One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics

C. Halper Edward

Description

The problem of the one and the many is central to ancient Greek philosophy, but surprisingly little attention has been paid to Aristotle's treatment of it in the Metaphysics. This omission is all the more surprising because the Metaphysics is one of our principal sources for thinking that the problem is central and for the views of other ancient philosophers on it.The Central Books of the Metaphysics are widely recognized as the most difficult portion of a most difficult work. Halper uses the problem of the one and the many as a lens through which to examine the Central Books. What he sees is an extraordinary degree of doctrinal cogency and argumentative coherence in a work that almost everyone else supposes to be some sort of patchwork. Rather than trying to elucidate Aristotle's doctrines-most of which have little explicitly to do with the problem, Halper holds that the problem of the one and the many, in various formulations, is the key problematic from which Aristotle begins and with which he constructs his arguments. Thus, exploring the problem of the one and the many turns out to be a way to reconstruct Aristotle's arguments in the Metaphysics. Armed with the arguments, Halper is able to see Aristotle's characteristic doctrines as conclusions. These latter are, for the most part, supported by showing that they resolve otherwise insoluble problems. Moreover, having Aristotle's arguments enables Halper to delimit those doctrines and to resolve the apparent contradiction in Aristotle's account of primary ousia, the classic problem of the Central Books. Although there is no way to make the Metaphysics easy, this very thorough treatment of the text succeeds in making it surprisingly intelligible.

Sujets

• Philosophie et théologie

Informations

• Publié par: Parmenides Publishing
• Date de parution: 12 janvier 2005
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781930972476
• Langue: English

Extrait

One and Many in Aristotle s Metaphysics
One and Many in Aristotle s Metaphysics

The Central Books
EDWARD C. HALPER
2005 by Parmenides Publishing All rights reserved
Originally published in 1989 by Ohio State University Press
This edition with a new Introduction published in 2005 by Parmenides Publishing in the United States of America
ISBN-13: 978-1-930972-05-6 ISBN-10: 1-930972-05-9
Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Halper, Edward C., 1951-
One and many in Aristotle s Metaphysics. Central books / Edward C. Halper. p. cm. Originally published: Columbus : Ohio State University Press, c1989. With new pref. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-930972-05-6 ((hardcover) : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-930972-05-9 ((hardcover) : alk. paper) 1. Aristotle. Metaphysics. 2. One (The One in philosophy) 3. Many (Philosophy) I. Title. B434.H35 2005 110-dc22 2005033060

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To Slavka
Contents
Analytical Table of Contents
Glossary
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition
A Note to the Reader
Introduction
Chapter 1 Book E: What Is Being?
1.1 The Central Books
1.2 The Theoretical Sciences: E1
1.3 Accidental Being E 2-3
1.3.1 E 2: Knowledge of Accidents
1.3.2 E 3: Causes of Accidents
Chapter 2 Categorical Being: Z-H
2.1 Z 1: The Primacy of Ousia
2.1.1 One and This
2.2 Z 2-3, 1028b36: Instances of Ousia
2.3 Z 3: The Substrate
2.3.1 1029b3-12
2.4 Z 4-5: Essence
2.4.1 Accidents and Accidental Composites
2.4.2 The Opening Lines of Z 4: 1029b13-22
2.4.3 Z 5: Coupled Things
2.4.4 Addition and Essence
2.4.5 Secondary Essences
2.4.6 Addition, Subtraction, and Ousia
2.5 Z 6: The Identity of Thing and Essence
2.5.1 1031a19-28: What is Said Accidentally
2.5.2 1031a28-1032a11: What is Said Per Se
2.6 Z 7-9: The Physical Treatment of Essence
2.6.1 Some Objections
2.7 Z 10-11: The Parts of Ousia
2.7.1 Z 10
2.7.2 Z 11
2.7.3 Wholes, Parts, and Unity
2.7.4 One and Subtraction
2.8 Z 12: The Unity of Form
2.9 Z 13-16: The Universal
2.9.1 Z 13, 1038b9-16: Arguments 1 and 2
2.9.2 Z 13, 1038b16-1039a23: Arguments 3-6
2.9.2.1 Argument Three: 1038b16-23
2.9.2.2 Argument Four: 1038b23-29
2.9.2.3 Argument Five: 1038b29-30
2.9.2.4 Argument Six: 1039a3-8
2.9.3 Z 14
2.9.4 Z 15
2.9.5 Z 16, 1040b5-16
2.9.6 Z 16, 1040b16-1041a5
2.9.7 Species and Genus
2.10 Z 17: Ousia as Cause
2.11 Book H 1-5: The Composite
2.11.1 H 1
2.11.1.1 1042a32-b8: Matter
2.11.2 H 2: Actuality and Accidental Composites
2.11.2.1 Differentiae: 1042b11-31
2.11.2.2 Composites: 1042b31-1043a28
2.11.3 H 3: Definitions of Accidental Composites
2.11.4 H 4-5: Proper Matter
2.12 H 6: The Unity of the Composite
2.12.1 1045a7-33: Problem and Solution
2.12.2 1045a33-b17: Form without Matter
2.12.3 1045b17-23: Justification and Interpretation of the Solution
2.13 Z-H: One and Categorial Being
Chapter 3 Book : Actuality and Truth
3.1 1-5: Potentiality
3.1.1 1: The Potencies of Doing and Suffering
3.1.2 2: Rational and Nonrational Potencies
3.1.3 3-4: Potentiality and Actuality
3.1.4 5: Natural and Nonnatural Potencies
3.2 6-9: Actuality
3.3 E 4, 10: Truth
Chapter 4 Being, One and Ousia in the Central Books
4.1 Convergence
4.2 Form, Universal, and Individual
4.2.1 Universal Form
4.2.2 Individual Form
4.2.3 Form as neither Universal nor Individual
4.2.4 Universal and Individual
4.3 The Central Books and the Aporiai
4.4 The Nature of Ousia
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Analytical Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Book E: What is Being?
1.1 The Central Books Though only books Z- are traditionally called the central books, this section argues that book E, including its first chapter, should be grouped with them. Common to all these books is a concern with the what is being question. They stand in contrast with book whose only concern is another of the scientific questions of the Posterior Analytics , the is it question, that is, the question of whether being and the science that treats it exist.
1.2 The Theoretical Sciences: E 1 This chapter considers the reasons that mathematics and physics are theoretical sciences in order to argue that theology is a theoretical science that is prior to them. Its priority derives from the character of its subject matter, eternal, separate, and immobile ousiai . If such ousiai exist, and if the other ousiai depend upon them, then the science of them is also the universal science of all beings. Consequently, Aristotle can pursue the inquiry into the nature of being by seeking the primary being.
1.3 Accidental Being: E 2-3
1.3.1 E 2: Knowledge of Accidents Aristotle argues that accidents are unknowable, a claim that seems to be at odds with his insistence in 2 that accidents fall under metaphysics. Ways of reconciling these texts are examined.
1.3.2 E 3: Causes of Accidents This section argues that, because accidents are unknowable, metaphysics treats them by tracing them to other causes, in particular, to ousia . An accident is not uncaused, as some commentators have maintained; what is distinctive about it is that its cause does not come to be a cause through a process. An accident is a plurality that has a plurality of causes.
Chapter 2 Categorial Being: Z-H
A brief summary of the role of unity in the discussion of categorial being precedes the analysis.
2.1 Z 1: The Primacy of Ousia The entire first chapter of book Z argues that the investigation of categorial being reduces to an investigation into the nature of ousia . To substantiate this claim Aristotle argues that ousia is simple being and that ousia is prior to the other categories in formula, knowledge, and time. Ousia seems to be prior in these three ways because of its unity. The chapter shows ousia to be the one nature to which all other beings are related, the hen of the pros hen .
2.1.1 One and This There is some reason for identifying numeric unity and this. Even though the case is strong, the subsequent discussion does not draw on this equation.
Z 2-3, 1028b36: Instances of Ousia Aristotle presents two lists of ousiai . The first consists of bodies and other things that are called ousiai . The second list contains that in respect of which the items on the first list are ousiai . For the most part, Aristotle assumes that some portion of the first list is correct and evaluates the entries on the second. The criteria to be used should have been established earlier, in Z 1. Aristotle s central criterion is, I propose, unity.
2.2 Z 3: The Substrate This section explains how Aristotle s argument against the material substrate s being primary ousia draws on the two lists. He argues that the material substrate cannot be the primary ousia of the second list by arguing that if it were, that matter from which all predicates had been subtracted would need to appear on the first list. Such matter is completely undetermined and lacks unity. Without unity it cannot be separate, and thus is not an ousia . Implicit in this attempt to arrive at ousia by subtracting all attributes is the assumption that ousia is one.
2.3.1 1029b3-12 Most editors place this passage at the end of Z 3 and suppose that it explains Aristotle s injunction to investigate sensible ousiai in 1029a33-34. The text makes good sense where it appears in the manuscripts, at the beginning of Z 4, if what is more knowable to us is the unity of ousia and what is more knowable in nature is its actuality. Then, the passage enjoins us to begin with unity and proceed to actuality, exactly Aristotle s method in Z-H.
2.4 Z 4-5: Essence
Aristotle characterizes the essence of a thing as what belongs to it per se , and he proceeds to describe the two ways a formula could fail to be per se . These latter are not mistakes made by an incompetent definer. They arise because for some things formulae that express what they are inevitably fail to be definitions. Such things lack definitions and essences.
2.4.1 Accidents and Accidental Composites The formulae of accidents and accidental composites fail to be per se in just the two ways that Aristotle describes. The formulae of accidents inevitably add the accident to something else, ousia . The formulae of composites inevitably add something else to what is defined. Since these formulae are pluralities, they cannot be definitions. On similar grounds, Aristotle argues that neither accidents nor accidental composites have essences.
2.4.2 The Opening Lines of Z 4: 1029b13-22 1029b13-22 parallel Aristotle s discussion of the two ways that formulae fail to be per se . They show why accidents do not belong to an essence and why the being of the composite is also not the essence of the substrate. Drawing upon the parallel enables us to interpret an otherwise difficult text.
2.4.3 Z 5: Coupled Things In Z 5 Aristotle considers per se attributes and per se composites. Using arguments that resemble those about accidents and accidental composites, he argues that neither has an essence or a definition.
2.4.4 Addition and Essence The traditional Greek assumption that what is is one accounts for Aristotle s denial that a formula is a definition if it contains an addition. A formula with an addition is not the formula of one thing. Attributes and composites not only lack unity, they lack being.
2.4.5 Secondary Essences Aristotle s reason for denying that non- ousiai have essences and definitions is also his reason for saying that they have essences and definitions in a secondary way. Non- ousiai lack essences and definitions because they are not properly one, but they have essences and definitions because they are one in a way; they are one by the addition and subtraction of ousia , just the reason that they are beings.
2.4.6 Addition, Subtraction, and Ousia The method of Z 4-5 looks like the method Aristotle us