Iran Unveiled

Ali Alfoneh

Description

In Iran Unveiled, Middle East expert Ali Alfoneh describes the coming revolt of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the implications this would have on regional and international politics. As Iran experiences the most important change in its history since the revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the regime in Tehran, traditionally ruled by the Shia clergy, is transforming into a military dictatorship dominated by the officers of the IRGC. This transformation is changing not only the economy and society in Iran, but also the Islamic Republic’s relations with the United States and its allies. This book provides the legal, historical, ideological and military frameworks for what Alfoneh believes to be an escalating and inevitable revolution in Iran. Iran Unveiled informs and educates anyone with an interest in Iran-US relations and the future of Middle eastern politics at a time at a time of growing tension in one of the world's most unstable but indispensable political zones.

Sujets

• Security International
• Security National
• Political Science
• Irán
• Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
• Iran

Informations

• Publié par: AEI Press
• Date de parution: 18 avril 2013
• Nombre de lectures: 1
• EAN13: 9780844772554
• Langue: English

Extrait

Iran Unveiled:
How the Revolutionary Guards Is Turning Theocracy into Military Dictatorship
Iran Unveiled:
How the Revolutionary Guards Is Turning Theocracy into Military Dictatorship
Ali Alfoneh
The AEI Press
Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute
W A S H I N G T O N , D . C .
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Alfoneh, Ali.
Iran unveiled : how the revolutionary guards is turning theocracy into military dictatorship / Ali Alfoneh.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8447-7253-0 (cloth)—ISBN 978-0-8447-7254-7 (pbk.)— ISBN 978-0-8447-7255-4 (ebook) 1. Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islami (Iran) 2. Iran—History, Military.
3. Civil-military relations—Iran. 4. Iran—Politics and government—1997—
I. Title.
UA853.I7A44 2013 955.06—dc23
2012050830
© 2013 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI.
Printed in the United States of America
List of Illustrations
F IGURES
2-1 Attempted Reconstruction of the Organizational Chart of the IRGC as of April 22, 1979
7-1 Value of Privatized State-Owned Enterprises in Iran, 1991–2008
7-2 Percentage of Assets Purchased through Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in Iran, 2005–2009, by Purchasing Sector
T ABLES
2-1 Islamist Khomeini Loyalists at the Eve of the Revolution
2-2 Composition and Leading Members of the Umbrella Organization Holy Warriors of the Islamic Revolution
2-3 Factions Negotiating Unification of the Guards in 1979
4-1 IRGC Organizational Structure at General Governorate Level as of July 2008
5-1 Representatives of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei to the IRGC, 1979–2011
5-2 Representatives of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC
5-3 Representatives of the Supreme Leader to the IRGC at the Provincial Level
7-1 Main Subsidiaries of the Mehr Finance and Credit Institution (Formerly the Basij Cooperative Foundation)
7-2 Subsidiaries of the Mehr Finance and Credit Institution
7-3 Companies Entirely or Partially Owned by Mehr-e Eghtesad-e Iranian Investment Company
7-4 Companies and Investment Institutes Entirely or Partially Owned by the IRGC Cooperative Foundation as of May 31, 2010

On the cover: This image depicts the IRGC logo. At the base of the coat of arms, the number 1357 refers to the year 1979, which not only commemorates the year of the revolution in Iran, the establishment of the Islamic Republic, and the emergence of the IRGC but also heralds the beginning of a new era of world revolution. The centerpiece of the logo shows strong arms holding an AK-47, the emblematic weapon of revolutionary armies in the 1960s and 1970s. The arms are shaped in the form of the Arabic word La , a reference to the first article of the faith in Islam, La Ilaha Ilallah (there is no God but Allah). The Islamist character of the IRGC is further signified by a book that symbolizes the Quran. The Arabic text at the top of the logo reads, “And make ready for them whatever force you can.” The text is from verse 60 of the “Sura al-Anfal,” which—not quoted on the coat of arms—subsequently reads: “to frighten [terrorize] thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them, whom you know not—Allah knows them.” There is also an olive branch, which does not play a prominent role in the logo, and a globe, which does. As demonstrated by its coat of arms, the IRGC is clearly a military organization that serves as the vanguard of an Islamist world revolution—a permanent revolution that never managed to seize control over the Islamic world but helped the IRGC seize control over Iran.
Acknowledgments
This book, and the articles on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) published in the American Enterprise Institute’s Middle Eastern Outlook series that laid the foundations for the book, are based on my research since the June 24, 2005, presidential election in Iran, which paved the path of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s first soldier-president to the presidential palace in Tehran. I alone am responsible for the shortcomings of the book, but I am indebted to the many individuals and institutions that have helped my research. Birthe Hansen, professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, urged me to embark on a comparative study of civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa, which helped me analyze the rise of the IRGC in theoretical perspective. Ole Kvaernoe, director of the Institute for Strategy at the Faculty of Strategy and Military Operations of the Royal Danish Defence College, most graciously hosted me, which among other things helped me witness civil-military relations in a democratic polity firsthand. The Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation most generously provided financial support for my research while in Denmark. On the other side of the Atlantic, Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) vice president for foreign and defense policy studies, generously offered me a position at AEI, and the Smith Richardson Foundation equally generously provided financial support for my research and the publication of this book. My research has benefited from the advice and friendship of present and former colleagues at AEI, including Michael Rubin—without whose friendship this book would not have been possible—Frederick W. Kagan, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Gary J. Schmitt, Thomas Donnelly, Nicholas Eberstadt, Ahmad K. Majidyar, Maseh Zarif, and Will Fulton. While my assistant Daniel Vajdic organized the work of interns engaged in the research project with the zeal of Basij members in the field, AEI’s editors and Karin Horler patiently made my English comprehensible. Outside of AEI I am indebted to a large group of individuals in the United States military and the Department of State who do not necessarily share my analysis, but have improved it by continuously inviting me to discuss my findings with them, and friends and colleagues in other think tanks: Patrick Clawson, who opened my eyes to the U.S. policy world by offering me an internship at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 1999, Mike Eisenstadt, Kenneth Pollack, Kenneth Katzman, Mehdi Khalaji, Karim Sadjadpour, Alex Vatanka, Afshin Molavi, Mohsen Sazegara, and other friends who prefer to remain anonymous.
1 Introduction
Iran is currently experiencing the most important change in its history since the revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic: The regime in Tehran, traditionally ruled by the Shia clergy, is transforming into a military dictatorship dominated by the officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami ). This transformation is changing not only the economy and society in Iran, but also the Islamic Republic’s relations with the United States and its allies.
While the Iranian public is gradually coming to understand the scope of the IRGC’s powers, policy makers in the United States with the notable exception of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have largely ignored the transformative change in Iran and still consider the Islamic Republic a theocracy with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at its helm. This erroneous understanding of Iran has already led to failed U.S. policies. Extending hands of friendship to Khamenei; siding with the regime rather than with Iran’s prodemocracy protest movement in the wake of the fraudulent presidential election of June 12, 2009; engaging in negotiations with representatives of the clerical class in Iran; holding a naïve belief in the possibility of a negotiated solution to the nuclear standoff with Iran; answering Iranian provocations with the statement that “all options are on the table” followed by various officials’ statements stressing that the United States did not seek to use military power against the Islamic Republic; and instituting gradually tightening sanctions to which the regime in Tehran is adapting have all been counterproductive. The IRGC officers, the new rulers of the Islamic Republic, are likely to consider such initiatives as signs of weakness rather than strength and are therefore not likely to offer concessions in the areas of greatest importance to the United States.
This book aims at correcting the U.S. decision makers’ understanding of the nature of the regime in Tehran by discussing how the IRGC is transforming the Islamic Republic into a military dictatorship. This introductory chapter presents the problem that an IRGC-dominated Islamic Republic poses to the West and includes a brief discussion of sources and prior studies. Chapter 2 traces the emergence of the IRGC as a military organization, which explains not only the nature of the IRGC but also the nature of the regime that this organization has managed to dominate. Chapter 3 discusses the IRGC’s interventions in the domestic politics of the Islamic Republic. I argue that once the IRGC was invited to intervene in internal politics in order to ensure the survival of the regime, the IRGC took advantage of the disunited civilian politicians and began pursuing its own interests. Chapter