Avoiding Governors
298 pages
English

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Description

With the goal of showing the effect of domestic factors on the performance of poverty alleviation strategies in Latin America, Tracy Beck Fenwick explores the origins and rise of conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) in the region, and then traces the politics and evolution of specific programs in Brazil and Argentina. Utilizing extensive field research and empirical analysis, Fenwick analyzes how federalism affects the ability of a national government to deliver CCTs.

One of Fenwick’s key findings is that broad institutional, structural, and political variables are more important in the success or failure of CCTs than the technical design of programs. Contrary to the mainstream interpretations of Brazilian federalism, her analysis shows that municipalities have contributed to the relative success of Bolsa Familia and its ability to be implemented territory-wide. Avoiding Governors probes the contrast with Argentina, where the structural, political, and fiscal incentives for national-local policy cooperation have not been adequate, at least this far, to sustain a CCT program that is conditional on human capital investments. She thus challenges the virtue of what is considered to be a mainly majoritarian democratic system.

By laying out the key factors that condition whether mayors either promote or undermine national policy objectives, Fenwick concludes that municipalities can either facilitate or block a national government’s ability to deliver targeted social policy goods and to pursue a poverty alleviation strategy. By distinguishing municipalities as separate actors, she presents a dynamic intergovernmental relationship; indeed, she identifies a power struggle between multiple levels of government and their electorates, not just a dichotomously framed two-level game of national versus subnational.


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Publié par
Date de parution 20 décembre 2015
Nombre de lectures 0
EAN13 9780268079802
Langue English
Poids de l'ouvrage 2 Mo

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Avoiding g over norsRECENT TITLES FROM THE HELEN KELLOGG INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Scott Mainwaring, series editor
Te University of Notre Dame Press gratefully thanks the Helen Kellogg Institute for
International Studies for its support in the publication of titles in this series.
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For a complete list of titles from the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies,
see http://www.undpress.nd.edug
g
Avoidin
overno rs
Federalism, Democracy, and Poverty
Alleviation in Brazil and Argentina
Tr Acy Beck Fenwick
University of Notre Dame Press
Notre Dame, IndianaCopyright © 2016 by the University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
www.undpress.nd.edu
All Rights Reservrd
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Fenwick, Tracy Beck, 1975– author
Title: Avoiding governors : federalism, democracy, and poverty alleviation in
   Brazil and Argentina / Tracy Beck Fenwick.
Description: Notre Dame, Indiana : University of Notre Dame Press, 2015. |
   Series: Te Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies | Includes
   bibliographical references and index.
Identifers: LCCN 2015032992 | ISBN 9780268028961 (paperback) | ISBN
0268028966 (paper | ISBN 9780268079802 (web pdf))
Subjects: LCSH: Central-local government relations—Brazil. | Central-local
   government relations—Argentina. | Decentralization in government—Brazil.
   | Decentralization in government—Argentina. | Federal government—Brazil.
   | Federal government—Argentina. | Public welfare administration—Brazil.
   | Public welfare administration—Argentina. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE /
   Public Policy / Social Policy. | SOCIAL SCIENCE / Poverty & Homelessness.
Classifcation: LCC JS2411 .F46 2015 | DDC 362.5/5610981—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015032992To my mother—Iris, mi tulipán,
and mis muchachos, Rolando, Félix, and Samuelc
on Ten Ts
List of Table s ix
List of Figures xi
List of Abbreviations xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Ch Apter 1 Te Politics of Alleviating Poverty and Why 1
Federalism Matters
Ch Apter 2 Federalism, the Welfare State, and the Rise of CCT s 21
in Latin America
Ch Apter 3 Avoiding Governors and the Success of CCTs in Brazi l55
Ch Apter 4 Factors Encouraging Municipal Actors to Promote 85
National Goals in Brazil
Ch Apter 5 CCTs in Argentina and the Politics of Alleviating 119
Poverty
Ch Apter 6 Factors Impeding Municipal Actors from Promoting 155
National Goals in Argentina
Ch Apter 7 Federalism and the Territorial Distribution of 201
Targeted Social Welfare: In Comparative Perspective
Appendix 227
Notes 233
Referen ces 243
Index 265TABles
Table 2.1 Social Insurance Coverage, Poverty, and Growth Rates
in Federal Latin America 27
Table 2.2 Factors that Impede or Encourage Municipalities with
Respect to Promoting National Policy Goals 42
Table 3.1 Scope of Bolsa Escola, 2001–2006 67
Table 3.2 Phases of Policy Development and Critical Outcomes
in Brazil, 1988–2014 82
Table 4.1 Brazil’s Revenue and Expenditure by Level of
Government before and afer Decentralization 92
Table 4.2 Brazil’s Revenue and Expenditure by Level of
Government afer Decentralization and afer
Recentralization 98
Table 4.3 Brazil’s Total Collection and Disposable Tax Revenues
and Expenditures by Level of Government in 2003 100
Table 4.4 Characteristics of Brazil’s Consensual Democratic
Model 107
Table 5.1 Counterfactual Order of Future Benefciaries of
Programa Familias 145
Table 5.2 Phases of Policy Development and Critical Outcomes
in Argentina, 1989–2014 152
Table 6.1 Municipal Autonomy Recognized in Argentine
Provincial Constitutions 163
Table 6.2 Argentina’s Revenue and Expenditure by Level
of Government before and afer Decentralization 165
Table 6.3 Argentina’s Revenue and Expenditure by Level
of Government afer Decentralization and afer
Recentralization 173
ixx tables
Table 6.4 Socioeconomic Diversity of Argentine
Municipalities 177
Table 6.5 Characteristics of Argentina’s Majoritarian
Democratic Model 186
Table 6.6 Public Perceptions of CCTS in Argentina in 2007 198
Table 7.1 Constitutional Recognition of Subnational Level of
Government in Comparative Perspective 207
Table 7.2 Fiscal Decentralization and Subnational Budget
Constraints from Brazil and Argentina in Comparative
Perspective 213
Table A.1 Characteristics of Brazilian Political Decentralization
afer 1988 228
Table A.2 Aggregating Argentine Provinces According to
Partisanship Based on Electoral Results, 2003–2005 229
Table A.3 Actual Targeting of Provinces for Programa Familias
2006 and Estimates of Ideal Based on Program
Criteria 230
Table A.4 Characteristics of Argentine Political
Decentralization 231Figures
Figure 2.1 Link between Politics and the Sof Budget Syndrome 49
Figure 3.1 Poverty Rates in Brazil during CCT Expansion,
1992–2006 66
Figure 3.2 Actual Territorial Distribution of Bolsa Família
in 2005 76
Figure 3.3 Ideal T erritorial Distribution of Bolsa Família Based
on Its Criteria 77
Figure 4.1 Predatory Federalism in Brazil, 1988–1995 91
Figure 4.2 Social Expenditure in Brazil per Level of Government,
2002–2006 (without Pensions) 97
Figure 4.3 Distribution of Bolsa Família, December
2003–August 2013 116
Figure 5.1 Rising Support for UCR Relative to the PJ at
Gubernatorial Level, 1989–1999 125
Figure 5.2 Poverty Rates in Argentina, 1989–2006 126
Figure 5.3 Rising Distribution of PJJHD before the 2003 General
Elections 131
Figure 5.4 Ideal Distribution of Programa Familias in 2006 143
Figure 5.5 Actual Distribution of Programa Familias in 2006 144
Figure 5.6 Gradual Discontinuation of CCTs in Argentina,
2003–2010 147
Figure 6.1 Social Expenditure in Argentina per Level of
Government, 2001–2006 (without Pensions) 172
Figure 6.2 Evolution of Municipal Social Spending, 1980–2004 177
xixii Figures
Figure 6.3 UCR and PJ Combined Dominance in Democratic
Institutions, 1987–2007 184
Figure 6.4 PJ Dominance in Argentine Democracy, 1989–2011 189ABBrevi ATions
Tis list is selective. Acronyms are also identifed in the text.
ANSES La Administración de Seguridad Social
AUH Asignación Universal por Hijo
CBA Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires
CCT s Conditional Cash Transfers
IBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografa e Estatística
IBOPE Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística
IMSS Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social
INDEC El Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos
IPEA Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada
LBA Legião Brasileira de Assistência Social
LRF Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal
MDS Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social
PJJHD Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogares Desocupados
SP State of São Paulo
politi CAl pArties, Argentin A
Alianza Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación
FPV Frente para la Victoria
PJ Partido Justicialista
UCR Union Cívica Radical
politi CAl pArties, Br Azil
ARENA Aliança Nacional Renovadora
PFL Partido Frente Liberal
xiiixiv Abbreviations
PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
PT Partido dos TrabalhadoresAcknowledgmen Ts
I am grateful to many people who have assisted me in writing and
researching this book over the past decade. My interest in Latin American
politics, and more specifcally Argenti

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