The Gig Mafia

David M. Shapiro

Description

Organized crimes (e.g., weapons trafficking, drug distribution, white collar crime) persist globally due primarily to the power of modern information and communication technology (e.g., computer-based networks in the open and dark webs) to facilitate organization and the enhanced liquidity provided by electronic transfers (in effect, e-capital) to distribute criminal proceeds in the same covert and high-speed manner used by the so-called legitimate commercial enterprises. Offshore banking in tax secrecy and tax haven jurisdictions facilitates both the socially accepted process commonly known as tax avoidance, for example, and the notorious practice commonly known as tax evasion: the former is lawful; the latter is illicit.

The dirty secret of how transnational organized economic crime persists lies in global finance, especially transactions using the U.S. dollar in safe havens (e.g., the West uses the Cayman Islands; the East uses Cyprus). Regulators, monitors, auditors, and other specialists in conducting transaction review do not readily and timely tell the difference between high valued transfers that involve true sales of licit goods from high valued transfers that involve the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking, drug distribution, arms sales, and so on.

Sujets

• Financial Risk Management
• Economie gestion
• Economics
• Business
• Finance

Informations

• Publié par: Business Expert Press
• Date de parution: 09 février 2021
• Nombre de lectures: 1
• EAN13: 9781953349859
• Langue: English

Extrait

The Gig Mafia
The Gig Mafia
How Small Networks and High-Speed Digital Funds Transfers Have Changed the Face of Organized Crime
David M. Shapiro
The Gig Mafia: How Small Networks and High-Speed Digital Funds Transfers Have Changed the Face of Organized Crime
Copyright © Business Expert Press, LLC, 2021.
Cover design by Charlene Kronstedt
Interior design by Exeter Premedia Services Private Ltd., Chennai, India
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or any other except for brief quotations, not to exceed 400 words, without the prior permission of the publisher.
First published in 2021 by
Business Expert Press, LLC
222 East 46th Street, New York, NY 10017
www.businessexpertpress.com
ISBN-13: 978-1-95334-984-2 (paperback)
ISBN-13: 978-1-95334-985-9 (e-book)
Business Expert Press Business Law and Corporate Risk Management Collection
Collection ISSN: 2333-6722 (print)
Collection ISSN: 2333-6730 (electronic)
First edition: 2021
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Description
Organized crimes (e.g., weapons trafficking, drug distribution, white collar crime) persist globally due primarily to the power of modern information and communication technology (e.g., computer-based networks in the open and dark webs) to facilitate organization and the enhanced liquidity provided by electronic transfers (in effect, e-capital) to distribute criminal proceeds in the same covert and high-speed manner used by the so-called legitimate commercial enterprises. Offshore banking in tax secrecy and tax haven jurisdictions facilitates both the socially accepted process commonly known as tax avoidance, for example, and the notorious practice commonly known as tax evasion: the former is lawful; the latter is illicit.
The dirty secret of how transnational organized economic crime persists lies in global finance, especially transactions using the U.S. dollar in safe havens (e.g., the West uses the Cayman Islands; the East uses Cyprus). Regulators, monitors, auditors, and other specialists in conducting transaction review do not readily and timely tell the difference between high valued transfers that involve true sales of licit goods from high valued transfers that involve the laundering of proceeds from human trafficking, drug distribution, arms sales, and so on.
Keywords
organized crime; organized economic crime; transnational organized crime; mafia; gig economy; risk assessment; global finance; drug distribution; firearms offenses; five families
Contents
Preface
Chapter 1 Introduction: Revisiting and Revising Organized Crime
Chapter 2 Welcome to the Gig (Crime) Economy
Chapter 3 Why Smaller/More Flexible Cell-Like Nodes and Networks?
Chapter 4 The Criminogenic Network and Role of Legitimate Financial Institutions
Chapter 5 Overview of the Size of the Problem
Chapter 6 Traditional Organized Crime (e.g., Mafia)
Chapter 7 Historical Overview: A Few Key Concepts
Chapter 8 Japan (i.e., Yakuza)
Chapter 9 Italy (e.g., La Cosa Nostra)
Chapter 10 United States (e.g., Al Capone, the “Five Families”)
Chapter 11 Notes on Ontology of Organized Crime
Chapter 12 Event-Based (i.e., the Study of Criminal Events and Collective Action as the Basis for Conclusions)
Chapter 13 Epistemology and Sources of Knowledge
Chapter 14 Operations and Functioning of Organized Crime Groups
Chapter 15 Transformation of Organized Crime Groups in Theory and Practice
Chapter 16 Organized Crime and New Participants
Chapter 17 Professions and the New Organized Crime: Control
Chapter 18 The Future of Organized Crime
References
About the Author
Index
Preface
I’ve been providing organized crime background information and context to investigative journalists over the past several years, following stints in the public sector (e.g., U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Essex County Prosecutor’s Office) and private sector (i.e., management consultants, certified public accounting firms, and financial crimes specialists). After years of enjoying vicariously (i.e., observing and not participating) the multiplicity of myths and narratives with an indeterminate amount of truth in each, I decided that it would be a good time to think for myself.
Applying my experiences and refined competency in the subject matter popularly known as organized crime and scrutinizing statistical information going back at least three decades, I’ve come to some conclusions. Firstly, I know much less than I thought I knew. Much of organized crime folklore is better interpreted as stories of intrigue like an espionage novel wherein many individuals are slaughtered. The bible of organized crime has not and cannot be written because of a lack of not only divine inspiration but a lack of sufficient independently and impartially validated evidence. Deal-seeking defendants and career-climbing public prosecutors need not apply.
There are many useful readings referenced in this manuscript. I hope only that you enjoy it enough to follow up with the writings of so many other scholars and analysts noted herein. Finally, I wish for readers to develop an enlightened awareness of the nature of the problems inherent in the phrase “organized crime” without succumbing to fearmongering, especially where one must trust and cannot verify, and with a sense of proportion, which is commonly lacking.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Revisiting and Revising Organized Crime
This is a book about organized crime. It includes discussion and analysis of organizing for criminal purposes, the collective commission of criminal activities, and organized concealment of criminal activities. Relevant ideas are drawn from scholars and practitioners, including the author’s professional experience. A key notion is that organizing for profit, gain, and power is not unusual; however, organizing for these ends outside of the rule of law is something extraordinary.
Please observe that within this work product, there are several related uses of the core concept of organized crime:

1. Organized crime (OC) means unlawful activities comprising crimes within the jurisdiction.
2. Organized economic crime means unlawful activities inclusive of crimes and predicate acts that could be considered criminal (e.g., whether resulting in civil or administrative charges brought by regulators such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
3. Transnational organized crime (TOC) is a fairly recently developed phrase applied to cooperative ventures or associations, in fact among organized crime groups operating cross-border.
4. Transnational organized economic crime is a modification of TOC to include potentially unlawful activities that are generally not investigated and prosecuted as crimes (e.g., use of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions to avoid taxes).
5. OC groups, whether restricted to collective criminal activity or expanded to collective, potentially unlawful activity.
There is a wide gulf between the land of organized crime (e.g., traditional organized crime as committed by the New York City five mafia crime families in the mid- to late-20th century) and the land of organized economic crime (e.g., bankers behaving badly, whether “mis-selling” securities and investments, wrongfully foreclosing on mortgages with defective chains of legal title, creating bogus customer accounts to meet sales targets and secure employment and bonuses). The traditional organized crime group (e.g., the Gambino crime family) is conceived as a primarily illicit collective exercise, whereas the organized economic crime group (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Wirecard), when discussed seriously at all, is conceived as a secondarily illicit collective exercise—a hybrid. This overestimates the immorality of traditional organized crime and underestimates the amorality of organized economic crime.
Some key concepts developed in this work product include the materially misleading theory of organized crime as akin to Fortune 500 companies; the materially misleading theory of organized crime as an existential threat; the materially misleading theory of organized crime as independent of the political economy at large (including the creation of a large reserve army of the desperately un- and under-employed); and the materially misleading theory of ethnicity as a precondition to participating in any given illicit collective. In brief, organized crime is to be expected under conditions of widespread precariousness in the political economy, especially where the rule of law is changeable, whether in design or implementation, based on narrow interpretations of bribery (e.g., excluding political contributions) and honest services (e.g., excluding the prosecution of official dishonesty not resulting in bribes or kickbacks).
By way of example (and there are indeed too many to catalogue and describe), the UK’s Serious Fraud Office charged two high level executives of accounting irregularities (i.e., criminal fraud) with respect to reporting profits under a contract with the UK government. While the executives were charged criminally, the corporate employer received a deferred prosecution agreement (a voluntary settlement not accompanied by a criminal conviction) (Tokar 2020a). This set of conduct is as much organized economic crime as it is white collar crime, but it would rarely be discussed and analyzed publicly as a criminal event at its core indicative of an organized criminal enterprise. In many