Two Admirals
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325 pages
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Description

Sail out for adventure on the high seas with famed author James Fenimore Cooper. The Two Admirals is a gripping tale of nautical warfare set during the Jacobite rebellion of 1745. Parallel with the plotline of naval conflict is a puzzle of inheritance, as Sir Wycherly Wychecombe struggles to identify the true heir of his family's wealth and legacy.

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Publié par
Date de parution 01 juillet 2011
Nombre de lectures 0
EAN13 9781775453796
Langue English

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,0134€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

Extrait

THE TWO ADMIRALS
* * *
JAMES FENIMORE COOPER
 
*
The Two Admirals First published in 1842 ISBN 978-1-775453-79-6 © 2011 The Floating Press and its licensors. All rights reserved. While every effort has been used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in The Floating Press edition of this book, The Floating Press does not assume liability or responsibility for any errors or omissions in this book. The Floating Press does not accept responsibility for loss suffered as a result of reliance upon the accuracy or currency of information contained in this book. Do not use while operating a motor vehicle or heavy equipment. Many suitcases look alike. Visit www.thefloatingpress.com
Contents
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Preface Chapter I Chapter II Chapter III Chapter IV Chapter V Chapter VI Chapter VII Chapter VIII Chapter IX Chapter X Chapter XI Chapter XII Chapter XIII Chapter XIV Chapter XV Chapter XVI Chapter XVII Chapter XVIII Chapter XIX Chapter XX Chapter XXI Chapter XXII Chapter XXIII Chapter XXIV Chapter XXV Chapter XXVI Chapter XXVII Chapter XXVIII Chapter XXIX Chapter XXX Chapter XXXI Endnotes
*
Come, all ye kindred chieftains of the deep, In mighty phalanx round your brother bend; Hush every murmur that invades his sleep, And guard the laurel that o'ershades your friend.
Lines on Trippe.
Preface
*
It is a strong proof of the diffusive tendency of every thing in thiscountry, that America never yet collected a fleet. Nothing is wanting tothis display of power but the will. But a fleet requires only onecommander, and a feeling is fast spreading in the country that we oughtto be all commanders; unless the spirit of unconstitutional innovation,and usurpation, that is now so prevalent, at Washington, be controlled,we may expect to hear of proposals to send a committee of Congress tosea, in command of a squadron. We sincerely hope that their firstexperiment may be made on the coast of Africa.
It has been said of Napoleon that he never could be made to understandwhy his fleets did not obey his orders with the same accuracy, as totime and place, as his corps d'armée . He made no allowances for thewinds and currents, and least of all, did he comprehend that allimportant circumstance, that the efficiency of a fleet is necessarilyconfined to the rate of sailing of the dullest of its ships. More may beexpected from a squadron of ten sail, all of which shall be averagevessels, in this respect, than from the same number of vessels, of whichone half are fast and the remainder dull. One brigade can march as fastas another, but it is not so with vessels. The efficiency of a marine,therefore, depends rather on its working qualities, than on its numberof ships.
Perhaps the best fleet that ever sailed under the English flag, was thatwith which Nelson fought the battle of the Nile. It consisted of twelveor thirteen small seventy-fours, each of approved qualities, andcommanded by an officer of known merit. In all respects it was efficientand reliable. With such men as Hallowell, Hood, Trowbridge, Foley, Ball,and others, and with such ships, the great spirit of Nelson wassatisfied. He knew that whatever seamen could do, his comparativelylittle force could achieve. When his enemy was discovered at anchor,though night was approaching and his vessels were a good deal scattered,he at once determined to put the qualities we have mentioned to thehighest proof, and to attack. This was done without any other order ofbattle than that which directed each commander to get as close alongsideof an enemy as possible, the best proof of the high confidence he had inhis ships and in their commanders.
It is now known that all the early accounts of the manoeuvring at theNile, and of Nelson's reasoning on the subject of anchoring inside andof doubling on his enemies, is pure fiction. The "Life" by Southey, inall that relates to this feature of the day, is pure fiction, as,indeed, are other portions of the work of scarcely less importance. Thisfact came to the writer, through the late Commodore (Charles Valentine)Morris, from Sir Alexander Ball, in the early part of the century. Inthat day it would not have done to proclaim it, so tenacious is publicopinion of its errors; but since that time, naval officers of rank havewritten on the subject, and stripped the Nile, Trafalgar, &c, of theirpoetry, to give the world plain, nautical, and probable accounts of boththose great achievements. The truth, as relates to both battles, wasjust as little like the previously published accounts, as well could be.
Nelson knew the great superiority of the English seamen, their facilityin repairing damages, and most of all the high advantage possessed bythe fleets of his country, in the exercise of the assumed right toimpress, a practice that put not only the best seamen of his owncountry, but those of the whole world, more or less, at his mercy. Hisgreat merit, at the Nile, was in the just appreciation of theseadvantages, and in the extraordinary decision which led him to go intoaction just at nightfall, rather than give his enemy time to prepare tomeet the shock.
It is now known that the French were taken, in a great measure, bysurprise. A large portion of their crews were on shore, and did not getoff to their ships at all, and there was scarce a vessel that did notclear the decks, by tumbling the mess-chests, bags, &c, into the insidebatteries, rendering them, in a measure, useless, when the Englishdoubled on their line.
It was this doubling on the French line, by anchoring inside, andputting two ships upon one, that gave Nelson so high a reputation as atactician. The merit of this manoeuvre belongs exclusively to one ofhis captains. As the fleet went in, without any order, keeping as muchto windward as the shoals would permit, Nelson ordered the Vanguardhove-to, to take a pilot out of a fisherman. This enabled Foley, Hood,and one or two more to pass that fast ship. It was at this criticalmoment that the thought occurred to Foley (we think this was theofficer) to pass the head of the French line, keep dead away, and anchorinside. Others followed, completely placing their enemies between twofires. Sir Samuel Hood anchored his ship (the Zealous) on the inner bowof the most weatherly French ship, where he poured his fire into,virtually; an unresisting enemy. Notwithstanding the great skillmanifested by the English in their mode of attack, this was the onlytwo-decked ship in the English fleet that was able to make sail on thefollowing morning.
Had Nelson led in upon an American fleet, as he did upon the French atthe Nile, he would have seen reason to repent the boldness of theexperiment. Something like it was attempted on Lake Champlain, thoughon a greatly diminished scale, and the English were virtually defeatedbefore they anchored.
The reader who feels an interest in such subjects, will probably detectthe secret process of the mind, by which some of the foregoing factshave insinuated themselves into this fiction.
Chapter I
*
"Then, if he were my brother's. My brother might not claim him; nor your father, Being none of his, refuse him: This concludes— My mother's son did get your father's heir; Your father's heir must have your father's land."
KING JOHN.
The events we are about to relate, occurred near the middle of the lastcentury, previously even to that struggle, which it is the fashion ofAmerica to call "the old French War." The opening scene of our tale,however, must be sought in the other hemisphere, and on the coast of themother country. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the Americancolonies were models of loyalty; the very war, to which there has justbeen allusion, causing the great expenditure that induced the ministryto have recourse to the system of taxation, which terminated in therevolution. The family quarrel had not yet commenced. Intensely occupiedwith the conflict, which terminated not more gloriously for the Britisharms, than advantageously for the British American possessions, theinhabitants of the provinces were perhaps never better disposed to themetropolitan state, than at the very period of which we are about towrite. All their early predilections seemed to be gaining strength,instead of becoming weaker; and, as in nature, the calm is known tosucceed the tempest, the blind attachment of the colony to the parentcountry, was but a precursor of the alienation and violent disunion thatwere so soon to follow.
Although the superiority of the English seamen was well established, inthe conflicts that took place between the years 1740, and that of 1763,the naval warfare of the period by no means possessed the very decidedcharacter with which it became stamped, a quarter of a century later. Inour own times, the British marine appears to have improved in quality,as its enemies, deteriorated. In the year 1812, however, "Greek metGreek," when, of a verity, came "the tug of war." The great change thatcame over the other navies of Europe, was merely a consequence of therevolutions, which drove experienced men into exile, and which, byrendering armies all-important even to the existence of the differentstates, threw nautical enterprises into the shade, and gave anengrossing direction to courage and talent, in another quarter. WhileFrance was struggling, first for independence, and next for the masteryof the continent, a marine was a secondary object; for Vienna, Berlin,and Moscow, were as easily entered without, as with its aid. To these,and other similar causes, must be referred the explanation of theseeming invincibility of the English arms at sea, during the late greatconflicts of Europe; an invincibility that was more apparent than real,however, as many well-established defeats were, even then, intermingledwith her thousand victories.
From the time when her numbers could furnish succour of this nature,down to the day of separation, America had her full share in theexploits of the English marine. The gentry of the colonies w

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