Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States

Gerald Easter

Description

The postcommunist transitions produced two very different types of states. The "contractual" state is associated with the countries of Eastern Europe, which moved toward democratic regimes, consensual relations with society, and clear boundaries between political power and economic wealth. The "predatory" state is associated with the successors to the USSR, which instead developed authoritarian regimes, coercive relations with society, and poorly defined boundaries between the political and economic realms. In Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States, Gerald M. Easter shows how the cumulative result of the many battles between state coercion and societal capital over taxation gave rise to these distinctive transition outcomes. Easter's fiscal sociology of the postcommunist state highlights the interconnected paths that led from the fiscal crisis of the old regime through the revenue bargains of transitional tax regimes to the eventual reconfiguration of state-society relations. His focused comparison of Poland and Russia exemplifies postcommunism's divergent institutional forms. The Polish case shows how conflicts over taxation influenced the emergence of a rule-of-law contractual state, social-market capitalism, and civil society. The Russian case reveals how revenue imperatives reinforced the emergence of a rule-by-law predatory state, concessions-style capitalism, and dependent society.

Sujets

• Sociologie, société et politique
• Sociology
• Political economy
• Eastern Europe
• History of Europe
• Central

Informations

• Publié par: Cornell University Press
• Date de parution: 15 octobre 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780801465710
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

CAPITAL,COERCION, AND POSTCOMMUNIST STATES

Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States

GeraldM.Easter

CORNELLUNIVERSITYPRESSITHACA AND LONDON

CornellUniversityPressgratefullyacknowledgesreceiptofasubventionfrom Boston College which helped in the publication of this book.

Copyright © 2012 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2012 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2012 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data

Easter, Gerald, 1959–  Capital, coercion, and postcommunist states / Gerald M. Easter.  p. cm.  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 9780801451195 (cloth : alk. paper)  ISBN 9780801478246 (pbk. : alk. paper)  1. Finance, Public—Poland. 2. Finance, Public—Russia (Federation) 3. Fiscal policy—Poland. 4. Fiscal policy—Russia (Federation) 5. Postcommunism—Economic aspects—Poland. 6. Postcommunism— Economic aspects—Russia (Federation) 7. Poland—Economic conditions—1990– 8. Russia (Federation)—Economic conditions—1991– I. Title.  HJ1213.E27 2012  339.5'209438—dc23 2012014475

CornellUniversityPressstrivestouseenvironmentallyresponsiblesuppliersand materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetablebased, lowVOC inks and acidfree papers that are recycled, totally chlorinefree, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further informa tion, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu. Cloth printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Paperback printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents

Preface

Introduction:Capital,Coercion,andPostcommunistStates 1 . Toward a Fiscal Sociology of the Postcommunist State 2 . The Fiscal Crisis of the Old Regime 3 of Tax Reform: Making (and Unmaking). Politics Revenue Bargains 4 Meets Society in the Transitional Tax Regime. State 5 Fiscal Capacity in Postcommunist States. Building 6 . Taxation and the Reconfiguration of State and Society

Conclusions

Notes SelectedBibliography Index

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1 8 23

51 86 124 152 187

197 233 235

Preface

The[Russian]governmentshouldassurethatinallpublicinstitutions transparency and accountability prevail; debts are paid and arrears eliminated; the tax system is fair, simple and efficient, based on transparent laws and effective administration. Michel Camdessus (St. Petersburg, 1999)

Manwalksintoadoctor’sofficeandsays,“Doc,ithurtswhenIdo this.” Doctor replies, “Don’t do that.” Henny Youngman

WhyinvokethewordsofHennyYoungmanonthesubjectofthepostcommu nist state, when his main body of work was in the area of intrahousehold rela tions? Because they capture so well the gist of the advice on tax collection that capitalist custodians, such as IMF head Michel Camdessus, had for postcom munist governments, like Russia’s. Of course, Camdessus had a pretty good idea of what Russia was doing or, in the case of tax collection, not doing, and he had a clear image of what Russia should be doing. But what one does not get from his remarks is a sense of why Russia was doing what it was doing. His advice repeats the monotonous mantras, based on idealized depictions of capitalism and governance in the West, which an international brigade of economic advisers chanted to Eastern European public officials throughout the 1990s. Regarding public finance, in particular, policy expertise invariably rested on assumptions of public choice theory, a conceptual world of rational economic actors where political and cultural phenomena were unwelcome intruders. By contrast, fiscal sociology represented an alternative conceptual framework, where state finances are enmeshed in a larger sociopolitical context, promising a richer explanation of the fiscal fates of postcommunist states. But as the Russian state succumbed to financial collapse, transition technocrats for whom fiscal sociology was as remote

ix