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Publié par | profil-zyak-2012 |
Nombre de lectures | 47 |
Langue | English |
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INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ETUDES ECONOMIQUES
Série des Documents de Travail du CREST
(Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique)
n° 2007-25
The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy
*Auction with Final Discounts
1L. LAMY
Les documents de travail ne reflètent pas la position de l'INSEE et n'engagent que
leurs auteurs.
Working papers do not reflect the position of INSEE but only the views of the authors.
* I am grateful above all to my Ph. D. advisor Philippe Jehiel for his continuous support. I would like to thank
seminar participants in Paris-PSE and Vienna ESEM 2006 Conference. All errors are mine.
1 Laboratoire d’Economie Industrielle, CREST-INSEE, 28 Rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 PARIS, France.
laurent.lamy@ensae.fr ∗
†
∗
†
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