Imagination, Music, and the Emotions

Saam Trivedi

Description

Both musicians and laypersons can perceive purely instrumental music without words or an associated story or program as expressing emotions such as happiness and sadness. But how? In this book, Saam Trivedi discusses and critiques the leading philosophical approaches to this question, including formalism, metaphorism, expression theories, arousalism, resemblance theories, and persona theories. Finding these to be inadequate, he advocates an "imaginationist" solution, by which absolute music is not really or literally sad but is only imagined to be so in a variety of ways. In particular, he argues that we as listeners animate the music ourselves, imaginatively projecting life and mental states onto it. Bolstering his argument with empirical data from studies in neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science, Trivedi also addresses and explores larger philosophical questions such as the nature of emotions, metaphors, and imagination.
Introduction

I. Emotions, Moods, and Feelings

1. Introduction
2. What are Emotions?
3. Emotions, Beliefs, and Moods
4. Other Views: Martha Nussbaum’s Neo-Stoic Cognitivism
5. Paul Griffiths’s Theory
6. Jesse Prinz’s Somatic View
7. A Concluding Concession

II. Expression Theories and Arousalism

1. Introduction
2. Bruce Vermazen’s Expression Theory
3. Jerrold Levinson’s Persona Theory
4. Jenefer Robinson’s Theory
5. Contra Simple Arousalism
6. Aaron Ridley’s Moderate Arousalism
7. Derek Matravers’s Moderate Arousalism
8. Charles Nussbaum’s View
9. Conclusion

III. Metaphors and Metaphorism

1. Introduction
2. Against Metaphorism (Part 1)
3. Metaphorical Meaning and Paraphraseability
4. Against Metaphorism (Part 2)
5. Metaphors, Resemblance, and Imagination
6. Against Metaphorism (Part 3)
7. Conclusion

IV. Resemblance-Based Theories

1. Introduction
2. Resemblance-Based Views
3. Criticisms
4. Objections and Replies
5. Conclusion

V. Imagination

1. Introduction: Different Kinds of Imaginings
2. Imaginative Perceptions and Perceptual Imaginings
3. Children’s Imaginings
4. Gregory Currie’s View
5. Imagination, Music Perception, and Musical Culture
6. Conclusion

VI. Imaginationism

1. Introduction
2. Against Formalism about Music
3. How We Imagine in Relation to Music
4. Why We Imagine in Relation to Music
5. Musical Arousal
6. Objections and Replies
7. Conclusion

Summary and Conclusion
Notes
References
Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Esthétique et philosophie de l'art
• Película fotográfica
• Philosophy
• Visual culture
• Film

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 07 août 2017
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781438467184
• Langue: English

Extrait

Imagination, Music, and the Emotions
Imagination, Music, and the Emotions
A Philosophical Study
SAAM TRIVEDI
Cover art courtesy of fotolia.
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2017 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu
Production, Diane Ganeles
Marketing, Anne M. Valentine
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Trivedi, Saam, 1968– author.
Title: Imagination, music, and the emotions : a philosophical study / by Saam Trivedi, State University of New York.
Description: Albany, NY : State University of New York, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016054531 (print) | LCCN 2017032652 (ebook) | ISBN 9781438467184 (ebook) | ISBN 9781438467177 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Music—Philosophy and aesthetics. | Emotions in music.
Classification: LCC ML3800 (ebook) | LCC ML3800 .T75 2017 (print) | DDC 781.1/1—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016054531
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Malcolm, Jerry, Tara, and Sarah
Contents
Introduction
Chapter I: Emotions, Moods, and Feelings
I.1. Introduction
I.2. What are Emotions?
I.3. Emotions, Beliefs, and Moods
I.4. Other Views: Martha Nussbaum’s Neo-Stoic Cognitivism
I.5. Paul Griffiths’s Theory
I.6. Jesse Prinz’s Somatic View
I.7. A Concluding Concession
Chapter II: Expression Theories and Arousalism
II.1. Introduction
II.2. Bruce Vermazen’s Expression Theory
II.3. Jerrold Levinson’s Persona Theory
II.4. Jenefer Robinson’s Theory
II.5. Contra Simple Arousalism
II.6. Aaron Ridley’s Moderate Arousalism
II.7. Derek Matravers’s Moderate Arousalism
II.8. Charles Nussbaum’s View
II.9. Conclusion
Chapter III: Metaphors and Metaphorism
III.1. Introduction
III.2. Against Metaphorism (Part 1)
III.3. Metaphorical Meaning and Paraphraseability
III.4. Against Metaphorism (Part 2)
III.5. Metaphors, Resemblance, and Imagination
III.6. Against Metaphorism (Part 3)
III.7. Conclusion
Chapter IV: Resemblance-Based Theories
IV.1. Introduction
IV.2. Resemblance-Based Views
IV.3. Criticisms
IV.4. Objections and Replies
IV.5. Conclusion
Chapter V: Imagination
V.1. Introduction: Different Kinds of Imaginings
V.2. Imaginative Perceptions and Perceptual Imaginings
V.3. Children’s Imaginings
V.4. Gregory Currie’s View
V.5. Imagination, Music Perception, and Musical Culture
V.6. Conclusion
Chapter VI: Imaginationism
VI.1. Introduction
VI.2. Against Formalism about Music
VI.3. How We Imagine in Relation to Music
VI.4. Why We Imagine in Relation to Music
VI.5. Musical Arousal
VI.6. Objections and Replies
VI.7. Conclusion
Summary and Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
Introduction
This book has been a long time in gestation. I first started thinking philosophically about music while studying musical composition in my late teens on a small Inlaks Foundation grant that took me to the Guildhall School of Music and Drama, London, and Dartington College of Arts, Devon, in 1985, exactly 300 years after the birth of J. S. Bach, G. F. Handel, and Domenico Scarlatti. On encountering ultraserialized avant-garde musical works by composers of the Darmstadt school such as Karlheinz Stockhausen and others, at some level I wondered if that was music; and if so, what made it music; what music is in the first place; what is its purpose; what makes a work of music good; and so on. These kinds of questions were all playing around at the back of my mind, even if they were not well-formulated, and I had no idea back then (and perhaps even today!) how to even begin to answer them.
However, it was not until a few years after these sorts of worries led me to philosophy (as they did also in the case of the Harvard philosopher Stanley Cavell) that I started thinking about musical expressiveness per se, when I wrote a short philosophy thesis on musical aesthetics at Oxford, and first came across the expression theory associated with Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingwood. But I was still more interested in musical meaning than in musical expressiveness. That changed as I went on to study, first for a year as a graduate student with Malcolm Budd at University College London, and then right after that with Jerrold Levinson, my doctoral adviser at the University of Maryland. Both of these philosophers made me realize the significance of the problem of musical expressiveness, an issue that has gripped me since then and happily taken up a lot of my time (despite some sleepless nights).
So, what is the philosophical problem of musical expressiveness, you might ask? I favor the formulation of this problem given by Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies. According to this formulation, it is the problem of explaining how something inanimate and insentient such as music can be sad or happy or some such mental state. Put differently, it is the problem of explaining how something without life and mental states such as music (an abstract art-form 1 consisting of sets or sequences of sounds) can be heard readily, immediately, and willy-nilly by many people—both musicians and laypersons—as sad or happy, etc. Note here that this problem, as stated, is more acute for pure or absolute or instrumental music without words than it is for music with words, or for music with a story or a program such as Beethoven’s “Pastoral” Symphony, No. 6 in F Major, Op. 68. For in the case of vocal and program music, it might be thought that the music derives its expressiveness at least partly from the accompanying words, or from the story or program associated with it. Accordingly, most of my examples in this book will be about both Western and non-Western pure music, which is the primary focus of the philosophical problem of musical expressiveness. The reader should bear in mind that this is the reason why many of my examples do not feature much vocal music and songs from more popular Western musical styles and traditions such as jazz, the blues, rock, rap, hip-hop, and the like, which I might add are all musical styles and traditions that I respect and enjoy greatly.
An alternative formulation of the problem of musical expressiveness comes from Derek Matravers. According to this formulation, the problem of musical expressiveness consists of finding a link between using emotion-terms to describe people, and using emotion-terms for artworks, including musical works.
As I hope will emerge, my solution to the problem of musical expressiveness answers to both formulations of the problem of the musical expressiveness, even though I favor Kivy and Davies’s formulation, as stated above. Here, very roughly and in a nutshell, is my resemblance-plus-imagination or imaginationist (a term I will use for brevity) solution: sad (or happy) music is only imagined in various, not always highly conscious, ways to be sad (or happy), in virtue of various heard resemblances to sad (or happy) people, their vocal and behavioral expression, and the affective feel of emotions and other mental states. This solution is spelled out and defended in the six chapters that follow. 2
Before I set out briefly what the various chapters of this work try to do and then express my acknowledgments, a word about the very diverse influences that helped shape my solution. For some years, I was tempted by a kind of arousalist-projectivist solution, not too dissimilar from a view that might combine the varying arousalisms of Aaron Ridley, Derek Matravers, and Charles Nussbaum with the projectivism associated with Richard Wollheim. I was also briefly attracted to metaphorism, a view associated with Nelson Goodman and Roger Scruton. But I came to see arousalism and metaphorism as flawed, for reasons I set out in chapters II and III . I next came to see the merits of various resemblance-based theories, associated with Peter Kivy, Stephen Davies, and Malcolm Budd, even as I also saw the merits of Jerrold Levinson’s persona-based theory. That led to an attempt to reconcile the insights in resemblance-based and persona-based theories, as found respectively in the work of Budd and Levinson, while trying to avoid what I took to be their respective drawbacks (Trivedi 2001a). Around this time, I also came across Kendall Walton’s influential work on imagination, which made me wonder if imagination, resemblance, and personae could somehow be combined in one solution. And it so happened, when I was about a year from finishing my doctorate, that one day in January 1998 while improvising (very badly and therefore privately!) on my Kashmiri hammer-dulcimer (the santoor , also found in parts of Central Asia, Iran, and Greece, where it is known as the santuri , an instrument also played by Zorba the Greek in the “splendiferous” novel and film of that name), I had this very strong and unshakable feeling that the music itself was sad, that somehow it itself was alive and possessive of mental states such as sadness. That made me reflect on this experience and think about it in terms of animation, akin to what happens when we read comics or see animation films or what our pagan ancestors did with regard to nature and the elements in it such as the sun, the wind, the ocean, and so on. When Jerrold Levinson then directed me to Peter Kivy’s very brief but insightful remarks about animation, which I had read many years back but mistakenly neglected, animation became a central element of my imaginationism, though I understand anim