Introduction Assumptions On Shoup's lemma The proof Conclusion

Bruno Blanchet

Description

Introduction Assumptions On Shoup's lemma The proof Conclusion Automatically Verified Mechanized Proof of One-Encryption Key Exchange Bruno Blanchet INRIA, Ecole Normale Superieure, CNRS, Paris March 2012 Bruno Blanchet (INRIA, ENS, CNRS) OEKE in CryptoVerif March 2012 1 / 23

• automatically verified


• property obvious


• encrypted key


• ?? pn


• cryptoverif


• sku ?


• exchange


• ecole normale

Sujets

• Blanchet
• Exchange
• École normale

Informations

• Publié par: pefav
• Nombre de lectures: 4
• Langue: English

Extrait

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Automatically Verified Mechanized Proof of One-Encryption Key Exchange

23

March 2012

´ INRIA,EcoleNormaleSup´erieure,CNRS,Paris

Bruno Blanchet [e-mail]

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Motivation

OEKE (One-Encryption Key Exchange)[Bresson, Chevassut, Pointcheval, CCS’03]: Variant of EKE (Encrypted Key Exchange) A password-based key exchange protocol. A non-trivial protocol. It took some time before getting a computational proof of this protocol. Our goal: Mechanize, and automate as far as possible, its proof using the automatic computational protocol verifierCryptoVerif. This is an opportunity forseveral interesting extensionsof CryptoVerif.

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