The Intercorporeal Self

Scott L. Marratto

Description

Challenging a prevalent Western idea of the self as a discrete, interior consciousness, Scott L. Marratto argues instead that subjectivity is a characteristic of the living, expressive movement establishing a dynamic intertwining between a sentient body and its environment. He draws on the work of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, contemporary European philosophy, and research in cognitive science and development to offer a compelling investigation into what it means to be a self.
Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

1. Situation and the Embodied Mind

I. Mind, Self, World

Representation
Behavior
Situated Cognition

II. Perception

Sensation
Spatiality

III. Situated Subjectivity

2. Making Space

I. Subjectivity, Sensation, and Depth

Affordance Depth
Spectral Depth
Spatial ‘Levels’
Time, Space, and Sensation
The Depth of the Past

II. Learning

3. Subjectivity and the ‘Style’ of the World

I. The ‘Subject’ and the ‘World’ of Situated Cognition

Sensorimotor Laws
Sensorimotor Subjectivity
Ecological Laws
Ecological Subjectivity

II. Perception and Subjectivity beyond Metaphysics

4. Auto-affection and Alterity

I. Presence

The ‘Privilege’ of the Present
Auto-affection

II. The Deconstruction of Presence

Derrida’s Appraisal of Husserl’s Phenomenology
Derrida on the Lived Body (‘Leib’; ‘le corps propre’)
Derrida’s Deconstruction of ‘Intercorporeity’

III. Auto-hetero-affection in Merleau-Ponty

Intercorporeity and Intersubjectivity
Body Schema
Auto-hetero-affection as the Advent of the Intercorporeal Body

5. Ipseity and Language

I. Language and Gesture

The Tacit Cogito
Perceptual Meaning and Natural Expression
The Paradox of Expression
Institution

II. Diacritical Intercorporeity

III. Expression and Subjectivity

Conclusion

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Épistémologie
• Philosophie de l'esprit
• Epistémologie
• Epistémologie
• Epistémologie
• Philosophy of mind
• Philosophy

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 05 juin 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781438442334
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

A VOLUME IN THE SUNY SERIES IN C ONTEMPORARY F RENCH T HOUGHT

David Pettigrew and Francois Raffoul, editors

THE INTERCORPOREAL SELF
Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity
SCOTT L. MARRATTO
S TATE U NIVERSITY OF N EW Y ORK P RESS

Published by S TATE U NIVERSITY OF N EW Y ORK P RESS , A LBANY
© 2012 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu
Production, Kelli W. LeRoux Marketing, Anne M. Valentine
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Marratto, Scott L. (Scott Louis), 1968–
The intercorporeal self : Merleau-Ponty on subjectivity / Scott L. Marratto.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978-1-4384-4231-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908–1961. 2. Subjectivity. I. Title.
B2430.M3764M373 2012
194—dc23
2011027049
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

In memory of my mother, Melody McLoughlin
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In Phenomenology of Perception , Maurice Merleau-Ponty remarks on the strange manner in which we discover, in a kind of unending process, the patterns of our own thinking only by letting it find its expression in the context of our relations with others. He writes, “There is … a taking up of others' thought through speech, a reflection in others, an ability to think according to others which enriches our own thoughts” ( PhP , 179/208). The process of writing a book, which is inevitably a reflection of many conversations, collaborations, helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions, is particularly exemplary of this philosophical insight.
There are a great many people to whom acknowledgment is due, and any list is sure to be incomplete. I would like to express my particular gratitude to John Russon, who has been an inspiring and challenging teacher, mentor, and friend to me. His comments and reflections on this manuscript have been crucial to its development. I am grateful for John's work as a gifted philosopher and teacher, and also for his efforts in organizing an ongoing philosophical conversation among a group of scholars who have been meeting, for a number of years now, a few days each summer, in Toronto. It has been my privilege to participate in a number of these ‘Toronto Seminars’ to discuss the works of Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Hegel, Heidegger, Plato, and Fichte. The list of participants in these conversations over the years includes Ömer Aygün, Don Beith, Noah Moss Brender, Susan Bredlau, David Ciavatta, Peter Costello, Bruce Gilbert, Jill Gilbert, Shannon Hoff, Kirsten Jacobson, Kym Maclaren, David Morris, Alexandra Morrison, Gregory Recco, and Maria Talero. These conversations have shaped my own approach to the practice of philosophy as well as my interpretation of Merleau-Ponty, and I am grateful to all of them.
My exploration of the relationship between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and Derrida's ‘deconstruction,’ reflected in chapters 4 and 5 of this book, began with a paper that I presented at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Città di Castello, Italy, in 2006. I am grateful to the coordinator of that year's Collegium, Michael Naas, and to those participants and faculty who have shared insights and helpful comments in the course of an ongoing philosophical conversation. I am thinking, in particular, of Bryan Bannon, Maxime Doyon, Donald Landes, and François Raffoul. My exploration of the relations between Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, cognitive science, and naturalism, reflected in chapters 1 and 3 of this book, began in conversations with Andrew Bailey. His thoughtful approach to my questions and ideas stands, for me, as a model of open-minded philosophical dialogue.
Several people have offered detailed suggestions and comments on versions of the manuscript as a whole. Kirsten Jacobson's very insightful and helpful suggestions motivated and guided my attempts to clarify some key passages. I would also like to express my appreciation for the way in which her work effectively demonstrates the pertinence of Merleau-Ponty's analyses of embodiment and spatiality to a number of issues and debates in contemporary empirical research on child development, gender, mental health, and politics. I am grateful to Leonard Lawlor for his comments and encouragement as well as for his many excellent books and articles on Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, Derrida, and contemporary French philosophy. His work as an interpreter of the continental tradition and as a philosopher has made a deep impression on me, and I can only hope that this is reflected in the pages of this book. I am grateful to Kym Maclaren for her comments, questions, and suggestions on an earlier version of the manuscript as well as for her work as a phenomenologist and scholar of Merleau-Ponty. Her insights on expression, intersubjectivity, self-consciousness, and development have significantly informed my work on these issues. Thanks also to Jeff Mitscherling for his helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.
I would also like to thank Jay Lampert and Graeme Nicholson for their work as extraordinarily gifted teachers and philosophers, as well as for their friendship and encouragement. Lawrence E. Schmidt and Bernard Hammond are two mentors and long-time friends whose approaches to the vocation of teacher and scholar give powerful expression to their abiding concerns for justice and the Good. I am deeply grateful for both of them.
I want to gratefully acknowledge the support of my family, especially my sisters, Laura Ogden and Tracy Fleet.
I acknowledge the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Guelph, and the University of King's College in Halifax with gratitude for their support of my research. I would also like to thank Andrew Kenyon and Kelli Williams-LeRoux at SUNY Press for guiding the process of bringing this work to publication.
Lastly, I would like to thank Alexandra Morrison. I am grateful for the joy of her companionship, her support and assistance and, most especially, for a rich philosophical conversation whose various strands weave their way through our daily life together.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

TEXTS BY MERLEAU-PONTY EM “Eye and Mind.” Translated by Carleton Dallery. In PrP . ( L'Oeil et l'Esprit . Paris: Gallimard, 1964.) N Nature: Course Notes from the Collége de France . Translated by Robert Vallier. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003. ( La Nature: notes, cours du Collége de France . Établi et annoté par Dominique Séglard. Paris: Seuil, 1995.) PhP Phenomenology of Perception . Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. ( Phénoménologie de la perception . Paris: Gallimard, 1964.) PPOE In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays . Translated by John Wild and James M. Edie. Evanston, 1970. ( Éloge de la philosophie . Paris: Gallimard, 1953; and Résumés de cours, Collège de France 1952–1960 . Paris: Gallimard, 1968.) PrP The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics . J.M. Edie, editor. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964. PW The Prose of the World . Translated by John O'Neill. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973. ( Le prose du monde . Paris: Gallimard, 1969.) S Signs . Translated by Richard C. McCleary. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964. ( Signes . Paris: Gallimard, 1960.) SB The Structure of Behavior . Translated by Alden L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. ( La structure du comportement . Paris: Quadridge/Presses Universitaires de France, 1942.) SNS Sense and Non-sense . Translated by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964. ( Sens et non-sens , Paris: Nagel, 1948.) VI The Visible and the Invisible . Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968. ( Le visible et l'invisible . Paris: Gallimard, 1964.)
The citations used in this book refer first to the English translation, then to the French edition.
INTRODUCTION

In fact I cannot totally grasp all that I am. Thus the mind is not large enough to contain itself: but where can that part be which it does not contain? Is it outside itself and not within? How can it not contain itself?
—Augustine, Confessions
“ Who Comes After the Subject? ”: this title of a 1991 collection of essays edited by Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy reflects a certain anxiety felt by many contemporary thinkers concerning the status of the modern subject (in the ontological, epistemological, and ethico-political senses). The modern concept of the ‘subject,’ as it is developed, for example, in the philosophies of Descartes, Locke, and Kant, has informed liberal accounts of the self, of ethical and political autonomy and responsibility, of universal human rights. This concept, which, to be sure, is by no means univocal, is subjected to a radical questioning in the twentieth century. This interrogation has occurred, perhaps most famously, in the context of so-called ‘continental’ thought (in which, for example, the modern metaphysics of subjectivity has been subjected to a ‘deconstructive’ appraisal), but arguably no less so in the ‘Anglo-American,’ or ‘analytic,’ tradition, as well as in the fields of cognitive neuroscience and psychology. In any case, it is not clear that the subjects of the cogito, of rational, voluntary, action, of political rights and freedoms, and of ethical normativity, have survive