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Essays on accounting disclosure and the use of stock price in incentive contracts [Elektronische Ressource] / Mirko S. Heinle

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125 pages
Mirko S. HeinleESSAYS ONACCOUNTING DISCLOSURE AND THE USE OF STOCK PRICE IN INCENTIVE CONTRACTSMirko S. HeinleESSAYS ONACCOUNTING DISCLOSURE AND THE USE OF STOCK PRICE IN INCENTIVE CONTRACTSInauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität MannheimIDekan: Prof. Dr. Hans H. BauerReferent: Prof. Dr. Christian HofmannKorreferent: Prof. Dr. Dirk SimonsTag der muendlichen Pruefung: 28. Oktober 2009TABLE OF CONTENTSTable of Contents IIList of Figures IIIList of Tables IVAcknowledgments VIntroduction 1Essay 1: Soft Information and the Stewardship Value of Accounting Disclosure 7Essay 2: Transient Institutional Investors, Incentives,and Disclosure 48Essay 3: The Use of Price and Accounting Informationin Compensation Contracts 79Conclusion 107CV 111IILIST OF FIGURESFigure 1.1: Value of a Publicly Reported Contractible PerformanceMeasure y Given the Disclosure of Two Non-contractiblec Performance Measures Under η 372Figure 2.1: Timeline 54Figure 2.2: Value of Disclosing Report y andReport’s Sensitivity to the Agent’s Action 70Figure 2.3:y and Productivity 71IIILIST OF TABLESTable 1.1: Disclosure of a Single Performance Measure 21Table 1.2: Two-task Agency Conflict 28Table 1.3: Market Price and Price Sensitivity Under η and η 301 2Table 1.4: Agency Conflict with Price and one Contractible Measure 35Table 3.
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Mirko S. Heinle
ESSAYS ON
ACCOUNTING DISCLOSURE
AND THE USE OF STOCK PRICE
IN INCENTIVE CONTRACTSMirko S. Heinle
ESSAYS ON
ACCOUNTING DISCLOSURE
AND THE USE OF STOCK PRICE
IN INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universität Mannheim
IDekan: Prof. Dr. Hans H. Bauer
Referent: Prof. Dr. Christian Hofmann
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Dirk Simons
Tag der muendlichen Pruefung: 28. Oktober 2009TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents II
List of Figures III
List of Tables IV
Acknowledgments V
Introduction 1
Essay 1: Soft Information and the Stewardship Value
of Accounting Disclosure 7
Essay 2: Transient Institutional Investors, Incentives,
and Disclosure 48
Essay 3: The Use of Price and Accounting Information
in Compensation Contracts 79
Conclusion 107
CV 111
IILIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Value of a Publicly Reported Contractible Performance
Measure y Given the Disclosure of Two Non-contractiblec
Performance Measures Under η 372
Figure 2.1: Timeline 54
Figure 2.2: Value of Disclosing Report y and
Report’s Sensitivity to the Agent’s Action 70
Figure 2.3:y and Productivity 71
IIILIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1: Disclosure of a Single Performance Measure 21
Table 1.2: Two-task Agency Conflict 28
Table 1.3: Market Price and Price Sensitivity Under η and η 301 2
Table 1.4: Agency Conflict with Price and one Contractible Measure 35
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Price and Incentive Weights under η 891
Table 3.2: Reports and Incentive Weights under η 932
Table 3.3: Incentive Weights under η 983
IV