Winner of the 2009 Richard F. Fenno Jr. Prize of the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association
While students of American politics are accustomed to thinking of members of Congress as recipients of campaign contributions, Sharing the Wealth shows that incumbents are increasingly active as contributors to their parties and other political candidates. As this provocative study shows, member contributions have grown exponentially in recent years to finance the fierce biannual battle for majority control of Congress. Utilizing both quantitative methods and case studies, Damon M. Cann examines arrangements designed to advance ambitions of individuals while ultimately strengthening parties, and also explores several important consequences of this growing phenomenon. More than a campaign finance study, Sharing the Wealth offers a comprehensive examination of member-to-member and member-to-party contributions, and makes the connection between member contributions and the growing strength of political parties in Congress. List of Illustrations Preface
1. Introduction
2. Candidates as Contributors?
3. The Exchange Theory of Party Influence
4. Leadership Investment in Legislative Loyalty in the U.S. House
5. Member Contributions and the Politics of House Committee Chair Selection
6. Member Contributions and Control of the House Appropriations Committee
7. Member Contributions and the Politics of Party Leadership Selection
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Sharing the Wealth
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Sharing the Wealth
Member Contributions and the Exchange Theory of Party Influence in the U.S. House of Representatives
Damon M. Cann
State University of New York Press
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
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For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu
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Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data
Cann, Damon M., 1976– Sharing the wealth : member contributions and the exchange theory of party influence in the U.S. House of Representatives / Damon M. Cann. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9780791474938 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Campaign funds—United States. 2. United States. Congress. House. 3. Legislators—United States. 4. Political parties— United States. 5. Power (Social sciences)—United States. 6. United States—Politics and government. I. Title.
JK1021.C36 2008 328.73'074—dc22
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
2007048684
For Clair, Cambria, and Ian
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List of Illustrations Preface
CHAPTER1: CHAPTER2:
CHAPTER3: CHAPTER4:
CHAPTER5:
CHAPTER6:
CHAPTER7:
CHAPTER8:
Notes References Index
Introduction
Contents
Candidates as Contributors?
The Exchange Theory of Party Influence
Leadership Investment in Legislative Loyalty in the U.S. House
Member Contributions and the Politics of House Committee Chair Selection Member Contributions and Control of the House Appropriations Committee Member Contributions and the Politics of Party Leadership Selection Conclusion
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ix xi
1 7 25
37
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77
87 97
103 109 119
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Illustrations
Figures
FIGUREPACs Sponsored byof Leadership 2.1: Number Members of the House of Representatives, 1978–2006 FIGUREand Senate MembertoMember Contributions,2.2: House 1978–2004
FIGURE4.1: Party Unity Increase from Leadership Contributions FIGUREof Uncompensated Seniority Violations5.1: Proportion in Committee Chair Appointments, 1889–1957 FIGURESeniority Violationsof Uncompensated 5.2: Proportion in Committee Chair Appointments, 1947–2007 FIGURE5.3: Predicted Probabilities for Winning the International Relations Committee Chair
TABLE2.1:
TABLE2.2:
TABLE2.3:
Tables
Percentage of MembertoMember Funds by Incumbency Status
Percentage of MajorParty Candidates Receiving Member Contributions and Average Size of Contribution by Incumbency Status
Percentage of MajorParty Candidates Receiving Member Contributions by Incumbency Status and Electoral Competitiveness