Atomic Assistance

Matthew Fuhrmann

Description

Nuclear technology is dual use in nature, meaning that it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to build nuclear weapons. Despite security concerns about proliferation, the United States and other nuclear nations have regularly shared with other countries nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes. In Atomic Assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft. Nuclear suppliers hope that they can reap the benefits of foreign aid-improving relationships with their allies, limiting the influence of their adversaries, enhancing their energy security by gaining favorable access to oil supplies-without undermining their security. By providing peaceful nuclear assistance, however, countries inadvertently help spread nuclear weapons. Fuhrmann draws on several cases of "Atoms for Peace," including U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from 1957 to 1979; Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986; French, Italian, and Brazilian nuclear exports to Iraq from 1975 to 1981; and U.S. nuclear cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008. He also explores decision making in countries such as Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria to determine why states began (or did not begin) nuclear weapons programs and why some programs succeeded while others failed. Fuhrmann concludes that, on average, countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb-especially if they experience an international crisis after receiving aid.

Sujets

• Military history
• Nuclear weapon

Informations

• Publié par: Cornell University Press
• Date de parution: 05 juillet 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780801465758
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 3 Mo

Extrait

ATOMICASSISTANCE

avolumeintheseries

CORNELLSTUDIESINSECURITYAFFAIRS editedbyRobertJ.Art,RobertJervis,andStephenM.Walt

Alistoftitlesinthisseriesisavailableatwww.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

ATOMICASSISTANCE

HOW“ATOMSFORPEACE”PROGRAMS CAUSE NUCLEAR INSECURITY

MATTHEWFUHRMANN

CornellUniversityPress Ithaca and London

Copyright © 2012 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permis sion in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2012 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2012 Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Fuhrmann, Matthew, 1980–  Atomic assistance : how “atoms for peace” programs cause nuclear insecurity / Matthew Fuhrmann.  p. cm. — (Cornell studies in security affairs)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 9780801450907 (cloth : alk. paper)  ISBN 9780801478116 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Nuclear nonproliferation—International cooperation. 2. Nuclear industry—International cooperation. 3. Technology transfer—International cooperation. 4. Technical assistance— International cooperation. 5. Security, International. I. Title. II. Series: Cornell studies in security affairs.  JZ5675.F85 2012  327.1'747—dc23 2012005396 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible sup pliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetablebased, lowVOC inks and acidfree papers that are recycled, totally chlorinefree, or partly com posed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

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Contents

ListofTablesandFigures PrefaceandAcknowledgments ListofAbbreviations

Introduction: Unintended Consequences in International Politics

1.DefinitionsandPatternsofPeacefulNuclearCooperation

PARTI:ATOMSFORPEACE 2.EconomicStatecraftandAtomsforPeace:ATheory of Peaceful Nuclear Assistance 3.TheHistoricalRecord:AFirstCut 4.NuclearArmsandInfluence:AssistingIndia, Iran, and Libya 5.TheThirstforOilandOtherMotives:NinePuzzling Cases of Assistance 6.OilforPeacefulNuclearAssistance?

PARTII:ATOMSFORWAR 7.SpreadingTemptation:WhyNuclearExport Strategies Backfire 8.WhoBuildsBombs?HowPeacefulNuclearCooperation Facilitates the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

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9.HaveInternationalInstitutionsMadetheWorldSafer?

Conclusion: What Peaceful Nuclear Assistance Teaches Us about International Relations

Notes Index

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TablesandFigures

TABLES 3.1 Crosstabulation of military alliances and civilian nuclear assistance, 1950–2000 3.2 Crosstabulation of conflict and civilian nuclear assistance, 1950–2000 3.3 Crosstabulation of shared enemy and civilian nuclear assistance, 1950–2000 3.4 Crosstabulation of superpower enemy and civilian nuclear assistance, 1950–2000 3.5 Crosstabulation of joint democracy and civilian nuclear assistance, 1950–2000 3.6 Predicted probabilities of U.S. atomic assistance to ASEAN countries, 2000 3.7 Determinants of peaceful nuclear cooperation, 1950–2000 3.8 Determinants of disaggregated peaceful nuclear cooperation, 1950–2000 3.9 The Nuclear Suppliers Group and peaceful nuclear cooperation, 1950–2000 3.10 Determinants of peaceful nuclear cooperation with limited sample of suppliers and recipients, 1950–2000 3.11 Determinants of peaceful nuclear cooperation, 1992–2000 5.1 Determinants of nuclear cooperation in outlying cases

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viiiand Figures Tables

6.1 Crosstabulation of oil producers and civilian nuclear assistance, 1950–2000 6.2 Crosstabulation of oil producers and civilian nuclear assistance, years following large increases in oil prices 6.3 Oil producers and peaceful nuclear cooperation, 1950–2000 7.1 Nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons program onset, 1945–2000 7.2 Dates of first nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons programs for nonnuclear weapon states, 1945–2000 7.3 Determinants of nuclear weapons program initiation, 1945–2000 7.4 Endogenous models of nuclear weapons program initiation, 1945–2000 7.5 Disaggregated nuclear cooperation agreements and nuclear weapons program onset, 1945–2000 7.6 The conditional effect of nuclear cooperation on nuclear weapons program initiation, 1945–2000 8.1 Weapons acquisition and peaceful nuclear cooperation 8.2 Determinants of nuclear weapons acquisition, 1945–2000 8.3 Disaggregated peaceful nuclear assistance and the determinants of nuclear weapons acquisition, 1945–2000 8.4 The conditional effect of peaceful nuclear assistance, 1945–2000 9.1 Determinants of nuclear weapons program initiation, with time interactions 9.2 Determinants of nuclear weapons program initiation, with NPT interactions

FIGURES 1.1 Number of NCAs signed per year, 1945–2000 1.2 Number of NCAs signed by type, 1945–2000 1.3 Number of NCAs signed per year, by type, 1945–2000 1.4 Regional dispersion of NCAs, 1945–2000 1.5 Regional dispersion of disaggregated NCAs, 1945–2000

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Tables and Figuresix

3.1 Percentage change in probability of civilian nuclear cooperation caused by each statistically significant independent variable 54 6.1 Percentage change in oil prices, 1950–2000 131 6.2 Percentage change in probability of peaceful nuclear cooperation resulting from statistically significant independent variables, years following large increases in oil prices 133 6.3 Oil prices by week, January 2001–December 2008 135 7.1 The logic of nuclear weapons program initiation 145 7.2 Effect of peaceful nuclear assistance on predicted probability of nuclear weapons program initiation 153 7.3 The marginal effect of nuclear cooperation on nuclear weapons program onset as militarized interstate disputes increase 157 8.1 Effect of peaceful nuclear assistance on predicted probability of nuclear weapons acquisition 183 8.2 Marginal effect of comprehensive nuclear power cooperation agreements on the probability of nuclear weapons acquisition as militarized interstate disputes increase, 1945–2000 186 9.1 Theoretical illustration of the safeguards argument 211 9.2 Marginal effect of nuclear cooperation agreements on nuclear weapons program onset as the number of years since 1945 increases 213 9.3 Nonnuclear weapons states receiving peaceful nuclear assistance, by decade 214 9.4 Percentage change in the probability of weapons program initiation resulting from increases in peaceful nuclear assistance, NPT members vs. nonNPT members 215 9.5 Marginal effect of NPT membership on nuclear weapons program initiation as comprehensive power NCAs increase 216