Four Essays on Risk, Incentives, and Markets [Elektronische Ressource] / Julius Pahlke. Betreuer: Martin Kocher

Julius Pahlke

Informations

• Publié par: ludwig-maximilians-universitat_munchen
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2011
• Nombre de lectures: 14
• Langue: English

Extrait

Four Essays on Risk, Incentives, and Markets


Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

2011

vorgelegt von
Julius Andreas Pahlke



Referent: Prof. Dr. Martin G. Kocher
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Florian Englmaier
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 16. November 2011
 
  Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 31.10.2011
Namen der Berichterstatter:
Prof. Dr. Martin Kocher, Prof. Dr. Florian Englmaier, Prof. Dr.Klaus Schmidt Acknowledgements
There are many people that I am grateful to for sharing with me their knowledge, for
their comments, and for their support.
I would like to thank my supervisor Martin G. Kocher for his inexhaustible patience
and his guidance both in his function as supervisor and as co-author. It was him who
first introduced me to the field of experimental economics and gave me the
opportunity to work as his research assistant.
I also owe thanks to Florian Englmaier and Klaus Schmidt who agreed to serve as
supervisors to my dissertation and supported me with numerous helpful comments
during my doctoral studies.
I further thank my co-authors Sebastian Strasser, Stefan Trautmann, and Ferdinand
Vieider for an inspiring and fruitful collaboration and for supporting me in all my
projects – not only in the joint ones.
I have received support and valuable comments from many other friends, colleagues,
and participants at conferences and seminars. I am in particular grateful to
participants of the MELESSA Brown Bag Seminar and the Micro Workshop, both
internal seminars at the University of Munich, to participants of the Work-in-
Progress Tiber Meeting at the University of Tilburg, the ESA conference 2009 in
Innsbruck, the EEA conference 2010 in Glasgow, and the annual meeting of the
Verein für Socialpolitik 2010 in Kiel. I also thank the entire staff involved in
conducting my experiments at MELESSA.
I thank my family for supporting me in everything I do and lastly I thank Elena
Brosch for her patience and professional and emotional support.



Julius Pahlke
I Contents

Preface ..................................................................................................................................... 1
 
Chapter 1 - Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk ........................ 8
1.1 Motivation ................................................................................................................ 8
1.2 Risk Attitudes in Social Contexts .......................................................................... 10
1.3 Experiment 1: Responsibility for Gains, Losses, and Mixed Prospects ................. 13
1.3.1 Experimental Design ...................................................................................... 13
1.3.2 Results: Choices under Responsibility ........................................................... 16
1.3.3 Discussion ...................................................................................................... 23
1.4 Experiment 2: Disentangling Social Norm and Amplification Accounts .............. 25
1.4.1 Experimental Design 25
1.4.2 Results ............................................................................................................ 26
1.4.3 Discussion30
1.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 32
1.6 Appendix ................................................................................................................ 34

Chapter 2 - Tempus Fugit: Time Pressure in Risky Decisions ............................... 41
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 41
2.2 Experimental Design .............................................................................................. 44
2.2.1 Treatments and Procedures ............................................................................ 44
2.2.2 Time Pressure and Expected Value Manipulation ......................................... 46
2.2.3 Subjects and Payoffs ...................................................................................... 48
2.3 Prospects and Dependent Variables ....................................................................... 48
2.4 Experimental Results ............................................................................................. 51
2.4.1 Time Pressure Manipulation .......................................................................... 51
2.4.2 Time Pressure and Risk Attitude.................................................................... 52
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 57
2.6 Appendix ................................................................................................................ 59

II Chapter 3 - An Experimental Test of Precautionary Bidding ................................ 61
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 61
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Predictions ................................................................ 63
3.3 Experimental Design .............................................................................................. 66
3.3.1 The Auction ................................................................................................... 66
3.3.2 Elicitation of Risk Preferences ....................................................................... 69
3.3.3 Laboratory Protocol and Subjects .................................................................. 70
3.4 Results of the Main Experiment ............................................................................. 71
3.5 Control Experiment ................................................................................................ 76
3.5.1 Design and Hypotheses .................................................................................. 76
3.5.2 Results of the Control Experiment ................................................................. 78
3.6 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 81
3.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 83
3.8 Appendix ................................................................................................................ 85

Chapter 4 - Outcome Risk and Prevention Framing in Social Dilemmas ........... 94
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 94
4.2 Experimental Design .............................................................................................. 97
4.2.1 Treatments ...................................................................................................... 97
4.2.2 Equilibria and Predictions .............................................................................. 99
4.2.3 Laboratory Protocol ..................................................................................... 103
4.2.4 Procedure ..................................................................................................... 104
4.3 Related Literature ................................................................................................. 106
4.3.1 Prevention vs. Creation Framing ................................................................. 106
4.3.2 Outcome Risk vs. No Outcome Risk ........................................................... 108
4.4 Results .................................................................................................................. 110
4.4.1 Unconditional Cooperation (Part 2) ............................................................. 110
4.4.2 Conditional Cooperation (Part 1) 115
4.5 Discussion ............................................................................................................ 117
4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 121
4.7 Appendix .............................................................................................................. 124

References ............................................................................................................................ 143


III List of Tables
Table 1-1: Prospects as functions of stake level b ................................................................. 15
Table 1-2: Experiment 1 – Choice of safe prospect ............................................................... 19
Table 1-3: Experiment 1 – Satisfaction rating ....................................................................... 22
Table 1-4: Experiment 2 – C28
Table 1-5: Experiment 2 – Satisfaction ratings ...................................................................... 29
Table 1-6: Overview of lotteries ............................................................................................ 38
Table 1-7: Choices by prospect type ......