Psychology of Beauty

D. Puffer Ethel

Description

What do we mean we call something -- or someone -- beautiful? Which mental and cognitive processes play a role in making aesthetic judgments? Trailblazing female psychologist Ethel Puffer tackles these questions and many more in a series of engaging essays in The Psychology of Beauty.

Informations

• Publié par: The Floating Press
• Date de parution: 01 août 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781775416289
• Langue: English

Extrait

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEAUTY
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ETHEL D. PUFFER
 
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The Psychology of Beauty From a 1905 edition.
ISBN 978-1-775416-28-9
© 2009 THE FLOATING PRESS.
While every effort has been used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in The Floating Press edition of this book, The Floating Press does not assume liability or responsibility for any errors or omissions in this book. The Floating Press does not accept responsibility for loss suffered as a result of reliance upon the accuracy or currency of information contained in this book. Do not use while operating a motor vehicle or heavy equipment. Many suitcases look alike.
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Contents
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Preface I - Criticism and Aesthetics II - The Nature of Beauty III - The Aesthetic Repose IV - The Beauty of Fine Art V - The Beauty of Music VI - The Beauty of Literature VII - The Nature of the Emotions of the Drama VIII - The Beauty of Ideas Endnotes
Preface
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THE human being who thrills to the experience of beauty innature and in art does not forever rest with that experienceunquestioned. The day comes when he yearns to pierce thesecret of his emotion, to discover what it is, and why, thathas so stung him—to defend and to justify his transport tohimself and to others. He seeks a reason for the faith thatis in him. And so have arisen the speculative theories ofthe nature of beauty, on the one hand, and the studies ofconcrete beauty and our feelings about it, on the other.Speculative theory has taken its own way, however, as apart of philosophy, in relating the Beautiful to the othergreat concepts of the True and the Good; building up anarchitectonic of abstract ideas, far from the immediatefacts and problems of the enjoyment of beauty. There hasgrown up, on the other hand, in the last years, a greatliterature of special studies in the facts of aestheticproduction and enjoyment. Experiments with the aestheticelements; investigations into the physiological psychologyof aesthetic reactions; studies in the genesis and developmentof art forms, have multiplied apace. But these are stillmere groups of facts for psychology; they have not been takenup into a single authoritative principle. Psychology cannotdo justice to the imperative of beauty, by virtue of which,when we say "this is beautiful," we have a right to implythat the universe must agree with us. A synthesis of thesetendencies in the study of beauty is needed, in which theresults of modern psychology shall help to make intelligiblea philosophical theory of beauty. The chief purpose of thisbook is to seek to effect such a union.
A way of defining Beauty which grounds it in general principles,while allowing it to reach the concrete case, is set forth inthe essay on the Nature of Beauty. The following chapters aimto expand, to test, and to confirm this central theory, byshowing, partly by the aid of the aforesaid special studies,how it accounts for our pleasure in pictures, music, andliterature.
The whole field of beauty is thus brought under discussion;and therefore, though it nowhere seeks to be exhaustive intreatment, the book may fairly claim to be a more or lessconsistent and complete aesthetic theory, and hence toaddress itself to the student of aesthetics as well as to thegeneral reader. The chapter on the Nature of Beauty, indeed,will doubtless be found by the latter somewhat technical, andshould be omitted by all who definitely object to professionalphraseology. The general conclusions of the book aresufficiently stated in the less abstract papers.
Of the essays which compose the following volume, the first,third, and last are reprinted, in more or less revised form,from the "Atlantic Monthly" and the "International Monthly."Although written as independent papers, it is thought thatthey do not unduly repeat each other, but that they serve toverify, in each of the several realms of beauty, the truthof the central theory of the book.
The various influences which have served to shape a work ofthis kind become evident in the reading; but I cannot refrainfrom a word of thanks to the teachers whose inspiration andencouragement first made it possible. I owe much gratitudeto Professor Mary A. Jordan and Professor H. Norman Gardinerof Smith College, who in literature and in philosophy firstset me in the way of aesthetic interest and inquiry, and toProfessor Hugo Munsterberg of Harvard University, whosephilosophical theories and scientific guidance have largelyinfluenced my thought.
WELLESLEY COLLEGE, April 24, 1905.
I - Criticism and Aesthetics
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IT is not so long ago that the field of literary criticismwas divided into two opposing camps. France being the onlycountry in the world where criticism is a serious matter,the battle waged most fiercely there, and doubtless greatlyserved to bring about the present general interest andunderstanding of the theoretical questions at issue. Thecombatants were, of course, the impressionistic and scientificschools of criticism, and particularly enlightening were themore or less recent controversies between MM. Anatole Franceand Jules Lemaitre as representatives of the first, and M.Brunetiere as the chief exponent of the second. They haveplanted their standards; and we see that they stand fortendencies in the critical activity of every nation. Theideal of the impressionist is to bring a new piece ofliterature into being in some exquisitely happy characterization,—to create a lyric of criticism out of the unique pleasure ofan aesthetic hour. The stronghold of the scientist, on theother hand, is the doctrine of literary evolution, and hisaim is to show the history of literature as the history ofa process, and the work of literature as a product; to explainit from its preceding causes, and to detect thereby the generallaws of literary metamorphosis.
Such are the two great lines of modern criticism; their purposesand ideals stand diametrically opposed. Of late, however, therehave not been wanting signs of a spirit of reconciliation, andof a tendency to concede the value, each in its own sphere, ofdifferent but complementary activities. Now and again thelion and the lamb have lain down together; one might almost say,on reading a delightful paper of Mr. Lewis E. Gates onImpressionism and Appreciation, [1] that the lamb had assimilatedthe lion. For the heir of all literary studies, according toProfessor Gates, is the appreciative critic; and he it is whoshall fulfill the true function of criticism. He is toconsider the work of art in its historical setting and itspsychological origin, "as a characteristic moment in thedevelopment of human spirit, and as a delicately transparentillustration of aesthetic law." But, "in regarding the workof art under all these aspects, his aim is, primarily, not toexplain, and not to judge or dogmatize, but to enjoy; torealize the manifold charms the work of art has gathered untoitself from all sources, and to interpret this charm imaginativelyto the men of his own day and generation."
Thus it would seem that if the report of his personal reactionsto a work of literary art is the intention of the impressionist,and its explanation that of the scientist, the purpose of theappreciative critic is fairly named as the illuminating andinterpreting reproduction of that work, from material furnishedby those other forms of critical activity. Must, then, themethod of appreciation, as combining and reconciling the twoopposed views, forthwith claim our adherence? To put to useall the devices of science and all the treasures of scholarshipfor the single end of imaginative interpretation, for the sakeof giving with the original melody all the harmonies of subtleassociation and profound meaning the ages have added, is, indeed,a great undertaking. But is it as valuable as it is vast? M.Brunetiere has poured out his irony upon the critics who believethat their own reactions upon literature are anything to us inthe presence of the works to which they have thrilled. May itnot also be asked of the interpreter if its function is anecessary one? Do we require so much enlightenment, only toenjoy? Appreciative criticism is a salt to give the dullpalate its full savor; but what literary epicure, what realboo-lover, will acknowledge his own need of it? If the wholeaim of appreciative criticism is to reproduce in otherarrangement the contents, expressed and implied, and theemotional value, original and derived, of a piece of literature,the value of the end, at least to the intelligent reader, isout of all proportion to the laboriousness of the means. Sing,reading's a joy! For me, I read.
But a feeling of this kind is, after all, not a reason to beurged against the method. The real weakness of appreciativecriticism lies elsewhere. It teaches us to enjoy; but are weto enjoy everything? Since its only aim is to reveal the"intricate implications" of a work of art; since it offers,and professes to offer, no literary judgments,—having indeedno explicit standard of literary value,—it must, at leaston its own theory, take its objects of appreciation ready-made,so to speak, by popular acclaim. It possesses no criterion;it likes whate'er it looks on; and it can never tell us whatwe are not to like. That is unsatisfactory; and it is worse,—it is self-destructive. For, not being able to reject,appreciation cannot, in logic, choose the objects of itsattention. But a method which cannot limit on its own principlesthe field within which it is to work is condemned from thebeginning; it bears a fallacy at its core. In order to makecriticism theoretically possible at all, the power to chooseand reject, and so the pronouncing of judgment, must be anintegral part of it.
To such a task the critic may lend himself without arousingour antagonism. We have no pressing need to know the latentpossibilities of emotion for us in a book or a poem; but whetherit is excellent or the reverse, whether "we were right in beingmoved by it," we are indeed wi