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Securing the supply chain: does the container security initiative comply with WTO law? [Elektronische Ressource] / vorgelegt von: Christopher Dallimore

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387 pages
Securing the Supply Chain: Does the Container Security Initiative Comply with WTO Law? INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Rechte durch die Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster Vorgelegt von Christopher Dallimore Aus Wells, Somerset, Großbritannien 2008 Erster Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Hans-Michael Wolffgang, Institut für Zoll- und Verbrauchsteuerrecht, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Deutschland Zweiter Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. David Widdowson, Centre for Customs and Excise, University of Canberra, Australien Dekan: Prof. Dr. Hans-Dietrich Steinmeyer Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 11. November 2008 Foreword This study was accepted as a dissertation by the Law Faculty of the Wilhelminian University of Münster in Westphalia during the winter semester of 2008. I would like to thank Professor Dr. Hans-Michael Wolffgang for his supervision and support during the writing of the study and Professor Dr. David Widdowson of the Centre for Customs and Excise of Canberra University, Australia for producing the second opinion. I dedicate this work to my parents and brother, in recognition of their encouragement and support. Münster im November, 2008 Christopher Dallimore EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...
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Securing the Supply Chain: Does the
Container Security Initiative Comply with
WTO Law?


















INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION

Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Rechte durch die
Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster




Vorgelegt von Christopher Dallimore

Aus Wells, Somerset, Großbritannien

2008






























Erster Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Hans-Michael Wolffgang, Institut für
Zoll- und Verbrauchsteuerrecht, Westfälische
Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Deutschland

Zweiter Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. David Widdowson, Centre for
Customs and Excise, University of Canberra,
Australien

Dekan: Prof. Dr. Hans-Dietrich Steinmeyer
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 11. November 2008


Foreword

This study was accepted as a dissertation by the Law Faculty of the Wilhelminian University of
Münster in Westphalia during the winter semester of 2008.

I would like to thank Professor Dr. Hans-Michael Wolffgang for his supervision and support
during the writing of the study and Professor Dr. David Widdowson of the Centre for Customs
and Excise of Canberra University, Australia for producing the second opinion.

I dedicate this work to my parents and brother, in recognition of their encouragement and
support.



Münster im November, 2008 Christopher Dallimore



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 5
THESIS AND METHOD OF INVESTIGATION................................................................ 9
A. MARITIME SECURITY MEASURES FOLLOWING 9/11................................... 12
1. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES.................................................................................. 13
1.1. Unilateral Security Measures .......................................................................... 13
1.2. Bilateral Agreements ....................................................................................... 16
1.3. Multilateral Framework .................................................................................. 17
1.4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches .. 20
2. SECURITY MEASURES AT NATIONAL LEVEL .............................................................. 23
2.1. The Maritime Transportation Security Policy of the United States ................. 23
2.1.1 The Container Security Initiative..................................................................................28
2.1.2. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism....................................................29
2.1.3. The Secure Freight Initiative.........................................................................................30
2.1.4. The Megaport Initiative.................................................................................................32
2.1.5. Operation Safe Commerce ............................................................................................32
2.1.6. The Proliferation Security Initiative.............................................................................33
2.1.7. The Smart Box Initiative ...............................................................................................34
2.2. Legislative Instruments Relating to the CSI..................................................... 34
2.2.1. Homeland Security Act 2002........................................................................................35
2.2.2. US PATRIOT Act 2002 ................................................................................................36
2.2.3. The Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002.........................................................37
2.2.4. The Trade Act 2002.......................................................................................................38
2.2.5. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 2006.........................................39
2.2.6. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 2007 .......................41
3. SECURITY MEASURES AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL ..................................................... 42
3.1. International Organizations............................................................................. 45
3.1.1 United Nations’ Resolutions .........................................................................................46
3.1.2. Co-operative G8 Action on Transport Security...........................................................47
3.1.3. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.....................................................48
3.1.4. The WCO Framework of Standards .............................................................................49
3.1.5. The SUA Convention 1988...........................................................................................51
3.1.6. Other Instruments Relevant to Maritime Security.......................................................53
3.2. The European Union........................................................................................ 56
4. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................. 57
B. THE CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE......................................................... 61
1. SUBSTANCE OF THE MEASURE ................................................................................... 61
1.1. Use of Terminology in the Container Security Initiative......................................... 65
1.2. Identification of High-Risk Containers ............................................................ 70
1.2.1. The 24 Hour Rule ..........................................................................................................71
1.2.2. Data Processing and Risk Assessment.........................................................................75
1.3. Pre-Screening Containers at the Port of Departure........................................ 77
1.3.1. The Declaration of Principles .......................................................................................80
1.3.2. Stationing of U.S. Customs Officers at Foreign Seaports...........................................85
1.4. Use of Technology to Scan High-Risk Containers........................................... 87
1.5. Use of Smarter, Tamper-Evident Containers................................................... 90
1.6. Benefits of CSI Participation ........................................................................... 92
2. ADMINISTRATION....................................................................................................... 93
2.1. The Department of Homeland Security........................................................................94
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2.2. The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security..............................................96
2.3. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Bureau (CBP)...................................................97
2.4. The National Targeting Centre (NTC).......................................................................103
2.5. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................103
3. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 104
C. COMPLIANCE WITH WTO LAW......................................................................... 112
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 112
1.1. Scope of Investigation.................................................................................... 114
1.2. Methodology .................................................................................................. 115
2. TRADE EFFECTS OF THE CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE ..................................... 115
2.1. Trade in Services ........................................................................................... 116
2.2. Trade in Goods .............................................................................................. 119
2.3. Parties Affected by the Container Security Initiative..................................... 121
2.4. Complaints by Private Parties ....................................................................... 123
2.5. Complaints by Member States ....................................................................... 127
3. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES ............................................... 128
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 128
3.2. Maritime Transportation Services under the GATS....................................... 129
3.3. The ‘Standstill Commitment’ ......................................................................... 131
3.4. Result ............................................................................................................. 135
4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GATS AND THE GATT ............................................. 135
5. COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE ............... 137
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 137
5.1.1. The Complainant..........................................................................................................139
5.1.2. Burden of Proof for General Measures ......................................................................141
5.1.3. Standard of Proof.........................................................................................................142
5.1.4. Right of the Panel to Seek Information......................................................................146
5.1.5. Rules of Interpretation for General Obligations ........................................................147
5.1.6. Role of Previous Decisions.........................................................................................149
5.2. Preamble to the Marrekech Agreement ......................................................... 149
5.2.1. Introduction..................................................................................................................149
5.2.2. Requirements ...............................................................................................................150
5.2.3. Examination .................................................................................................................151
5.2.4. Result............................................................................................................................155
5.3. Article I:1 GATT: Most Favoured Nation Treatment .................................... 155
5.3.1. Introduction..................................................................................................................155
5.3.2. Requirements ...............................................................................................................156
5.3.3. Examination .................................................................................................................160
5.3.4. Result............................................................................................................................165
5.4. Article XI GATT............................................................................................. 165
5.4.1. Introduction..................................................................................................................165
5.4.2. Requirements ...............................................................................................................166
5.4.3. Examination .................................................................................................................168
5.4.4. Result............................................................................................................................175
5.5. Article X: Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations.................. 176
5.5.1. Introduction..................................................................................................................176
5.5.2. Requirements ...............................................................................................................177
5.5.3. Examination .................................................................................................................182
5.5.4. Result............................................................................................................................186
5.6. Article V: Freedom of Transit........................................................................ 187
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5.6.1. Introduction..................................................................................................................187
5.6.2. Requirements ...............................................................................................................188
5.6.3. Examination .................................................................................................................192
5.6.4. Result............................................................................................................................196
5.7. Article VIII..................................................................................................... 197
5.7.1. Introduction..................................................................................................................197
5.7.2. Requirements ...............................................................................................................197
5.7.3. Examination .................................................................................................................200
5.7.4. Result............................................................................................................................207
6. TBT AGREEMENT 1994............................................................................................ 208
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 208
6.2 Requirements ................................................................................................. 209
6.3. Examination................................................................................................... 212
6.4. Result ............................................................................................................. 212
7. WTO AGREEMENT ON PRE-SHIPMENT INSPECTIONS ............................................... 213
7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 213
7.2. Requirements ................................................................................................. 213
7.3. Examination................................................................................................... 214
7.4. Result ............................................................................................................. 215
8. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 215
D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION......................................................... 220
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 220
1.1. Does the Panel have Jurisdiction over Article XXI?...................................... 223
1.2. Is Article XXI Justiciable? ............................................................................. 228
1.3. The General Rule – Exception Principle ....................................................... 231
1.3.1. Burden of Proof ...........................................................................................................232
1.3.2. The Narrow Interpretation...........................................................................................233
1.3.3. The Evolutionary Interpretation..................................................................................235
1.3.4. The Effet Utile Doctrine ..............................................................................................237
1.3.5. Does the General-Rule Exception Still Apply? .........................................................237
1.4. Standard of Review in Relation to Article XXI............................................... 238
1.5. Arguments against a Violation Complaint..................................................... 240
1.5.1 Dispute Would Not Be “Fruitful” Pursuant to Article 3.7 DSU...............................241
1.5.2. Political Question Doctrine (Non Liquet)...................................................................243
1.5.3. Judicial Activism .........................................................................................................246
1.6. Literature on Article XXI ............................................................................... 248
1.7. Intermediate Result........................................................................................ 255
2. THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE XXI..................................................................... 258
2.1. Article XXI(a)................................................................................................. 259
2.2. Situations Covered by Article XXI(b) (i) & (iii)............................................. 262
2.2.1. “War”............................................................................................................................262
2.2.2. Emergency in International Relations ........................................................................265
2.2.3. Fissionable Materials...................................................................................................266
2.3. Is the Security Interest “Essential”? ............................................................. 268
2.4. Extraterritoriality (Extrajurisdictionality)..................................................... 269
2.5. Is the Measure “Necessary”?........................................................................ 274
2.5.1. Is There a Risk to Essential Security Interests?.........................................................275
2.5.2. The Necessity Test in Article XX...............................................................................277
2.5.2.1. Necessity Test: Factors to be Considered .......................................................279
2.5.2.2. First Stage: Importance of Interests and Effectiveness ..................................281
2.5.2.3. Second Stage: Trade Restrictiveness...............................................................283
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2.5.3. Creating a Chapeau for Article XXI...........................................................................285
2.5.3.1. The Principle of Good Faith in WTO Law .....................................................286
2.5.3.2 The Reasonable Exercise of a Right................................................................288
2.6. Intermediate Result........................................................................................ 294
3. EXAMINATION.......................................................................................................... 296
3.1. Does the CSI Fall Within the Scope of Article XXI (b) (i)? ........................... 296
3.1.1. Does the CSI Relate to Fissionable Materials?..........................................................296
3.1.2. Does the War Against Terrorism Amount to a State of War? ..................................298
3.1.3. Does Maritime Terrorism Amount to an Emergency in International Relations?...301
3.1.4. Is there a Threat to U.S. Maritime Container Transport?..........................................304
3.2. Is the CSI Necessary to Protect US Essential Security Interests ? ................ 310
3.2.1. Does the CSI Protect Essential Security Interests? ...................................................311
3.2.2. Is the CSI Effective in Protecting US Essential Security Interests?.........................317
3.2.2.1. The 24 Hour Rule is Seriously Flawed ...........................................................317
3.2.2.2. The CSI Offers Inadequate Security Coverage...............................................318
3.2.2.3. Bilateral Agreements are Ineffective...............................................................319
3.2.2.4. Inspection Equipment at Seaports is Ineffective ............................................321
3.2.2.5. Improvements to the CSI by the SAFE Port Act 2006 ..................................322
3.3. Is the CSI the Least Trade Restrictive Measure Available?........................... 324
3.4. Has the United States Exercised its Right Reasonably? ................................ 328
4. FINAL RESULT: DOES THE CSI COMPLY WITH WTO LAW? ..................................... 334
ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................................. 336
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................ 343





iv

Executive Summary

Container Security has steadily increased in importance since 2001 and today is one of the most
controversial trade-related issues. This is because maritime transportation is the most efficient
and cost-effective method of transporting goods throughout the world (pp. 5 – 7). Today
approximately 90 percent of the world’s goods are moved by means of maritime containers. The
challenge of securing the supply chain against terrorist attacks is to strike an effective balance
trade facilitation and security (pp. 13, 63 – 64).

The aim of the investigation is to establish whether the Container Security Initiative achieves this
balance by examining whether it complies with the legal requirements contained in the
agreements of the World Trade Organization (pp. 9 – 11). The WTO is the most important trade
organization in the world and safeguards the interests of its members to participate in
international trade. All members are bound by the obligations arising under its agreements
according to the international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda (pp. 112 – 114).

The first part of the investigation provides an overview of the various measures protecting the
supply chain at national, international and supranational levels (pp. 23 – 57). It finds that the
conflicting approaches to supply chain security run the risk of burdening traders with a
proliferation of overlapping and incompatible security measures (pp. 57 – 60). The second
section then defines and ascertains the nature of the Container Security Initiative (pp. 61 – 93)
and describes its administration (93 – 104). It finds that the CSI is fundamentally unilateral in
nature insofar as it does not recognize the maritime security standards of other nations and
primarily aims to protect the borders of the United States rather than ensure international peace
and security (pp. 104 – 111).

The third section deals with the question whether the CSI complies with the WTO agreements
and to this end adopts a three-step approach (p. 115). First, the framework conditions are
examined including the procedures for raising a complaint, the burden of proof, standard of
review as well as relevant jurisprudence; second, the relevant agreements are examined and
1

infringements identified; finally, possible justifications for a breach of the relevant agreement(s)
are examined.

The final section of the dissertation concerns Article XXI of the GATT, the so-called “national
security exception” (p. 220). This provision constitutes a general exception to the obligations
under the GATT and justifies measures which infringe the general obligations of the agreement.
In other words, the CSI would comply with WTO if it is justifiable on the basis of this provision.
However, the fact that there has never been a decision of the GATT or WTO concerning the
interpretation of this provision, its subjective and objective wording as well as the great political
sensitivity which surrounds the issue of national security means that this question cannot be
easily answered – as shown by the very different views expressed in the literature on this
provision (pp. 248 – 255).

The examination of Article XXI therefore adopts a modified version of the structure used by the
Panels and Appellate Body in relation to Article XX (pp. 296 – 333):

1) Preliminary investigation: Does the measure fall within the scope of Article XXI(b) (i) –
(iii)?
2) Necessity of the measure: a) is the measure “necessary” to protect “its essential security
interests? b) is the measure effective? and c) is the measure the least trade restrictive
measure available?
3) Has the United States exercised its right to invoke Article XXI reasonably?

The findings of the investigation are as follows. The question whether the CSI falls within the
scope of Article XXI is a moot point. The terms contained in these provisions are to be
interpreted in line with the “evolutionary interpretation” (pp. 297, 299) namely their
contemporary meaning as defined in international agreement. As far as sub-paragraph (b) (i) is
concerned, the CSI is primarily aimed at finding a “dirty bomb” rather than a nuclear weapon in a
container. Technically, such a device does not fall within the scope of the term “fissionable
materials”, because it is a by-product of the fission process (pp. 266 – 267, 297). Moreover, it
generally recognized that terrorists are highly unlikely to possess the technological know-how or
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means to transport a nuclear device in a container. The CSI is also unlikely to fall within the
scope of Article XXI (b) (iii) because the threat of international terrorism does not amount to a
state of war or an emergency in international relations (pp. 301 – 304). The term “war” is
interpreted according to Article 51 of the UN Charter and traditionally has been given a
restrictive meaning in the sense that it is limited to state actors. Although commentators have
called for the term to be re-evaluated following 9/11, the traditional notion of war still applies. It
is not the role of the evolutionary interpretation to shape international law but to reflect its current
usage (p. 300). Likewise, international terrorism does not amount to an “emergency in
international relations.” Although port facilities are classified as critical infrastructure in the
United States, the attacks carried out by terrorists within the maritime domain have hitherto been
small-scale, sporadic and primitive, using traditional explosives (pp. 303 – 304). The limited
technical capabilities of terrorists also casts doubt on whether there really is a terrorist threat in
relation to maritime transportation (pp. 308 – 310)

The next section of the enquiry concerns the necessity of the CSI (pp. 310 ff.). This question is
also difficult to answer with certainty mainly because the effectiveness of the CSI has been called
into question by oversight bodies in the United States such as the General Accounting Office and
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. On the other hand, the SAFE Port Act 2006 has
attempted to rectify some of these shortcomings (pp. 322 – 324).

The CSI does not appear to be the least trade restrictive measure available: considering that it
affects a global resource, the United States should offer membership of the measure to all
countries and closely base its requirements on the international standards of the Revised Kyoto
Convention and the Framework of Standards (pp. 327 – 328). In addition, the recent 100 percent
scanning amendment contained in Section 1701 of the IRCA 2007 sweeps away the risk
assessment strategy upon which the CSI is based. This is likely to be considered disproportionate
considering that the risk of maritime terrorism is uncertain at best (pp. 330).

The final stage of the test subjects the CSI to the abus des droit doctrine, similar to that found in
Article XX (pp. 328 ff.). In fact, the investigation uses the chapeau of the latter provision as a
basis for this investigation, concentrating on evidence of arbitrary discrimination and disguised
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