Cet ouvrage fait partie de la bibliothèque YouScribe
Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le lire en ligne
En savoir plus

The economics of environmental innovation, regulation and commitment [Elektronische Ressource] / vorgelegt von Grischa Sebastian Perino

162 pages
The Economics of Environmental Innovation,Regulation and CommitmentInaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Wurde¨ eines Doktorsder Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) an derWirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakult¨at derRuprecht-Karls-Universit¨at Heidelbergvorgelegt im Juli 2007 vonGrischa Sebastian Perinogeboren in Oberkirch.2To Vanessa34ContentsTable of Contents iList of Figures vAcknowledgments vii1 Introduction 11.1 Green Horizontal Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 Implementation and the Choice of Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.3entation and the Ability of a Government to Commit . . . . 51.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6I Green Horizontal Innovation: The Social Optimum 72 Introduction to Part I 82.1 Backstop Technologies and the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82.2 Green Horizontal Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92.3 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102.4 Outline of the Model and the Methodology Used . . . . . . . . . . . 122.5 Key Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 The Model 143.1 The Environment-Economy Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.2 The R&D Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163.3 The Social Planner’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Voir plus Voir moins

The Economics of Environmental Innovation,
Regulation and Commitment
Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Wurde¨ eines Doktors
der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) an der
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakult¨at der
Ruprecht-Karls-Universit¨at Heidelberg
vorgelegt im Juli 2007 von
Grischa Sebastian Perino
geboren in Oberkirch.2To Vanessa
34Contents
Table of Contents i
List of Figures v
Acknowledgments vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Green Horizontal Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Implementation and the Choice of Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3entation and the Ability of a Government to Commit . . . . 5
1.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
I Green Horizontal Innovation: The Social Optimum 7
2 Introduction to Part I 8
2.1 Backstop Technologies and the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Green Horizontal Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Outline of the Model and the Methodology Used . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Key Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 The Model 14
3.1 The Environment-Economy Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 The R&D Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 The Social Planner’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 The Optimal Pollution Policy 20
4.1 The First Order Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2 The Singular Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 Innovation with Symmetric Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4 Innovation with Asymmetric Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 The Optimal Timing of R&D 26
5.1 Setup of the Optimal Timing Decision for R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2 Characterization of the Optimal Innovation Policy . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3 No Backstop is Feasible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.4 The Effects of Technological Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.5 A Short History of Refrigeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 Extensions 38
6.1 Alternative R&D Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1.1 Exogenous Efficiency Improvements in Research . . . . . . . 39
6.1.2 Increasing Returns to R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
i6.1.3 Decreasing Returns to R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2 Evolving Technological Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2.1 The Technology Optimist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2.2 The Technology Pessimist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.3 Generalized functional specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7 Conclusion of Part I 48
II Green Horizontal Innovation: Implementation 51
8 Introduction to Part II 52
9 The Model 54
10 The Social Optimum 56
10.1 Static Post-Innovation Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
10.2 Optimal Level of R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
10.3 Implementation Without Restrictions on Instruments. . . . . . . . . 57
11 The Market Equilibrium with Patents and Permits 59
11.1 Production Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.2 License Fee Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
11.3 Policy Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.4 The Case of a Superior New Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12 The Market Equilibrium with Patents and Taxes 65
12.1 Production Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
12.2 License Fee Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
12.3 Policy Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
12.4 Robustness of Results to Alternative Cost Structures . . . . . . . . . 67
13 Instrument Mix 69
14 ImplementationoftheOptimalPollutionPolicyforMultipleGreen
Horizontal Innovations 71
14.1 The Decentralized Version of the Part I Economy . . . . . . . . . . . 71
14.2 Optimal Pollution Policy with a Downward Sloping Demand Function 73
14.3 Exclusive Use of the Unrestricted Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
14.4 Exclusive Use of the New Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
14.5 Simultaneous Use of All Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
15 Conclusion of Part II 76
III Endogenous Design of Environmental Regulation, Commit-
ment and Intellectual Property Rights 79
16 Introduction to Part III 80
17 The Model 85
18 Vertical Environmental Innovation 88
18.1 No Revenue Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
18.2 With Revenue Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
ii19 A Polluting Industry Facing a Clean Substitute 92
19.1 No Revenue Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
19.2 With Revenue Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
20 Clean Industry and Polluting Substitute 96
20.1 No Revenue Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
20.2 With Revenue Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
21 Implementation of the Optimal R&D Policy for Multiple Green
Horizontal Innovations 99
21.1 Perfectly Elastic Demand cum Capacity Constraint . . . . . . . . . . 100
21.2 Downward Sloping Demand Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
22 Conclusion of Part III 103
IV Commitment by Delegation 105
23 Introduction to Part IV 106
24 The Model 110
25 McCallum’s Second Fallacy 114
25.1 Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
25.2 Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
26 Beyond the Fallacy 117
26.1 The Final Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
26.2 The First Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
26.3 Costly delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
26.4 Endogenous choice of bureaucrat’s type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
27 Conclusion of Part IV 123
28 Conclusion 125
28.1 Summary of Results and Policy Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
28.1.1 Optimal Green Horizontal Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
28.1.2 Implementing Policies for Green Horizontal Innovation . . . . 126
28.1.3 Commitment and the Internal Organization of Government . 128
28.2 Caveats and Areas of Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
V Appendix 131
A Appendix to Part I 132
A.1 Proof of Necessary Conditions (5.3) and (5.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.2 Combining the Necessary Conditions: (5.3) and (5.4) to (5.5) and (5.6)133
A.3 Shadow Prices When a Backstop Arrives: (5.7) . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A.4 Proof That Innovation Is Sequential (Proposition 5.2) . . . . . . . . 135
∗A.5 Shadow Price of a New Technology at t > 0: (5.9) . . . . . . . . 135n+1
B Appendix to Part II 137
iiiC Appendix of Part IV 138
C.1 Proof of Proposition 25.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
DisC.2 Proof of S (c ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1381
DelC.3 Proof of S (c ,a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1391
C.4 Proof of Remark 26.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
C.5 Proof of Proposition 26.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
C.6 Case with c >c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1402 1
C.6.1 The adjustment decision under discretion . . . . . . . . . . . 141
C.6.2 The adjustment decision under delegation . . . . . . . . . . . 141
C.6.3 Remark 26.1 and Corollary 26.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
C.6.4 The optimization problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Bibliography 143
ivList of Figures
3.1 Potential Sequence of Innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1 Optimal evolution of stock and R&D sequence (N=3) when R&D
fails to develop a backstop (p = 0.25). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.2 The upper bound on the technology portfolio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3 MaximumandExpectedNumberofInnovationsandProbabilitythat
no Backstop is Developed as Functions of p. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.1 Technological Optimist: Optimal evolution of stock and R&D se-
quence(N=4)whenR&Dfailstodevelopabackstop(M = 7,BS = 3). 42
6.2 Technological Pessimist: Optimal evolution of stock and R&D se-
˜quence(N=3)whenR&Dfailstodevelopabackstop(M = 4,BS = 3). 44
18.1 Vertical environmental innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
19.1 A clean but expensive substitute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
20.1 A cheap but polluting substitute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
24.1 Timing of the game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
vvi

Un pour Un
Permettre à tous d'accéder à la lecture
Pour chaque accès à la bibliothèque, YouScribe donne un accès à une personne dans le besoin