The major accident at Fukushima

Alain Carpentier, Jacques Friedel, Edouard Brezin, Étienne-Émile Beaulieu

Description

“On March 11, 2011, the North-East of Japan was struck by a huge earthquake followed by a major tsunami and a series of accidents that took place at the nuclear power site at Fukushima, with emissions of radioactive elements”. This was the message addressed by Prof. Kanazawa, President of the Science Council of Japan (SCJ), only a few days after the catastrophe, to his colleagues Presidents of the Science Academies, adding that he nourished the hope the “the academies would continue in the future to help with the necessary rehabilitation work”.

The idea arose immediately to set up an ad hoc academic Working Party, with the assigned mission to analyse the events that had taken place in Japan, to make a status report regarding seismic and nuclear risks both in metropolitan France and in overseas territories and to draw conclusions and make recommendations as deemed appropriate to the situation.

The academic Working Party comprised three separate sub-groups, each dealing with one of the three aspects – seismic, nuclear and medical – of the drama as it unfolded.

For each of these components, objects of the three parts of this report, the analysis of observed events in Fukushima was supplemented by a reflection o the strengths and weaknesses of these areas in France, in order to formulate the necessary recommendations and to answer scientific and societal question public arises. Although uncertainties remain and that new information still come each month to enrich the record, the enclosed reports seemed complete enough to be published in the state, after the anniversary of this tragedy that will long continue to challenge us.

Sujets

• Techniques
• Energie et Environnement
• Energie & environnement
• Sciences et techniques
• Physics
• Nuclear
• Nucléaire
• Science
• Physique
• Physical attractiveness

Informations

• Publié par: EDP Sciences
• Date de parution: 01 mars 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 2
• EAN13: 9782759824861
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

The major accident at Fukushima

Seismic, nuclear and medical considerations

ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES

17, avenue du Hoggar Parc d’activités de Courtabœuf, BP 112 91944 Les Ulis Cedex A, France

Imprimé en France

© 2012, EDP Sciences, 17, avenue du Hoggar, BP 112, Parc d’activités de Courtaboeuf, 91944 Les Ulis Cedex A

Tous droits de traduction, d’adaptation et de reproduction par tous procédés réservés pour tous pays. Toute reproduction ou représentation intégrale ou partielle, par quelque procédé que ce soit, des pages publiées dans le présent ouvrage, faite sans l’autorisation de l’éditeur est illicite et constitue une contrefaçon. Seules sont autorisées, d’une part, les reproductions strictement réservé es à l’usage privé du copiste et non destinées à une utilisation collective, et d’autre part, les courtes citations justifiées par le caractère scientifique ou d’information de l’oeuvre dans laquelle elles sont incorporées (art. L. 1224, L. 1225 et L. 3352 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle). Des pho tocopies payantes peuvent être réalisées avec l’accord de l’éditeur. S’adresser au : Centre français d’exploitation du droit de copie, 3, rue Hautefeuille, 75006 Paris. Tél. : [phone].

ISBN 9782759807550

Report of working groupSolidarity for Japan Chaired by Alain CARPENTIER, President of the Académie des sciences, with Jacques FRIEDEL, former President of the Académie des sciences, for the part Megaseisms and megatsunamis Édouard BRÉZIN, former President of the Académie des sciences, for the part The nuclear accident ÉtienneÉmile BAULIEU, former President of the Académie des sciences, for the part Consequences on health and the environment

CONTENTS

Presentation

FIRST PARTMegaseisms and megatsunamis

The Megaseisms and megatsunamis Working Party, Chair and Members

1. Scientific data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Earthquakes in subduction zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Tsunamis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. The Tohoku earthquake, March 11, 2011 . . . . . . . . . 2. France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. French West Indies (Antilles islands) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Mainland (“metropolitan”) France . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Ground response factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Socioeconomic considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Regulations applicable to seismic events and nuclear installation safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. Paraseismic protection for installations . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendations

ix

3

5 5 7 8 10 10 11 12 13 13

14 15 16

17

Appendices in CDRom 1. Données sur le séisme du 11 mars 2011 – Raùl Madariaga 2. Erreurs de prévision et de gouvernance dans la gestion au Japon de la mitigation des séismes, mises en lumière par le séisme de Tohoku du 11 mars 2011 – Xavier Le Pichon

vi

3.

4.

5.

T HE MAJOR ACCIDENT AT F UKUSHIMA

La prévention des tsunamis (évaluation de l’aléa, alerte, préparation) – François Schindelé Réflexions sur les besoins en recherche sur les données accélérométriques – John Douglas Le risque sismique en France – Michel Cara

SECOND PARTThe nuclear accident

The nuclear accident Working Party, Chair and Members 1. Sequence of events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Nuclear power generation in France, postFukushima . . . . . . . 2.1. French nuclear power stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. How France’s national nuclear safety is ensured and organised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Nuclear fuel cycle and future possibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.Acomparison of safety equipment: EPR  Generation II reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Beyond the EPR? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendations

Appendices in CDRom

1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

21

24 30 31

33 38

38 38

41

L’accident de la centrale nucléaire de Fukushima Daiichi ; texte ASN et IRSN Complément : traitement des eaux contaminées ; texte B. Barré Glossaire nucléaire Les réacteurs à eau légère (ou ordinaire) – Réacteurs à eau pressurisée (REP) et réacteurs à eau bouillante (REB) ; texte B. Barré Description des réacteurs modérés par de l’eau ordinaire : réacteurs à eau bouillante (Fukushima) ou réacteurs à eau pressurisée (réacteurs utilisés en France) Les accidents graves sur les REB ; texte IRSN Description spécifique de l’évolution d’un accident grave dans un réacteur à eau bouillante Les améliorations de la sûreté des centrales nucléaires apportées par EDF à la suite des incidents et accidents du passé ; texte EDF Le risque hydrogène dans les enceintes des réacteurs du parc nucléaire français ; texte IRSN

C ONTENTS

vii

Description des dispositifs mis en œuvre dans le parc nucléaire français pour éviter l’explosion d’hydrogène 7. L’évaluation de la tenue aux séismes des installations nucléaires françaises ; texte IRSN 8. Retour d’expérience de Fukushima, recherche sur le combustible nucléaire ; texte R. Guillaumont 9. L’apport des recherches de l’IRSN, concernant les accidents avec fusion de cœur, à la compréhension de l’accident de Fukushima et de ses conséquences ; texte IRSN 10. Comparaison des systèmes de sûreté d’EPR avec ceux des réacteurs de deuxième génération ; texte B. Barré 11. La recherche à l’IRSN et au CEA dans le domaine de la sûreté nucléaire pour les réacteurs à eau ; texte IRSN et CEA 12. Vieillissement des centrales nucléaires de type REP ; texte Y. Bréchet 13. Les réexamens de sûreté et les visites décennales des réacteurs à eau sous pression ; texte ASN 14. Le cycle du combustible et ses différentes étapes ; texte B. Barré e 15. Les réacteurs de 4 génération, le prototype ASTRID, les enseignements de l’accident de Fukushima ; texte CEA 16. Le cycle du combustible des réacteurs à neutrons rapides ; document CEA 17. La sûreté des réacteurs à neutrons rapides refroidis au sodium ; document IRSN 18. Le cas des réacteurs embarqués (propulsion navale) ; texte B. Barré 19. Document ASN : Présentation des évaluations complémentaires de la sûreté des installations nucléaires au regard de l’accident de Fukushima

THIRD PARTConsequences on health and the environment

The Working Party on Consequences on health and the environment, Chair and Members

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Sanitary consequences of the accident at FukushimaDaiichi . . . 1.1. Effects of radioactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. General sanitary consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Environmental consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Impacts of exposure to nuclear radiation on land fauna and flora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

47 53 54 63 77

77

viii

2.2. 2.3. 2.4.

T HE MAJOR ACCIDENT AT F UKUSHIMA

Impact on vegetables: different modes of deposit . . . . . . Land decontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contaminated wastes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendations

Appendices in CDRom

79 83 84

86

1. Rappels sur la radioactivité et ses effets sur l’organisme (A. Aurengo) 2. Becquerel, Gray, Sievert, trois unités différentes (H. Métivier) 3. Organisation française des activités nucléaires industrielles, de la sûreté et de la radioprotection (E. D. Carosella et P. Laroche) Tableau des formations (SFRP) 4. Iode et accident nucléaire (B. Le Guen) 5. Prise d’iode stable en situation d’urgence (P. Laroche et D. Schoulz) 6. Les études épidémiologiques à long terme des conséquences psychosociologiques des désastres environnementaux : l’exemple de l’attentat du 11 Septembre (AJ. Valleron) 7. L’accident de Three Mile Island (AJ. Valleron) 8. Tchernobyl, conséquences de santé autres qu’en termes de mortalité (AJ. Valleron) 9. L’Institut national de Veille sanitaire et l’exemple de son investigation de l’accident AZF (AJ. Valleron) 10. Analyse du Rapport UNSCEAR 2011 Annexe D : Aspects environnementaux de l’Accident de Tchernobyl (H. Métivier) 11. Mesure et surveillance (J.M. Péres) 12. Influence de la date d’occurrence des retombées radioactives sur les conséquences d’un rejet atmosphérique accidentel (Ph. Renaud) 13. Exemple de modélisation française pour étudier la dynamique des masses d’eau Océaniques (Pascal Bailly du Bois  Coopération IRSNIfremer) 14. Réduction de la contamination en milieu bâti (JM. Péres) 15. On the use of plants to decontaminate soils around Fukushima Daiichi (P. Chagvardieff, E. Quéméneur)

CDRom : Appendices of three parts

PRESENTATION

Alain Carpentier, sciences – Institut

“Although Fukushima academies with us”.

President of the Académie des de France

it is Japan government’s global responsibility to overcome the Nuclear Power Plant accident, we hereafter want to ask all in countries and regions around the world to support and cooperate

Science Council of Japan

“On March 11, 2011, the NorthEast of Japan was struck by a huge earthquake followed by a major tsunami and a series of accidents that took place at the nuclear power site at Fukushima, with emissions of radioactive elements”.This was the message addressed by Prof. KANAZAWA, President of the Science Council of Japan (SCJ), only a few days after the catastrophe, to his colleagues Presidents of the Science Academies, adding that he nourished the hope the “the academies would continue in the future to help with the necessary rehabilitation work”. Coincidentally, some ten days later, a Japanese delegation from SCJ was welcomed by the Académie des sciences  Institut de France to a G8G20 meeting organised this year by France. On this occasion, we were able to have an exchange of views about the situation at Fukushima and to envisage the aid that our country could offer to a friendly nation whose high repute in science generally and particularly in the nuclear field is longstanding. Consequently, the idea arose to set up an ad hoc academic Working Party, with the assigned mission to analyse the events that had taken place in Japan, to make a status report regarding seismic and nuclear risks both in metropolitan France and in our overseas territories and to draw conclusions and make recommendations as deemed appropriate to the situation, recognising nonetheless the limits of the exercise in a constantly evolving context which will continue to do so for several years to come.

This was not the first time that more or less serious accidents took place in the world, whether of natural origin or related to human activities, but generating, through the return on experience, the necessary analyses and, subsequently, to taking the measures most appropriate to forecasting such events, mitigating their effects or preventing them from taking place in the future. As far as seismic activities are concerned, geologists have carefully registered, localised and analysed accurately the more dramatic occurrences, with their spectre of several hundred thousand deaths, as happened in Lisbon

x

T HE MAJOR ACCIDENT AT F UKUSHIMA

in 1755 and at Sanriku in 1896, to mention but two of the most memorable earthquakes among hundreds on record. At Tohuku, on March 11, what was first observed was an earthquake of magnitude 9 that took place in a zone which, although certainly prepared for this risk, nevertheless had not foreseen an event of such a magnitude. Secondly and more important, there was an associated tsunami of exceptional size for that coastline. The cumulative effects of the earthquake and the tsunami led to thousands of deaths, wounded, displaced, homeless and lost persons. This disaster enabled us, notwithstanding, to observe that the GPS alert systems and the paraseismic constructions had proven reliable. If these had not existed, Japan would have had to record a far greater number of dead and wounded, inasmuch as the capital area of Tokyo was close to the earthquake’s epicentre.

In contradistinction, where the nuclear events were concerned, the fact that the Fukushima power station was located in a risk area led to a cascade of events where the negative effects were additive. “When the earthquake took place, March 11, 2011 at 14h46, three reactors in service immediately went to outage status (as planned), but the site was cut off from its external electric power supply. The emergency diesel generators started and came on line, but those connected to reactors N°1 and N°4 stopped one hour later, given that their diesel fuel tanks had been swept away by the incoming tsunami.” This is the verbatim wording in the report that the SCJ addressed on March 23 to the other science academies who had made known their solidarity with Japan early on. Their report and the numerous information briefs released on a regular basis, demonstrated that the SCJ had the clear intention to honour its earlier commitment to provide full, realtime information to the world’s scientific community and the public at large, thereby countering the criticism, often justly levelled in the past, of secrecy that had previously too often surrounded nuclear activities in general and nuclear site accidents in particular. The desire to be transparent is but one of the aspects of the exemplary behaviour of Japan, whose population, faced with this terrible tragedy, remained dignified and self controlled to a remarkable degree, eliciting our admiration. We witnessed scenes of courage, solidarity, humanity that will serve as examples to those who, under similar circumstances and submerged by the events and remorse, would have given up.

The academic Working Party (WP) we set up comprised three separate sub groups, each dealing with one of the three aspects – seismic, nuclear and medical – of the drama as it unfolded. Although these events are, in many respects, interdependent, we felt they were sufficiently distinct to justify that we study them separately. Thus, each subgroup, chaired by a former president of the Académie des sciences  Institut de France, whose remit it was to guarantee high level debates, received information from both Japanese and French authorities as well as advice from numerous experts invited for hearings. The WP members had a constant concern to reply not only the questions the