Summary of Martin Middlebrook's Convoy SC122 & HX229

Everest Media

Description

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 The Battle for Merchant Shipping was a campaign of attrition between the British merchant fleet and the German U-boats. If German U-boat captains torpedoed and sank more Allied ships than the British shipyards could replace, the Germans would achieve a tightening stranglehold on Britain’s supplies.
#2 The Battle of the Atlantic was the struggle between the German Navy and the Allied navies, and it was extremely close. The Germans had 46 U-boats available for action at the start of the war, and sent as many of them as possible to sea several days before Poland was invaded. They sank 222 merchant ships in March 1940, but most of these sinkings had been of ships sailing alone.
#3 The German admirals and the German Naval Staff had always wished and intended to introduce unrestricted warfare as quickly as the political leaders would allow them to. The admirals never ordered the U-boat captains to shoot survivors, but they did not protect them either.
#4 The German victories in the spring and early summer of 1940 changed many of the factors affecting the U-boat war. The successful invasion of Norway, followed by their victories in France and the Low Countries, gave the Germans the valuable ports on the coastlines of these countries.

Sujets

• Europe
• History
• Germany
• Histoire

Informations

• Publié par: Everest Media LLC
• Date de parution: 11 mai 2022
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9798822505544
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Insights on Martin Middlebrook's Convoy SC122 & HX229
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8 Insights from Chapter 9 Insights from Chapter 10 Insights from Chapter 11 Insights from Chapter 12 Insights from Chapter 13 Insights from Chapter 14 Insights from Chapter 15 Insights from Chapter 16 Insights from Chapter 17
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

The Battle for Merchant Shipping was a campaign of attrition between the British merchant fleet and the German U-boats. If German U-boat captains torpedoed and sank more Allied ships than the British shipyards could replace, the Germans would achieve a tightening stranglehold on Britain’s supplies.

#2

The Battle of the Atlantic was the struggle between the German Navy and the Allied navies, and it was extremely close. The Germans had 46 U-boats available for action at the start of the war, and sent as many of them as possible to sea several days before Poland was invaded. They sank 222 merchant ships in March 1940, but most of these sinkings had been of ships sailing alone.

#3

The German admirals and the German Naval Staff had always wished and intended to introduce unrestricted warfare as quickly as the political leaders would allow them to. The admirals never ordered the U-boat captains to shoot survivors, but they did not protect them either.

#4

The German victories in the spring and early summer of 1940 changed many of the factors affecting the U-boat war. The successful invasion of Norway, followed by their victories in France and the Low Countries, gave the Germans the valuable ports on the coastlines of these countries.

#5

The German tactic of attacking convoys at night, called die Rudeltaktik, was extremely successful in the fall of 1940. It was the basis of U-boat operations for the next three years.

#6

The Royal Navy’s main anti-submarine weapons were the depth charge and the Asdic underwater detection device, which was developed in great secrecy after 1918. The approved tactics consisted of one or more destroyers hunting the single, submerged submarine.

#7

The Battle of the Atlantic, which was the name given to the conflict between the Allies and the Nazis over the transportation of supplies, was extremely important to Britain’s survival.

#8

The Royal Canadian Navy was also building up rapidly, and the Allies were able to meet in May 1941, when the first eastbound convoy received continuous escort all the way across the North Atlantic. The first westbound convoy received the same protection in July.

#9

The wolf-pack attack tactic was found to have one essential element that the Allies used to great effect. The Germans used their wireless to report the result of attacks, their stocks of fuel and torpedoes, and to send weather reports.

#10

The Battle of the Atlantic was a stalemate in 1941. The U-boats had sunk 432 ships, a decrease on their successes in 1940, but the capacity sunk remained the same at over 2,000,000 tons.

#11

The American coast was 3,500 sea miles from the Biscay bases, but the Germans were able to assemble and maintain a force averaging eight U-boats there by the end of May 1942. The American Navy did not follow British methods, and no attempt was made to form convoys.

#12

The U-boats were now searching for easy hunting grounds, which could not continue indefinitely. The Germans lost sixty-six U-boats in the last six months of 1942, and one significant factor emerged when they were analyzed: the U-boat sinkings by aircraft exceeded those by surface escort vessels.
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

The British merchant fleet was the largest in the world pre-war. It contained almost one third of all the world’s merchant ships, and almost exceeded the combined total of its next three rivals, the United States, Japan, and Norway.

#2

The British tonnage was made up of a motley collection of ships and their crews. The officers were usually men of good education who went to sea following a family tradition. The pay of the officers was abysmally low in comparison to the skills and qualifications they required.

#3

The pre-war merchant fleet may have brought prosperity to Britain and the shipowners and shareholders, but the merchant seamen had seen little of the benefit. There was no guaranteed employment, and a man signed articles for the one round voyage and was not automatically reemployed for the next.

#4

The Merchant Navy began to suffer heavy losses of ships and crew members as soon as the war began, but a proportion of the crews were always saved. The overall numbers of ships and seamen declined for several years, but there was neither unemployment nor the need to conscript new men.

#5

The war brought more secure employment for seamen. The merchant sailors registered at their local Merchant Navy Pool office, which found them a ship and even paid them stand-by money when not at sea. The officers preferred independent sailing and the Arctic run to Russia was usually avoided.

#6

The Merchant Navy was a civilian occupation, and it suffered high casualties during the war. However, it also contained heroes and cowards alike. The pre-war experiences of American merchant seamen were similar to those of British seamen, with poor conditions, bad food, and competition with cheap foreign labor.

#7

The American shipbuilding industry was a major success story of the war. They were able to produce both warships and merchant ships, and they did so much that the Allies’ losses of merchant shipping were eventually replaced by American-built ships.

#8

The American merchant sailor had a similar life to the British, but he was paid twice as much. The American Navy also had a large contingent of gunners on every ship, who were rarely popular in the merchant ships.

#9

The British navy received a large supply of shipping when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, and the countries’ fleets were sent to work for Britain. The crews of these ships were not allowed to see their homelands or families for five years.

#10

The British navy had many fine classes of modern destroyers, but its main allocation for convoy duty were the oldest and least effective destroyers of the V and W Class and the Town Class. The 1,000-ton Vs and Ws had been produced in large numbers during and just after the 1914-18 War, and could not even cross the Atlantic without going into Iceland to refuel.

#11

The Royal Navy had six Havant Class destroyers that had been built for the Brazilian Navy, but were taken over by Britain when war broke out. They were fast, had advanced depth-charge armament, and good fuel endurance.

#12

The British groups all had their main bases on their own side of the Atlantic, and they would escort one convoy across to a position off Newfoundland, go into St John’s for a few days rest, and then bring another convoy back to England for a longer period of rest at its main base.

#13

The Allies were fighting the U-boats in the North Atlantic in 1943 with ships that were practically castoffs and surplus from more important theaters of war. The officers and men who manned the escort vessels of the Western Approaches Command must have felt that they formed a separate navy.

#14

The escort vessels were met by mid-ocean escorts provided by the British, Belgian, and Canadian navies. Only eight regular Royal Navy deck officers were in these eighteen escorts compared with 103 reserve officers.

#15

The Navy sent large numbers of both types of reserve officers into anti-submarine escorts. The R. N. R. s had little experience and had to learn many of their specialist duties as they went along, but they also found a tremendous responsibility and self-satisfaction in being trusted as Watchkeeping Officers.

#16