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EssaysinIndustrialOrganization

andBehavioralEconomics

Inaugural-Dissertation
zurErlangungdesGradeseinesDoktors
derWirtschafts-undGesellschaftswissenschaften
durchdie
Rechts-undStaatswissenschaftlicheFakulta¨t
derRheinischenFriedrich-Wilhelms-Universita¨t
nnoB

vorgelegtvon
FabianHerweg
ausKo¨ln

Bonn2009

II

Dekan:
Erstreferent:
Zweitreferent:

DissertationofFabianHerweg

Prof.Dr.ChristianHillgruber
Prof.PaulHeidhues,Ph.D.
Prof.Dr.UrsSchweizer

Tagdermu¨ndlichenPru¨fung:04.11.2009

DieseDissertationistaufdemHochschulschriftenserverderULBBonn
(http://hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de/dissonline)elektronischpubliziert.

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Dissertation

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Fabian

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Acknowledgements

InpreparingthisthesisIreceivedsupportfrommanypeopletowhomIamgrateful.
Firstandforemost,IwanttothankPaulHeidhueswhohasbeenagreatsupervisor.
Heprovidedverydetailedandconstructivecommentstoallfourchaptersofmythesis.
Secondly,IwanttothankUrsSchweizerforactingasarefereeonmythesiscommittee
andformanyhelpfulcomments.
Moreover,IamparticularlygratefultoDanielMu¨ller.Hehasnotonlybeena
goodfriend,ourjointresearchhasbeenafruitful,usuallyfun,andinspiringactivity.
ChaptersIandIIofthisthesisareachievementsofthiscooperation.Besidesourjoint
projects,thediscussionswithandthecommentsmadebyDanielalsoimprovedthe
qualityoftheremainingchapters.
ThecountlessdiscussionswithPhilippWeinschenk,whoalsocontributedtoChapter
I,aboutthecorrectintuitionsforour/myndingssignicantlyimprovedtheillustration
ofthemainresultsofthisthesis.
IamgratefultoJo¨rgBuddewhotaughtmealotaboutthetheoryofincentives.The
insightsobtainedinthisinteractionfacilitatedmeexploringtheeconomicsofcontract
designundermoralhazard,whichisthetopicofChapterI.
ChapterIIIbenetedalotfromcommentsandsuggestionsmadebyHeidrunC.
Hoppe.ShehasbeenextremelysupportivebeforemovingtoHanover.
TheBonnGraduateSchoolofEconomics(BGSE)providednotonlynancialsup-
portbutalso,andmoreimportantly,astimulatingenvironmentwithmanyyoung
researchers.Iwouldliketothankallpeoplewhohavecontributedtothisorganization,
especiallyUrsSchweizer.Moreover,IamindebtedtoBennyMoldovanuformotivating
metoapplyfortheBGSE.
TheBGSEtopicscoursesimprovedmyunderstandingofseveraleldsofeconomics
andprovidedusefulhintsformyownresearch.Therefore,Iamgratefultothelecturers
ofthecoursesIattended:GeorgNo¨ldeke,BennyMoldovanu,PaulHeidhues,Jo¨rg
Budde,AnjaScho¨ttner,andMatthiasKra¨kel.
Ihavebenetedfromdiscussionswithandcommentsmadebymyocemates:
KonradMierendor,J.MarceloCadena,andSebastianKranz.Moreover,Iowethanks
toBotondKo}szegi,DanielKra¨mer,ChristinaMatzke,NoraSzech,ThomasRieck,

VI

DissertationofFabianHerweg

AndreasRoider,PhilippWichardt,andmanyotherpeople.

Finally,IowemuchtoKerstin,myfamilyandfriends,without

havegonesofar,andwho

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Contents

I.TheOptimalityofSimpleContracts:MoralHazardandLossAversion9
1.Introduction.................................10
2.TheModel..................................16
3.TheAnalysis................................19
3.1.TwoPolarCases:PureRiskAversionvs.PureLossAversion.24
3.2.TheGeneralCase:LossAversionandRiskAversion......29
4.ImplementationProblems,TurningaBlindEye,andStochasticContracts34
4.1.TheCaseofaBinaryMeasureofPerformance..........34
4.2.InvalidityoftheFirst-OrderApproach..............35
4.3.TurningaBlindEye........................36
4.4.BlackwellRevisited.........................38
5.Robustness,Extensions,andConcludingRemarks............39

II.PerformanceofProcrastinators:OntheValueofDeadlines43
1.Introduction.................................44
2.TheModel..................................47
3.TheAnalysis................................49
4.ComparisonoftheNaiveandtheSophisticatedAgent..........52
5.Deadlines..................................56
6.Conclusion..................................62

III.RelaxingCompetitionThroughQualityandTariDierentiation65
1.Introduction.................................66
2.DescriptionoftheModel..........................68
2.1.LinearPricing............................70
3.Two-partTariCompetition........................71
3.1.PreliminaryRemarksontheQualityGame...........71
3.2.TheTariGame..........................72
3.3.CharacterizationoftheEquilibria.................75
4.Two-PartTariCompetitionversusLinearPricing...........77

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DissertationofFabianHerweg

5.MotivationoftheUtilityFunction:ApplicationstoVerticalRelations.78
6.ConcludingRemarks............................80

IV.UncertainDemand,ConsumerLossAversion,andFlat-RateTaris81
1.Introduction.................................82
2.TheModel..................................86
3.TheDemandFunction...........................90
4.Firm’sSubproblem:JointSurplusMaximization.............97
5.CompetitiveEquilibrium..........................101
6.ConcludingRemarks............................105

A.Appendices107
1.AppendixtoChapterI...........................107
1.1.ProofsofPropositionsandLemmas................107
1.2.ValidityoftheFirst-OrderApproach...............119
2.AppendixtoChapterII..........................122
2.1.ProofofPropositionsandLemmas................122
2.2.PartialNaivete´...........................134
3.AppendixtoChapterIII..........................137
3.1.ProofsofPropositionsandLemmas................137
3.2.ExaminationoftheSecond-OrderNecessaryConditions.....145
4.AppendixtoChapterIV..........................147
4.1.ProofsofPropositionsandLemmas................147
4.2.ExamplesofDiscreteChoiceModels...............160

ListofFigures

I.1.a<0..............................
0I.2.a>0..............................
0

III.1.Optimalchoicesfordierentconsumertypes.........

IV.1.PersonalEquilibriumwithBunching............
IV.2.JointSurplusfor=3....................
IV.3.JointSurplusfor=1,1.5,2,3,5...............

A.1.Solutionoftheequilibriummarginalconsumer.

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Dissertation

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Introduction

Theanalysisofcontractualarrangementsbetweentwoormorepartieshasalong
traditionineconomics,sincethe“game-theoretic”revolution.Questionsamongthis
lineare:Inwhichwayshouldthewageofanemployeedependonhisownortherm’s
performance?1Whatistheoptimalsellingcontractforagivengoodorservice?2
Forinstance,atelecommunicationserviceprovidemayaskhowshouldtheinvoiceofa
customervarywithhisconsumptionpatternswithinamonth?Thisdissertationaims
atcontributingtothestrandsoftheoreticalliteratureineconomicsinvestigatingthe
abovementionedquestions.
Nexttotheorthodoxtheoriesoncontractdesignandoptimalsellingstrategies,there
isarecentandgrowingliteratureinvestigatinghowrationalrmsrespondtoconsumer
oremployeebiases.Duringthelastdecadetheeldofeconomicsthatmodi

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