New Pathways In Science

Arthur Stanley Eddington

Description

This vintage book contains a fascinating book on scientific theory and development, written by sir Arthur Eddington. It contains a discussion of the philosophical outlook of modern science, a summary of then-contemporary knowledge, and a number of fascinating and insightful lectures on the various scientific topics. The chapters of this book include: 'Science and Experience', 'Dramatis Personae', 'The End of the World', 'The Decline of Determinism', 'Indeterminacy and Quantum Theory', 'Probability', 'The Constitution of the Stars', 'Subatomic Energy', 'Cosmic Clouds and Nebulae', and more. We are republishing this vintage text now in an affordable, modern edition - complete with a specially commissioned new biography of the author.

Sujets

• Essays
• Science

Informations

• Publié par: Read Books Ltd.
• Date de parution: 31 mai 2013
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781473383081
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

NEW PATHWAYS IN SCIENCE
by
SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON
M.A., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S.
Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy in the University of Cambridge
MESSENGER LECTURES 1934
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
CONTENTS
Preface
I
Science and Experience
II
Dramatis Personae
III
The End of the World
IV
The Decline of Determinism
V
Indeterminacy and Quantum Theory
VI
Probability
VII
The Constitution of the Stars
VIII
Subatomic Energy
IX
Cosmic Clouds and Nebulae
X
The Expanding Universe
XI
The Theory of Groups
XII
Criticisms and Controversies
XIII
Epilogue
Index
PLATES
1
Electrons and Positrons By permission of Prof. P. M. S. Blackett
2
Gaseous Nebula (Cygnus)
3
Dark Nebulosity—The Horse’s Head
4
Spiral Nebula (Canes Venatici)
PREFACE
T HIS volume contains the Messenger Lectures which I delivered at Cornell University in April and May 1934. Chapters II and VIII have been added; the remaining chapters correspond to the twelve lectures of the course. It was one of the conditions of the lectureship that the lectures should be published.
Except for a small book on the Expanding Universe, my last spell of writing was about six years ago, when Stars and Atoms (1927), The Nature of the Physical World (1928) and Science and the Unseen World (1929) practically exhausted all that it was then in my mind to say. A scientific writer is placed in a difficulty by his earlier books; either his new book will appear as a rather disjointed addendum to them, or he must perfunctorily go over again a great deal of matter which he has no wish to rewrite. Being unwilling to adopt the second alternative, I determined to make what I could of whatever had come to my mind in the last six years. Accordingly I spoke at Cornell on a variety of topics, using as a nucleus the material contained in a number of addresses and lectures which I had had occasion to deliver since 1929, and adding other subjects to which I had been giving attention. The general plan was that each lecture should have a separate theme, except that Indeterminism was spread over two lectures. The choice of subjects has allowed a certain amount of continuity of treatment; but there has been no attempt to provide a systematic introduction to modern scientific thought. Perhaps the biggest gap is the absence of any account of the elementary ideas of the theory of relativity; I could not bring myself to go over again the ground covered in Chapters I , II , III , VI , VII of The Nature of the Physical World altering the treatment and illustrations merely for the sake of alteration.
In the opening lecture I try to explain the philosophical outlook of modern science, as I understand it, and show how the scientific picture of the world described in physics is related to the “familiar story” in our minds. Chapter II is an interpolation containing a summary of our knowledge of atomic physics, etc., which some readers may find necessary for an understanding of subsequent chapters and others may find useful as a reminder. Then follow four lectures which have something in common; they are concerned with the consequences of the statistical type of law, first introduced into physics in the subject of thermodynamics, which has in recent years completely driven out the older causal type of law from the foundations of physics. The last of these four lectures, on Probability, has besides its application to statistical law a more elementary interest.
Then follows a complete change of subject, and the next four lectures are devoted to astrophysics. Starting with the sun and familiar stars, we advance to greater distances till we reach the system of milliards of galaxies which constitutes the universe. This last subject has been treated more fully in my recent book The Expanding Universe ; I here give a much shorter account. In this lecture ( Chapter X ) we meet the elusive “cosmical constant” which takes us back to the fundamental conceptions of physics again for the next two chapters. Chapter XI is, I realise, much too severe for this kind of book; I can only plead that the subject which has occupied me for the last five years, almost to the exclusion of any other research, was bound to spill over into any course of lectures I might give. The next lecture, on Theory of Groups, was something of an experiment; but it, more nearly than any other part of the book, touches the key-note of scientific philosophy.
The chapter “Criticisms and Controversies” may by its title lead the reader to expect a comprehensive series of answers to the multitudinous points raised by critics and reviewers, and by many who have contributed valuable discussion of the views which I have advocated. I think that a little reflection will show that this was impracticable with any reasonable allotment of space. If a criticism can be answered briefly and decisively it seems scarcely worth while to inform the world in general that so-and-so has raised it. If it is more arguable, a lengthy explanation and discussion of it is usually necessary. For the most part I am content to think that if my contentions are of value they will find their proper level without continual parental intervention to save them from determined opponents—and sometimes from over-enthusiastic friends. But I would express here my gratitude for many articles by philosophers and others courteously discussing my writings. Sometimes I have appreciated the justice of the criticism, and it has had its due influence in maturing my views. Often I would have liked to write a reply in the hope of advancing an understanding on both sides; but such a reply requires at least as much time and care as an independent article, and with rare exceptions I have had to let the opportunity go by. In the concluding lecture I return again to the philosophical outlook of Chapter I , but this time I refer to that part of “the problem of experience” which the methods of physics do not profess to treat. Parts of this lecture are taken from an address which I gave in a broadcast symposium on Science and Religion.
As usual, notwithstanding my efforts to simplify things, I have to impose a rather heavy strain on the attention of the reader. Since the chapters are to a considerable extent independent, the difficulty tends to increase towards the ends of the chapters. There is hope of a respite when the next chapter begins.
These lectures carry for me happy memories of the weeks which I spent in Cornell University. To the friends who welcomed me, and to the large audiences who encouraged me, I dedicate them gratefully.
A. S. E.
CAMBRIDGE September 1934
CHAPTER I
SCIENCE AND EXPERIENCE
Does the harmony which human intelligence thinks it discovers in Nature exist apart from such intelligence? Assuredly no. A reality completely independent of the spirit that conceives it, sees it or feels it, is an impossibility. A world so external as that, even if it existed, would be for ever inaccessible to us. What we call “objective reality” is, strictly speaking, that which is common to several thinking beings and might be common to all; this common part, we shall see, can only be the harmony expressed by mathematical laws.
P OINCARÉ , The Value of Science .
I
A S a conscious being I am involved in a story. The perceiving part of my mind tells me a story of a world around me. The story tells of familiar objects. It tells of colours, sounds, scents belonging to these objects; of boundless space in which they have their existence, and of an ever-rolling stream of time bringing change and incident. It tells of other life than mine busy about its own purposes.
As a scientist I have become mistrustful of this story. In many instances it has become clear that things are not what they seem to be. According to the story teller I have now in front of me a substantial desk; but I have learned from physics that the desk is not at all the continuous substance that it is supposed to be in the story. It is a host of tiny electric charges darting hither and thither with inconceivable velocity. Instead of being solid substance my desk is more like a swarm of gnats.
So I have come to realise that I must not put overmuch confidence in the story teller who lives in my mind. On the other hand, it would not do to ignore him altogether, since his story generally has some foundation of truth more especially in those anecdotes that concern me intimately. For I am given a part in the story, and if I do not take my cue with the other actors it is the worse for me. For example, there suddenly enters into the story a motor car coming rapidly towards the actor identified with myself. As a scientist I cavil at many of the particulars given by the story teller—the substantiality, the colour, the rapidly increasing size of the object approaching—but I accept his suggestion that it is wisest to jump out of the way.
There are ponderous treatises on my shelves which tell another story of the world around me. We call this the scientific story. One of our first tasks must be to try to understand the relation between the familiar story and the scientific story of what is happening around us.
At one time there was no very profound difference between the two versions. The scientist accepted the familiar story in its main outline; only he corrected a few facts here and there, and elaborated a few details. But latterly the familiar story and the scientific story have diverged more and more widely—until it has become hard to recognise that they have anything in common. Not content with upsetting fundamentally our ideas of material substance, physics has played strange pranks with our conceptions of space and time. Even causality has undergone transformation. Physical science now deliberately aims at presenting a new version of the story of our experience from the very beginning, rejecting the familiar story as too erratic a foundation.
But a