Introduction to cryptographic protocols

Bruno Blanchet

Description

Introduction to cryptographic protocols Bruno Blanchet CNRS, École Normale Supérieure, INRIA March 2009 (Slides by Stéphanie Delaune) Bruno Blanchet (CNRS) Introduction to cryptographic protocols March 2009 1 / 18

• agent alice


• later deny


• really counted


• voters can


• outcome really


• individual verifiability


• having


• alice initiates

Sujets

• Blanchet
• Having

Informations

• Publié par: pefav
• Nombre de lectures: 18
• Langue: English

Extrait

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Introduction to cryptographic protocols

March 2009

CNRS, École Normale Supérieure, INRIA [e-mail]

/1810290rahc

(Slides by Stéphanie Delaune)

Bruno Blanchet

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Cryptographic protocols small programs designed tosecure communication (various security goals) usecryptographic primitives(e.g. encryption, hash function,

Cryptographic protocols

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SRNC(tehcnalBonuocntioctduront)IBr

Cryptographic protocols

81

Cryptographic protocols small programs designed tosecure communication (various security goals) usecryptographic primitives(e.g. encryption, hash function,

hpcirptoyrtpgoarch20092/ocolsMar

NC(tehcnalBonurBSRI)tnorudtcoitnocryptographicprcotoMslohcra9002183/

Non-repudiation:Alicesends a message toBob.Alicecannot later deny having sent this message.Bobcannot deny having received the message. ...

Fairness:AliceandBobwant to sign a contract.Aliceinitiates the protocol. MayBobobtain some advantage?

Security properties (1)

Authentication the agent: IsAlicereally talking toBob?

Secrecy an intruder learn some secret message between two: May honest participants?