Wittgenstein

Mark Jago

Description

A stimulating introduction to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, which encourages active engagement with the ideas it presents.

Sujets

• Literary Criticism
• European

Informations

• Publié par: Humanities eBooks
• Date de parution: 11 janvier 2021
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781847600141
• Langue: English

Extrait

The World is all that is the case Philosophy Insights General Editor: Mark Addis

Running Head 1

Wittgenstein

Mark Jago

‘The World is all that is the case’

http//www.humanities-ebooks.co.uk For advice on use of this ebook please scroll to page 2

Publication Data

© Mark Jago, 2007

he Autor as asserted is rigt to be identified as te autor of tis Work in accord- ance wit te Copyrigt, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Publised byHumanitiesEbooks, LLP Tirril Hall, Tirril, Penrit CA10 2JE

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ISBN 978-1-84760-014-1

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Bibliographical Entry:

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Jago, Mark. Wittgenstein. Philosophy Insights. Tirril: Humanities-Ebooks, 2007

A Note on the Author

Mark Jago is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK and a Junior Research Associate in the Research Group on the Philosophy of Information at the University of Oxford. He has published on logic, belief, fiction and the philosophy of information. His main interests are in meaning, belief and truth and how these concepts might link together. He favours a broadly Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy, particularly when thinking about meaning and other minds. See also the titles on formal logic and the philosophy of mathematics in the Philosophy Insights series.

Personal website: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/philsoophy/staff/markjago.htm.

Contents

1

2

3

4

5

TheTractatus 1.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Metaphysics in theTractatus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Objects in theTractatus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Substance and Possibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Truth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Discussion Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Picture Theory 2.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Elementary Propositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Empiricist Interpretation of theTractatus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Discussion Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Meaning and Nonsense 3.1 Meaning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Understanding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Limits of Sense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The Purpose of Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Discussion Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Necessity 4.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Necessity in theTractatus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Towards the Later Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Discussion Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Meaning and Use 5.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 TheAugustinian View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Criticism of the Augustinian View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Family Resemblance and Language Games. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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22 22 25 28 30

31 31 32 33 37 40

42 42 43 47 48

50 50 50 52 55

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5.5

Philosophy Insights:Wittgenstein

Discussion Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sensations and Private Language 6.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 The Cartesian Model and Private Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Private Language Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Sensations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Discussion Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Following a Rule 7.1 Meaning and RuleFollowing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Wittgenstein’s Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Kripke’s Sceptical Interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Necessity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Discussion Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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59 59 59 60 64 68

69 69 72 74 75 76

Introduction

About this Book

This is an introductory text on one of the greatest Twentieth Century thinkers, Lud wig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). I could not hope to give a full account of the breadth and inventiveness of Wittgenstein’s thought. Although he published only one book in his lifetime, he produced a huge number of notebooks and dictated notes which have subsequently been published. At least two of his books are classics of twentieth century philosophy: theTractatus LogicoPhilosophicus(1922) and thePhilosophical Investigations(1953). Both books have proved enormously influential in contempo rary analytic philosophy. It is these two books that I shall focus on, as they represent the key ideas of both the ‘early’ (Tractatusera) and the ‘later’ (Philosophical Investi gationsera) Wittgenstein. I shall primarily be concerned with giving an exposition of some of the key ideas in Wittgenstein’s thought. In choosing what to cover and what to leave out, I opted for those topics that can best be amalgamated into a coherent whole and that best reflect our interests, as analytic philosophers. As a result, the theme of meaning is to the fore, whereas Wittgenstein’s mysticism in theTractatusand much of his thinking on psychology in theInvestigationsis passed over. Although there is much in Wittgenstein’s thought that is open to debate, my aim has been to give a clear presentation of his ideas rather than an argument for or against them. I have included pointers to the relevant literature for the reader who wishes to investigate the arguments further. Each chapter ends with several discussion points which should be considered; often, these points link Wittgenstein’s thoughts to that of other philosophers and to the contemporary debate. Where appropriate, there are pointers to further reading.

Background to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

Wittgenstein began his philosophical career at Cambridge in 1912, at a time when British philosophy was still very much under the influence of Hegalian Idealism. Ide alism’s advocates in nineteenth century Britain included T. H. Green (1836–1882),

Philosophy Insights:Wittgenstein

8

F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925) and H. H. Joachim (1868–1938). Although British Idealism is rarely discussed or taught in academic philosophical circles nowadays, these philosophers nevertheless had an important im pact on British philosophy in general: McTaggart’s article ‘The Unreality of Time’ (1908) is essential reading in the Philosophy of Time and Joachim’sThe Nature of Truth(1906) is the classic presentation of the coherence theory of truth. McTaggart taught Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore (1873–1958) at Cambridge, both of whom would later teach Wittgenstein; and indeed both Russell and Moore began their careers as Idealists. Largely as a result of the changing atti tudes of Moore and Russell, British Idealism fell out of favour early in the Twentieth Century, to be replaced by the still dominant analytic school of philosophy (which is not so much a body of doctrine as a way of approaching the subject). The rise of ana lytic philosophy was also due to the writings of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) on logic, language and the foundations of mathematics. Frege was a mathematician who wanted to provide secure foundations for mathematics; he developed modern logic in more or less the form we find it in today and gave an analysis of language and its meaning which remains influential. Frege’s influence can be found throughout theTractatus. Russell too was a mathematician who helped to develop modern logic (hisPrinci ples of Mathematics(1903) andPrincipia Mathematicawith A. N. Whitehead (1910, 1912, 1913) are both classics in the field). This shared interest in logic, mathematics and meaning was to be a key influence in early analytical philosophy and these were the areas on which Wittgenstein began to work. Russell’s approach to language allowed for a method of logical analysis to reveal the true form of an expression or proposition, known as itslogical form. By way of example, the meaning of the expression ‘the present king of France’ is not clear because, at present, France has no king. Russell’s method was to analyse the linguistic form of the proposition (in this example, the definite description ‘the present king of France’) to reveal its true logical form. Once that had been done, the meaning would 1 be clear. Wittgenstein took up Russell’s project of logical analysis and combined it with the ories of meaning he had learnt from Frege. The results of Wittgenstein’s early thought are both remarkably deep and, in a sense, diametrically opposed to Russell’s aims. Whereas Russell was concerned with placing knowledge on a firm Empiricist footing,

1 Russell’s famous analysis of descriptions in ‘On Denoting’ (1905) held that the logical form of ‘the present king of France is bald’ is:there is exactly one present king of France, and he’s bald. But this is false; so the original proposition is false too. The example is intended to show how the analysis reveals the meaning obscured in the original form of the proposition.