Armed State Building

D. Miller Paul

Description

Since 1898, the United States and the United Nations have deployed military force more than three dozen times in attempts to rebuild failed states. Currently there are more state-building campaigns in progress than at any time in the past century-including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Sudan, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Lebanon-and the number of candidate nations for such campaigns in the future is substantial. Even with a broad definition of success, earlier campaigns failed more than half the time. In this book, Paul D. Miller brings his decade in the U.S. military, intelligence community, and policy worlds to bear on the question of what causes armed, international state-building campaigns by liberal powers to succeed or fail.The United States successfully rebuilt the West German and Japanese states after World War II but failed to build a functioning state in South Vietnam. After the Cold War the United Nations oversaw relatively successful campaigns to restore order, hold elections, and organize post-conflict reconstruction in Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere, but those successes were overshadowed by catastrophes in Angola, Liberia, and Somalia. The recent effort in Iraq and the ongoing one in Afghanistan-where Miller had firsthand military, intelligence, and policymaking experience-are yielding mixed results, despite the high levels of resources dedicated and the long duration of the missions there. Miller outlines different types of state failure, analyzes various levels of intervention that liberal states have tried in the state-building process, and distinguishes among the various failures and successes those efforts have provoked.

Informations

• Publié par: Cornell University Press
• Date de parution: 15 août 2013
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780801469541
• Langue: English

Extrait

ArmedStateBuilding

AVolumeintheSeries

CornellStudiesinSecurityAffairs

edited byRobert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt

A list of titles in this series is available at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Armed State Building

Confronting State Failure, 1898–2012

Pau l D . M i l l e r

Cornell University Press

Ithaca and London

Copyright © 2013 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2013 by Cornell University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data

Miller, Paul D., author.  Armed state building : confronting state failure, 1898–2012 / Paul D. Miller.  pages cm. — (Cornell studies in security affairs)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 9780801451492 (cloth : alk. paper)  1. Nationbuilding. 2. Failed states. 3. Postwar reconstruction. 4. Intervention (International law) I. Title.  JZ6300.M55 2013  327.1'1—dc23 2013008335

CornellUniversityPressstrivestouseenvironmentallyresponsiblesuppliersand materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetablebased, lowVOC inks and acidfree papers that are recycled, totally chlorinefree, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Cloth printing

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Preface

1. Introduction  2. The Myth of Sequencing 3. Statehood 4. State Failure  5. State Building  6. Strategies of State Building  7. Five StateBuilding Case Studies  8. Conclusion

AppendixA:CaseSelection AppendixB:MeasuringSuccessandFailure Bibliography Index

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Contents

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1 21 39 53 70 83 117 175

205 227 235 249

Preface

I served in Afghanistan with the United States Army in 2002. I also served in the White House on the National Security Council staff as Di rector for Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009, during the last sixteen months of the Bush administration and first eight months of the Obama admin istration, on the staff of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. I assisted with the presidential transition and sup ported the AfghanistanPakistan strategy reviews in 2008 and 2009. These experiences demonstrated to me the tremendous resources and capabilities of the United States and our partners and allies around the world for delivering international assistance, yet also the equally tre mendous challenge of bringing our resources to bear in a concerted, co herent way to achieve goals halfway around the world in a broken state in the midst of war, extreme poverty, and a foreign culture. None of my colleagues doubted that we should do everything possible to succeed, but many began to wonder as the years went by if wecouldsucceed. I heard many soldiers, officers, bureaucrats, aid workers, and analysts ask, “Can this be done? Can we succeed? What does it take to succeed in an environment like this? Have we ever done anything like this before?” Thisbookisanefforttohelpthemanswerthesequestions,anditis dedicated to them and to the people of Afghanistan. Theviewsanderrorsinthisbookaremyown.Allstatementsoffact, opinion, or analysis expressed are mine and do not reflect the official positions of the US Army, the Department of Defense, the White House, the Central Intelligence Agency, either presidential administration for which I worked, or any other organization or agency. Nothing in the con tents should be construed as asserting or implying US government au thentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views. This

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Preface material has been reviewed by the CIA and the National Defense Univer sity to prevent the disclosure of classified information. Inthelongjourneyofthisbook,andthelongerjourneyoflifeand work, I have incurred many debts. I would like to thank Robert Baldwin, high school English teacher, for inspiring me to learn; Josh Mitchell, col lege philosophy professor, for teaching me that ideas matter; Alan J. Young, Army drill sergeant, for showing me that I am capable of more than I thought possible; Harold E. Brown Jr., friend and fellow soldier who gave the last, full measure in Afghanistan; my wife Jennilee for her patience, support, and love; my son Liam and daughter Lily, for giving Daddy much needed laughter and study breaks; and my parents, whose love and sacrifice I am only now beginning to understand.

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Introduction

TheAmericanArmythereforebeganitsdutiesinoccupiedterri tory with only the scantest information. . . . From the beginning therefore there was a crying need for personnel trained in civil administration. . . . The conclusion from these facts is incontest able; the American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly 1,000,000 civil ians whom the fortunes of war had placed under it temporary sovereignty.

—Col. Irwin L. Hunt, March 4, 1920

TheQuestionandItsImportance

TheUnitedStatesdeployedanarmyof45,000soldierstoCubain1898 to help insurgents rebel against the Spanish Empire. The war was short and the Cubans victorious, but Cuba was in ruins and appeared in need of American help. Faced with similar situations in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, the McKinley administration freely annexed terri tory and imposed imperial rule, but Cuba was different. The war was fought to liberate Cuba; denying Cuba sovereignty would be a betrayal of the war’s purpose, and Congress duly forbade the island’s annexation with the Teller Amendment. McKinley improvised a solution: “As soon as we are in possession of Cuba and have pacified the Island it will be necessary to give aid and direction to its people to form a government for themselves.” McKinley told Congress, “It should be our duty to assist in every proper way to build up the waste places of the island, encourage the industry of the people, and assist them to form a government which

Colonel Hunt’s comment on the aftermath of World War I is found in Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, 6.

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