The economic implications of reciprocity in teams and markets [Elektronische Ressource] / Elke Renner

Winter

Description

The economic implications of reciprocity in teams and markets Elke Renner 2005 DISSERTATION zur Erlangung eines Grads einer Doktorin der Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Dr. rer. pol.) der Universität Erfurt Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Bettina Rockenbach Prof. Dr. Manfred Königstein Datum der Disputation: 19.12.2005 urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-200600171 [http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=nbn%3Ade%3Agbv%3A547-200600171] 2 Acknowledgements Many thanks to Klaus Abbink, Christoph Albrecht, Andrea Bäcker, Simon Gächter, Mario Gruppe, Özgür Gürerk, Sebastian Händschke, Bernd Irlenbusch, Manfred Königstein, Jürgen Kumbartzki, Thomas Lauer, Rosemarie and Peter Meyer, Mark Peacock, Christiane Pilz, Bettina Rockenbach, Karim Sadrieh, Paul and Dorothea Schindegger, Martin Sefton, Martina Stamm, Jean-Robert Tyran, Anne Ulmke, Katrin Uschmann, Gerhard Wegner, Tim Wenniges and Egon Zimpel. 3 Contents 1 Introduction and overview 6 1.1 References 8 2 Leading by example in the presence of free rider incentive 9 2.1 Introduction 9 2.2 Related literature 10 2.3 Design and procedures 10 2.3.1 Design 10 2.3.2 Procedures 12 2.4 Leading by example in a one-shot experiment – a benchmark 13 2.4.1 Results 13 2.5 The dynamics of leadership and voluntary cooperation 15 2.5.1 Does the leader matter? 15 2.5.2 Are there good and bad leaders? 17 2.5.3 The impact of increased gains from cooperation 19 2.5.

Informations

• Publié par: universitat_erfurt
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2006
• Nombre de lectures: 127
• Langue: English

Extrait

The economic implications of reciprocity in teams and markets

nner eke RlE

2005

DISSERTATION

aft (Dr. rer. hder Wirtschaftswissensczur Erlangung eines Grads einer Doktorin pol.) der

Universität Erfurt

Staatswisshe Fakultät enschaftlic

Gutachter:

eProf. Dr. Bttina Rockenbach Prof. Dr. Manfred Königstein

ion: Datum der Disputat

19.12.2005

urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-200600171
[http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=nbn%3Ade%3Agbv%3A547-200600171]

2

ledgements Acknow

Many thanks to Klaus Abbink, Christoph Albrecht, Andrea Bäcker, Simon Gächter, Mario Gruppe,
ÖzgThomaür Gsü Lareuer, Rork, Sebastian Händsemarie and Peter Meschke, Bernd Irleyer, Mark Peaconbucsch, Manfred Kk, Christiönigstein, Jüane Pilz, Bettina Rorgen Kumbckenartbazki, ch,
Anne UlmKarim Sadrike, eKatrin Uschmh, Paul and Dorotheann, Gearha Schirdndeg Wegnger, Maer, Timrt Wennigein Sefton, Martina Stams and Egon Zimpm,el. Jean-Robert Tyran,

3

nts Conte 1 1.1 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.4 2.4.1 2.5 2.5.1 2.5.2 2.5.3 2.5.4 2.5.5 2.6 2.7 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.3.3 4.4

wnd overviection aIntroduReferences
Leading by example in the presence of free rider incentive
ion tIntroduc uretd literaRelateDesign and procedures
signDes reProceduLeading by example in a one-shot experiment  a benchmark
sultsReThe dynamics of leadership and voluntary cooperation
Does the leader matter?
Are there good and bad leaders?
The impact of increased gains from cooperation
ample?xng by eLeadi ader?Shall I be a bold or timid leding remarks lucConReferences
When in doubt...  Cooperation and punishment under incomplete
information ion tIntroducdures d procegn andesiExperimental sultsReur bution behavioContri rehavioument bPunish sationcWelfare impliConclusions
References
Group size and social ties in microfinance institutions
ion tIntroduces studirimental d expeRelate signental ded experimModel an elThe modents Treatmures edcExperimental pro sultsRe

6 8 9 9 10 10 10 12 13 13 15 15 17 19 22 23 24 25 27 27 29 30 30 33 37 38 40 41 41 43 44 45 46 47 48

4

4.4.1 The effect of the group size
play cs of Dynami 4.4.2cial ties The effect of so 4.4.3s er effectGend 4.4.44.5 Summary and discussion
4.6 References
5 Price rigidity in customer markets
ion tIntroduc 5.15.2 An experimental approach to price rigidity in customer markets
5.3 Experimental design
5.3.1 General description of the experimental design
5.3.2 Procedures, parameters and information conditions
5.3.3 Predictions
sultsRe 5.45.5 Concluding remarks
5.6 References
ns Instructio:Appendix 1.A nd 1.b Tables 1.a a:Appendix 1.Bns Instructio:Appendix 2.A 2.d Tables 2.a :Appendix 2.Bns Instructio:Appendix 3.Ans Instructio:Appendix 4.AAppendix 4.B: Screens announcing the cost shock in period 3
Appendix 4.C: Figure 4.a

50 50 51 52 52 54 56 56 57 58 58 59 60 62 68 69 71 77 79 85 89 91 97 98

5

Introduction and overview 1 TraditioThe question nally economiof how to dests hasign efficient eve built this analysiconsomic o on thrganeoretiizatiocns ial mosdels a a key issssuming ue in economic afully rational and nalysis.
tractablpurely selfish e matagenthematical mos. This assumptiodels. Howeven has a clr, it has oftear adven been criticiseantage in its simplicity whid as unrealistcih alloc. In the last few ws building
decades a growing number of researchers in economics have investigated actual human behaviour in
controlled laboratory experiments. These experiments explore the boundaries of human rationality in
search for alternative behavioural assumptions that can feed back into the development of new
models with more explanatory power.
One central finding in this field is the prominent impact of reciprocity. Many experiments have
kind ademoncts strated(positive reci that people arprocity) and e not unbouthey punish unndedly selfishkind but acts (neg care aboative reciput others wellrocity). The existen being. They rewace of rd
positive reciprocity has been demonstrated in gift exchange and trust games (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut and
rejeMcCabe, 19ction beh9a5 and Fehviour in ultir, Kirchsmatum gameteiger asn (Gdüth, Riedl, 19Schm93ittberge). Negative rer and Schwarze, ciprocity ca1982n be ob) and in servepunid in shment
behaviour in public good games (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In the moonlighting game (Abbink,
Irlenbuthese asch annd mad Renny other expener, 2000) poriments resitive aciprnd negocal bativehavioe recipur carocn be conity ares obseiderred aved sis a multaneostylized fauslyct (Came. From rer
). 2003environThis thesmentis investigates studied in ths the ecoe next fournomic ch implicatapters shions of recipare several corocmmon fity in teams and meatures.arkets. The First, in all of them,
and group traditional thesettory sugings invegesstigts oppoated efficienrtunistic behaviocy requires ur byind individualividuals to cos will undermine eoperate, but they have privfficiency. In the team ate
incentives to free ride; in the market setting we investigate efficiency requires consumers to trust
selleto distrurs nst sellot to supers. Seply subcon-dstanda, in the four envrd producironmts, but moralents we hazard pr study, the inefficienoblems give concy prosbumerlem may be s good reason
considmitigated throerations caugh recipn overcorocity. These chame team inefficienpters tocy and gethemar showrket failure d that whether in faepends on sect reciveral factoprocity rs. First,
and moinformatiost obviously, individn that allows themuals mu to act on their rest be sufficiecipnroctly real ciprocal in nature. Secomotives in a way that improves group ond, they must hautcomeve the s.
act oppThird, they mortuniustically. st have instruments at their disposal to effectively monitor and discipline individuals who
to leading by A more detailexample in teed outline of the spams anecifid do lc reseaeaderrs mch questionsake a differen is asce? followsSecon: Firsd, can t, doespeer p reciuniprocshmity give risent e
enhance cooperation in teams when it is difficult to identify free riders? Third, can reciprocity sustain
group lending schemes in microfinance institutions? Fourth, can reciprocal loyalty help overcome
market failures in markets with incomplete information about quality? Each of these four questions will
be addressed in separate chapters. The next section gives a brief overview.
The second chapter examines the impact of positive reciprocity in the form of leading by example in
the context of a simple team cooperation problem with free rider incentives. In a public goods game
linear pone playeublirc was a good. Hissignes contribution was d to the role of the leadannouner anced tod had to cho three followeors se how muwho then dch toecid contried bute to a
recisimultaneouprocity, their cosly on their conntributiotns will ribution deincreacisionse with the les. If followers aader's rcontributie sufficiently stronglon. By allowing the ley motivated by ader to set
wholan example, e growe provide thup. We find that leadee leader and follr with oweran instrume contributnt to harneions are poss thsitively correlese motivations to benated even in a efit the one-
in a repeshot gamated leadee, testifying to the relevanrship game did not ence of recihanprocity.ce the ov Despite thierall level of coopesration , we find that the presenrelative to a situation ce of a leader
peoplwith an abe follow sethe leadent leader. Even thougrs exh on ample, the leadeaveragrs e it paywho do so eas to be a bolrn led leadess than follor becaweuse rs ansufficied leaders are ntly many
reduce theinot willing to tolerate thir contributiosns. : they resist being taken for a sucker and the only way they can resist is to
The third game. Previochapus reseter examinarch hesa negs showative ren that recipciprocity inroc the form of peeally motivated playr puniers arshme willingent in a public to punish free goods
6

6

rideimprovinrs, ang grod soup outcome the opportunis. Here ty to punish pwe studrovidey the effectivs an instrument for eness of this instrumdisciplining free rideent when it is difficult to rs and
identify free rito evaluate others' contribders. The exputerimeions to a pubntal setlic gooup discrid. minaIn both treatmenttes between ts contributiohe ability to obsens are orbve and thservable but e ability
taken. When endoonly in one treatment are the individual wments are publicly known puniendowmenshts publicment exerts aly know strong n before pdiscipluniishmening effect ant decisind ons are
cooperation rates are high. In contrast, when endowments are private information, cooperation rates
reluare subctanstantice to punially lower ash; rathendr punishment those who are punihas virtuallyshed n doo not cha effect. Surpnge risingtheir behavioly this is not due to a ur in response to
punishment. We conclude that transparency about others endowments is crucial for successful
peration. cooThe fourth chapter demonstrates that reciprocity can sustain group lending schemes in microfinance
seleprogramcted gmreous. These props. In a typical microfinangrammes provice schde pooer peome bplorrowers withe with small loan individual ris given tosky projec jointly liable self-ts form groups
which apply for loans together. The whole gro