Beyond Good and Evil

Wilhelm Nietzsche Friedrich

Description

Beyong Good and Evil expands on the ideas Nietzsche first published in Thus Spake Zarathustra. Darker in its philosophy, this text questions Christianity as a basis for moral thinking. In its place, Nietzsche calls for the use of bold critical thinking and individualism.

Sujets

• Philosophie et théologie
• Philosophy

Informations

• Publié par: The Floating Press
• Date de parution: 01 janvier 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781775411499
• Langue: English

Extrait

BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE
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FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE
Translated by
HELEN ZIMMERN
 
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Beyond Good and Evil Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future First published in 1886.
ISBN 978-1-775411-49-9
© 2008 THE FLOATING PRESS.
While every effort has been used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in The Floating Press edition of this book, The Floating Press does not assume liability or responsibility for any errors or omissions in this book. The Floating Press does not accept responsibility for loss suffered as a result of reliance upon the accuracy or currency of information contained in this book. Do not use while operating a motor vehicle or heavy equipment. Many suitcases look alike.
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Contents
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Preface Chapter I - Prejudices of Philosophers Chapter II - The Free Spirit Chapter III - The Religious Mood Chapter IV - Apophthegms and Interludes Chapter V - The Natural History of Morals Chapter VI - We Scholars Chapter VII - Our Virtues Chapter VIII - Peoples and Countries Chapter IX - What is Noble? From the Heights Endnotes
Preface
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SUPPOSING that Truth is a woman—what then? Is there not groundfor suspecting that all philosophers, in so far as they have beendogmatists, have failed to understand women—that the terribleseriousness and clumsy importunity with which they have usuallypaid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled and unseemlymethods for winning a woman? Certainly she has never allowedherself to be won; and at present every kind of dogma stands withsad and discouraged mien—IF, indeed, it stands at all! For thereare scoffers who maintain that it has fallen, that all dogma lieson the ground—nay more, that it is at its last gasp. But tospeak seriously, there are good grounds for hoping that alldogmatizing in philosophy, whatever solemn, whatever conclusiveand decided airs it has assumed, may have been only a noblepuerilism and tyronism; and probably the time is at hand when itwill be once and again understood WHAT has actually sufficed forthe basis of such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices asthe dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popularsuperstition of immemorial time (such as the soul-superstition,which, in the form of subject- and ego-superstition, has not yetceased doing mischief): perhaps some play upon words, a deceptionon the part of grammar, or an audacious generalization of veryrestricted, very personal, very human—all-too-human facts. Thephilosophy of the dogmatists, it is to be hoped, was only apromise for thousands of years afterwards, as was astrology instill earlier times, in the service of which probably morelabour, gold, acuteness, and patience have been spent than on anyactual science hitherto: we owe to it, and to its "super-terrestrial" pretensions in Asia and Egypt, the grand style ofarchitecture. It seems that in order to inscribe themselves uponthe heart of humanity with everlasting claims, all great thingshave first to wander about the earth as enormous and awe-inspiring caricatures: dogmatic philosophy has been a caricatureof this kind—for instance, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia, andPlatonism in Europe. Let us not be ungrateful to it, although itmust certainly be confessed that the worst, the most tiresome,and the most dangerous of errors hitherto has been a dogmatisterror—namely, Plato's invention of Pure Spirit and the Good inItself. But now when it has been surmounted, when Europe, rid ofthis nightmare, can again draw breath freely and at least enjoy ahealthier—sleep, we, WHOSE DUTY IS WAKEFULNESS ITSELF, are theheirs of all the strength which the struggle against this errorhas fostered. It amounted to the very inversion of truth, and thedenial of the PERSPECTIVE—the fundamental condition—of life, tospeak of Spirit and the Good as Plato spoke of them; indeed onemight ask, as a physician: "How did such a malady attack thatfinest product of antiquity, Plato? Had the wicked Socratesreally corrupted him? Was Socrates after all a corrupter ofyouths, and deserved his hemlock?" But the struggle againstPlato, or—to speak plainer, and for the "people"—the struggleagainst the ecclesiastical oppression of millenniums ofChristianity (FOR CHRISTIANITY IS PLATONISM FOR THE "PEOPLE"),produced in Europe a magnificent tension of soul, such as had notexisted anywhere previously; with such a tensely strained bow onecan now aim at the furthest goals. As a matter of fact, theEuropean feels this tension as a state of distress, and twiceattempts have been made in grand style to unbend the bow: once bymeans of Jesuitism, and the second time by means of democraticenlightenment—which, with the aid of liberty of the press andnewspaper-reading, might, in fact, bring it about that the spiritwould not so easily find itself in "distress"! (The Germansinvented gunpowder—all credit to them! but they again made thingssquare—they invented printing.) But we, who are neither Jesuits,nor democrats, nor even sufficiently Germans, we GOOD EUROPEANS,and free, VERY free spirits—we have it still, all the distressof spirit and all the tension of its bow! And perhaps also thearrow, the duty, and, who knows? THE GOAL TO AIM AT. . . .
Sils Maria Upper Engadine, JUNE, 1885.
Chapter I - Prejudices of Philosophers
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one
The Will to Truth, which is to tempt us to many a hazardousenterprise, the famous Truthfulness of which all philosophershave hitherto spoken with respect, what questions has this Willto Truth not laid before us! What strange, perplexing,questionable questions! It is already a long story; yet it seemsas if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at lastgrow distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away? Thatthis Sphinx teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves? WHO isit really that puts questions to us here? WHAT really is this"Will to Truth" in us? In fact we made a long halt at thequestion as to the origin of this Will—until at last we came toan absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. Weinquired about the VALUE of this Will. Granted that we want thetruth: WHY NOT RATHER untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance?The problem of the value of truth presented itself before us—orwas it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of usis the Oedipus here? Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be arendezvous of questions and notes of interrogation. And could itbe believed that it at last seems to us as if the problem hadnever been propounded before, as if we were the first to discernit, get a sight of it, and RISK RAISING it? For there is risk inraising it, perhaps there is no greater risk.
two
"HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? Forexample, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the willto deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or thepure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Suchgenesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worsethan a fool; things of the highest value must have a differentorigin, an origin of THEIR own—in this transitory, seductive,illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity,they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, inthe intransitory, in the concealed God, in the 'Thing-in-itself—THERE must be their source, and nowhere else!"—This mode ofreasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysiciansof all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at theback of all their logical procedure; through this "belief" oftheirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," forsomething that is in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." Thefundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESESOF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubthere on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was mostnecessary); though they had made a solemn vow, "DE OMNIBUSDUBITANDUM." For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antithesesexist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations andantitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set theirseal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merelyprovisional perspectives, besides being probably made from somecorner, perhaps from below—"frog perspectives," as it were, toborrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all thevalue which may belong to the true, the positive, and theunselfish, it might be possible that a higher and morefundamental value for life generally should be assigned topretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity.It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value ofthose good and respected things, consists precisely in theirbeing insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these eviland apparently opposed things—perhaps even in being essentiallyidentical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himselfwith such dangerous "Perhapses"! For that investigation one mustawait the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as willhave other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hithertoprevalent—philosophers of the dangerous "Perhaps" in every senseof the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such newphilosophers beginning to appear.
three
Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having readbetween their lines long enough, I now say to myself that thegreater part of conscious thinking must be counted among theinstinctive functions, and it is so even in the case ofphilosophical thinking; one has here to learn anew, as onelearned anew about heredity and "innateness." As little as theact of birth comes into consideration in the whole process andprocedure of heredity, just as little is "being-conscious"OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greaterpart of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretlyinfluenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels.And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement,there ar