Summary of Karl Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery

Everest Media

Description

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 The task of the logic of scientific discovery is to analyze the method of the empirical sciences. The methods of the empirical sciences are the steps that a scientist takes to test his hypotheses.
#2 The problem of induction is the question of the validity of universal statements based on experience, such as the hypotheses and theoretical systems of the empirical sciences. People believe that the truth of these universal statements is known by experience, but it is clear that an account of an experience can only be a singular statement and not a universal one.
#3 The principle of induction is a universal statement that is accepted by the whole of science. However, this does not mean that it is known from experience. The attempt to base the principle of induction on experience leads to an infinite regress.
#4 The work of the scientist is to put forward and test theories. The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me to be neither susceptible of nor calling for logical analysis.

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Épistémologie
• Philosophie et théologie
• Philosophy
• Logic

Informations

• Publié par: Everest Media LLC
• Date de parution: 08 mai 2022
• Nombre de lectures: 1
• EAN13: 9798822502734
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Insights on Karl Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

The task of the logic of scientific discovery is to analyze the method of the empirical sciences. The methods of the empirical sciences are the steps that a scientist takes to test his hypotheses.

#2

The problem of induction is the question of the validity of universal statements based on experience, such as the hypotheses and theoretical systems of the empirical sciences. People believe that the truth of these universal statements is known by experience, but it is clear that an account of an experience can only be a singular statement and not a universal one.

#3

The principle of induction is a universal statement that is accepted by the whole of science. However, this does not mean that it is known from experience. The attempt to base the principle of induction on experience leads to an infinite regress.

#4

The work of the scientist is to put forward and test theories. The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me to be neither susceptible of nor calling for logical analysis.

#5

The method of critically testing theories, and selecting them according to the results of tests, always proceeds on the following lines. From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way, conclusions are drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions are then compared with one another and with other relevant statements.

#6

The problem of demarcation is the source of all the other problems of the theory of knowledge. It is clear that the implied criterion of demarcation is identical with the demand for an inductive logic. I reject inductive logic, and thus all attempts to solve the problem of demarcation.

#7

The positivist attempt to demarcate science from metaphysics is to say that scientific laws are logically reducible to elementary statements of experience. But this is not the case for natural laws, which cannot be accepted as genuine or legitimate statements.

#8

I believe that science should be focused on absolutely certain, irrevocably true statements. But I also believe that science cannot exist without metaphysical ideas, and that it is impossible for scientific discovery to occur without faith in such ideas.

#9

The definition of an empirical science is not easy to come by. The three requirements are that the system must be synthetic and non-contradictory, it must satisfy the criterion of demarcation, and it must be distinguished from other systems that represent our world of experience.

#10

The criterion of demarcation inherent in inductive logic is that all the statements of empirical science must be capable of being finally decided, with respect to their truth and falsity. But I propose that we accept a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience.

#11

The proposed criterion of demarcation leads us to a solution of Hume’s problem of induction. It is based on the fact that all empirical scientific statements are susceptible to falsification, which is why they can be tested by systematic attempts to falsify them.

#12

The problem of the empirical basis is one that arises within the logic of science, but not in connection with singular statements. It is often urgent in relation to theoretical systems, but rarely in relation to singular statements.

#13

The terms objective and subjective are philosophical terms that are heavily burdened with a heritage of contradictory usages and inconclusive discussions. I use the terms objective and subjective to indicate that scientific knowledge is testable inter-subjectively.

#14

If we adhere to our demand that scientific statements must be objective, then those statements that belong to the empirical basis of science must also be objective, which means inter-subjectively testable. But inter-subjective testability always implies that from the statements that are to be tested, other testable statements can be deduced.

#15

The deductive method of testing is intended to test smaller, more universal statements that are derived from larger, more general ones. But systems of theories are not tested by deducing from them statements of a lesser level of universality. Instead, they are tested by deducing from them statements of a lesser level of universality, and so on ad infinitum.

#16

The idea of treating scientific laws as pseudo-propositions was attributed to Wittgenstein by Schlick. But it is actually much older. It is part of the instrumentalist tradition, which can be traced back to Berkeley.

#17

The idea of falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation is a myth. It separates two kinds of perfectly meaningful statements: the falsifiable and the non-falsifiable. It draws a line inside meaningful language, not around it.

#18

The idea of inter-subjective testing is simply a more important aspect of the more general idea of inter-subjective criticism, or in other words, of the idea of mutual rational control by critical discussion. This more general idea is discussed in detail in my Open Society and Its Enemies, chapters 23 and 24.

#19

Epistemology, or the logic of scientific discovery, should be identified with the theory of scientific method. The theory of method, in so far as it goes beyond the purely logical analysis of the relations between scientific statements, is concerned with the choice of methods.

#20

The way in which one answers these questions will largely depend on one’s attitude towards science. Those who view empirical science as a system of statements that satisfy certain logical criteria will give a different answer than those who view it as a system that is constantly being revised and improved.

#21

The positivist dislikes the idea that there should be any problems outside the field of positive empirical science. He dislikes the idea that there should be a genuine theory of knowledge, an epistemology, or a methodology.

#22

I believe that methodology is not an empirical science. I do not believe that it is possible to decide whether science actually uses a principle of induction or not by using the methods of an empirical science.

#23

The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one day that scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded as finally verified, retires from the game. Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, it may not be allowed to drop out without good reason.

#24

The rules of method are connected both with other methodological rules and with our criterion of demarcation. They are constructed with the aim of ensuring the applicability of our criterion of demarcation, and their formulation and acceptance proceeds according to a practical rule of a higher type.

#25

The most interesting problems in theoretical philosophy can be interpreted as problems of method. For example, the requirement of scientific objectivity can be interpreted as a methodological rule.

#26

The view that it is a matter of decision what is called a genuine statement and what is called a meaningless pseudo-statement is one that I have held for years. I regret that I was unable to discuss Carnap’s Logische Syntax der Sprache, 1934, in my text.

#27

I have relegated the critical method of resolving contradictions to second place in this book, because I have been concerned with the attempt to develop the practical aspects of my views. In an as yet unpublished work, I have tried to take the critical path and show that the problems of both the classical and modern theory of knowledge can be traced back to the problem of demarcation: finding the criterion of the empirical character of science.
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

The empirical sciences are systems of theories. The logic of scientific knowledge can be described as a theory of theories. Theories are universal statements. Like all linguistic representations, they are systems of signs or symbols.

#2

To give a causal explanation of an event, you must first find a universal law that describes it, along with certain singular statements that describe the initial conditions. You then use these ingredients to deduce a specific prediction.

#3

The principle of causality is the assertion that any event can be causally explained. It is either tautological or an assertion about reality. It is not falsifiable, and so it cannot be proven or disproven.

#4

The distinction between strictly universal statements and those that are merely numerically universal statements is important. The former are true for any place and any time, while the latter only apply to a finite class of specific elements within a finite individual.

#5

The distinction between strictly universal statements and merely numerically universal statements is applied only to synthetic statements. I may, however, mention the possibility of applying this distinction to analytic statements as well.

#6

The distinction between universal and singular statements is important in science. Every application of science is based on an inference from scientific hypotheses to singular cases, which are then predictions. But in every singular statement, individual concepts or names must occur.

#7

The distinction between universal and individual concepts is important, as it allows us to distinguish between universal and singular statements. Any attempt to define universal names with the help of individual names is bound to fail, as it is impossible to separate individual concepts from their proper names.

#8