Summary of Lewis Sorley's A Better War

Everest Media

Description

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 The choice of William Westmoreland as commander of American forces in Vietnam was a fateful one. He was chosen from a slate of four candidates presented to President Lyndon B. Johnson. The others were General Harold K. Johnson, who instead became Army Chief of Staff; General Creighton Abrams, who was assigned as Vice Chief of Staff to Johnson; and General Bruce Palmer, Jr. , who replaced Johnson as the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.
#2 The war was being fought using the big battalion approach, which was expensive and ineffective. The enemy could avoid combat when he wanted, accept it when and where they wanted, and break contact at will.
#3 In 1967, criticism of Westmoreland’s war strategy began to build from many quarters. The primary measure of merit in Vietnam was not body count, but security for the people, and search-and-destroy operations were not contributing to that.
#4 The American public was starting to feel the effects of Westmoreland’s having taken over the South Vietnamese armed forces. They felt that the Vietnamese army wasn’t carrying its fair share of the combat effort, and that the emphasis should not be on the military destruction of Communist forces, but on the protection of the people of South Vietnam and the stabilization of the situation at a politically tolerable level.

Sujets

• Histoire
• Military
• Vietnam War
• History

Informations

• Publié par: Everest Media LLC
• Date de parution: 11 mai 2022
• Nombre de lectures: 1
• EAN13: 9798822505018
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Insights on Lewis Sorley's A Better War
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8 Insights from Chapter 9 Insights from Chapter 10 Insights from Chapter 11 Insights from Chapter 12 Insights from Chapter 13 Insights from Chapter 14 Insights from Chapter 15
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

The choice of William Westmoreland as commander of American forces in Vietnam was a fateful one. He was chosen from a slate of four candidates presented to President Lyndon B. Johnson. The others were General Harold K. Johnson, who instead became Army Chief of Staff; General Creighton Abrams, who was assigned as Vice Chief of Staff to Johnson; and General Bruce Palmer, Jr. , who replaced Johnson as the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

#2

The war was being fought using the big battalion approach, which was expensive and ineffective. The enemy could avoid combat when he wanted, accept it when and where they wanted, and break contact at will.

#3

In 1967, criticism of Westmoreland’s war strategy began to build from many quarters. The primary measure of merit in Vietnam was not body count, but security for the people, and search-and-destroy operations were not contributing to that.

#4

The American public was starting to feel the effects of Westmoreland’s having taken over the South Vietnamese armed forces. They felt that the Vietnamese army wasn’t carrying its fair share of the combat effort, and that the emphasis should not be on the military destruction of Communist forces, but on the protection of the people of South Vietnam and the stabilization of the situation at a politically tolerable level.

#5

In 1967, the American leadership in Vietnam was augmented with the appointment of Ellsworth Bunker as ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Bunker was a consummate gentleman and an unusual diplomat, having come to diplomacy professionally after a long and successful business career.

#6

When Abrams first arrived to be the deputy commander, he was extremely critical of the Westmoreland approach to conduct of the war. He spent much of his year as Westmoreland’s deputy traveling the country from one end to the other, visiting South Vietnamese forces at every level to improve their leadership, equipment, and combat effectiveness.

#7

The Tet Offensive was the watershed event of the Vietnam War. It proved the domino theory, but only one domino, Lyndon B. Johnson, fell as a result of it. The costs to the enemy were enormous, and they were forced to replace their losses primarily with infdtrators from North Vietnam.

#8

The Tet Offensive had positive results within South Vietnam, as the government was able to draft more men and expand the armed forces. The expansion of the armed forces and draftable categories was due to the General Mobilization Law of June 1968.
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

The one war approach recognized and accommodated the fact that the war was a complex of interrelated contests on several levels. It stressed the importance of meeting and countering the enemy on each level.

#2

The complicated Washington policy apparatus constantly played off one faction against another, while Bunker and Abrams stood apart from such machinations. Their objective was to prepare the South Vietnamese to defend themselves before American forces were withdrawn.

#3

The body count was a major problem in Vietnam. It was grossly exaggerated by many units primarily because of the incredible interest shown by people like McNamara and Westmoreland.

#4

Abrams’s most significant impact as the new MACV commander was in his conduct of the war, and he focused on population security as the most important measure of progress. He emphasized that body count was far less important than some other measures of how well things were going.

#5

The enemy renewed their attacks in May 1968, striking in what became known as mini-Tet at multiple locations. The allies had plenty of advance warning this time, and were able to take preemptive action.

#6

The American military began to defend Saigon by installing counterbattery radars, patrolling constantly, sweeping rivers for infiltrators, and setting up a network of observation towers around the city perimeter.

#7