IEC-ECC Fact Sheet Audit Processx

Melissa.Rudderham

Description

Fact Sheet on the Audit Process in Response to ECCO rder of 8 September 2009 In accordance with the 8 September 2009 ordere oEfl etchtoral Complaints Commission (ECC), the ECC and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) adg retheat auditing of suspect Presidential ballotsl l shabe carried out through a random sampling of bbaollxoets that fell within the order and were idedn tifiethrough triggers in the national database. The objectives of the sampling process are: to establish whether there are physical indicatoofr s ballot box stuffing in the ballot boxes examined; to establish whether there are physical indicatofr s ballot box tampering in the ballot boxes examined; to establish whether there are physical indicatoofr sa ny other electoral irregularity in the ballot boxes examined; based on the indicators identified, to establisthte rpnas of fraud of sample populations that can be expressed mathematically. The sampling and audit processes will be conduoctne dt he basis of established statistical methodst,h withe aim to ensure that a clear outcome to Afgahna’ns is2t009 Presidential election is reached without undue delay. In compliance with procedures agreed between theC EaCnd IEC, an initial selection of 313 ballot boxeswas made. These were retrieved from the IEC piraol vinwcarehouses and brought to the IEC headquarters, under the constant ...

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• Publié par: Addo
• Nombre de lectures: 35
• Langue: English

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Fact Sheet on the Audit Process in Response to ECC Order of 8 September 2009 In accordance with the 8 September 2009 order of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), the ECC and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) agreed that auditing of suspect Presidential ballots shall be carried out through a random sampling of ballot boxes that fell within the order and were identified through triggers in the national database. The objectives of the sampling process are: to establish whether there are physical indicators of ballot box stuffing in the ballot boxes examined;  to establish whether there are physical indicators of ballot box tampering in the ballot boxes examined; to establish whether there are physical indicators of any other electoral irregularity in the ballot boxes examined; based on the indicators identified, to establish patterns of fraud of sample populations that can be expressed mathematically. The sampling and audit processes will be conducted on the basis of established statistical methods, with the aim to ensure that a clear outcome to Afghanistan’s 2009 Presidential election is reached without undue delay. In compliance with procedures agreed between the ECC and IEC, an initial selection of 313 ballot boxes was made. These were retrieved from the IEC provincial warehouses and brought to the IEC headquarters, under the constant observation of the ECC and candidate agents. However, it was later detected that, due to an administrative error, three initial categories were selected in a way that did not include all polling stations covered by the ECC Order of 8 September 2009.For example, ballot boxes that had been quarantined and were never added to the preliminary results should not be included in the audit process. Thirty nine quarantined boxes had been included in the sample and have therefore

been removed from the audit sample. The total number of ballot boxes which correctly meet criteria set out in the Order is3498. In order to accurately reflect the corrected number of boxes a further 84 ballot boxes will be selected by the same random sampling technique on 5 October.These ballot boxes will be brought to the IEC under the same conditions and added to the audit. Thus the total audit sample will be 358 ballot boxes. The IEC has set up an audit centre in its campus. The audit process will begin on 5 October and is expected to run for around four days. The IEC will examine the sample ballot boxes in a consistent manner. TheECC will verify that the IEC conducts this process in accordance with the agreed-upon audit and recount procedures.In accordance with the order of the ECC, the audit will be conducted in the presence of observers and candidate agents. The ECC will use the information collected through this process in its decision-making, and all decisions will be final and binding. The Audit Process Six audit teams have been established.Two teams will work on one category of ballot boxes.Teams consist of two IEC members and one ELECT staff member. In addition there is an IEC Quality Control Team and an ECC Verification Team. Overall supervision of the process is the responsibility of the Operational Control and Command Group which consists of ECC, IEC members and an international electoral expert. The examination of ballot boxes from one group is done independently from the other groups. Only one box will be examined at a time by each team. When a team has finished auditing all the ballot boxes in their group they may start auditing ballot boxes from another group as assigned by the Audit Centre Manager. Boxes are opened and visually inspected by the audit teams, supervised by the IEC “Quality Control Team.” Thistakes place in the presence of accredited party agents and electoral observers. Each team will follow and complete an audit checklist for the examination of each ballot box. This starts with a visual inspection of the ballot box for signs of tampering, opening of the box, display of the box contents and search for physical indications of irregularities or fraud.

At the end of the examination of the ballot box, all contents are put back in the box. The box is sealed with new seals and seal serial numbers are recorded in the Audit checklist. The check list is signed by the audit team leader, Quality control team and ECC verification team member. A copy of the checklist is made for the IEC and the original is provided to the ECC. Candidate agents and observers are invited to follow each audit group and to take notes. However, they must not interfere with the process. If they have concerns they may address them to the IEC Quality Control Team or the Operational Control and Command Group. Extrapolation of Results The presence of clear and convincing evidence of fraud in the sampled polling stations will enable the ECC to determine the incidence of fraud in non-sampled polling stations from the same category. If a percentage of the votes in a sample is found to be fraudulent, the ECC would find this to be clear and convincing evidence to conclude that the same incidence of fraud applies to the votes cast at all polling stations in the corresponding category.

The ECC has adopted a policy for audit and recount evaluations.This policy can be found on the ECC website.

It should be noted that, in addition to the audit conducted as a result of the ECC order of 8 September, the ECC continues to investigate and adjudicate complaints submitted on and after Election Day (20 August 2009).