Contractual Politics and the Institutionalization of Bureaucratic Influence

Suzanne L. Parker, Glenn R. Parker

Description

This book sheds light on the dealings between special interests and political parties by challenging three long-standing assumptions: that transactions between interest groups and parties are quid pro quo exchanges, such as the buying and selling of legislation; that the interrelationship between bureaucrats and interest groups is accommodating and friendly; and that special interests are single-minded in their pursuit of favorable policies, specifically legislation and regulations. The authors argue that political transactions are organized through durable informal agreements between interest groups and political parties, whereby parties obtain a dependable source of long-term campaign funds, and interest groups gain enduring favorable treatment in the political process. In response to interest group demands, legislatures such as Congress establish quasi-governmental appendages to federal agencies that oversee the administration of programs prized by special interests—namely, federal advisory committees. The authors examine the complex relationship between the establishment and influence of thousands of federal advisory committees and long-term interest group contributions to political parties.
List of Tables and Figures
Preface

1. Introduction: A Contractual Perspective on Interest Group Politics

2. The Political Utility of Advisory Committees

3. The Institutional Underpinnings of Political Contracts

4. A Theory of Political Contracts

5. Defusing Contractual Hazards

6. Interest Group Demand and the Spread of Advisory Committees

7. Advisory Committees as Instruments of Bureaucratic Influence

8. The Efficiency of Contracts in Governing Political Exchange

9. Conclusions

Appendix to Chapter 4: A Formal Representation of Contractual Politics
Appendix to Chapter 7: Predicting the Linkage between Agency Budgets and Implementation of Advisory Committee

Recommendations
Notes
References
Index of Names
Index of Subjects

Sujets

• USA
• United States of America
• Central government
• Central
• États-Unis
• National

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 29 janvier 2018
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781438467955
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

Contractual Politics and the Institutionalization of Bureaucratic Influence
Contractual Politics and the Institutionalization of Bureaucratic Influence
Glenn R. Parker and Suzanne L. Parker
Cover images: ( top ) © Dmitr1ch ( bottom ) © Phototreat / iStockphoto.com
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2018 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu
Production, Dana Foote
Marketing, Anne M. Valentine
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Parker, Glenn R., 1946– author. | Parker, Suzanne L., 1946– author.
Title: Contractual politics and the institutionalization of bureaucratic influence / Glenn R. Parker and Suzanne L. Parker.
Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017004238 (print) | LCCN 2017033196 (ebook) | ISBN 9781438467955 (ebook) | ISBN 9781438467931 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Executive advisory bodies—United States. | Pressure groups—United States. | Lobbying—United States. | Campaign funds—United States.
Classification: LCC JK468.C7 (ebook) | LCC JK468.C7 P37 2018 (print) | DDC 324/.40973—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017004238
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Chris—an author in his own right
Contents
List of Tables and Figures
Preface
1 Introduction: A Contractual Perspective on Interest Group Politics
2 The Political Utility of Advisory Committees
3 The Institutional Underpinnings of Political Contracts
4 A Theory of Political Contracts
5 Defusing Contractual Hazards
6 Interest Group Demand and the Spread of Advisory Committees
7 Advisory Committees as Instruments of Bureaucratic Influence
8 The Efficiency of Contracts in Governing Political Exchange
9 Conclusions
Appendix to Chapter 4: A Formal Representation of Contractual Politics
Appendix to Chapter 7: Predicting the Linkage between Agency Budgets and Implementation of Advisory Committee Recommendations
Notes
References
Index of Names
Index of Subjects
Tables and Figures
Tables Table 2.1 Establishment authority for advisory committees by function performed Table 2.2 Percentage of industry contributions to parties Table 2.3 Interest areas associated with long-term group support of political parties Table 2.4 Specialization of advisory committees and establishing authority Table 2.5 Distribution of specialized committees across agencies and departments in 2008 Table 2.6 Provisions for termination of advisory committees in major legislation, 1947–2008 Table 2.7 Percentage of advisory committees recommended for merging or termination that require legislation to terminate by establishing authority Table 2.8 Percentage of advisory committees recommended for merging or termination that require legislation to terminate by committee specialization Table 2.9 Number of advisory committees recommended for merging or termination by committee specialization Table 2.10 Percentage of advisory committees terminated by committee specialization Table 6.1 Explaining expansion in the advisory committee system Table 6.2 Explaining the establishment of congressionally mandated committees, 1789–2008 Table 7.1 Factor loadings for advisory committee outcome dimensions (varimax rotation) Table 7.2 Factor loadings for agency action dimensions (varimax rotation) Table 7.3 The effects of partisan advisory committees on committee outcomes Table 7.4 The effects of partisan advisory committees on agency actions Table 7.5 Changes in Republican advisory committee success and changes in agency budgets, 2003–2008 Table 7.6 Summary of accuracy of predictions Table 7.7 Predictions for success of advisory committees and gains and losses in agency budgets Table 8.1 Establishment of federal agencies
Figures Figure 2.1 How advisory committees are established Figure 2.2 Percentage of advisory committees in partisan policy areas that are legislatively mandated Figure 2.3 Congressionally mandated committees and mandated special-interest representation committees Figure 2.4 Percentage of advisory committees with mandated group representation in partisan policy areas Figure 2.5 Terminated and new committees, 1972–2008 Figure 2.6 Durability of advisory committees by establishment authority Figure 2.7 Durability of advisory committees by function Figure 2.8 Durability of advisory committees by partisan specialization Figure 2.9 Durability of advisory committees by legislative action for termination Figure 4.1 Percent of workforce older than fifty years in major federal agencies, 2006 Figure 4.2 Extensive-form stage game schematic Figure 6.1 Costs of advisory committees Figure 6.2 Number of new advisory committees Figure 6.3 Year of establishment of advisory committees by authorizing authority Figure 6.4 Year of establishment of statutory advisory committees Figure 6.5 Partisan control of Congress and the establishment of advisory committees Figure 6.6 Advisory committees created from major legislation, 1947–2008 Figure 6.7 Number of advisory committees established through major legislation and congressionally mandated, 1947–2006 Figure 6.8 The expansion of the advisory committee system Figure 7.1 Advisory committee specialization and major policy outcomes Figure 7.2 Republican advisory committee outcomes and agency actions Figure 7.3 Democratic advisory committee outcomes and agency actions Figure 7.4 The relationship between special interests and internal agency decisions Figure 9.1 Transformation of subgovernmental politics
Preface
Exchange and politics go hand in hand, exemplified by vote trading and striking political deals. At its core, Contractual Politics is a study of political exchange, in particular, the repetitive dealings between parties, interest groups, legislatures, and bureaucracies. Although seemingly straightforward exchanges—for example, trading campaign contributions for influence over public policy—such transactions are sheathed in informational asymmetries, political uncertainties, specialized-trading relationships, recurring transactions, and above all, prospects for opportunism. Explicably, these chilling problems plague reaching and enforcing political agreements.
While there is no surefire way of eliminating such obstacles, some mechanisms of exchange are superior to others in minimizing the costs related to fashioning agreements between special interests and political parties. In particular, ensuring that deals between parties and interest group allies remain intact in the long run—that is, durable—smooths the way for repetitive, mutually advantageous, and efficient political trades. Political bargains are endowed with resilience through the creation of quasi-governmental structures in the service of special interests, bestowed with lawful power to oversee and influence agency administration of pet industry programs—that is, federal advisory committees. In short, implicit agreements between special-interest allies and parties— political contracts —have prominently stoked the institutionalization of special-interest influence within the federal bureaucracy. Though the existence of special-interest influence in government is not, of course, a startling revelation, the widespread institutionalization of bureaucratic influence adds an important element to this rendering.
The objective of our inquiry is neither to lament nor critique the influence of groups in politics; that has been admirably done by others. Instead, we seek to explain how and why group influence has morphed into lasting bureaucratic footholds within government. Drawing on the political and economic study of institutions, we show how the precarious nature of political exchange fuels the sorry state of affairs, and why remedying this gloomy predicament seems a fool’s errand.
We want to acknowledge the efforts of several colleagues who provided vital assistance from the inception of the idea to its publication: Matt Dabros for his impeccable work as our research assistant; Wendy Ginsberg and Walter Oleszek for sharing their intimate knowledge of federal advisory committees; Aaron Hoffman for prudent statistical advice; and Tim Cason and Brian Roberson for help in formalizing our theory. We are, of course, indebted to reviewers of the manuscript—Paul Teske and Colin Provost—for their comments and suggestions, which have strengthened the book immeasurably. Our intellectual debts are too many to enumerate, but most apparent are the ideas that have shaped our understanding of bureaucracies, legislatures, political parties, interest groups, and political exchange—thanks to Gary Becker, Anthony Downs, Morris Fiorina, George Stigler, Barry Weingast, and Oliver Williamson. Finally, we want to express a special thanks to our editors at State University of New York Press, Michael Rinella and Dana Foote, for shepherding Contractual Politics through the editorial process as if we were family.
1
Introduction
A Contractual Perspective on Interest Group Politics
Long-term associations between inter