Social Movements and State Power

Henry Veltmeyer, James Petras

Description

The 2003 electoral victory of Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador was met with the same sense of optimism that greeted the election of Ignacio 'Lula' da Silva in Brazil, and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Gutierrez's victory was viewed as a major advance for the country in its 500 year-long struggle for freedom and democracy.



In Bolivia, Evo Morales similarly came within an electoral whisker of achieving state power in 2002, and in 2003 Nestor Kirchner became President of Argentina.



Many journalists , academics and politicians speak of a "left-turn" in Latin America, characterizing these regimes as "center -left". They came to power on the promise of delivering a fundamental change of direction that would steer their countries away from neo-liberal economic policies, and towards greater social equity. Their success awakened major hopes on the Left for a new dawn in Latin American politics.



This book challenges these assumptions. It critically examines their agreements with the IMF, their social and economic policies, and the economic ties of leading policy makers, as well as the beneficiaries and losers under these regimes.



Latin America is unique in that it has experienced two decades of popular resistance to neo-liberal policies: each of the four countries examined here has a rich history of diverse indigenous and working class movements coming together to promote radical political change.



The authors examine the political dynamics between the state and its agenda, and the strategy of mass mobilisation taken by the mass movements. They explore the intensifying conflicts between the movements and their former allies in the state.
Preface

Introduction

1. Bad Government, Good Governance: Civil Society versus Social Movements

2. From Popular Rebellion to ‘Normal Capitalism’ in Argentina

3. Lula and the Dynamics of a Neoliberal Regime

4. Social Movements and State Power in Ecuador

5. The Politics of Adjustment, Reform and Revolution in Bolivia

6. Political Power Dynamics in Latin America

Bibliography

Index

Sujets

• Science

Informations

• Publié par: Pluto Press
• Date de parution: 20 juillet 2005
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781849642842
• Langue: English

Extrait

Social Movements and State Power

Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador

James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer

P Pluto Press LONDON • ANN ARBOR, MI

First published 2005 by Pluto Press 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA and 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

www.plutobooks.com

Copyright © James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer 2005

The right of James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN ISBN

0 7453 2423 1 hardback 0 7453 2422 3 paperback

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Petras, James F., 1937–  Social movements and state power : Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador / James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer.  p. cm.  Includes bibliographical references.  ISBN 0–7453–2423–1 (hb) –– ISBN 0–7453–2422–3 (pb)  1. Political participation––Latin America––Case studies. 2. Social movements––Latin America––Case studies. 3. Argentina––Politics and government––2002– 4. Brazil––Politics and government––1985– 5. Bolivia– –Politics and government––1982– 6. Ecuador––Politics and government–– 1984– I. Veltmeyer, Henry. II. Title.  JL966.P375 2005  322.4'098––dc22  2005005107

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Designed and produced for Pluto Press by Chase Publishing Services Ltd, Fortescue, Sidmouth, EX10 9QG, England Typeset from disk by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England Printed and bound in Canada by Transcontinental Printing

Preface

C

o

n

t

e

n

t

s

Introduction 1 Bad Government, Good Governance: Civil Society versus Social Movements 2 From Popular Rebellion to ‘Normal Capitalism’ in Argentina 3 Lula and the Dynamics of a Neoliberal Regime 4 Social Movements and State Power in Ecuador 5 The Politics of Adjustment, Reform, and Revolution in Bolivia 6 Social Movements and the State: Political Power Dynamics in Latin America

Notes Bibliography Index

vi

1

8

28 60 136

175

220

241 258 271

Preface Chavez and the Referendum: Myths and Realities

Between rightwing frustration and leftwing euphoria, little has been written about the complex and contradictory reality of Venezuelan politics and the specificities of President Chavez’ policies. Even less discussion has focused on the division between ideological Washington and pragmatic Wall Street, between the politics of confrontation and conciliation, and the convergences and divergences between Venezuela and the rest of Latin America. Both the right and left have substituted myths about the Chavez government rather than confronting realities.

RIGHTWING MYTHS

Myth 1—Chavez is an unpopular president whom the rightwing opposition is capable of defeating in the referendum. In reality, the rightwing and its backers in Washington miscalculated on several counts. First, the weakest moment of the Chavez government was immediately after the Petroléos de Venezuela (PDVSA) executive lockout (December 2002–February 2003), when oil prices were much lower, the economy was devastated, government social welfare programs were underfunded and grassroots political organizations were weak. By the time the referendum took place (August 2004), one and a half years later, socioeconomic and political conditions had dramatically changed. The economy was growing by 12 per cent, oil prices were at record highs, social welfare expenditures were increasing and their social impact was highly visible and widespread, and the mass social organizations were deeply embedded in populous neighborhoods throughout the country. Clearly, the initiative had passed from the right to the left, but both the US and its opposition collaborators were blind to the realities. Having lost control of the state petroleum industry and allocation of funds via the failed lockout in early 2003, and having lost influence in the military after the failed coup of April 2002, the opposition possessed few resources to limit the government’s referendum campaign and no leverage in launching a postelection ‘civic–military’ coup.

vi

Preface vii

Myth 2—According to rightwing analysts the referendum on the opposition’s demand that Chavez be recalled from office was based on the issue of Chavez’ ‘popularity,’ ‘personality,’ charisma, and ‘autocratic’ style. In reality, the referendum was based on class/race divisions. Nonopposition trade union leaders indicated that over 85 per cent of the working class and working poor voted for Chavez, while preliminary reports on voting in affluent neighborhoods and circumscriptions showed just the reverse: over 80 per cent voted for the referendum. A similar process or class/race polarization was evident in the extraordinary turnout and vote among poor Afro Venezuelans: the higher the turnout, the higher the vote for Chavez, as an unprecedented 71 per cent of the electorate voted. Clearly, Chavez was successful in linking social welfare programs and class allegiances to electoral behavior.

Myth 3—Among both the right and left there is a belief that the mass media control mass voting behavior, limit political agendas, and necessarily lead to the victory of the right and the domestication of the left. In Venezuela the right controlled 90 per cent of the major television networks and print media and most of the major radio stations, yet the referendum was crushed by an 18 per cent margin (59 per cent to 41 per cent). The results of the referendum demonstrate that powerful grassroots organizations built around successful struggles for social reforms can create a mass political and social consciousness which can easily reject media manipulation. Elite optimism in their ‘structural power’—money, media monopoly, and backing by Washington—blinded them to the fact that conscious collective organization can be a formidable counterweight to elite resources. Likewise, the referendum results refute the argument of the centerleft that they lose elections because of the mass media. The centerleft justify their embrace of neoliberalism as a means to ‘neutralize’ the mass media during elections. They refuse to recognize that elections can be won despite mass media opposition if previous mass struggle and organization create mass social consciousness.

Myth 4—According to many leftist journalists, Chavez’ victory reflected a new wave of popular nationalist politics in Latin America. Evidence to the contrary is abundant. Brazil under Lula has sold oil exploration rights to US and European multinational corporations, provides a contingent of 1,500 troops (along with Argentina, Chile, etc.) to Haiti to stabilize Washington’s puppet regime there imposed

viii Social Movements and State Power

through the kidnapping of Presidentelect Aristide. Likewise in the other Andean countries (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia) the elected regimes propose privatizing petroleum companies, support ALCA and Plan Colombia, and pay their foreign debts. The Broad Front in Uruguay promises to follow Brazil’s neoliberal policies. While Chavez promotes the regional trading bloc, Mercosur, the two major members—Brazil and Argentina—are increasing their trade relations outside the region. In effect, there is a bloc of neoliberal regimes arrayed against Chavez’ antiimperialist policies and mass social movements. To the extent that Chavez remains true to his independent foreign policy, his principal allies are the mass social movements and Cuba.

Myth 5—The defeat of the referendum was a major tactical defeat of US imperialism and its local vassals. But a defeat of imperialism does not necessarily mean or lead to a revolutionary transformation, as postChavez postelection appeals to Washington and big business demonstrate. More indicative of Chavez’ politics is the forthcoming $5 billion investment agreements with TexacoMobil and Exxon to exploit the Orinoco gas and oil fields. The euphoria of the left blinds them to the pendulum shifts in Chavez’ discourse and the heterodox social welfare—neoliberal economic politics he has consistently practiced. President Chavez’ policy has always been a careful balancing act between rejecting vassalage to the US and local oligarchic rentiers on the one hand, and trying to harness a coalition of foreign and national investors, and urban and rural poor, to a program of welfare capitalism on the other. He is closer to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal than to Fidel Castro’s socialist revolution. In the aftermath of the three political crises—the failed civil–military coup, the debacle of the corporate executives’ lockout, and the defeat of the referendum— Chavez offered to dialogue and reach a consensus with the media barons, big business plutocrats, and the US government, on the basis of the existing property relations, media ownership, and expanded relations with Washington. Chavez’ commitment to centristreformist policies explains why he did not prosecute owners of the mass media who had openly called for the violent overthrow of his government and also why he took no action against the association of the business leaders (FEDECAMARAS) who had incited military rebellion and violent attacks on the constitutional order. In Europe, North America, and

Preface ix

many other regions, democratically elected governments would have arrested and prosecuted these elites for acts of violent subversion. President Chavez has constantly reiterated that their property, privileges, and wealth are not in question. Moreover, the fact that these elites have been able to engage in three unconstitutional attempts to overthrow the regime and still retain their class positions strongly suggests that President Chavez still envisages their playing an important role in his proposed development based on private– public partnership and social welfare spending. After five years in government and three major ‘class confrontations,’ it is evident that at least at the level of the government, there has been no rupture in property or class relations and no break with foreign creditors, investors, or oil clients. Within the fiscal framework of foreign debt payments, subsidies to private exporters, and lowinterest loans to industrialists, the government has increased the allocation of state spending for social programs in health, education, housing, micro enterprises, and agrarian reform. The Venezuelan government can maintain this balance between big business and the poor because of the high prices and revenue from petroleum exports. Like President Roosevelt, Chavez’ positive social welfare programs attract millions of lowincome voters, but do not affect money income levels or create largescale employment projects. Unemployment is still in the region of 20 per cent and poverty levels remain at over 50 per cent. Comprehensive social spending has positively affected the social lives of the poor but has not improved their class position. Chavez is both confrontational and radical when his rulership is threatened, and conciliatory and moderate when he successfully overcomes the challenge.

Myth 6—The left and right have failed to recognize a divergence of tactics between an ideological Washington and a pragmatic Wall Street. The US political class (both Republican and Democrats, the presidency and Congress) have been actively threatening, intervening, and supporting destructive lockouts, violent coups, and a fraudulent referendum to oust Chavez. In contrast, the major American and European oil companies and banks have been engaged in stable, sustained, and profitable economic relations with the Chavez government. Foreign creditors have received prompt and punctual payments of billions of dollars and have not spoken or acted in a fashion to disrupt these lucrative transactions. Major American multinational oil companies project investing between $5 billion

x Social Movements and State Power

and $20 billion in new exploration and exploitation. No doubt these MNCs would have liked the coup to succeed in order to monopolize all Venezuelan oil revenue, but perceiving the failures of Washington they are content to share some of the oil wealth with the Chavez regime. The tactical divergences between Washington and Wall Street are likely to narrow as the Venezuelan government moves into the new conciliatory phase toward FEDECAMARAS and Washington. Given Washington’s defeat in the referendum, and the big oil deals with key American multinationals, it is likely that Washington will seek a temporary ‘truce’ until new, more favorable circumstances emerge. It will be interesting to see how this possible ‘truce’ will affect Venezuela’s critical foreign policy.

Myth 7—The main thrust of the current phase of the Chavez revolution is a moral crusade against government corruption and a highly politicized judicial system tightly aligned with the discredited political opposition. For many on the left, the radical content of the ‘No’ vote campaign was rooted in the proliferation of community based mass organizations, the mobilization of trade union assemblies, and the decentralized democratic process of voter involvement based on promises of future consequential social changes in terms of jobs, income, and popular political power. Moralization campaigns (anticorruption) are commonly associated with middleclass politics designed to create ‘national unity’ and usually weaken class solidarity. The left’s belief that the mass organizations mobilized for the referendum will necessarily become a basis for a ‘new popular democracy’ has little basis in the recent past (similar mobilizations took place prior to the failed coup and 1 during the corporate bosses’ lockout in midApril 2002). Nor do governmentsponsored moralization campaigns attract much interest among the poor in Venezuela or elsewhere. Moreover, the focus of theChavistapolitical leaders is on the forthcoming elections for parliament, not in creating alternative sources of governance. The left’s facile projection of popular mobilization in the postreferendum period creates a political mythology that fails to recognize the internal contradictions of the political process in Venezuela.

CONCLUSION

The massive popular victory of the ‘No’ vote in the Venezuelan referendum gave hope and inspiration to hundreds of millions in Latin

Preface xi

America and elsewhere that USbacked oligarchies can be defeated at the ballot box. The fact that the favorable voting outcome was recognized by the Organization of American States (OAS), President Jimmy Carter, and Washington is a tribute to President Chavez’ strategic changes in the military, guaranteeing the honoring of the constitutional outcome. At a deeper level of analysis, the conceptions and perceptions of the major antagonists among the right and the left, however, are open to criticism: the right for underestimating the political and institutional support for Chavez in the current conjuncture; the left for projecting an overly radical vision on the direction of politics in the postreferendum period. From a ‘realist’ position, we can conclude that the Chavez government will proceed with his ‘New Deal’ social welfare programs while deepening ties with major foreign and domestic investors. His ability to balance classes, leaning in one direction or the other, will depend on the continued flow of high returns from oil revenues. If oil prices drop, hard choices will have to be made—class choices.

Introduction

The 2003 electoral victory of Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador was greeted with the same sense of optimism and expectation of a new direction and alternative politics that greeted the election to the presidency of Ignacio (‘Lula’) da Silva in Brazil and has surrounded Hugo Chavez’ declaration of the Bolivian revolution. As for Gutiérrez’s ascendancy to state power, it was viewed as a major political advance for the country’s indigenous nationalities in its 500 yearlong struggle for freedom (from oppression and exploitation) and democracy (participation in the direction of national policy and the country’s political affairs). In Bolivia, Evo Morales, the leader of thecocaleros, an organization of cocaproducing peasants, as the candidate for theMovement Towards Socialism,came within an electoral whisker of achieving state power in 2002. This development awakened hopes on the left of a possible new dawn in Latin American politics. Even the ascendancy of Nestor Kirchner to the presidency in Argentina, after an economic and political crisis of historic proportions, encouraged the same hopes and expectations for a fundamental change of direction in national policy—at least as regards the neoliberal model of free market capitalist development and globalization. In each case, and collectively, political developments in some of the region’s largest and most important countries have been widely viewed on the left as growing evidence of both the demise of neoliberalism and the power of the US to shape economic policy in the region, as well as representing a new wave of progressive regimes, constituting an antiUS axis in foreign policy, oriented toward an alternate popular form of national development. Notwithstanding the title of a recent Italian film on the elections in Ecuador (How George W. Bush Won the Elections), the electoral victory of Gutiérrez was widely interpreted on the left as a setback to the efforts of the US government to dominate economic and political developments in the region—to reassert its hegemony and what some neoconservative advisors to the administration see as a project of imperial domination—a ‘new imperialism’ that is not afraid to speak its name or assert state power. Several years after or into these political developments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador, and elsewhere in the region, a number of fundamental questions have arisen, questions that are addressed

1