Bergson and History

Leon Ter Schure

Description

Henri Bergson is famous for his explorations of time as duration, yet he rarely referred to history in his writings. Simultaneously, historians and philosophers of history have generally disregarded Bergson's ideas about the nature of time. Modernity has brought change at an ever-accelerating rate, and one of the results of this has been a tendency toward presentism. Only the here and now matters, as past and future have been absorbed by the "omnipresent present" of the digital age. In highlighting the role of history in the work of Bergson, Bergson and History shows how his philosophy of life allows us to revise the modern conception of history. Bergson's philosophy situates history within a broader framework of life as a creative becoming, allowing us to rethink important topics in the study of history, such as historical time, the survival of the past, and historical progress.
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations

Introduction: History, Presentism, Bergsonism

1. The Case of the London Cenotaph

2. Historiography, Modernity, and the Acceleration of Time

3. Bergson and the Crisis of the Modern Regime of Historicity

4. A World Made Out of Time

5. The Survival of the Past

6. Historical Creation

7. The Dream of Progress

Conclusion: Assessing Presentism

Bibliography
Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Philosophie moderne
• Philosophie moderne
• Philosophy
• Historiography

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 27 septembre 2019
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781438476254
• Langue: English

Extrait

BERGSON AND HISTORY
SUNY series in Contemporary French Thought

David Pettigrew and François Raffoul, editors
BERGSON AND HISTORY
Transforming the Modern Regime of Historicity
L EON TER S CHURE
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2019 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Schure, Leon ter, 1980– author.
Title: Bergson and history : transforming the modern regime of historicity / Leon ter Schure.
Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, [2019] | Series: SUNY series in contemporary French thought | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018052656 | ISBN 9781438476230 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781438476254 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Bergson, Henri, 1859–1941. | Historicism. | History—Philosophy.
Classification: LCC B2430.B43 S382 2019 | DDC 194—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018052656
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
C ONTENTS
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction: History, Presentism, Bergsonism
1. The Case of the London Cenotaph
2. Historiography, Modernity, and the Acceleration of Time
3. Bergson and the Crisis of the Modern Regime of Historicity
4. A World Made Out of Time
5. The Survival of the Past
6. Historical Creation
7. The Dream of Progress
Conclusion: Assessing Presentism
Bibliography
Index
I LLUSTRATIONS Figure 1.1 Photograph of the London Cenotaph, 1920. Figure 3.1 People listening at the window to a course by M. Bergson, 1914. Figure 5.1 Bergson’s memory-cone. Figure 7.1 Front page of Le Matin , August 4, 1914.
A CKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to acknowledge those who contributed in various ways to the realization of this book. This work evolved from my doctoral thesis and I want to thank the University of Groningen for allowing me the opportunity to conduct the research on which it is based. While working at the Faculty of Philosophy, I benefited a lot from the feedback that I received from my colleagues. My special thanks go out to René Boomkens and Eddo Evink, who took the time to discuss earlier drafts of this manuscript and who gave many useful suggestions for improvement. This also goes for Eelco Runia, who pointed me to the history of the London Cenotaph. I am appreciative to Marc Cooper and James Harbeck for their help in improving the English of this text. I would like to thank the editors and staff of SUNY Press for the pleasant way in which they have guided me through the publication process, especially Jenn Bennett-Genthner, Andrew Kenyon, Chelsea Miller, and Kate Seburyamo. I also owe gratitude to the two anonymous readers for their insightful reports. I acknowledge the Mary Evans Picture Library and the Bibliothèque nationale de France for giving me permission to use a number of images in this book. Many people have contributed to this book by giving me new insights and inspiration, or by reading and commenting on previous versions of this text. In particular, I want to thank Thijs Lijster, Daniëlle Aalten, Auke Kranenborg, Joost van Driessche, Bjinse Sikma, Frank Ankersmit, and Sandra Ramírez. I am deeply grateful for the encouragement and support of my friends and of my family, Inge and Jeroen, Jurre and Lize, and Pauline. I thank my girlfriend, Hiske, for her invaluable love and support. I dedicate this book to my mother and father.
A BBREVIATIONS
Whenever possible, references to the works of Bergson are given to the authorized English translations, which were approved by Bergson, who was fluent in English. Abbreviations are used in the notes to refer to Bergson’s writings. The French originals are included in Bergson’s Oeuvres (1959), to which I refer below: CE Creative Evolution ( L’Évolution créatrice , 1907). Translated by Arthur Mitchell. 1911. Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1988. In Oeuvres , 487–809. CM The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics ( La Pensée et le mouvant , 1934). Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. 1946. Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2007. In Oeuvres , 1249–1482. ML Mélanges . Edited by André Robinet. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972. ME Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays ( L’Énergie spirituelle , 1919). Translated by H. Wildon Carr. London: Henry Holt and Company, 1920. In Oeuvres , 811–977. MM Matter and Memory ( Matière et mémoire , 1896). Translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. 1912. Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004. In Oeuvres , 159–379. OE Oeuvres . Edited by André Robinet. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. TFW Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness ( Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience , 1889). Translated by F.L. Pogson. 1913. Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2001. In Oeuvres , 1–157. TS The Two Sources of Morality and Religion ( Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion , 1932). Translated by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton. 1935. Reprint, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. In Oeuvres , 979–1247.
I NTRODUCTION
History, Presentism, Bergsonism
We have been thrown into a time in which everything is provisional. New technologies alter our lives daily. The traditions of the past cannot be retrieved. At the same time we have little idea of what the future will bring. We are forced to live as if we were free. 1
—John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals
A “return to Bergson” does not only mean a renewed admiration for a great philosopher but a renewal or an extension of his project today, in relation to the transformations of life and society, in parallel with the transformations of science. 2
—Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism
Time is what hinders everything from being given at once. It retards, or rather it is retardation. It must therefore, be elaboration. Would it not then be a vehicle of creation and of choice? Would not the existence of time prove that there is indetermination in things? Would not time be that indetermination itself? 3
—Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics
In 1989 Francis Fukuyama famously proclaimed the “end of history.” The fall of the Berlin Wall and the failure of communism had, according to Fukuyama, ended a centuries-long, political-ideological evolution of mankind. Liberal democracy had prevailed over rival ideologies such as monarchy, fascism, and communism, and would soon establish a uniform political reality based on equality and freedom. To Fukuyama, the end of history was also a sad time. The world would now be free from irrationalities and there would be nothing left to fight for: “the worldwide ideological struggle that calls forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of consumer demands.” 4
Fukuyama’s predictions have since been widely criticized and rejected. Now, more than twenty-five years after its proclamation, the end of history is often considered as a utopian symbol for the “happy ’90s,” when liberal democracy seemed like the “finally found formula of the best possible society.” 5 The only thing left to do was improve liberal-democratic capitalism and make it even more just and tolerant than it already was. The ideological striving that had determined the course of the twentieth century appeared to belong to the past once and for all.
We could therefore maintain that Fukuyama was not all that wrong and that history did indeed come to an end after 1989. Yet this has not been the end of history as such, but of a very specific idea about the nature of history. What has come to an end is the notion that we as human beings are part of history as an all-encompassing process that we are collectively shaping. This idea came into existence at the end of the eighteenth century with the invention of the “modern” future. 6 History, in this view, was the road upon which we collectively travel toward a utopian future, while the past represented the distance already covered, measuring how far we have removed ourselves from the traditional, premodern world that we have left behind.
Nowadays, we no longer consider ourselves historical beings. Of course, we still live in times of constant change. Technological innovations transform on an almost daily basis the ways we communicate, transport ourselves, and produce. “Just about everything” seems to accelerate, as James Gleick puts it, while paradoxically we seem to have less and less free time and collectively suffer from “hurry-sickness.” 7 However, despite the continuous acceleration of time, it seems that history has come to a standstill. It is as if we have lost the ability to “make history.” The changes among which we live are overwhelming and appear without direction. In spite of our hectic daily lives, it seems that in contemporary society “nothing essentially changes anymore and nothing new occurs.” 8
Commentators have therefore noted that twenty-first-century societies are no longer oriented toward the future, but increasingly to the present moment. Douglas Rushkoff even speaks of “present shock” to describe our current condition. He argues that while futurist Alvin Toffler spoke in 1970 of “future shock” to describe what happens to people when they are “overwhelmed by an acceleration of change,” 9 the future that we were waiting for