Summary of Max Hastings's Overlord

Everest Media

Description

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 The United States, which might have chosen to view the war in Europe as a distraction from the struggle against Japan, was instead persuaded to commit its greatest strength in the west.
#2 The outcome of the Second World War was never in doubt. But great delays and difficulties lay ahead in mobilizing America’s industrial might for the battlefield, and in determining by what strategy the Axis was to be crushed.
#3 The American government was initially afraid of a rapid Russian collapse, so they agreed to launch ROUNDUP with 48 Allied divisions in April 1943. But the British continued to fight to divert resources towards more modest objectives. In the summer of 1942, the Americans reluctantly agreed to launch GYMNAST, an operation for the invasion of French North Africa.
#4 The American Chiefs of Staff returned to Washington irritably conscious that they had been persuaded to adopt a course they did not favor. The British had at least acknowledged that north-west Europe must be invaded in 1944.

Sujets

• Seconde Guerre mondiale
• World War II
• Military
• Segunda Guerra Mundial

Informations

• Publié par: Everest Media LLC
• Date de parution: 27 avril 2022
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781669393122
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Insights on Max Hastings 's Overlord
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8 Insights from Chapter 9 Insights from Chapter 10 Insights from Chapter 11 Insights from Chapter 12
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

The United States, which might have chosen to view the war in Europe as a distraction from the struggle against Japan, was instead persuaded to commit its greatest strength in the west.

#2

The outcome of the Second World War was never in doubt. But great delays and difficulties lay ahead in mobilizing America’s industrial might for the battlefield, and in determining by what strategy the Axis was to be crushed.

#3

The American government was initially afraid of a rapid Russian collapse, so they agreed to launch ROUNDUP with 48 Allied divisions in April 1943. But the British continued to fight to divert resources towards more modest objectives. In the summer of 1942, the Americans reluctantly agreed to launch GYMNAST, an operation for the invasion of French North Africa.

#4

The American Chiefs of Staff returned to Washington irritably conscious that they had been persuaded to adopt a course they did not favor. The British had at least acknowledged that north-west Europe must be invaded in 1944.

#5

The British were growing weary of the war, and their people were reaching the limits of their capacity to support the Allied offensive. They were beginning to feel that their strength was waning, and that they would never use it for a military offensive against western Europe.

#6

The Americans, on the other hand, were often judged unfairly by the British. They saw many difficulties in haste, but great virtues in delay. The British were reluctant to launch a campaign in Europe, but they were realistic about the German army’s dwindling numbers and the air forces’ strategic bombing efforts.

#7

The American strategic view was that Germany could have been defeated much earlier, if the Allied air supremacy had been maintained from the beginning and France had been invaded in 1943. But the American soldiers were not yet the equals of their German opponents.

#8

The planning and preparation of OVERLORD was not to slacken again. Through the winter of 1943 and even into the spring of 1944, other plans and problems were occupying the minds of the British and American high commands, but one by one, lesser operations withered on the bough.

#9

The COSSAC staff was handicapped by the fact that they were required to plan an operation with limited resources. They still were able to achieve a lot, though, as they drew upon the fruits of aerial reconnaissance and a canvass of Britain for pre-war holiday photographs of every yard of the coast line of France.

#10

The planning of the invasion was intense, and the staff worked painstakingly through every aspect of it. The priorities were Caen, Bayeux, and the road to St Lô, followed by the road to Falaise and the port of Cherbourg.

#11

Eisenhower was a great commander, but he was no battlefield commander. He was sensitive to the charge that he was timid, when he had had to do things that were so risky that they were almost crazy. But history has so far been confident in his greatness as Supreme Commander.

#12

The invasion was an American design, but for the British people, it represented a rebirth, a return, and a reversal of all the humiliations and defeats they had endured since 1939.
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

Bradley was 50 years old when he was assigned to lead the American army in north-west Europe. He was a commander of exceptional stability and discretion, whom men liked and immediately trusted. He could read a battle.

#2

Montgomery, after months of hesitation, had finally sketched out a feasible plan. He began to exert his own immense will to ensure that the resources would be found to land five divisions and secure a beachhead large enough to provide room for the Allied armies.

#3

Montgomery’s claim that the new plan was entirely his vision and conception was false. In reality, most of the staff in England had been aware for months of the need to strengthen the attack, but lacked the authority to insist upon it.

#4

Montgomery’s self-esteem was based on his faith in himself as a supreme professional who understood the conduct of military operations better than less dedicated commanders. He was devoted to winning, even if it meant sacrificing truth.

#5

The planning process was a huge task that required the cooperation of many different military organizations. The Americans would go for Cherbourg, Brest, and the Loire ports. The British and Canadians on the left would deal with the enemy main body approaching from the east and south-east.

#6

The American invasion of France was the largest logistical achievement of the Second World War. The American army had 137,000 wheeled and semi-tracked vehicles, 4,217 full-tracked vehicles, and 3,500 artillery pieces.

#7

The staff at 21st Army Group was pre-occupied with planning the battle, and they used little paper and long hours of debate and thought to do so. They were haunted by the fear that some breach of security might compromise the landing, and the Germans might secretly be waiting for the Allies in Normandy.

#8

The Allied landing plan called for four corps to feed their men in columns through the five beaches during the period following D-Day. The British 7th Armoured Division was preparing for D-Day in the flatlands of East Anglia. Most British infantry battalions knew little of the infiltration tactics in which the Germans were so skilled, and relied overwhelmingly upon the straightforward open order advance.

#9

The British and Canadian elements of the invasion force were supposed to hold a line north of Caen, but Montgomery’s plans changed constantly, and he was not honest with his superiors about his difficulties on the eastern flank.

#10

The issue of the perimeters which the Allied armies might expect to hold by given dates following the landings was a source of controversy between Bradley and Montgomery. Bradley wanted the American sector to be removed from the map, but Montgomery refused to be committed.

#11

The air forces of Britain and America were extremely passionate about their independence, and they struggled to find a role for themselves beyond that of flying eyes and artillery for the older services. This enthusiasm for strategic air power severely hindered the development of close air-ground support techniques.

#12

The American Fortresses pursued their precision bombing campaign guided by General Carl Tooey Spaatz, an airman who disagreed with Harris about the best means of defeating Germany from the air, but made common cause with the Englishman’s commitment to independent air power.

#13

The document shows that there were still Allied officers in high commands who were deeply skeptical about the entire operation two months before D-Day. The airmen opposed their own participation in the operation, believing that it was a dangerous distraction.

#14

The Allied air forces were responsible for the transport bombing of French rail junctions and river crossings, which played a critical role in restricting the movement of German reinforcements after D-Day. The cost was 12,000 French and Belgian lives, which was considerably lower than Churchill had feared.

#15

By 1944, the credibility of the bomber chiefs had fallen low in the eyes of the Allied high command. They had so often exaggerated the extent of German aircraft destroyed that it was difficult for other leaders of the Allied air forces to believe the Mustang’s victory.

#16

The level of mutual dissent between the Allied air chiefs was driving them crazy. The American Brereton and the New Zealander Mary Coningham, commanding the British 2nd Tactical Air Force, hated Leigh-Mallory, and refused to follow his orders.

#17

The air chiefs in Britain were conspiring to defend the sectional interests of their own service. They had devoted only minimal thought or effort to close ground support.

#18

By 1944, southern England had become a vast military encampment. The soldiers were packed into Nissen and Quonset huts, tents, and requisitioned country houses from Cornwall to Kent and far northwards up the length of the country.

#19

The British battle school army was excited to be fighting in France, but many of the men were simply eager to go home. Others were resigned to their part in the invasion.

#20

The British invasion force was made up of veteran divisions that had been brought home from the Mediterranean, where they had gained great reputations. The men of 50th Division were told that they were expendable, and that they would be used on the battlefield for tasks in which the rate of attrition would be high.

#21

The British army that landed in Normandy would be the greatest force that Montgomery ever commanded in north-west Europe. The early weeks in Europe would be the last of British parity with the Americans in ground-force strength.

#22

The American and British armies worked extremely well together beneath the surface tensions between them. The American class system and military tradition meant that their men were far more deeply imbued with the manners and habits of regular soldiers than their British counterparts.

#23

The American army’s teeth were severely blunted because they lacked their proper share of the ablest and fittest officers and men. The American air corps, the specialist branches, and the service staff had been allowed to cream off too high a proportion of the best-educated, fittest recruits.

#24

The invasion was a difficult concept for many young men to grasp. They felt like it was