Insurgent cohesion is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes. Cohesive insurgent groups produce more effective war-fighting forces and are more credible negotiators; organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution. In Networks of Rebellion, Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes over time during conflicts. He outlines a new way of thinking about the sources and structure of insurgent groups, distinguishing among integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented groups. Staniland compares insurgent groups, their differing social bases, and how the nature of the coalitions and networks within which these armed groups were built has determined their discipline and internal control. He examines insurgent groups in Afghanistan, 1975 to the present day, Kashmir (1988-2003), Sri Lanka from the 1970s to the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009, and several communist uprisings in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. The initial organization of an insurgent group depends on the position of its leaders in prewar political networks. These social bases shape what leaders can and cannot do when they build a new insurgent group. Counterinsurgency, insurgent strategy, and international intervention can cause organizational change. During war, insurgent groups are embedded in social ties that determine they how they organize, fight, and negotiate; as these ties shift, organizational structure changes as well.
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Networks of Rebellion
A volume in the series
CornellStudiesinSecurityAffairs edited byRobert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt A list of titles in this series is available at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
Networks of Rebellion ExplainingInsurgentCohesionandCollapse
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 2014 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2014
Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Staniland, Paul, 1982– author. Networks of rebellion : explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse / Paul Staniland. pages cm. — (Cornell studies in security affairs) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8014-5266-6 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-8014-7929-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 2. Social networks—Cross-cultural studies.1. Insurgency—Cross-cultural studies. 3. Insurgency—South Asia—Case studies. 4. Insurgency—Southeast Asia—Case studies. I. Title. JC328.5.S832014 303.6'4—dc232013042305 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwoodfibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
Part I. Theorizing Rebellion 2. Insurgent Origins 3. Insurgent Change
Contents
Part II. Comparative Evidence from South Asia 4. Azad and Jihad: Trajectories of Insurgency in Kashmir 5. Organizing Rebellion in Afghanistan 6. Explaining Tamil Militancy in Sri Lanka
Part III. Extensions and Implications 7. “Peasants and Commissars”: Communist Tides in Southeast Asia 8. Insurgency, War, and Politics
Notes Index
[v]
vii ix
1
17 35
59 100 141
181 217
233 285
List of Tables
1.1. Types of insurgent organizations 1.2. Prewar social bases and wartime organization 2.1. Political categories of prewar social bases 3.1. Pathways of insurgent change 4.1. PaTerns of organization in Kashmir 5.1. PaTerns of organization in Afghanistan 6.1. PaTerns of organization in Sri Lanka 7.1. PaTerns of organization in Southeast Asia, 1928–1960
[vii]
6 9 19 38 62 103 143 182
Acknowledgments
I owe a profound debt to the many people who shared their knowl-edge with me during myfield research. The core question driving this book—why some insurgent groups are unified and disciplined while others struggle with splits and feuds—emerged during a summer I spent in Northern Ireland, and it took on fuller form during my research in India and Sri Lanka. I knew remarkably liTle when I began researching this topic, and to the extent that this book succeeds in offering new insights, it is solely because of those who helped me. My interviewees remain anonymous because of this book’s sensitive subject maTer, but I hope theyfind something of value in the pages that follow. I am grateful for the good friends and thoughtful colleagues who helped me navigate, enjoy, and learn from new places. I also oten benefited from the kind-ness of strangers. I owe particular thanks to the institutions that hosted me in thefield: Queen’s University Belfast and Linen Hall Library in Northern Ireland, the Centre for Policy Research and the India Interna-tional Centre in New Delhi, and the Centre for Policy Alternatives and the International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Colombo. This book has its roots in my time in the Department of Political Sci-ence and the Security Studies Program at MIT. Roger Petersen provided a unique mixture of intellectual creativity and personal support. Barry Posen’s high standards kept me focused on the things that maTer. Stephen Van Evera’s insistence on valuing research that grapples with important questions is an inspiration. I cannot thank Steven Wilkinson enough for bringing to bear his sharp questions and encyclopedic knowl-edge. I am indebted to Fotini Christia, Taylor Fravel, and David Andrew Singer for their advice over the years and to the staff of the department