Gao 08 467sp defense acquisitions assessments of selected weapon

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United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional CommitteesGAO March 2008 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs a GAO-08-467SPMarch 2008 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Accountability Integrity Reliability Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Highlights Highlights of GAO-08-467SP, a report to congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found This report is GAO’s sixth annual Of the 72 programs GAO assessed this year, none of them had proceeded assessment of selected weapon through system development meeting the best practices standards for mature programs. Since 2000, the technologies, stable design, or mature production processes by critical Department of Defense (DOD) has junctures of the program, each of which are essential for achieving planned roughly doubled its planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. The absence of wide-spread investment in new systems from adoption of knowledge-based acquisition processes by DOD continues to be a $790 billion to $1.6 trillion in 2007, major contributor to this lack of maturity. Aside from these knowledge-based but acquisition outcomes in terms issues, GAO this year gathered data on four additional factors that have the of cost and schedule have not potential to influence DOD’s ability to manage programs and improve improved. Total acquisition costs outcomes—performance requirements changes, program manager tenure, for major defense programs in the fiscal year 2007 portfolio have reliance on nongovernmental personnel to help perform program office roles, increased 26 percent from first and software management. GAO found that 63 percent of the programs had estimates, compared with 6 percent changed requirements once system development began, and also experienced in 2000. Programs have also often significant program cost increases. Average tenure to date for program failed to deliver capabilities when managers has been less than half of that called for by DOD policy. About 48 promised. DOD’s acquisition percent of DOD program office staff for programs GAO collected data from is outcomes appear increasingly composed of personnel outside of the government. Finally, roughly half the suboptimal, a condition that needs programs that provided GAO data experienced more than a 25 percent to be corrected given the pressures increase in the expected lines of software code since starting their respective faced by the department from other system development programs. military and major nondiscretionary government demands. In response to previous GAO recommendations and congressional direction, DOD has recently taken actions that could help move the department toward This report provides congressional more sound, knowledge-based acquisition processes. For example, a new and DOD decision makers with an concept decision review initiative, guidance for determining acquisition independent, knowledge-based approaches based on capability need dates, and the establishment of review assessment of defense programs, boards to monitor weapon system configuration changes could enable identifying potential risks when a department officials to make more informed decisions in the early stages of a program’s projected attainment of program and better match program requirements and resources, a key first knowledge diverges from best step. Improvements to individual program acquisition outcomes will likely practices. The programs hinge on the success of initiatives like these, paired with knowledge-based assessed—most of which are strategies. considered major acquisitions by DOD—were selected using several Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios (fiscal year [FY] 2008 dollars) factors: high dollar value, FY 2000 FY 2005 FY 2007 Portfolio Portfolio Portfolioacquisition stage, and congressional interest. This report Portfolio size also highlights overall trends in Number of programs 75 91 95 DOD acquisition outcomes and Total planned commitments $790 Billion $1.5 Trillion $1.6 Trillion issues raised by the cumulative Commitments outstanding $380 Billion $887 Billion $858 Billion experience of individual programs. Portfolio performance GAO updates this report annually Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate 27 percent 33 percent 40 percent under the Comptroller General’s Change in total acquisition cost from first estimate 6 percent 18 percent 26 percentauthority to conduct evaluations on Estimated total acquisition cost growth $42 Billion $202 Billion $295 Billionhis own initiative. Share of programs with 25 percent or more increase in program acquisition unit cost 37 percent 44 percent 44 percentTo view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on GAO-08-467SP. Average schedule delay in delivering initial capabilities 16 months 17 months 21 months For more information, contact Michael Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. Sullivan at [phone] or [e-mail]. United States Government Accountability Office Contents 1Foreword Letter 3 Summary 3 Weapon Acquisition Outcomes Continue to Undermine DOD Investments 6 DOD Weapon System Programs Are Still Not Following a Knowledge-Based Approach 12 DOD Practices Continue to Contribute to Program Risk and Instability 23 Additional Factors Can Contribute to Poor Weapon Acquisition Outcomes 27 Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement 31 How to Read The Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed 33 Assessments of Individual Programs 34 Airborne Laser (ABL) 35 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) 37 Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites 39 Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) Increment 2 41 Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) 43 Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System 45 B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability 47 B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP) 49 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System 51 C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) 53 C-130J Hercules 55 C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP) 57 C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP) 59 CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) 61 Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X) 63 CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier 65 Distributed Common Ground System—Army (DCGS-A) 67 DDG 1000 Destroyer 69 E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE) 71 EA-18G 73 Page i GAO-08-467SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Contents Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)—Atlas V, Delta IV 75 Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) 77ary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 79 Extended Range Munition (ERM) 81 Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile 83 F-22A Modernization Program 85 Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) 87 Future Combat Systems (FCS) 89 Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System 91 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 93 H-1 Upgrades 95 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) 97 Joint Cargo Aircraft 99 Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) 101Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) 103 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 105Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS AMF) 107 Joint Ta System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR) 109 JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS) 111 KC-X Program 113 Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) 115 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 117 Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 119 Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 121 Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW) 123 LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program 125 Longbow Apache Block III 127 Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) 129 Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) 131 Multiple Kill Vehicle 133 Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 135 Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform 137 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System 139 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle 141 Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 143 Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control 145 Page ii GAO-08-467SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Contents National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 147 P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft 149 PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit 151 Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High 153 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II 155 Sky Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 157 Space Radar (SR) 159 Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) 161 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 163 Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) 165 V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft 167 VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program 169 Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774) 171 Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) 173 Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 1 175 Warfigation Network-Tactic Increment 2 177 Agency Comments 179 Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 181 Appendix II: Technology Readiness Levels 190 Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments 192 196Related GAO Products Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Tables Portfolios 7 Table 2: Examples of Program Delays and Impacts 9 Table 3: Planned RDT&E and Procurement Funding for Major Defense Acquisition Programs, as of December 2006 10 Table 4: Outcomes for Weapon Programs in 2008 Assessment 14 Table 5: Significant Changes to Contract Prices for DOD Development Contracts 25 Table 6: Program Office Staffing Composition for 52 DOD Programs 30 Page iii GAO-08-467SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Contents Figure 1: Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems 9Figures Figure 2: Knowledge Achievement for Weapon System Programs in 2008 Assessment at Key Junctures 15 Figure 3: Maturity Levels of Critical Technologie