Terrorist Groups: Ideologies, Methods, Failing States and Rising ...

Kevin Motes

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Terrorist Groups: Ideologies, Methods, Failing States and Rising ...

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• Publié par: ycyzadom
• Nombre de lectures: 92
• Langue: English

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—TERRORIST GROUSP :DIOEOLIGSE ,THMES,ODAI FNGLI ATS    SET dnaISIRNTI-NG AERN WESTMINEESTN—T   

  AL QAEDA AFTER THE IRAQ CON   FLLiIbrCaTr.y of Congress. Audrey Kurth Cronin. 23 May 2003. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003. [Online Report]. SuDoc#LC 14.19/3: RS21529 At the heart of the analysis is the question of whether Al Qaeda can launch additional major attacks of strategic impact or whether the organization is now largely relegated to low level tactical attacks. In the wake of the Riyadh bombings, this report examines the debate about how to assess Al Qaedas strength and will explain the major points on which experts differ, as well as the assumptions underlying their arguments. Online http://www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/iraq_alq.pdf (PDF)

  AL-QAEDA AND THE GLOBAL REACH OF TER   RU.OS.RCIoSnMgr.ess. House. Committee on International Relations. 107 th Congress, 1 st Session, 3 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 71p. [Hearing]. SuDoc#Y 4. IN 8/16: T 27/5 The extent of the al-Qaeda network and U.S. objectives with respect to Osama Bin Laden and other members of the al-Qaeda leadership. Weighs the narrow objective of retribution against al-Qaeda solely to the broader objective of forcefully discouraging state-sponsored or aided terrorism. Online http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42949 (PDF) http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/75562.pdf (PDF)

  AL QAEDA AND THE INTERNET: THE DANGER OF “CYBERP   LUA.SN.NING.” DepartmentofDefense.TimothyL.Thomas.Parameters:USArmyWarColy.Quarteregel Vol. 33, No. 1. Spring, 2003. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p. 112-123. [Article]. SuDoc#D 101.72: 33/1

Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that al Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages via the Internet. As recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda cells operating in America reportedly were using Internet-based phone services to communicate with cells overseas. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a cyberplanning tool for terrorists. It provides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options. Cyberplanning may be a more important terrorist Internet tool than the much touted and feared cyberterrorism optionattacks against information and systems resulting in violence against noncombatant targets.  Online http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/thomas.htm http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/thomas.pdf (PDF)

  ARE WE LISTENING TO THE ARAB ST   UR.ES.ECTo?ngress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 156p. [Hearing]. SuDoc#Y 4. G 74/7: AR 1 On September 11, many Americans got their first glimpse of the hostility and resentment harbored by some against our people and our culture. Others have known for decades that a toxic antipathy often dominates the so-called Arab Street of Middle East public disclosure. Left unrebutted, anti-American invective invites others to translate animus into deadly action. So the war on terrorism must also be fought with words  Over the past year, the State Department has increased the reach and frequency of both broadcast and Internet information on U.S. policy against terrorism. The new, more aggressive approach seeks to counter anti-American content polluting the global news cycle  But there are those who believe we came too late to the battle for Arab hearts and minds and continue to lose ground to apparent unsophisticated opponents hiding in caves. Like the stereotypical ugly American tourist, critics claim we have only upped the volume, shouting the same culturally tone-deaf slogans at an audience that neither understands the language of Western thinking nor trusts the source of the message. Online  http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS39591 (PDF)

  THE ATTACKS OF 9/11: EVIDENCE OF A CLASH OF R   EUL.ISG.IDOepNarSt?ment of Defense.DavidG.Kibble.Parameters:USArmyWarCollr.yarteeQueg   Vol. 32, No. 3,

Autumn 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p. 34-45. [Article]. SuDoc#D 101.72: 32/3 This article aims to unravel some of the religious background to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon  It looks too at the religious background to events that have followed on from those attacks. Much of the latter part of the article will be devoted to examining any perceived clash from the Muslim point of view in an attempt to generate a better understanding of how at least some Muslims view the West in general and America in particular. It will look, again from the Muslim point of view, at how any perception of a clash might be either ameliorated or neutralized. Online http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/kibble.htm http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/kibble.pdf (PDF)

  BACKGROUNDER: TERRO   RFIeSdeMr.al Emergency Management Agency. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2001. 2p. [Report].   SuDoc#FEM 1.2: T 27/2 General information concerning international, domestic, biological and chemical terrorism. Past terrorist acts in the United States. Definition of terrorism. Effects of terrorism.

Online http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS14923 http://www.fema.gov/library/terrbk.pdf (PDF)

  CAUSES OF ISLAMIC EXTRE   MU.ISS. IMn.,.4No,neJuctaWeca8.loV.hofPute.Peeacetsti 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002. p.1. [Article]. SuDoc#Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.8/NO.4 What are the factors that give rise to political violence in Pakistan, Egypt, and the occupied Palestinian territories? How do jihadi (holy war) groups in Indonesia and Pakistan use Islam to mobilize support? What strategies have the militant groups Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad employed to attract, retain, and deploy recruits in the West Bank, Gaza, Egypt, and Lebanon, and what motivates their behavior? Online http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2002/6/index.html