable, on which Vatican support might be helpful, or on which the Vatican might be able to play a useful role.” 1 I participated in these activities for more than five years when I was in charge of the special envoy’s office in Rome as assistant to three presidential envoys, 2 representing two presidents 3 to three popes. 4 Because our reporting, our consultations, and our activities at the Vatican were frequent, continuous, and extensive, it is not practical to address all of the matters we handled. Accordingly, I have selected for extended discussion and analysis the consultations relating to eleven “vignettes,” or diplomatic encounters, which illustrate the role of the special mission to the Vatican as observer and reporter, as advocate of U.S. foreign policy objectives, and as seeker of Vatican support for these objectives. 5 Furthermore, in describing a variety of U.S.–Vatican interactions, I call attention to various perceptions and assessments of important international issues or events (e.g., détente, balance of power, Eurocommunism, Middle East peace efforts, liberation theology).
These diplomatic encounters were significant in the context of the international relations of the period, were important to the U.S. national interest, and deserve to be more widely known by scholars and practitioners of U.S. diplomacy—and by the American public. Certain chapters, such as those relating to the Vatican and Italy, Vatican Ostpolitik, Vatican participation in the Helsinki process, and liberation theology, illustrate primarily the role of the special mission in providing to the U.S. State Department and the White House political reporting based on the information gathered from Vatican sources. These chapters demonstrate the Vatican’s value as a listening post, one that collects information from its vast global network, consisting of its diplomatic service, numerous religious organizations, and the stream of official and nonofficial visitors to the Vatican.
Other chapters, such as those concerning the encounters on the crises in Lebanon, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, emphasize the role of the mission as an instrument for advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives by convincing the pope and the Vatican to undertake convergent or parallel public or diplomatic policies on international issues of importance to the president and the secretary of state.
Chapter 7, relating to the return of the crown of St. Stephen to Hungary in 1977, in the first year of the Carter presidency, deals with the important role the Vatican played in the administration’s major initiative towards Eastern Europe. The account of this episode in U.S.–Vatican relations illustrates the mission’s usefulness to the president on an issue at the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy. It demonstrates how the president increasingly used the mission to enlist the Vatican’s help in diminishing domestic political opposition to the return of the crown, an important foreign policy initiative of the Carter administration.
The chapters concerning the Beagle Channel mediation, the Iran hostage crisis, Middle East peace efforts, the neutron bomb, and NATO modernization chronicle the démarches made at the express request of the president and the secretary of state to enlist the pope’s enormous power to influence the course of international relations on strategic matters of peace and war.
The chapters on the Iran hostage crisis and the crises in Nicaragua and El Salvador also illustrate the limits of papal power and Vatican diplomacy. In the Iran case, a non-Western, non-Christian nation essentially ignored the pope’s appeal for the release of the hostages. In the Central American case, papal power and diplomacy were buffeted by internal discord within the Catholic Church. This episode highlights an interesting and important contrast to other U.S.–Vatican encounters. In the Central America of the late 1970s, the Vatican had limited control or even influence over its clergy, including bishops, archbishops, and religious orders, such as the Jesuits. Although the senior Vatican officials agreed with U.S. positions supporting moderate forces, ideological and political divisions within the Church over liberation theology made it difficult for the Vatican to provide significant assistance.
Our consultations in several encounters, especially those on the Beagle Channel, the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, the crises in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and the Iran hostage crisis, took place in a context unique in several respects. In the first place, they were conducted during a new papacy (John Paul II) and by a new special envoy (Amb. Robert F. Wagner), with an expanded presidential mandate. 6 Second, they took place within the framework of a more robust relationship brought about by the U.S. response to the events relating to the transfer of power between papacies. 7 Third, they were strongly reinforced by high-level attention, including direct participation by the president, the secretary of state, and o