The role of verification in International Relations: 1945-1993 [Elektronische Ressource] / Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie

Kifleyesus-Matschie

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• Publié par: universitat_erfurt
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2006
• Nombre de lectures: 48
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

The role of Verification
in International Relations: 1945-1993
Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie
Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grads einer Doktorin
der Sozialwissenschaft (Dr. rer. pol.) der Universität Erfurt,
Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät
2006
urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-20061700

Betreuer: Prof. Dr. Michael Strübel
Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Reimand Seidelmann rof. Dr. Manfred Baldus
Datum der Disputation: 20. Februar 2006
2
Abstract
The role of verification in international relations is liked with the urge to verify
which is evident throughout human history. This study focused on the evolution of
this role in light of political circumstances and technological progress. Several
different approaches to verification can be identified – bilateral, regional
cooperation, global arrangements, and individual national efforts. Moreover, several
themes characterize the existing verification regimes. These issues – namely the
sharing of intelligence, managing compliance questions, and the integration of
different regimes – present themselves as the negotiating ground for future years.
One of the important results of the paper is that it demonstrates how the concept of
verification, once a contentious political instrument, is encompassing anew actors,
new frameworks, new technologies, and new fields.
Keywords:
Arms Control, Disarmament, Verification, Verification technology, Inspection,
Compliances, Sanction, Bilateral Verification, Multilateral Verification,
Regional Verification, UN Verification, Export Control, SALT I, SALT II,
SALT III, INF, START, PIBT, The Antarctic Treaty, The Outer Space
Agreement, The Seabed Treaty, ENMOD, The International Atomic Energy
Agency, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention,
Euratom, CSBM, CFE, Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, The Treaty of Tlatelolco,
The Treaty of Rarotonga, The Treaty of Pelindaba, UNSCOM
1
Index
Abstract 1
Index 2
Acronyms 4
Chapter 1 The Theory and the Technology of Verification 7
1. Historical and Theoretical approach of Verification 11
2. Historical development of arms control and disarmament
terminologies and definitions 11
3. The Concept of Verification 13
4. Theoretical framework of Verification Regime 16
4.1. International relations theories and Verification regime 18
4.2. Conclusion of the actual theoretical framework of verification
regime 19
5. The Theory and Practice of Standards in Verification Regime 19
5.1. Standards of verification 20
5.2. Conclusion on the concept of verification 23
6. The Technology of Verification 23
6.1. National Technical Means 24
6.2. Aerial overflights 28
6.3. On-site inspection technology 29
6.4. Perimeter or portal monitoring 30
6.5. Monitoring underground explosions 31
6.6. Conclusion on the role of technologies in verification regime 31
Chapter 2 Frameworks of Verification: From Bilateral to Global 32
1. Bilateral Verification 32
1.1. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I, ABM Treaty and
SALT II) 33
1.2. SALT Verification regime 34
1.3. Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 37
1.4. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 43
1.5. START II 48
1.6. START III 50
1.7. Bilateral Framework with Multilateral Verification Procedure:
Nuclear Test Bans 52
2. Multilateral Verification 60
2.1. Arrangements concerning uninhabited regions and environment 60
2
2.2. The Antarctic Treaty 60
2.3. The Outer Space Agreement 63
2.4. The Seabed Treaty 66
2.5. The Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) 66
2.6. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation regime 68
3. Global regimes for controlling chemical and biological
weapons 76
3.1. The Chemical Weapons Convention 76
3.2. Biological Weapons Convention 85
4. Regional Verification 91
4.1. European Regional Agreements 93
4.2. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ); the regional approach 115
4.3. The opportunities and challenges of Regional Verification
Regime 124
5. The United Nations 143
5.1. Forum for negotiation and discussion 146
5.2. Assistance in verification 149
5.3. UN verification in peacekeeping 151
5.4. Verifying Sanctions 153
5.5. Enforcing verification and compliance; the case of Iraq 156
5.6. Prospects and proposals: United Nation Verification Agency
for Peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building 164
6. Export Controls 167
6.1. National 168
6.2. Multilateral 168
6.3. Global controls 173
6.4. Regional Controls 176
6.5. Conclusion: the synergy of layered regimes 177
Chapter 3 The Trends and Future of Verification 180
1. The Trends 182
2. Issues for the Future 188
Annex 195
Bibliographical Readings 205
Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung 270
Lebenslauf 271
3
Acronyms
ATTU Atlantic to the Urals
ABACC Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of
Nuclear Materials
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACA Agency for the Control of Armaments
ATCM Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings
BW Biological Weapons
BWC Biological Convention
CBM or CSBM Confidence (and Security) Building Measures
CD Conference on Disarmament (see UN)
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
CSCE Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CW Chemical Weapons
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
EC European Community
ENMOD Environmental Modification Treaty
EPC European Political Cooperation
FRG Federal Republic of Germany (refers to pre-1990)
GDR German Democratic Republic (refers to pre-1990)
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICC Inter-allied Control Commissions
INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
JCIC Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (see START
talks)
JCG Joint Consulting Group (see CFE Treaty)
KMP Key Measurement Points
KT Kiloton
LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty
MBFR Mutually Balanced Force Reduction
MIRV Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
4
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
MUF Materials Unaccounted For
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRRC Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NTM National Technical Means
NWFZ Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon States
NWS Nuclear Weapon States
OPANAL Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSI On-Site Inspection
OSIA On-Site Inspection Agency (US)
PPNN Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non Proliferation
Newsbrief
PNET Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM Sanction Assistance Missions (of the CSCE)
SCC Standing Consultative Committee (see SALT agreements)
SCCC Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Material (see Argentine-Brazil agreement)
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SNDV Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
SVC Special Verification Commission (see discussion of INF
Treaty)
TLE Treaty-Limited Equipment
TLI Treaty-LimItem
TTBT Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UN United Nations
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission (see Iraq experience)
5
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (refers to pre-1990)
VCC or VICC Verification (Implementation) Coordination Committee (see
CFE Treaty)
VEREX Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Exports (see BWC)
WEU Western European Union
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization
6
Chapter 1 The Theory and the Technology of Verification
The urge to verify is evident throughout human history. In the Bible, one finds the
example of St. Thomas whose disbelief in the Resurrection was only assuaged by
examining Christ's wounds. The checks and audits of today's commercial world can
be traced back to the Tolomei and Medici banks of the fifteenth century. And in
military history, Xenephon records show an example of verification that occurred
nearly 2400 years ago as the Greek army left Persia:
“The more carefully the two armies observed one another the more mutual
distrust mounted and the more palpable tensions grew. The Greek commander
fearing a new outbreak of hostilities and bloodshed called upon his Persian
counterpart 'to put a stop to these suspicions.”
“I observe that you are watching our moves as though we were enemies, and
we, noticing this, are watching yours too. On looking into things, I am unable
to find evidence that you are trying to do us any harm, and I am perfectly sure
that, as far as we're concerned, we do not even contemplate such a thing; and
so I decided to discuss matters with you, to see if we could put an end to this
mistru