Power, competition and voting [Elektronische Ressource] : an experimental enquiry / Arne Robert Weiß

Arne Robert Weiß

Informations

• Publié par: universitat_erfurt
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 21
• Langue: Deutsch
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 9 Mo

Extrait

Power, Competition and Voting –
an Experimental Enquiry



Arne Robert Weiß



Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
(Dr. rer. pol) der
Universität Erfurt
Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät
2009

Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Bettina Rockenbach
Prof. Dr. Manfred Königstein
Datum der Disputation: 17.12.2009
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Manfred Königstein
urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201000028
2 Zusammenfassung
Macht spielt eine zentrale Rolle in Interaktionen mit Interessenkonflikten. Diese Arbeit
studiert experimentell die distributiven und allokativen Konsequenzen verschiedener
Machtbasen in wiederholten Spielen und untersucht darauffolgend die Bedeutung von
Prozeduren, durch die Macht zugeteilt wird. Im Besonderen werden die Verhaltenseffekte
von Wahlprozeduren und ihre Interaktion mit Wettbewerb in Situationen von
konfligierenden Interessen analysiert. Diejenigen, die durch die Machtverteilung bevorteilt
sind, entweder durch kompetitive, strategische oder allokative Macht, verdienen im
Durchschnitt mehr als ihre Gegenparte. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse zeigen zudem, dass
die Machtvergabeprozedur eine Rolle spielt. Die bloße Präsenz einer Wahlprozedur kann für
eine weniger selbstorientierte Machtausübung sorgen. Dieser Befund ist jedoch abhängig
vom Kontext, in den die Wahl eingebettet ist. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse deutet hierbei
darauf hin, dass Versprechen, als Basis für Wahlentscheidungen, eine entscheidende Rolle
dafür spielen, ob eine Wahl zu weniger oder zu möglicherweise sogar mehr
selbstorientierter Machtausübung führt.
Macht
Wahlen
Wettbewerb
Experiment
3 Abstract
Power plays a central role in interactions with conflicting interests. This thesis provides a
behavioural study of the distributive and allocative consequences of different power bases in
a repeated play framework and subsequently investigates the role of procedures through
which power is granted; in particular, we analyse the behavioural effects of voting and its
interaction with competition in situations of conflicting interests. Those who are favoured by
the power distribution, either with competitive and strategic power or with allocative power,
earn on average more than their counterparts. The experimental results also provide
evidence that the procedure matters through which power is granted. The mere procedure
of voting can lead to a less self-oriented exercise of power. However, this finding is
dependent on the context in which the election is embedded. In particular, the experimental
results suggest that promises, as a basis for voting decisions, play a crucial role in
determining whether voting leads to a less or, possibly, even to a more self-oriented exercise
of power.
Power
Voting
Competition
Experiment
4 Acknowledgements
First of all, I am greatly indebted to my advisor, Bettina Rockenbach, for her continuous
support and for the provision of an inspiring working atmosphere. I would like also thank my
co-authors Geng Hong and Gari Walkowitz for their support and for many productive
discussions. I also thank Stephan Tontrup for his support in the initial phase of designing the
experiments in chapter 3 and 4 and Mu Tao for programming the experiments in chapters 2
and 3. I thank Geng Hong for also running the experiments in chapters 2 and 3 and
translating the respective instructions; Fu Hao and Cheng Peng for running the treatments
VOT-P and RAN-P in chapter 4 and Mareike Hoffmann for running the German sessions in
chapter 4. I would also like to thank Urs Fischbacher for providing us with the z-tree program
of Brown, Falk, Fehr (2004), which we adjusted for the experiment in chapter 1.
Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to Irenaeus Wolff for his continuous
support, to Dennis Dittrich, Fabian Kleine and Manfred Königstein for their advice on
econometric modeling and to Özgür Gürerk for always being willing to help and give advice. I
also thank my colleagues at the University of Erfurt, the University of Bonn and beyond for
their valuable comments and help: Gerhard Wegner, Reinhard Selten, Heike Hennig-Schmidt,
Frank Renkewitz, Ringa Raudla, Christiane Pilz, Michel André Marechál, Moritz Mannschreck,
Thomas Lauer, Johannes Kaiser, Mareike Hoffmann, Lars Herrmann, Stefan Große, Sebastian
Georg, Simon Gächter, Kai Ebenrett and Matthias Altmann as well to CEREB and its members
for providing a stimulating, interdisciplinary working environment.
I also thank participants at respective sessions of the ESA-conference 2008 in Lyon, the
GfeW-meeting 2008 in Mannheim as well as workshops and colloquiums in Bonn, Cologne,
Zurich and, of course, Erfurt.
I am also indebted, not literally though, to the financial support by the Stiftung der
Deutschen Wirtschaft and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (research projects RO
3071/1-2 and HE 2790/2) as well as to funding by the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental
Economics. Financial support is also gratefully acknowledged by the Southwest-Jiaotong
University in Chengdu, China.
5 At last, I am very grateful to Severine Bebek as well as to Hans-Jürgen Weiß, Elisabeth Weiß
and my extended family for their long-lasting support.
6
Content
Zusammenfassung .......................................................................................................... 3
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 4
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... 5
Overview ...................................................................................................................... 13
1 When power meets relations – competitive and strategic power in incomplete
contracts markets
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 19
1.2 Experimental design .. 23
1.2.1 Treatments ......................................................................................................... 23
1.2.2 Trading environment .......................................................................................... 25
1.2.3 Payoffs ................................................ 25
1.3 Hypotheses ................................................................................ 26
1.3.1 Game-theoretic solution based on common knowledge of rationality ............. 26
1.3.1.1 Money-maximising predictions for strategic power................................... 27
1.3.1.2 Money-maximising predictions for competitive power ............................. 27
1.3.2 Behavioural hypotheses ..................................................................................... 28
1.3.2.1 Hypotheses for strategic power .................................. 30
1.3.2.2 Hypotheses for competitive power ............................................................ 32
1.3.2.3 Hypotheses for the interaction between strategic and competitive power ..
..................................................................................................................... 33
1.3.2.4 Hypothesis for the interaction of strategic power and competitive power
with relational contracting ........................................................................................... 34
1.4 Experimental implementation ................... 34
1.4.1 Specification ....................................................................................................... 34
7 1.4.2 Procedure ........................................................................................................... 35
1.5 Results of the German sessions ................. 35
1.5.1 The role of strategic power ................................................................................ 36
1.5.2 The role of competitive power ........... 41
1.5.3 The interaction between competitive and strategic power .............................. 43
1.6 The role of relational contracting .............................................................................. 46
1.6.1 Treatment differences are mainly driven by trades outside relations .............. 46
1.6.2 Are the treatment effects dependent on the subjects´ reliance on relational
contracting? ...................................................................................................................... 48
1.7 Cross-cultural hypotheses ......................... 49
1.8 Results of the Chinese sessions ................................................................................. 51
1.8.1 Relational contracting ........................ 51
1.8.2 Cooperation and efficiency ................................................................................ 52
1.8.3 When relations meet strategic power ............................................................... 52
1.8.4 When relations meet competitive power .......................... 57
1.8.5 Relational contracting and the interaction between strategic and competitive
power ............................