Regional level of conflict dynamics in the South Caucasus [Elektronische Ressource] : Russia's policies towards the ethno-territorial conflicts (1991-2008) / vorgelegt von Kavus Abushov

Kavus

Informations

• Publié par: westfalische_wilhelms-universitat_munster
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2010
• Nombre de lectures: 6
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

Politikwissenschaft



Regional level of conflict dynamics in the South Caucasus:
Russia’s policies towards the ethno-territorial conflicts
(1991-2008)

Inaugaral-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der
Philosophischen Fakultät
der
Westfälischen Wilhems-Univeristät
zu Münster

vorgelegt von
Kavus Abushov
aus Baku, Aserbaidschan



2010
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 20. August 2010

Dekan: Prof. Dr. Christian Pietsch

Referent: Prof. Dr. Susanne Feske

Korreferent: Prof. Dr. S. Neil MacFarlane






























2Table of contents

List of tables 8
List of maps 8
List of figures 8
Acknowledgements 9
Introduction 11
Methodology and sources 13
Case selection 15
Delimitation of the research 16
Level of analysis 16
Methodological challenges 17
Structure of the thesis
Chapter 1 Discourse in international relations: realism, regional security complex theory
and hegemony 19
1.1 Legacy of geopolitics
1.1.1. Geopolitics in Russia’s approach to the South Caucasus 22
1.2. Realist account of Russia’s policies 24
1.2.1. Clasical realism 24
1.2.2. Structral ealism 28
a) Staism 30
b) Self-help 31
c) Mature anarchy 35
d) Balancing and alliances 35
1.2.3. Offensive realism 38
1.2.4. Neo-classical realism 40
1.2.5. Realist account of Russia’s policies towards the conflicts in the South Caucasus 44
a) compatibility with realism 44
b) Rationality 47
c) Balancing 48
d) Relative versus relevant 50
e) Offensive realism 52
f) Role of perceptions in Russia’s behaviour: neo-classical realism 52
1.3 Regional security complex theory 54
31.3.1. Components of regional security complexes 56
1.3.2. Types of regional security complexes 57
1.3.3. Great power engagement in a security complex and overlay 58
1.3.4. The Caucasus as a regional security complex 60
1.4. Nature of Russia’s hegemony 64

Chapter 2 Ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus after the collapse of the
Soviet Union: causes and consequences of conflict spiral 67
2.1. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 67
2.1.1. Causes of the conflict 68
a) Role of perceptions 70
b) Demographic situation 72
c) Abkhazia’s status prior to the conflict 73
d) Abkhaz grievances 74
2.1.2. Escalation of the conflict and success of secessionism 76
a) War of laws 78
b) The Georgian-Abkhaz war 79
2.1.3. The peace process 84
a) UN Commitment 84
b) Return of IDPs 85
c) Status of Abkhazia 86
2.1.4. Crises of 1998, 2001 and 2006 87
2.1.5. Challenges to reconciliation 90
a) Societal challenges 90
2.2. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict 93
2.2.1. The Georgian and South Ossetian national movements 94
2.2.2. Role of historic narratives 96
2.2.3. Escalation of the conflict in 1989 97
2.2.4. Georgian-Ossetian war 99
2.2.5. 2004 crisis and follow up 103
2.2.6. The peace process 105
2.2.7. Provisional Administration of South Ossetia 109
2.3. The Mountainous Karabakh conflict 109
2.3.1. Background factors and roots of the conflict 110
4a) Role of history: brief history of the region 110
b) Socio-economic order in Mountainous Karabakh: Alleged discrimination
c) Causes of the conflict 116
2.3.2. Escalation of the conflict 119
a) War of laws 122
b) War 124
c) Definition of the conflict parties 126
2.3.3. The peace process and challenges 128
a) OSCE mediation efforts 128
b) Land swap 131
c) Mountainous Karabakh’s and Armenia’s position 132
d) Azerbaijan’s position 134
e) Identity related challenges to the process 135
2.3.4. De-facto ‘statehood’ in Mountainous Krabakh 140
Concluding remarks 141

Chapter 3 Russia’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus since 1991 144
3.1. Evolution of Russian foreign policy after 1991 144
3.2. Russian identity crisis and formation of Russian foreign policy 145
3.2.1. End of romanticism: Russia’s return to geopolitics and neo-imperialism 149
3.2.2. Implications for the South Caucasus 153
3.2.3. Foreign policy concepts 154
3.2.4. Russia’s great power status 158
3.2.5. NATO Enlargement 162
3.2.6. Russian-US détente after 9/11 166
3.2.7. Spheres of interest 168
3.3. Russia’s regional interests in the South Caucasus
3.3.1. Security interests 169
a) Interconnection of threats in the Caucasus 169
b) Spill-over effect 172
c) Controlled instability
5.2.3. Broader Geopolitical interests 174
a) Political and military presence 175
b) Military bases 176
5c) Peacekeeping forces 177
d) Resistance to US presence 178
e) Erosion of values and Russia’s soft power 180
Concluding remarks 181

Chapter 4 Russia’s policies towards the ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus
4.1 Russia’s engagement in the South Caucasus in the post-communist period 183
4.1.1. Policy incoherence 184
4.1.2. Shortage of resources 184
4.2. Russia’s policies towards the ethno-territorial conflicts in Georgia 188
4.2. Russia’s policies towards the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 189
4.2.1. Policies during President Yeltsin’s term in office 190
a) Initial reaction 190
b) Russia’s incentives for assistance to the Abkhaz side 193
c) Scale of Russia’s assistance to the Abkhaz side and its incentives 195
d) cease-fire 196
c) Civil war in Georgia and acquiesce to CIS membership 197
4.2.2. Policies during President Putin’s term in office 201
a) Naturalisation of residents 202
b) Alleged support to the de facto authorities 203
c) Active engagement 204
d) Attachment to the peace process 205
e) Involvement in the domestic affairs of the region 207
4.3. Russia’s policies towards the Georgian-Ossetian conflict 209
4.3.1. Deterioration of relations in light of Georgia’s reintegration attempts 211
a) Alleged impartiality 213
b) Roki tunnel 214
c) Calls for Russia’s recognition of the region’s independence 214
d) (In) Capacity to resolve the conflict 214
4.3.3. South Ossetia crisis and Russia’s recognition of both regions’ independence 215
a) Background 215
b) Outbreak of fighting in South Ossetia 216
c) Russia’s response 217
d) Cease fire 218
6e) Motivation of Russian behaviour