Philosophical Dialectics

Nicholas Rescher

Description

While the pursuit of philosophy "of" studies—of science, of art, of politics—has blossomed, the philosophy of philosophy remains a comparatively neglected domain. In this book, Nicholas Rescher fills this gap by offering a study in methodology aimed at providing a clear view of the scope and limits of philosophical inquiry. He argues that philosophy's inability to resolve all of the problems of the field does not preclude the prospect of achieving a satisfactory resolution of many or even most of them.

Preface

1. Philosophical Principles

Philosophical Principles
Principles of Informative Adequacy
Probative Principles of Rational Cogency
Principles of Rational Economy
Issues of Validation
Dealing with Objections

2. Aporetic Method in Philosophy

Consistency and Apories
Some Sample Apories
On Appraising Apories
Enter Distinctions
Apory Resolution as Cost-Benefit Analysis

3. On Distinctions in Philosophy

What Distinctions Are
How Distinctions Fail
Misassimilation
Historical Background
The Role of Distinctions in Philosophy
Philosophical Apories
Tie Issues Together

4. Respect Neglect and Misassimilation as Fallacies of Philosophical Distinctions

Respect Neglect
Simplicity
Fallacy

5. Systemic Interconnectedness and Explanatory Holism in Philosophy

The Problem
Summative Features
Fallacies of Composition and Division
Is Existence Mereologically Summative? No—A Whole is More Than Its Parts
The Analytical/Constructionist Program
Instances of the Implementation of the Constructionist Program
Problem Number One: The Fallacy of Termination Presumption
Problem Number Two: The Disintegration of Simplicity and the Fallacy of Respect Neglect
Perspectival Dissonance and Nonamalgamation
Cognition Is Not Summative
Review
Externalities and Negative Side Effects
Systematic Interconnectedness as a Consequence of Aporetic Complexity

6. The Structure of Philosophical Dialectic

Philosophical Aporetics
The Role of Distinctions
The Structure of Dialectic
Developmental Dialectics
The Burden of History
The Structure of Philosophical History

7. Ignorance and Cognitive Horizons

Ignorance
Intractable Questions about the Cognitive Future and Surd Generalities
Insolubilia Then and Now
Cognitive Limits
Identifying Insolubilia
Relating Knowledge to Ignorance

Notes
Bibliography
Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Métaphysique
• Philosophie générale
• Philosophy
• Metaphysics

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791481813
• Langue: English

Extrait

P h i l o s o p h i c a l

A N E S S A Y O N M E T A P H I L O S O P H Y D i a l e c t i c s

N I C H O L A S R E S C H E R

Philosophical Dialectics

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Philosophical Dialectics

An Essay on Metaphilosophy

Nicholas Rescher

State University of New York Press

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2006 State University of New York

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data

Rescher, Nicholas. Philosophical dialectics : Rescher./ Nicholas an essay on metaphilosophy p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-6745-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Methodology. 2. Philosophy. 3. Metaphysics. 4. Process philosophy. 5. Dialectic. I. Title. B53.R432 2006 101—dc22 2005014630 ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6745-9 (hardcover : alk. paper)

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Contents

Preface 1. Philosophical Principles  Philosophical Principles 1 Principles of Informative   Adequacy 3 Probative Principles of Rational Cogency 5   Principles of Rational Economy 7 Issues of Validation 10 Dealing with Objections 14 2. Aporetic Method in Philosophy   Consistency and Apories 17 Some Sample Apories 19   On Appraising Apories 21 Enter Distinctions 23 Apory Resolution as Cost-Benefit Analysis 24

3.

4.

5.

On Distinctions in Philosophy   What Distinctions Are 27 How Distinctions Fail 29   Misassimilation 31 Historical Background 35 The Role  of Distinctions in Philosophy 36 Philosophical Apories Tie Issues Together 41

Respect Neglect and Misassimilation as Fallacies of Philosophical Distinctions   Respect Neglect 45 Simplicity 46 Fallacy 47 Systemic Interconnectedness and Explanatory Holism in Philosophy   The Problem 51 Summative Features 52 Fallacies of Composition and Division 53 Is Existence Mereologically   Summative? No—A Whole is More Than Its Parts 53

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17

27

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51

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6.



Contents

The Analytical/Constructionist Program 54 Instances of the  Implementation of the Constructionist Program 55 Problem  Number One: The Fallacy of Termination Presumption 60  Problem Number Two: The Disintegration of Simplicity and  the Fallacy of Respect Neglect 61 Perspectival Dissonance and Nonamalgamation 62 Cognition Is Not Summative 63  Review 65 Externalities and Negative Side Effects 66    Systematic Interconnectedness as a Consequence of Aporetic Complexity 71

The Structure of Philosophical Dialectic Philosophical Aporetics 75 The Role of Distinctions 78    The Structure of Dialectic 81 Developmental Dialectics 84   The Burden of History 89 The Structure of Philosophical History 92

7. Ignorance and Cognitive Horizons Ignorance 95 Intractable Questions about the Cognitive  Future and Surd Generalties 97 Insolubilia Then and    Now 100 Cognitive Limits 102 Identifying Insolubilia  104 Relating Knowledge to Ignorance 106 Notes

Bibliography Index

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109 115 119

Preface

While the pursuit of the philosophy of various studies (of science, of art, of politics, etc.) has recently blossomed, the philosophy of philosophy remains a comparatively neglected domain. The present book offers a further small contribution toward filling a very large gap. Overall, the book’s argumentation proceeds by way of unfolding the following story line. Philosophy is a purposive venture with charac- teristic aims of its own whose pursuit leads the enterprise into certain particular methodological pathways (chapter 1). The course of problem resolution along these pathways makes for a dialectical development (chapter 2) that requires ever subtler and more sophisticated distinctions (chapter 3). In this regard respect neglect can prove a fatal error (chap- ter 6). Its systematic aspirations mean that the usual recourse to parti- tioning, specialization, and division of labor will not work in philosophy (chapter 5), with the result that as this discipline develops it becomes engaged in grappling with increasingly complex and intricate problem solving (chapter 6). And in the end this leads into an area of unanswer- able questions and insolubilia—issues whose nature precludes our ever conclusively achieving the aims of the enterprise (chapter 7). And so the book begins with a discussion of philosophical prin- ciples and methods, and then unfolds step by step a story of how philosophical inquiry faces the ever more formidable difficulties that arise in a complex and widely variegated world. Fortunately, however, this inability to resolveallthe problems of the field nowise precludes the prospect of achieving a satisfactory resolution of many or even most of them.

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Preface

On this basis, the present book presents not only a panorama of metaphilosophical issues but also a theory of metaphilosophy. For it takes the discipline to develop dialectically in a context of increasing complex- ity, detail, and subtlety of deliberation that moves the issues ever further in the direction of intractability and inscrutability. Although that aim of the enterprise is clarification, its net effect is to lead through this very process to an increasingly less manageable residue of problematic issues. I am indebted to Estelle Burris for her excellent assistance in preparing this material for publication.

Pittsburgh PA September 2004

Nicholas Rescher

Chapter 1

Philosophical Principles

Philosophical Principles

Metaphilosophy is the philosophical examination of the practice of phi- losophizing itself. Its definitive aim is to study the methods of the field in an endeavor to illuminate its promise and prospects. And in address- ing the issues that arise here, there is no better place to begin than by considering the rules and principles of procedure that provide the guide- lines for cultivating this historic realm of rational deliberation. For Plato, principles were the root source (archai) of being or of 1 knowledge. For Aristotle, they were the “first cause” of being, of be- 2 coming, or of being known (hothen h e estin h e gignetai h e gign o sketai). And much the same conception is at issue with Thomas Aquinas, for whom a principle (principium) was something primary in the being of a thing, or in its becoming, or in knowledge of it (quod est primum aut in 3 esse rei . . . aut in fieri rei, . . . aut in rei cognitione ) standard philo-. As sophical usage has evolved in the light of these ideas, a principle is viewed as something basicas afundamentum(Latin) orarch e (Greek). In particular, a proposition that is a principle either admits no proof (is axiomatic) or does not need proof (is obvious and self-evident). More- over, it must be abstract by way of applying to a broad range of cases. Thus, all concerned seem agreed that principles are fundamental gener- alities governing our understanding of the modus operandi of some knowledge-accessible domain. Against this background, a specificallyphilosophical principle, in the sense of the term that is to be at issue here, is a general instruction for cogent philosophizing, a maxim that lays down a methodological rule

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