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ETHNOCENTRISME ET DIPLOMATIE : L'AMÉRIQUE ET LE MONDE AU XXè SIECLE

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254 pages
La conception qu'ont les Américains de leur place et de leur mission dans le monde, la défense de leurs intérêts nationaux et de leur sécurité, le regard qu'ils portent sur les autres peuples, l'influence qu'ils ont exercée sur leur " hémisphère " puis progressivement sur le reste du monde, renvoient aux fondements de leur république et à sa tradition expansionniste, et font de leur histoire l'illustration d'une montée en puissance puis d'une suprématie unique en son genre.
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ETHNOCENTRISME ET DIPLOMATIE: L'AMERIQUE ET LE MONDE AU XXe SIECLE

Collection L'Aire Anglophone dirigée par Serge Ricard
Cette collection entend s'ouvrir aux multiples domaines d'un vaste champ d'investigation, caractérisé par la connexion idiome-culture, auquel les spécialistes formés en langues, civilisations et littératures dites "anglosaxonnes" donnent sa spécificité. Il s'agira, d'une part, de mieux faire connaître des axes de recherche novateurs en études britanniques, américaines et canadiennes et, d'autre part, de répondre à l'intérêt croissant que suscitent les cultures anglophones d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Océanie - sans oublier le rôle de langue véhiculaire mondiale joué par l'anglais aujourd'hui. A cette fin, les domaines privilégiés seront l'histoire des idées et des mentalités, la sociologie, la science politique, les relations internationales, les littératures de langue anglaise contemporaines, le transculturalisme et l'anglais de spécialité.

Dernières parutions

Fabrice BENSIMON, Les Britanniques face à la Révolution française de 1848. Jean-Bernard BASSE, Poétique du vide et fragmentation de l'écriture dans l'œuvre de Richard Brautigan. Pierre MELANDRI (textes réunis et présentés par), Le Welfare State en Amérique du Nord. Luc BENOIT A LA GUILLAUME, Les discours d'investiture des présidents américains ou les paradoxes de l'éloge.

Pierre MELANDRI Serge RICARD (eds )

ETHNOCENTRISME ET DIPLOMATIE: L'AMERIQUE ET LE MONDE AU XXe SIECLE

L'Harmattan 5-7, rue de l'École-Polytechnique 75005 Paris France

L'Harmattan Inc. 55, rue Saint-Jacques Montréal (Qc) CANADA H2Y 1K9

L'Harmattan Hongrie Hargita u. 3 1026 Budapest HONGRIE

L'Harmattan Italia Via Bava, 37 10214 Torino ITALlE

cg L'Harmattan, 2001 ISBN: 2-7475-0824-2

SOMMAIRE

Avant-propos, par Pierre MELANDRI Serge RICARD et
Les États-Unis et l'Europe The Anglo-American Factor in the Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt, by William N. TILŒIIN Between the Diplomacy of Imperialism and the Achievement of World Order by Supranational Mediation: Ethnocentrism and Theodore Roosevelt's Changing Views ofWorld Order, by Kathleen DALTON Franklin D. Roosevelt et Charles de Gaulle: culturelles d'une approche, par André BÉZIA T L'Europe de l'Est vue des États-Unis cinquante, par Justine FAURE les limites

7

11

27

49

dans les années ... 65

Les États-Unis et le monde non-européen From Canned Goods to Gugus: American Perceptions Filipinos in 1898, by John L. OFFNER of 83

De l'inégalité des relations bilatérales: expressions de l'ethnocentrisme des États-Unis en Éthiopie dans les années cinquante, par Annick CIzEL 101

L'AMÉRIQUE

ET LE MONDE AU xxe SIÈCLE

6

La politique américaine en Indochine centrique? par Laurent CESAR! ...

était-elle

ethno129

Trafic de drogue et certificat de bonne conduite: les ÉtatsUnis, gendarme de l'Amérique latine (1987-2000), par Isabelle VAGNOUX 143 Les États-Unis et les relations internationales Les Américains et l'affaire de l'Amoco-Cadiz, par Liliane KERJAN Sanctions unilatérales et respect du droit international, par Anne DEYSlNE Taking the Heat: America and Global Warming, by Robert E. BIEDER Le monde vu par les dirigeants ricaines, par Jean RIVIÈRE La projection d'un ethnocentrisme: par Jus tin VAÏSSE des multinationales amé217 facteur de puissance? 225 165 185 201

Postface, par Pierre MELANDR! et Serge RICARD

245 251

.

Note sur les auteurs ... ... ..:..

Pierre MELANDRI Serge RICARD
Université Paris 11/

(Sorbonne Nouvelle)

AVANT-PROPOS

La puissance de l'Amérique continue de fasciner chercheurs et commentateurs, notamment européens; nombre d'analystes voient dans son rôle hégémonique incontesté depuis la fin de la guerre froide l'émergence d'un nouvel ordre mondial, en rupture avec les précédents. L'histoire est pourtant riche d'enseignements et l'étude des relations internationales ne saurait, d'évidence, faire l'économie d'instructifs retours en arrière. La politique extérieure des États-Unis présente à cet égard d'étonnantes constantes qui tiennent autant à leur culture politique qu'à leur situation géographique. La conception qu'ont les Américains de leur place et de leur mission dans le monde, la défense de leurs intérêts nationaux et de leur sécurité, le regard qu'ils portent sur les autres peuples, l'influence, sinon le contrôle, qu'ils ont exercé d'abord sur leur "hémisphère" puis progressivement sur le reste du monde, renvoient aux fondements de leur république et à sa tradition expansionniste, et font de leur histoire l'illustration d'une montée en puissance puis d'une suprématie unique en son genre. Par-delà la chronique d'un déclin périodiquement annoncé ces trente dernières années et toujours démenti, les ressorts de cette hégémonie n'ont cessé d'inspirer une historiographie abondante, à laquelle les auteurs français sont chaque année plus nombreux à contribuer. L'engouement pour l'étude des relations extérieures des États-Unis est aujourd'hui patent chez des chercheurs d'origines disciplinaires aussi diverses que l'histoire, la science politique ou les études anglophones et hispanophones. C'est dans le but de mieux tirer parti de cette

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richesse pluridisciplinaire que nous avons créé à la Sorbonne Nouvelle (Université Paris III) l'Observatoire de la Politique Étrangère Américaine, groupe de réflexion rassemblant des collègues et doctorants locaux et extérieurs, ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'universitaires étrangers. Lors d'un colloque qui s'est tenu les 14 et 15 janvier 2000, les premiers travaux de l'D.P.E.A. ont abordé la question des incompréhensions interculturelles en diplomatie, notamment les tensions engendrées par une approche souvent ethnocentrique des relations internationales et de la négociation chez les concepteurs ou artisans de la politique extérieure américaine; les communications se sont articulées autour du thème qui donne aujourd'hui son titre au présent ouvrage collectif: "Ethnocentrisme et diplomatie: l'Amérique et le monde au )(Xesiècle" . La postface qui clôt le volume et ses treize contributions - dont quatre en anglais - entend non seulement dresser le

bilan d'une rencontre, mais aussi proposer une réflexion a posteriori sur une problématique qui, un an après notre colloque, et au lendemain de l'élection présidentielle américaine la plus controversée du)(Xe siècle, n'a rien perdu de son actualité, bien au contraire. .:..:..:.

,

LES ETATS-UNIS

ET L1EUROPE

William N. TILCHIN Boston University

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FACTOR IN THE DIPLOMACY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

La conviction qu'une relation privilégiée entre les États-Unis et l'Empire britannique était possible, ainsi que la détermination mise à la construire, fut un e1ément central des conceptions stratégiques, de l'idéologie impérialiste et de l'art diplomatique de Théodore Roosevelt. S'intéressant au facteur anglo-américain dans la diplomatie de Roosevelt, cet article décrit et analyse sa théorie de l'impérialisme bienveillant, les aspects clés de sa vision stratégique et l'impressionnante réussite de ses efforts pour forger une étroite amitié américano-britannique. Cette étude se conclut par une évaluation de l'ethnocentrisme rooseveltien un ethnocentrisme qui attribuait des qualités supérieures aux Npeuples de langue anglaise" - et souligne la complexité qui caractérise la question de son idéologie impérialiste, tout en estimant que son appréciation des grandes puissances fut d'une remarquable prescience.

One of the most successful statesmen in American history was Theodore Roosevelt, the twenty-sixth president of the United States, who held office from 1901 to 1909. Roosevelt's diplomacy has been the subject of numerous studies in recent decades. One of the best and most important of these studies is Serge Ricard's 1991 book Théodore Roosevelt: principes et pratique d'une politique étrangère. Ricard and others have

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demonstrated that Roosevelt (or TR) was a highly sophisticated strategic thinker, a firm believer in the concept of benevolent imperialism as a primary agent of global progress, and an enormously talented and effective practitioner of statecraft. A central element in Roosevelt's strategic conceptions, imperial ideology, and conduct of statecraft was his strong belief in and determination to construct a special relationship between the United States and the British Empire. Reflecting this Rooseveltian priority, this paper has as its focus the Anglo- American factor in TR's diplomacy. It is in Roosevelt's imperial ideology that ethnocentrism comes most clearly into play. As David Burton argues in his book Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist, TR was "unreservedly committed" to the "world movement" concept of imperialism, according to which the most civilized nations and peoples were duty-bound to uplift the less civilized through benevolent imperial rule.! The proper ultimate purpose of imperialism, Roosevelt believed, was to prepare the subject population for freedom and self-government. While "needless brutality" was unacceptable, the use of necessary force was justified in the process of imposing benevolent imperial rule, because the primary beneficiaries of the imperial process would be the native peoples themselves.2 In professing this ideology, Roosevelt was totally sincere about his purposes. He strongly opposed using imperialism for economic aggrandizement; he was an idealistic civilizer rather than an opportunistic exploiter. President Roosevelt's genuineness in this regard is apparent in an examination of his policy toward the Philippines. With no second thoughts, he carried to its conclusion in 1902 the difficult and bloody suppression of the Filipino insurrection. He then proceeded to do his very best to implement his theory of benevolent imperialism. He pushed vigorously for Filipino tariff relief against a resistant Congress, and he paid close attention to all facets of U.S. rule in the Philippines, sending Secretary of War and former Governor General of the Philippines William H. Taft
1. David H. Burton, Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 35. 2. Theodore Roosevelt to Speck von Sternburg, July 19, 1902, Elting E. Morison, John M. Blum, and Alfred D. Chandler, eds., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (8 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1951-1954), Vol. TII, p. 298.

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to the colony in 1907 "to open the new Filipino assembly, the first major instrument of self-government for the Islands."3 TR's approach to the Philippines was unquestionably ethnocentric, but his paternalism was thoroughly well-intentioned and lacking in hypocrisy. Roosevelt's perspectives on the concept of race shed light on his imperial ideology. In Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race, Thomas Dyer notes that TR (and many of his contemporaries) "broadly construed" the term, permitting "a significant variety of human groups to be recognized as races."4 In Roosevelt's view, racial qualities were both inherited and acquired, and traits acquired in one generation could be inherited by later generations. Races he considered inferior therefore could progress under the tutelage of superior races by assimilating the more desirable qualities of those superior races. Roosevelt also downplayed ethnicity in his identification of races. Instead of referring to the racial grouping he considered the most advanced as "the AngloSaxon race," he preferred to employ the more inclusive phrase "the English-speaking peoples," thereby emphasizing, in Ricard's words, "la communauté de langue et de valeurs."s With regard to effectuating and attaining the goals of his imperial ideology, Roosevelt believed that the mammoth British Empire and the small American empire stood above all the others. Despite occasional private criticisms of British imperial conduct, particularly in Malaya,6 on the whole TR saw the British Empire as a great positive force, indispensable to the advancement of civilization. And he considered the D.S.controlled Philippines to be the most altruistically and efficiently ruled of all the world's colonies. On the other side, imperial rule in colonies run by continental European powers fell far short of the Rooseveltian ideal. As Burton puts it, "in any comparison of the accomplishments of the non-English and the English[-speaking] peoples, [...] Roosevelt held that
3. Morison et a1., Letters of TR, Vol. V, p. 742 n. 4. Thomas G. Dyer, Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race (Baton Rouge, 1980), pp. 168, 30. 5. Serge Ricard, Theodore Roosevelt: principes et pratique d'une politique étrangère (Aix-en-Provence, 1991), p.248. 6. See William N. Tilchin, Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft (New York, 1997), pp. 101102.

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those of the latter were of a different and higher quality. The triumphs of the English [...] stood in instructive contrast to the political occupations resting on force that typified European domination in Asia and Africa."7 Roosevelt's imperial ideology, then, gave him obvious reasons to pursue Anglo-American friendship. The perception of a common duty to extend civilization was reinforced by perceptions of a common history and of a common attachment to the principles of freedom and self-government. A common language provided additional reinforcement, enabling TR easily to develop a network of like-minded English friends with whom he corresponded regularly and intimately. (Foremost among President Roosevelt's British correspondents were the foreign service officer Cecil Spring Rice, the historian-politician George Otto Trevelyan, the editor of The Spectator John St. Loe Strachey, the Liberal Foreign Minister Edward Grey, and, especially, the Conservative parliamentarian Arthur Lee.) While a shared imperial philosophy was an important aspect of the bond between Roosevelt and his British friends, their belief that Great Britain and the United States had very similar strategic interests was even more important. Indeed, common ideas on imperialism in the absence of common strategic interests could not have provided a sufficient basis for the American and British governments to establish a special relationship during the opening decade of the twentieth century. Roosevelt himself was a sophisticated realist thinker and a skillful practitioner of realpolitik. His determined pursuit of Anglo-American unity needs to be understood as the product of strategic conceptions and imperial ideology, with the former as the more influential of the two. During the second half of the 1890s, Great Britain had taken the first steps toward a reversal of the tradition of AngloAmerican animosity, a tradition dating all the way back to the American Revolution. With the obsolescence of the revered old policy of splendid isolation becoming increasingly apparent, England had sought to escape from its isolation and to strengthen its international position by cultivating friendly
7. Burton, TR: Confident Imperialist, pp. 18-19.

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relations with the United States. Britain's decidedly proAmerican neutrality during the Spanish-American War of 1898 had been particularly successful in winning American goodwill, and had been reciprocated by America's decidedly proBritish neutrality during the Boer War of 1899-1902. Even before becoming president, Theodore Roosevelt had been a leading advocate of the United States' controversial Boer War policy, and once he assumed the presidency he continued it until the conclusion of the war in the spring of 1902, for which the British leadership was extremely appreciative. As president-although he was very ably assisted by Secretaries of State John Hay and Elihu Root and by various ambassadors and other individuals-Roosevelt dominated both the planning and the execution of u.S. foreign policy. Both TR and most British leaders of the period grasped the commonality of Anglo-American interests, a mutual understanding that was solidified when the Liberal party won a decisive victory in the election of January 1906, with Edward Grey taking over as foreign secretary. Britain and the United States each backed the open door in China, the existing situation in the Pacific, a stable balance of power on the European continent, the imperial status quo in Africa, and continued British naval supremacy. Early in Roosevelt's presidency the British acquiesced in American hegemony in the Caribbean and rapidly came to see it as a positive good. Despite the AngloJapanese alliance of 1902, which Roosevelt strongly supported, and the Anglo-Russian rapprochement of 1907, for which he expressed cautious approval,s both English-speaking powers trained a wary eye on Germany, Russia, and Japan and endeavored to comprehend, to limit, and to contain those countries' ambitions. Roosevelt's own estimation of these three powers vacillated as circumstances changed, but suspicion was never very far beneath the surface. President Roosevelt did a masterful job of orchestrating the development not merely of amicable relations but of a genuinely and uniquely close partnership between the British Empire and the United States. In the process of forging an Anglo-American special relationship TR encountered numer-

8. See TR to Cecil Spring Rice, December 21, 1907, Letters of TR, Vol. VI, p. 871.

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ous obstacles, displaying impressive diplomatic agility as he overcame them all. In the early years of Roosevelt's presidency, the issues pertaining to Anglo-American relations tended to be concentrated in the Caribbean region. First, Britain and the United States signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of November 1901, permitting American control and fortification of a future transisthmian canal. In December of the following year, a problem arose in Anglo-American relations when England joined Germany in taking military action against Venezuela for the purpose of forcing payment of uncollected debts. Roosevelt's reaction was very revealing. Assessing Germany's behavior as truly threatening, TR quietly ordered the u.s. Navy to prepare to confront Germany and privately demanded that Germany agree to submit its claims against Venezuela to arbitration, which it did agree to do in February 1903. In contrast, Roosevelt merely accused Britain of foolishness for allowing itself "to be roped in as an appendage to Germany."9 For its part, Britain quickly recognized its mistake and did not impede a settlement on Roosevelt's terms. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Venezuelan episode, England became an early advocate of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, according to which the United States undertook to employ its power at its own discretion to counteract "gross wrongdoing" by its hemispheric neighbors to the south.IO This corollary was proclaimed by the president in 1904, and that same year the British government initiated a nearly total withdrawal of British naval power from the Caribbean, leaving the protection of England's colonial and other interests there in American hands. Actually, the Western Hemisphere-though at a point far north of the Caribbean-was the site of the most dangerous problem in Anglo-American relations of TR's presidency. This was the disputed boundary betwe~n Alaska and the Canadian province of British Columbia. In Roosevelt's eyes the selfgoverning Dominion of Canada's claim was "an outrage pure and simple,"ll and the resolution therefore had to uphold all the essentials of the U.S. position. By making this requirement
9. TR to Whitelaw Reid, June 27, 1906, Letters of TR, Vol. V, p. 319. 10. TR to Elihu Root, June 7, 1904, Letters of TR, Vol. IV, p. 821. Il. TR to John Hay, July 10, 1902, Letters of TR, Vol. III, p. 287.

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unmistakably clear to British decision makers, by involving himself intensively in the proceedings, and by offering Britain face-saving concessions on secondary aspects of the boundary dispute, TR brilliantly engineered a mutually acceptable settlement in October 1903. What Roosevelt would later recall as "the last serious trouble between the British Empire and ourselves" had been brought to an amicable conclusion.12 Toward another Anglo-American difficulty in the hemisphere, the Newfoundland fisheries question, Roosevelt's outlook and approach were far more sympathetic to the British position. Self-governing Newfoundland revived this longstanding but long-dormant controversy in 1905 in retaliation for the u.s. Senate's ill treatment of a U.S.-Newfoundland bilateral tariff reduction treaty. TR was dismayed by the conduct of the various obstructive senators, notably including his close friend Henry Cabot Lodge, whom he chastised indirectly with these words: "[The defeat of the reciprocity treaty] has given deep offense to Newfoundland, and most naturally. If the circumstances had been reversed, this country in its turn would have been deeply angered. [Therefore, we should] try to show such patience and forbearance as possible until the exasperation caused by our very unfortunate action has worn off."13 Proceeding in a conciliatory spirit as the controversy persisted-anxious, as he put it, "not [...] to jeopardize bigger things elsewhere"14-in 1907 Roosevelt proposed to have the matter settled through arbitration by the Hague Tribunal. The British government accepted, leading to the eventual resolution of the fisheries problem on the basis of a compromise verdict issued by the tribunal. Probably the two greatest foreign policy triumphs of Roosevelt's presidency were his successful mediations of the Russo-Japanese War and of the Moroccan crisis. In the first case he brought an end to eighteen months of fighting, for which he was honored with a Nobel Peace Prize, and in the
12. TR to Alfred Thayer Mahan, June B, 1911, quoted in Charles S. Campbell, Jr., Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 (Baltimore, 1957), p. 347. For an in-depth treatment of Roosevelt's role in resolving the Alaskan boundary dispute, see Tilchin, TR and the British Empire, pp. 36-48. 13. TR to Henry Cabot Lodge, August 19, 1905, Letters of TR, Vol. IV, pp. 1305-1306. 14. TR to Reid, July 29, 1907, Letters of TR, Vol. V, p. 733.

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second he prevented a Franco-German war that could conceivably have brought on World War I eight or nine years ahead of schedule. Roosevelt's cultivation of Anglo-American friendship functioned as an important subtext to both of these mediations. A landmark international event in TR's view was the signing of the Anglo-French entente cordiale in April 1904. Roosevelt wholeheartedly approved of this agreement, seeing it as a formidable stabilizing factor in the European balance of power and as enormously beneficial to Anglo-American interests. Because Britain was allied with Japan while France was allied with Russia, the Russo-Japanese War posed a manifest danger to the new entente. This was a major reason why Roosevelt watched carefully for and then seized the opportunity to put himself forward as a mediator. And the Moroccan crisis, of course, constituted a direct German challenge to the entente. During April, May, and June of 1905, TR maneuvered energetically and adroitly behind the scenes to arrange for an international conference on the Moroccan question that forestalled a war between Germany and France. Afterward, at the Algeciras Conference of January-April 1906, the president deftly engineered a French diplomatic victory while doing his best to disguise the reality of the outcome and thereby to soften the blow for Germany. These two Rooseveltian mediations that had the effect of strengthening the Anglo-American international position were all the more remarkable because Britain, out of deference to its alliance with Japan, had been frustratingly unhelpful as TR labored for Russo-Japanese peace; and because the British government, utterly failing to comprehend Roosevelt's purposes, had been downright obstructive in 1905 as the president worked to arrange a conference on Morocco. Maintaining his perspective throughout, TR simply did not permit what he saw as irksome and ignorant British behavior to undermine the firm foundation of Anglo-American harmony that he had been instrumental in laying prior to these crises. A significant outgrowth of the Anglo-French entente cordiale and the mediations of 1905 and 1906 was increased affection for and confidence in France on the part of President Roosevelt. Reinforced by his unusually close personal friend-

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ship and excellent working relationship with Ambassador Jean Jules Jusserand, TR's outlook on France, which had been somewhat ambivalent prior to 1904, now became almost entirely positive. In this regard, an exchange of correspondence in February 1907 between Roosevelt and his English friend John St. Loe Strachey is illustrative. During a visit to Germany and France, Strachey had determined that Kaiser Wilhelm II "might be willing to engage in war for reasons of pure policy, which would seem detestable-I can use no other word-to an English or American statesman." Strachey had learned "that the Germans genuinely believed two years ago, when our fleet went into the Baltic, that we intended to attack them and destroy them"-because in reverse circumstances "they would not have hesitated for a moment to destroy" the British fleet "before it became a real danger." In distinct contrast, Strachey had found the leaders and citizens of France to be "extremely pacific. [...] That they will ever provoke a war or attack Germany is I feel sure out of the question."IS Roosevelt replied that he was "profoundly imprestl6 with what you described in both Berlin and Paris. I regret greatly to say that in its essentials I think your belief as to the foreign policies of the two countries is justifiable."17 In Roosevelt's worldview, then, France had assumed a place on the Anglo-American side of the civilization line dividing the great powers, while Germany and Russia stood on the opposite side of that line. About Japan TR was less certain. On the one hand, he admired the Japanese, his sympathies were with Japan during its war against Russia, he linked the United States informally to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and he worked hard and successfully to develop friendly D.S.Japanese relations, crowning his efforts with the RootTakahira Agreement of November 1908. But on the other
15. John St. Loe Strachey to TR, February 11, 1907, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, reel 71, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., and Harvard College Library, Cambridge, Mass. (Emphasis in original.) 16. While Roosevelt had recently abandoned his fight to impose simplified spelling on an unwilling nation, he had decided to Ucontinue using the new spelling [...] in my own correspondence." TR to James Brander Matthews, December 16, 1906, Letters of TR, Vol. V, p. 527. 17. TR to Strachey, February 22, 1907, Letters of TR, Vol. V, p. 596.

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hand, he was wary of Japan's intentions and believed that only a powerful u.s. Navy could ensure that Japan's ambitions in the Pacific Ocean would be kept in check. A strange episode occurring in a British colony in the Caribbean in 1907-referred to variously as the Jamaica incident and as the Swettenham incident-further demonstrates the extent of Roosevelt's devotion to the Anglo-American partnership. Following a devastating earthquake and fire in Kingston, Jamaica, the u.s. Navy dispatched a relief squadron in response to an urgent request from British authorities, Britain having no warships in the vicinity. Despite the dedicated and efficient relief work of the American naval forces-work that was generating immense gratitude among the inhabitants of Kingston-the anti-American governor of Jamaica, Sir Alexander Swettenham, wrote a sarcastic and extraordinarily offensive letter to the commander of the squadron, ordering him to withdraw. But Roosevelt-notwithstanding his great pride in the u.s. Navy and his sensitivity about insults to the national honor of the United States-unhesitatingly accepted the British government's prompt disavowal of Swettenham's rude act and took the leading American role in the execution of a joint AngloAmerican policy of damage-control diplomacy. The bizarre Governor Swettenham was isolated, and, despite encountering some tricky obstacles, Roosevelt and the British Foreign and Colonial Offices eventually brought the incident to a close.18 Roosevelt's handling of the Swettenham incident demonstrates that, whereas he was determined to resist German encroachments in the Western Hemisphere, he was by 1907 entirely comfortable with the existence of numerous British colonies in the hemisphere-and, for that matter, of French colonies as well. As Ricard writes with regard to TR and the Caribbean, "La Grande-Bretagne et la France [...] ne l'inquiètent nullement."19
18. The Jamaica incident and its diplomatic aftermath are explored in depth in Tilchin, TR and the British Empire, pp. 115-168. A briefer version is provided in Tilchin, "Theodore Roosevelt, Anglo- American Relations, and the Jamaica Incident of 1907," Diplomatic History, 19.3, pp. 385-405. 19. Ricard, TR: principes et pratique, p. 314.

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Perhaps the most important imperialist speech of Theodore Roosevelt's presidency was delivered in Washington on January 18, 1909, less than two months before he left office, at the African Diamond Jubilee of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The motivating purpose of this speech was to offer public praise of British rule in India during a difficult period. The English writer and editor Sydney Brooks had spearheaded a series of private British requests of the president to give such a speech. But wishing to obscure the speech's raison d'être, Roosevelt decided to submerge his laudatory remarks on British rule in India in a long address extolling the contribution of enlightened imperial rule to the advance of civilization in general and to an improved quality of life for native populations in particular. To illustrate this point he spoke specifically about French rule in Algeria, British rule in India, and American rule in the Philippines. Playing to his audience, he also complimented the impact on native Africans of Christian missionary work. This unabashedly ethnocentric speech rang with conviction and even celebration. Four short excerpts can capture its essence: "Alien control [.. .], in spite of all its defects, is in a very large number of cases the prerequisite condition to the moral and material advance of the peoples who dwell in the darker corners of the earth." "Algiers is far better off in every way under French rule than it was eighty years ago, before the French came into the land." "Every true friend of humanity should realize that the part England has played in India has been to the immeasurable advantage of India, and for the honor and profit of civilization, and should feel profound satisfaction in the stability and permanence of English rule." "We are constantly giving to the people of the Philippines an increasing share in, an increasing opportunity to learn by practice, the difficult art of self-government. [...] Weare leading them forward steadily in the right direction."2o Roosevelt's address had the effect of cementing still more firmly what by that time was already a seasoned friendship between the British Empire and the United States. Among proJI 20. TR, Address of the President at the celebration of the African Diamond Jubilee of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Washington, D.C., January 18, 1909," pp. 13, 16, 23-24, 28-29, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Harvard College Library, Cambridge, Mass.

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minent Britons offering TR personal expressions of gratitude were Sydney Brooks, Arthur Lee, Foreign Secretary Grey, Ambassador James Bryce, and Secretary of State for India John Morley.21 The British reaction was captured particularly well by a London Times editorial. "We have long been conscious," declared the Times, that British rule in India was "a monument [...] to our highest qualities as a nation. [...] But it is new to us to have its greatness [...] proclaimed in unhesitating accents by the Chief Magistrate of the people whose esteem and good opinion we prize beyond those of any other foreigners." Moreover, Roosevelt's "testimony [...] is an impressive proof of the happy change which has taken place of late years in the relations of the American people to us"-a change so far-reaching as to render it "possible for the President of the United States to express in a public speech his unstinted admiration of the British administration of alien races."22 Roosevelt, naturally, was delighted by Britain's overwhelmingly enthusiastic response to his address. For he would shortly be vacating the White House, and he wished to leave Anglo-American relations in the healthiest possible condition in every single respect. It might be noted that Roosevelt's selection of French rule in Algeria as one of his three models was not coincidental. Although he had never considered French imperialism to be as altruistic and enlightened as American or British imperialism, he likely was rewarding France for its entente with England-or, as TR sometimes put it, for "playing our game." In other words, this is a subtle illustration that strategic considerations often affected imperial considerations for Roosevelt, and that, between the two, strategic considerations were paramount. The case of Britain was less complicated for Roosevelt. As TR saw it, the British Empire was both an eminent agent of civilization and a thoroughly desirable strategic partner for the United States. Always an American nationalist, by the closing years of his presidency Roosevelt had become something of an Anglo-American nationalist as well.23 A letter of August 1908 from Roosevelt to Arthur Lee is especially eye21. See Tilchin, TR and the British Empire, pp.223-224.
22. London Times, January 19, 1909. 23. See Tilchin, TR and the British Empire, p. 228.

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opening in this regard. "I have become almost as anxious as you are," the president told his English friend, "to have the British fleet kept up to the highest point of efficiency" and in its "present position of relative power. [...] It is a great guaranty for the peace of the world."24 Roosevelt, who by 1907 had turned the U.S. Navy into the world's second strongest, was entirely content with America's role as the junior member of an informal two-power naval alliance responsible for an international balance of power decidedly favorable to AngloAmerican interests worldwide. To evaluate Theodore Roosevelt's ethnocentrism-an ethnocentrism that attributed superior qualities to the Englishspeaking peoples-is actually a rather complex task. One might begin by observing that there are really two parts of Roosevelt's Anglo-American ethnocentrism-one pertaining to his imperial ideology, the other pertaining to great power rivalries. Where occupying powers ruled their colonies in an exploitive, abusive manner, native peoples invariably suffered grievously. Roosevelt himself recurrently condemned this selfish type of imperialism. Rooseveltian-style benevolent imperialism, however, is a less simple matter. Both the extent to which benevolent imperialism was truly practiced and the balance between benefits conferred and damage inflicted on native populations have long been and probably always will be vigorously debated by historians. Whether Roosevelt was right or wrong that the achievements of benevolent imperialism far outweighed its drawbacks-a proposition for and against which one can find plenty of evidence-the sincerity of his outlook and the genuineness of his own effort are beyond question. Where great power rivalries are concerned, a more convincing case can be made for Roosevelt's perspective. TR worried about and indeed dreaded the possibility that the world might some day fall under the control of what he sometimes called the "military despotisms and military barbarisms."25 And he saw an informal but nonetheless vital alliance between the United States and the British Empire-featuring
24. TR to Arthur Lee, August 7, 1908, Letters of TR, Vol. VI, p. 1159. 25. See, for example, TR to Henry White, August 14, 1906, Letters of TR, Vol. V, p. 359.

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a decisive preponderance of Anglo- American naval power, and bolstered by the Anglo-French entente-as the best insurance against such a disastrous eventuality. From the vantage point of the year 2000, TR's prescience seems quite remarkable. His assessment of Germany, Japan, and Russia as potential menaces to peace, freedom, and civilization was starkly borne out by the events of the twentieth century. Equally acute was his vision that Britain and America working together could beat back the "despotisms and barbarisms" and thwart their aggressive designs. The phenomenon of ethnocentrism pervades both world history and the contemporary world. Ethnocentrism has generally been the product of parochialism or narrowmindedness or bigotry, and its effects have usually been harmful. However, ethnocentrism's opposites-cultural relativism and moral relativism-can also be highly dangerous if ascribed to unthinkingly and applied indiscriminately. People living in a world dominated by free institutions as it enters the twenty-first century can be grateful to Theodore Roosevelt, and to like-minded leaders of later decades, for rejecting a simplistic moral and cultural relativism and for steadfastly harnessing the energies and the resources of the free nations in the terrible but ultimately victorious struggle against the forces of totalitarianism and tyranny. Roosevelt may have been ethnocentric when he predicted in 1901 in an oft-quoted remark to Cecil Spring Rice that the twentieth century would "be the century of the men who speak English."26 But the writer of those words was also an extremely well-read, worldly, sophisticated man of broad mind and keen insight. And, fortunately, his prediction turned out not to be incorrect. The Anglo-American factor was predominant in the diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt. Nearly all of TR's actions in foreign policy were connected to it in at least some measure. Despite various disagreements and irritations with England, the twenty-sixth president never wavered in his determina26. TR to Spring Rice, March 16, 1901, Letters of TR, Vol. ill, p. 16. For example, see Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), p.81; Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 12; and Ricard, TR: principes et pratique, pp. 244-245.

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tion to advance the cause of Anglo-American unity. And it is largely because of the wisdom of this endeavor, and the dexterity exhibited in its execution, that Theodore Roosevelt-ethnocentrism notwithstanding-ranks as one of the most outstanding practitioners of statecraft in the history of the United States. ... ... . .:. .