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Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games

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24 pages
Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games Bruno Blanchet and David Pointcheval CNRS, Departement d'Informatique, Ecole Normale Superieure March 2008 Bruno Blanchet, David Pointcheval Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games

  • computational assumptions

  • message authentication

  • security protocols

  • cryptographic protocols

  • property can

  • automated security

  • scheme

  • signature

  • produced proofs

  • hash


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Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games
March 2008
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Bruno Blanchet and David Pointcheval CNRS,De´partementdInformatique, ´ EcoleNormaleSupe´rieure
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There are two main frameworks for analyzing security protocols: The Dolev-Yao model : a formal, abstract model. The cryptographic primitives are ideal blackboxes . The adversary uses only those primitives. Proofs can be done automatically. The computational model : a realistic model. The cryptographic primitives are functions on bit-strings. The adversary is a polynomial-time Turing machine. Proofs are done manually. Our goal: achieve automatic provability under the realistic computational assumptions.
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