Kierkegaard and Death
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Kierkegaard and Death

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192 pages
English

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Death and dying in the work of Søren Kierkegaard


Few philosophers have devoted such sustained, almost obsessive attention to the topic of death as Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard and Death brings together new work on Kierkegaard's multifaceted discussions of death and provides a thorough guide to the development, in various texts and contexts, of Kierkegaard's ideas concerning death. Essays by an international group of scholars take up essential topics such as dying to the world, living death, immortality, suicide, mortality and subjectivity, death and the meaning of life, remembrance of the dead, and the question of the afterlife. While bringing Kierkegaard's philosophy of death into focus, this volume connects Kierkegaard with important debates in contemporary philosophy.


Acknowledgments
Abbreviations

Introduction; Patrick Stokes and Adam Buben

1. Knights and Knaves of the Living Dead: Kierkegaard's Use of Living Death as a Metaphor for Despair; George Connell
2. To Die And Yet Not Die: Kierkegaard's Theophany of Death; Simon D. Podmore
3. Christian Hate: Death, Dying, and Reason in Pascal and Kierkegaard; Adam Buben
4. Suicide and Despair Marius; Timmann Mjaaland
5. Thinking Death Into Every Moment: The Existence-Problem of Dying in Kierkegaard's Postscript; Paul Muench
6. Death and Ethics in Kierkegaard's Postscript; David D. Possen
7. The Intimate Agency of Death; Edward F. Mooney
8. A Critical Perspective on Kierkegaard's "At a Graveside"; Gordon D. Marino
9. Life-Narrative and Death as the End of Freedom: Kierkegaard on Anticipatory Resoluteness; John J. Davenport
10. Heidegger and Kierkegaard on Death: The Existentiell and the Existential; Charles Guignon
11. Kierkegaard, Levinas, Derrida: The Death of the Other; Laura Llevadot
12. Derrida, Judge William, and Death; Ian Duckles
13. The Soft Weeping of Desire's Loss: Recognition, Phenomenality, and the One Who Is Dead in Kierkegaard's Works of Love; Jeremy J. Allen
14. Duties to the Dead? Earnest Imagination and Remembrance; Patrick Stokes
15. Kierkegaard's Understanding of the Afterlife; Tamara Monet Marks

Contributors
Index

Sujets

Informations

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Date de parution 20 octobre 2011
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EAN13 9780253005342
Langue English

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KIERKEGAARD AND DEATH
Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion MEROLD WESTPHAL, EDITOR
K IERKEGAARD AND D EATH
Edited by
PATRICK STOKES and ADAM BUBEN
Indiana University Press
BLOOMINGTON AND INDIANAPOLIS
This book is a publication of
Indiana University Press
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2011 by Indiana University Press
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No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition.
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Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kierkegaard and death / edited by Patrick Stokes and Adam Buben.
p. cm. - (Indiana series in the philosophy of religion)
Proceedings of a conference held in Dec. 2007 at St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minn.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-253-35685-7 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-253-22352-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-253-00534-2 (ebook) 1.
Kierkegaard, S ren, 1813-1855-Congresses. 2. Death-Congresses. I. Stokes, Patrick, [date] II. Buben, Adam, [date] III. Title. IV. Series.
B4378.D43K54 2011
128 .5092-dc22 2011015256
1 2 3 4 5 16 15 14 13 12 11
Contents
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction Patrick Stokes and Adam Buben
1. Knights and Knaves of the Living Dead: Kierkegaard s Use of Living Death as a Metaphor for Despair George Connell
2. To Die and Yet Not Die: Kierkegaard s Theophany of Death Simon D. Podmore
3. Christian Hate: Death, Dying, and Reason in Pascal and Kierkegaard Adam Buben
4. Suicide and Despair Marius Timmann Mjaaland
5. Thinking Death into Every Moment: The Existence-Problem of Dying in Kierkegaard s Postscript Paul Muench
6. Death and Ethics in Kierkegaard s Postscript David D. Possen
7. The Intimate Agency of Death Edward F. Mooney
8. A Critical Perspective on Kierkegaard s At a Graveside Gordon D. Marino
9. Life-Narrative and Death as the End of Freedom: Kierkegaard on Anticipatory Resoluteness John J. Davenport
10. Heidegger and Kierkegaard on Death: The Existentiell and the Existential Charles Guignon
11. Kierkegaard, Levinas, Derrida: The Death of the Other Laura Llevadot
12. Derrida, Judge William, and Death Ian Duckles
13. The Soft Weeping of Desire s Loss: Recognition, Phenomenality, and the One Who Is Dead in Kierkegaard s Works of Love Jeremy J. Allen
14. Duties to the Dead? Earnest Imagination and Remembrance Patrick Stokes
15. Kierkegaard s Understanding of the Afterlife Tamara Monet Marks
Contributors
Index
Acknowledgments
The idea for this book emerged over a plate of Chinese pork dumplings in December 2005, just after the Kierkegaard and Asia conference held at the University of Melbourne. Since then the project has been well traveled, with editorial work taking place in Australia, Minnesota, New Mexico, Florida, Guam, Denmark, and England. And along with the frequent flyer miles, we ve also accumulated a great many debts of gratitude, which it is our pleasure to acknowledge here.
Work on this project has been made possible by funding from various sources: a Kierkegaard House Foundation Fellowship, a Danish Research Council for the Humanities Postdoctoral Fellowship and a European Commission Marie Curie Fellowship (Stokes), and a University of South Florida Presidential Doctoral Fellowship and a Fulbright Fellowship (Buben). Our thanks to our hosts at St. Olaf College, the S ren Kierkegaard Research Centre, the University of South Florida, the University of Hertfordshire, and the University of Guam.
We owe a particular debt to Gordon Marino and Cynthia Lund and to all the staff and scholars at the Hong Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota. The library generously hosted a two-day conference on Kierkegaard and Death in early December 2007, which was the source of several papers presented in this volume. We would like to thank the more than forty attendees and presenters at this conference, especially Anthony Rudd, Myron B. Penner, and the late Howard V. Hong, for their comments.
The International Kierkegaard Commentary list of abbreviations is used with kind permission of Series Editor Robert L. Perkins and Mercer University Press.
We d like to offer our thanks to the following people who have provided help and encouragement at various stages of the project: Andrew Burgess and Janice Schuetz, Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Jon Stewart, James Giles, Sinead Ladegaard Knox, Robert L. Perkins, S ren Landkildehus, John Lippitt, Rick Anthony Furtak, Dario Gonzalez, Jonathan Weidenbaum, Jack Mulder, Eric Berg, Daniel Leichty, Antony Aumann, and J. Michael Tilley.
Finally, we thank our respective friends and families for their support and encouragement, and especially Jessica Doyle for her help throughout the entire project, and Megan Altman for her invaluable assistance.
Abbreviations
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS BA The Book on Adler , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) CA The Concept of Anxiety , trans. Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980) CD Christian Discourses and The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997) CI The Concept of Irony together with Notes on Schelling s Berlin Lectures, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989) CUP Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, 2 vols., trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992) EO Either/Or , 2 vols., trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987) EUD Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990) FSE For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990) FT Fear and Trembling and Repetition , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983) JC Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est. See Philosophical Fragments JFY Judge for Yourself! See For Self-Examination JP S ren Kierkegaard s Journals and Papers , ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1, 1967; 2, 1970; 3 and 4, 1975; 5-7, 1978) KJN 1 Kierkegaard s Journals and Notebooks: Vol. 1, Journals AA-DD , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa Rumble, and K. Brian S derquist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007) PC Practice in Christianity , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991) PF Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985) PV The Point of View for My Work as an Author, The Single Individual, On My Work as an Author and Armed Neutrality , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998) R Repetition. See Fear and Trembling . SLW Stages on Life s Way , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988) SUD The Sickness unto Death , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980) TDIO Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) TM The Moment and Late Writings , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998) UDVS Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) WA Without Authority , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997) WL Works of Love , trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995)
DANISH TEXTS SKS 1 Af en endnu Levendes Papirer; Om Begrebet Ironi , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Johnny Kondrup, and Finn Hauberg Mortensen (Copenhagen: Gads, 1997) SKS 2 Enten-Eller. F rste del , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Johnny Kondrup, and Finn Hauberg Mortensen (Copenhagen: Gads, 1997) SKS 3 Enten-Eller. Anden del , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Johnny Kondrup, and Finn Hauberg Mortensen (Copenhagen: Gads, 1997) SKS 4 Gjentagelsen; Frygt og B ven; Philosophiske Smuler; Begrebet Angest; Forord , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Johnny Kondrup, and Finn Hauberg Mortensen (Copenhagen: Gads, 1997) SKS 5 Opbyggelige taler, 1843-44; Tre Taler ved t nkte Leiligheder , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, and Finn Hauberg Mortensen (Copenhagen: Gads, 1998) SKS 6 Stadier paa Livets Vei , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, and Finn Hauberg Mortensen (Copenhagen: Gads, 1999) SKS 7 Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2002) SKS K7 Kommentarer til SKS 7 , by Tonny Aagaard Olesen (Copenhagen: Gads, 2002) SKS 8 En literair Anmeldelse; Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2004) SKS 9 Kjerlighedens Gjerninger , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2004) SKS 10 Christelige Taler , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2004) SKS 11 Lilien paa Marken og Fuglen under Himlen; Tvende ethiskreligieuse Smaa-Afhandlinger; Sygdommen til D den; Ypperstepr sten - Tolderen - Synderinden, ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Anne Mette Hansen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2006) SKS K11 Kommentarer til SKS 11 , by Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, and Tonny Aagaard Olesen (Copenhagen: Gads, 2006) SKS 12 Ind velse i Christendom; En opbyggelig Tale; To Taler ved Altergangen om Fredagen , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Anne Mette Hansen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2008) SKS 13 Dagbladsartikler 1834-48; Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed; Til Selvpr velse , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Johnny Kondrup, Tonny Aagaard Olesen, and Steen Tullberg (Copenhagen: Gads, 2009) SKS 15 Sendebrev til Heiberg; Johannes Climacus; Bogen om Adler (Copenhagen: Gads, forthcoming) SKS 16 Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed; Den bev bnede Neutralitet; D mmer Selv! (Copenhagen: Gads, forthcoming) SKS 17 Journalerne AA BB CC DD , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2000) SKS 18 Journalerne EE FF GG HH JJ KK , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2001) SKS 20 Journalerne NB NB2 NB3 NB4 NB5 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2003) SKS 21 Journalerne NB6 NB7 NB8 NB9 NB10 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2003) SKS 22 Journalerne NB11 NB12 NB13 NB14 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2005) SKS 23 Journalerne NB15 NB16 NB17 NB18 NB19 NB20 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Anne Mette Hansen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2007) SKS 24 Journalerne NB21 NB22 NB23 NB24 NB25 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Anne Mette Hansen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2007) SKS 25 Journalerne NB26 NB27 NB28 NB29 NB30 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Anne Mette Hansen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2008) SKS 26 Journalerne NB31 NB32 NB33 NB34 NB35 NB36 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Anne Mette Hansen, and Johnny Kondrup (Copenhagen: Gads, 2009) SKS 27 L se papirer 1833-55 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn, Joakim Garff, Johnny Kondrup, Tonny Aagaard Olesen, and Steen Tullberg (Copenhagen: Gads, 2011)
KIERKEGAARD AND DEATH
Introduction
Patrick Stokes and Adam Buben
On Wednesday, July 29, 1835, two days before the first anniversary of his mother s death, a twenty-two-year-old theology student writes of his experience of standing atop Gilbjerg Hoved, a small cliff just outside the North Zealand coastal town of Gilleleje:

This has always been one of my favorite spots. Often, as I stood here on a quiet evening, the sea intoning its song with deep but calm solemnity, my eye catching not a single sail on the vast surface, and only the sea framed the sky and the sky the sea, while on the other hand the busy hum of life grew silent and the birds sang their vespers, then the few dear departed ones rose from the grave before me, or rather, it seemed as though they were not dead. I felt so much at ease in their midst, I rested in their embrace, and I felt as though I were outside my body and floated about with them in a higher ether-until the seagull s harsh screech reminded me that I stood alone and it all vanished before my eyes, and with a heavy heart I turned back to mingle with the world s throng-yet without forgetting such blessed moments (KJN 1, 9/SKS 17, 13-14).
Three days later, Kierkegaard would write the famous entry so often cited as presaging and framing his entire authorial project: What I really need is to be clear about what I am to do the thing is to find a truth which is truth for me , to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die (KJN 1, 19/SKS 17, 24). But that stunningly prescient entry tends to overshadow another key strand of Kierkegaard s authorship that also begins in Gilleleje that week: his remarkable, lifelong preoccupation with death, dying, and the dead. Just as the few dear departed ones hover over that young student as he stands alone on a hill, trying to make sense of the enormity of loss, so the themes of death and mortality haunt Kierkegaard s signed and pseudonymous works, a constant presence appearing in a variety of guises and concerns.
And just as the very name Kierkegaard is homonymous with graveyard in Danish, so it has become virtually synonymous with death. Biographically, the specter of death is a constant presence for Kierkegaard, who endured the deaths of all but one of his immediate family members. Though the details are unclear, the Kierkegaard family seemed to interpret these deaths as some sort of divine retribution, according to which none of Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard s children would live to be thirty-four (Christ supposedly died at age thirty-three). 1 Only two children-S ren and Peter-surpassed this age, and S ren expresses surprise, almost disbelief, on reaching his thirty-fourth birthday. 2 Yet Kierkegaard was fated to die at the relatively young age of forty-two, of mysterious causes that, once again, he interpreted in terms of a religious destiny. 3 The medical examiner who admitted Kierkegaard to Frederik s Hospital in October 1855, Harald Krabbe, noted that the patient held some definite and unsettling views on his condition:

He considers his illness to be fatal. His death is necessary for the cause upon the furtherance of which he has expended all his intellectual energies, for which alone he has labored, and for which alone he believes he has been intended. Hence the strenuous thinking in conjunction with the frail physique. Were he to go on living, he would have to continue his religious battle, but then people would tire of it. Through his death, on the other hand, his struggle will retain its strength, and, as he believes, its victory. 4
It seems that Kierkegaard viewed his death as the final act of his martyrdom in the service of true Christianity, the culmination of the idea for which he was to live and die. 5 The trajectory of the short authorial life running between the haunted week of resolution at Gilleleje and the strange ending at Frederik s Hospital was shaped, defined, and informed by the thought of death. It should therefore come as no surprise that dying, death, and the dead are ever-present themes throughout Kierkegaard s prodigious authorial production.
From the Symparanekromenoi , the Fellowship of the Buried in the early, pseudonymous Either/Or (1843) to the late For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! (1851), which outline the notion of Christian dying to the world, the sheer variety of ways in which death appears throughout Kierkegaard s writings never loses its capacity to amaze. But precisely this diversity creates headaches for the reader who wants to come to grips with Kierkegaard s thoughts on death-or perhaps come to grips with the thought of death via Kierkegaard. How does one get one s bearing within such polyvocal material? And how, if at all, are these disparate claims about death to be integrated? Perhaps for this reason, the impact Kierkegaard s work on death has had on Western (let alone Eastern) 6 thought has yet to be fully uncovered and reckoned. Nor has Kierkegaard s potential contribution to contemporary debates on the unique metaphysical and ethical problems posed by death been fully assessed. The guiding thought behind the present book is that such a thorough engagement with Kierkegaard s views on death-related issues, across a number of thematic fronts and via a range of approaches, is long overdue. The contributors to this volume engage with the various facets of Kierkegaard s thanatology to provide a comprehensive guide to readers of Kierkegaard and those with an interest in the burgeoning philosophical literature on death. Our path through Kierkegaard s discussions of death will take us through four general stages: the boundaries between life and death, death and the meaning of life, twentieth-century receptions of Kierkegaard s work on death, and the ontological and ethical status of the dead.
The Boundaries of Life and Death
Contemporary philosophical discussions of death tend to distinguish sharply between death and the process of dying , and restrict themselves primarily to the former. While the border between the states of life and death may be biologically fuzzy, it s nonetheless assumed that some such boundary exists 7 and that whatever is philosophically interesting is to be found on the posthumous side of it. 8 Yet Kierkegaard s use of tropes such as dying to the world and living death suggests the boundaries may be far more conceptually and phenomenally porous than we might normally assume. Death and life, in Kierkegaard s account of moral and religious existence, can come to intersect and interpenetrate each other in surprising ways.
In the preface to The Sickness unto Death , Anti-Climacus states that in Christian terminology death is indeed the expression for the state of deepest spiritual wretchedness, and yet the cure is simply to die, to die to the world (at d e, at afd e) (SUD, 6/SKS 11, 118). This quote, in which the language of death is paradoxically applied to certain modes of life , encapsulates a distinction between two kinds of living death-two classes of Kierkegaardian zombies -that seem to come up in different ways throughout his authorship. On the one hand is the living death of despair, or sinful separation from the divine, in all its manifestations. And on the other hand is the antidote to this doomed state-more death-but still without perishing.
George Connell s Knights and Knaves of the Living Dead: Kierkegaard s Use of Living Death as a Metaphor for Despair focuses on the first sort of Kierkegaardian zombie, the self locked in a despairing state of living death. Connell points to motifs of living death that feature in Kierkegaard s writings from the early ruminations on the tortured immortals Ahasverus (the Wandering Jew of medieval folklore) and the Unhappiest One in Either/Or. 9 Yet a relatively late use of this trope-in Anti-Climacus s description of despair-has been underdiscussed in the literature. Connell notes a problem that again concerns the question of boundaries: If death is regarded as annihilation, a state with no experiential content whatsoever, what phenomenal features of a situation like despair could possibly license us in calling it living death ? Connell demonstrates the cogency of the living death metaphor by fleshing out several respects in which the state of death can indeed impinge upon the phenomenal experience of the living. For the various knights that populate what Connell calls Kierkegaard s aristocracy of spirit, this will come as no surprise: they live their all-too-self-aware despair on a grand, poetic scale. But Anti-Climacus also posits another class of people who are blissfully unconscious of their despair-those Connell refers to as knaves, who are in despair but experience themselves as thriving. Kierkegaard s claim that such perfectly satisfied lives can nonetheless be regarded as asymptomatic states of living death runs counter to the irony, liberalism, and secularism (as articulated by Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor, respectively) that are defining elements of modernity. Kierkegaard s claim that the knave will turn out to be stuck in the living death of despair when seen in the light of truth rests on a theological viewpoint inimical to our pluralist, post-Enlightenment context. But as Connell notes, Kierkegaard also has recourse to a three-pronged epistemological approach to defend his claim that even unconscious despair counts as a state of living death.
In To Die and Yet Not Die: Kierkegaard s Theophany of Death, Simon D. Podmore joins Connell in exploring significant metaphorical uses of the imagery of death in Kierkegaard s work. For instance, invoking ancient views about theophany, Podmore describes the sort of death that is risked in encountering God. The dangers of theophany signify an intermediary stage that must come just before full-fledged dying to the self and just after the spiritually dead state of despair. The first step on the path away from this initial despair-or as Podmore puts it, the living death of estrangement from the divine-in the direction of a cure involves turning toward God. But such taking notice of the divine in an attempt to relate oneself to it properly is not necessarily a joyous experience. Rather, it is a shocking glimpse of the distance between oneself and God. Before such an infinitely powerful being, one s frail, finite self simply melts away (like the faces of those who looked inside the Ark of the Covenant at the end of Raiders of the Lost Ark) . Fear of this judgment or loss of self in the face of God can actually lead to an even more profound or fantastic sense of despair, in which one might rather attack God than risk annihilation or humiliation. In order to overcome even this sort of despair, and take the final step toward being in the right relationship to God, one must approach with no self at all. Podmore explains that it is only through undergoing a spiritual self-denial (Anf gtelse) -a death of the self that in despair wills to be itself-that the individual can become a self before God. By dying to the self one will be saved from the prospect of dying before God. Fortunately, Christians have a model for guidance along the difficult path to becoming selfless.
So the remedy for the sickness unto death of despair is paradoxically dying to the worldly self, swapping one form of Kierkegaardian zombieexistence for another. Adam Buben s Christian Hate: Death, Dying, and Reason in Pascal and Kierkegaard considers the Pascalian and Kierkegaardian appropriations of the traditional Christian attitude of memento mori and the related (so he will argue) practice of sacrificing, or dying to, selfish bodily and worldly desires and preoccupations in order to purify the spirit and come closer to God. Perhaps the most difficult and disturbing aspect of such dying to worldliness is the idea that reason itself, and the desire to understand or know, actually stands in the way of a proper relationship with God. Thus it would seem that one must in some sense, or to some degree, kill off one s rational impulses if Christianity is to take hold. As it turns out, Kierkegaard, particularly in later works such as For-Self Examination , is far more extreme in his opposition to rationality than Pascal, and Buben suggests the possibility of making use of this difference to draw some conclusions on the hotly contested topic of Kierkegaard s so-called irrationalism. Because Kierkegaard s description of dying to reason is often so powerful, one should be careful not to portray him as an apologetic Pascalian figure who simply wants to demonstrate how reasonable and happy one can be in Christianity, and how foolish and unhappy one can be without it.
After these extended discussions of the nuances of dying to, we must once again foray into the issue of the living death of despair in order to address the ultimate peril, suicide. In his chapter Suicide and Despair, Marius Timmann Mjaaland explicates not only this danger but also the universality of despair (even the pagan, who is ignorant of these things and in favor of suicide, despairs) and the idea that a process of committing suicide, or at least trying to do so, is continuously going on within despair. Given that Anti-Climacus defines the self as a particular kind of self-relation, and despair as a failure to relate to oneself properly, despair is always an attempt to be rid of one s self. The really troubling thing about despair is that the less intense it is, the harder it is to recognize and cure. Thus it is necessary, for Anti-Climacus, to provoke the risk of actual physical suicide in the intensification of despair, so that one might instead seek an escape from the sickness unto death -a provocation, as Mjaaland notes, that might strike us as ethically questionable at best!
Mjaaland goes on to compare Anti-Climacus s analysis with the early sociologist mile Durkheim s work Le Suicide . As it turns out, the fourpart account of despair seen in the musings of Kierkegaard s pseudonym finds almost perfect parallels in the four types of suicide outlined in Durkheim s study of the phenomenon. The notable difference, however, is that for the latter, risk is accepted but not enhanced, and crises should be avoided as far as possible. While there is surely much to be learned in looking at their similarities, it is differences like this one that make for the most interesting questions. Mjaaland concludes his chapter by suggesting that the religious, psychological, and social ramifications of Kierkegaard s and Durkheim s respective views on suicide deserve increased attention, and he raises several pertinent concerns based on his comparison.
Death and the Meaning of Life
The topics of death and the meaning and purposefulness of life have always been intertwined. Kierkegaard s discussions of death reflect this close bond, as they regularly emphasize the power of death to impact upon and transfigure the life of the living . Consider the following:

death is the briefest summary of life, or life traced back to its briefest form. This is also why it has always been very important to those who truly think about human life to test again and again, with the help of the brief summary, what they have understood about life. No thinker grasps life as death does (WL, 345/SKS 9, 339).
This passage stresses just how central, transformative, and indispensable an engagement with the thought of this temporally distant and experientially unavailable event is for us in the here-and-now. In fact, in assessing its impact on our lives, one might suggest (as Heidegger seems to) that death becomes more than a mere event; it takes on a living role in our experience of life.
The problem of the meaning of death for the living is of course an ancient one. Like death, the figure of Socrates haunts Kierkegaard s entire authorship, and it is no accident that the wise man of old who taught that philosophy is preparation for death should exert such an influence on Kierkegaard. 10 Kierkegaard s Socratic gadfly Johannes Climacus in particular uses death as an example of a key existence problem in highly influential sections of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript . Socrates s last utterance was to insist on offering a sacrifice to the medicine god Asclepius in gratitude for the fatal dose of hemlock, and in like manner Climacus offers death-or at least the thought of it-to the reader for therapeutic purposes. In Thinking Death into Every Moment: The Existence-Problem of Dying in Kierkegaard s Postscript, Paul Muench pays particular attention to the specific type of reader that constitutes the philosophical patient the Postscript seems to be aimed at: neither the simple person who has no interest in philosophy, nor the hardcore Hegelian (who would be unlikely to sit through such sustained abuse!), but the philosophically inclined person who runs the risk of absent-mindedness. In an age dizzy with speculative fervor and eager to encompass world history philosophically, such a reader may wish to go beyond the task of understanding with inwardness what it is to exist. The Postscript , according to Muench, forces them to slow down and consider how they have been too hasty in assuming they are finished with the task of attending to themselves, and holds out the prospect of showing them a manner of doing philosophy that is compatible with this task.
Existence-problems such as what it is to die may seem too simple to satisfy the philosophically inclined, but if such a person approaches the question in the right mode, they will find such topics sufficient fodder for an entire life. Indeed, they may struggle to understand such problems precisely because they come at them reflectively. The aim for such a reader, then, is to become a simple wise person (like Socrates)-a very different type of philosopher to the Hegelian speculator, but, on Muench s account, a philosopher nonetheless. Climacus s (Socratic) strategy is to continually put the brakes on his overeager reader by claiming, for instance, that while he knows as much about death as anyone else, he hasn t understood it-calling into question whether the reader herself has understood it either. And the ever-present possibility of death makes this matter all the more urgent. The task, according to Climacus, is to think death into every moment of life in order to get to grips with the irreducibly first-personal quality my death has for me (something lost on the philosophically absentminded, as exemplified in the comical figure Soldin). What might all this mean? Ultimately, Muench concludes, Climacus doesn t really tell us, at least not clearly-but this is perhaps the whole point. Climacus leads his philosophical patient to a way of thinking about their death that makes such thought into an act within the broader ethical project of becoming subjective. In teaching his reader self-restraint, and thereby subjective self-attention, Climacus shows them how to evade the dangers of philosophy without having to deny their philosophically inclined natures.
David D. Possen s Death and Ethics in Kierkegaard s Postscript focuses on Climacus s peculiar reluctance to tell us anything about death. Possen calls death one of the case studies that Climacus suggests can be utilized to bring about a return to an ancient (i.e., Socratic) way of viewing ethics. But the vagueness of Climacus s discussion of thinking death into every moment seems to leave his reader with nothing but a tantalizing mix of urgency and fog. By considering both what is not said about death and Climacus s general strategy in the other case studies/existence problems (immortality, thanking God, and marriage), however, Possen sets out to solve the riddle of death in the Postscript .
The problem with modern objective ethics is that it deals with ethical difficulties in an inhuman once and for all manner, while the ancient subjective ethics that Socrates espouses is meant to occupy an individual for a lifetime. Because Climacus s case studies, according to Possen, are examples of problems with such a high degree of uncertainty that they simply cannot be resolved during one s lifetime, they are precisely the sorts of issues that encourage the never-ending inwardness that Socrates is looking for. Like this ancient wise man, Climacus believes that life ought to be approached in a perpetual state of concerned ignorance. This explains why Climacus doesn t attempt to fill out the concept of death: if thinking death is to ignite and sustain a life that is ethical in the ancient/subjective sense, this must be because the thought of death rouses our unceasing concern in and about our ignorance.
Edward F. Mooney s The Intimate Agency of Death further explores some of the ways in which death ramifies through and alters our experience of life-not simply by standing as a distant, terrifying reminder, but as a thought with which we are to become intimate, something we are to adopt, as Climacus puts it, as our dancing partner. Mooney, like Muench and Possen, strongly identifies Climacus and Socrates and sees both as advocating a mode of philosophy in which the thought of birth and death introduces radical discontinuities into experience that focus our attention on the contours of this life. Yet this raises the Epicurean question of how such nonexperienceable events can affect us so profoundly. In response, Mooney invokes our capacity to imaginatively occupy points in the past and future, a transgression of temporal limits that gives past and future standpoints agency over our present. We can be simultaneously in the present and imaginatively beyond it, occupying standpoints after death and before birth that in a direct experiential sense are closed to us. Only through taking such a standpoint outside my life can posthumous and prenatal spans have an enigmatic, intimate agency therein, calling us to a sharpened state of moral urgency and alertness.
This is only part of the profound ambiguity of death that Mooney discusses. The different contexts in which the concept of death is operative make the extension of the concepts life and death anomalous and fluid. Kierkegaard was alive in his brother s moral universe long after his civically recognized death and burial, and in our cultural context he lives still. To look for a correct context that would allow us to fix the definitive boundaries of Kierkegaard s life and death (by giving priority to the death certificate for instance) would be to miss crucial dimensions of the concept(s) of death and the way events that appear to occur at temporally specifiable points can bleed into their past and future in significant ways. What Kierkegaard calls death s decision can ramify throughout a life long before the cessation of metabolism. Again, the content of that decision and its meaning for my life can be shadowy and ambiguous, but no less real and important for that.
But beyond shadowy and ambiguous, Gordon D. Marino believes that such content might be better described as inhumane, and it is this inhumanity that is the subject of his A Critical Perspective on Kierkegaard s At a Graveside. Drawing on both his own experiences of death-related grief and Tolstoy s The Death of Ivan Ilych , Marino ponders the aspects of dying that Kierkegaard coldly excludes from his meditation on the earnest thought of death. While Kierkegaard scoffs at death s more social aspects and the moods that these engender, the character Ilych provides a rich first-person account of how he feels toward those around him as he traverses his final days. Although acknowledging the various motivations that may have led to the peculiar nature of Kierkegaard s graveside discourse, Marino suggests that perhaps there are valuable insights to be gleaned from the emotional content connected with leaving loved ones behind and saying good-bye to the only world one has ever known. More attention to the other related issues surrounding death within this discourse might have provided more practical advice on how to be with our fellow humans in general. But the personal and ethical impact of death on life may go even deeper than we have considered thus far.
For Kierkegaard, the importance of death for the living holds even down to the level of how we conceive of and individuate ourselves as agents. In recent years Kierkegaard has been seen as endorsing something like a narrative conception of human selfhood, linking him with a diverse range of contemporary thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul Ricoeur, and Charles Taylor. 11 The Narrative Approach has, however, recently drawn significant criticism, with one recurring complaint centering on how death fits into the narrative picture. Some narrativists have held that narrative identity needs death; a story without an ending is not a story, and human lives need deathly finitude in order to be thinkable as unified wholes in the way essential to narrative self-intelligibility. 12 On the other hand, critics have charged that the radical contingency of death poses a particularly difficult problem for narrative theory: how a story ends is crucial to the meaning of the entire story, but if the end of my lifenarrative (and everything that comes after it) is inaccessible to me, then I might be living out a radically different life-narrative to the one I take myself to be leading.
Building on his extensive work on Kierkegaardian narrative selfhood in his chapter Life-Narrative and Death as the End of Freedom: Kierkegaard on Anticipatory Resoluteness, John J. Davenport offers an answer to this problem. Distinguishing between four levels of agential unity (starting from the basic unity of apperception), Davenport argues that while human subjects are already fundamentally narratively unified, a greater level of unity is required to avoid conflicts between our fundamental cares. Such conflicts restrict autonomy and can only be avoided via attaining the highest level of unity, a volitional wholeheartedness that can only be developed across time. Against John Lippitt, Davenport argues that such freedom from volitional conflicts requires that the subject acknowledge the authority of ethical norms; even the most committed and clear-eyed aesthete cannot, in fact, become earnest in this way.
Death features in this picture as a sort of regulative eschatological concept: at death, our practical identity is eternally what it has become, our freedom to change ends and our character is forever fixed. For the subject, the urgency of this quest for wholeheartedness is conferred by the thought that there will come a point at which death will preclude further progress. But as noted above, the ever-present possibility of death has been thought by critics to suffuse human life with an element of contingency that forecloses the possibility of understanding our lives in terms of a projective narrative. Davenport s response is threefold. The objection involves an exaggeration, for we often do know when we are dying, or at least have less time left, and perhaps experience final moments filled with enormous significance; even those who die suddenly often have achieved a sense of unity in their practical identity such that the meaning of their life cannot be altered by sudden death; and by living in awareness of the omnipresent possibility of death we can have a metaphorical experience of our death such that it becomes part of our narrative. In this way, as Kierkegaard puts it, the thought of death gives the earnest person the right momentum (TDIO, 83/SKS 5, 453). Implicit in this is a faithful hope for an eschatological eucatastrophe, the joy of a reprieve beyond all rational hope that is felt as grace whereby, absurdly, all our ethical striving will be completed.
Kierkegaardian Death in the Twentieth Century
Kierkegaard s thoughts on death play a considerable-and not always easy to assess-role in several key strands of twentieth-century thought. In particular, Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida all appropriate or reject key Kierkegaardian themes on the topic of death. For example, perhaps borrowing directly from Kierkegaard (but with only a few cryptic footnotes on related issues as evidence of this borrowing), Heidegger s notion of the mineness of death seems clearly indebted to Kierkegaard s notion that the deaths of others cannot help us in our quest to understand ourselves. Reacting to both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Levinas rejects this dismissal of the death of the Other, while Derrida in turn defends the intuition that one s own death is of primary importance to our ethical understanding of our own existence. This issue of whose death is most significant binds the following three contributions to this volume together, but each in turn also deals with other unique nuances of the twentieth-century reception of Kierkegaard s thought on death.
Charles Guignon s Heidegger and Kierkegaard on Death: The Existentiell and the Existential begins with a brief overview of the evidence that suggests Kierkegaard s profound impact on Heidegger s early thought, despite the fact that it remains unclear exactly which texts Heidegger was relying on. The more pressing issue for Guignon is making sense of Heidegger s critical compliments in the few places where he actually mentions Kierkegaard. Specifically, what does it mean when Heidegger accuses Kierkegaard of having only an existentiell understanding of various topics? In this accusation, Heidegger is making the perhaps not inaccurate claim that Kierkegaard s evaluation of mankind s ailments is operating under certain ontic presuppositions and concerns, particularly those of a Christian. In the case of death in Kierkegaard s At a Graveside, Guignon argues that while Kierkegaard does not clearly acknowledge any theological perspective, the distinctively religious intention motivating this discourse becomes apparent when Kierkegaard says that the earnest thought of death has taught the living person to permeate the most oppressive dissimilarity with the equality before God.
Heidegger, on the other hand, treats death in an ontological manner, eschewing all theological, anthropological, and other derivative ontic scientific perspectives when describing the finitude of Dasein. Nonetheless, Guignon acknowledges several strong parallels with the work of Kierkegaard, if not full-blown examples of direct influence, in Being and Time . In particular, there is the reliance upon everyday attitudes toward death-including the view of death as some kind of limit-for indicating the proper way to understand death, even though many common views about death are problematic. Perhaps the most important similarity is the idea that ultimately death must not be seen as some kind of event standing before us, but rather as a way of being that, counter Epicurus, we always in some sense are. As Guignon puts it, what is of existential interest about death, then, is not the existentiell phenomenon of passing away or demise , but rather the distinctive way of being human as being mortal. As a way to be, death, according to Heidegger, reveals Dasein both in its wholeness and in its potential authenticity. Even though Kierkegaard s notion of earnestness in thinking about death may not be as primordial or ontological as Heidegger s authentic being-toward-death, Guignon concludes that Kierkegaard might have reason to be suspicious of the sort of grandiose project that Heidegger is engaged in.
Laura Llevadot s Kierkegaard, Levinas, Derrida: The Death of the Other returns to Heidegger, who, as previously mentioned, seems to have appropriated Kierkegaard s alleged aversion to finding significant meaning in the death of the Other. In fact, turning back to Plato s Phaedo , Llevadot suggests that philosophy has a long, and perhaps misguided, tradition of prioritizing one s own death. Breaking from this tradition, Levinas claims that ethics is based primarily on the notion of being responsible for the deaths of others and the possibility of dying for the Other. Thus, while Levinas rejects Heidegger s account of death, he is particularly critical of Kierkegaard s take on Abraham s willingness to suspend ethics and kill his own son. What Levinas seems to miss, according to Llevadot, is the importance of the death of the Other in Kierkegaard s second ethics, as developed in Fear and Trembling, The Sickness unto Death , and Works of Love.
While Kierkegaard is often associated with existentialism (broadly construed), his work also exerts a considerable influence on poststructuralist and deconstructionist thinking as well. Thus a key moment in the twentiethcentury reception of Kierkegaard s work on death is Derrida s The Gift of Death , part of his late ruminations on ethics and religion. Relying on Derrida s interpretation of what Kierkegaard is up to in Fear and Trembling , Llevadot offers a double-pronged critique of the universal ethics of duties and rights, which she (like Derrida) opposes to Kierkegaard s higher, absolute ethics as presented in Works of Love . This second ethics starts out by assuming our failure to live up to the first (we are weak and sinful beings). In Levinasian terms, we let the Other die; even if, in preferential love, we preserve the lives of some, we let others go, and we must accept this guilt and relate ourselves appropriately to the dead Other. In recollecting one who is dead-the one who can do nothing for us-Kierkegaard claims that we can learn to love as we should. As Llevadot puts it, the duty to love the dead expresses the duty to love unconditionally and without interest, the concept of love that is lodged in the second ethics.
Ian Duckles s Derrida, Judge William, and Death offers a more detailed defense of Derrida s (sometimes controversial) reading of Fear and Trembling . Derrida challenges one of the fundamental assumptions of post-Kantian ethics: that we are freest or most responsible when we act in accord with universal norms, such that we can justify how we have acted to others. For Derrida, the ethical demand to justify our actions cuts us off from our singularity, dissolving our uniqueness into universal concepts. Norm-based ethical systems thus involve an irresponsibilization. In this context, Abraham s silence 13 during the akedah amounts to his refus[al] to place moral responsibility for his actions onto impersonal ethical norms and so shirk responsibility for them. In the Christianized worldview that superseded the Greek, it is my death , as an event that only I can undergo, that is the principium individuationis of the responsible agent: my mortality and the consequent necessity of my death is what defines and distinguishes me from all others. And thus the denial of singularity at the heart of norm-based ethical systems amounts to a strategy for avoiding a confrontation with one s own mortality.
Duckles argues that when this understanding of the ethical is read back into Judge William s discussions of ethics in Either/Or and Stages on Life s Way , we can see the contours of Kierkegaard s rejection of the ethical more clearly. For Judge William is well aware that the ethical translates the particularity of the individual into the universal. Indeed, he celebrates this fact: his paradigm instance of ethical action, marriage, takes the singular instance of falling in love and sublates it into the socioethical category of marriage (in Duckles s phrase, translating the immediacy of love into a public event ). But for William s interlocutor, the young aesthete A, this is a reason to avoid the ethical: it hinders genuine autonomy by subsuming the individual in the general and universal. William claims that the ethical takes us beyond the finite and focuses us on the infinite and eternal, and thereby promises the dissolution of temporality, but this is precisely a denial of the individual singularity in its moral finitude. Hence Judge William s relative silence on the topic of death; the ethical life that he recommends is actually a covert flight from the thought of mortality.
The Dead
Llevadot s discussion of Works of Love raises the question of Kierkegaard s controversial claim that we have a duty (at least one) to the dead-to recollect them-even while he insists that dead persons are no one. The philosophical problem of whether we can have duties to people who no longer exist goes at least as far back as Aristotle, and in modern discussions it has been closely associated with the question of whether death itself is a harm-or whether, as Epicurus claimed, it is a state of annihilation which by definition we cannot experience and thus should regard as nothing to us. 14 Indeed, both critics of the ethics of Works of Love , such as Theodor Adorno, and prominent defenders of the text, such as M. Jamie Ferreira, Louise Carroll Keeley, and Pia S ltoft, have implicitly claimed that Kierkegaard does not mean we have actual moral duties to the dead. Rather, the work of love in remembering one who has died is to be understood as a heuristic device or standard against which to judge how we carry out our duties to the living . But is this correct? Are our only ethical duties to the living, or can the dead be objects of love and moral obligation as well? Both Jeremy J. Allen and Patrick Stokes explore this question and answer in the affirmative, but on very different grounds.
Allen s The Soft Weeping of Desire s Loss: Recognition, Phenomenality and the One Who Is Dead in Kierkegaard s Works of Love argues that Kierkegaard s discussion of recollecting the dead is tied in important ways to Hegel s account of mutual recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit . Following Merold Westphal s reading of Hegel, Allen understands the communitarian process whereby self-consciousness intersubjectively constitutes itself via mutual recognition as one of agapic love. But recognition of the other requires their phenomenal presence, and our duty, according to Kierkegaard, is to love the people we see . And we don t see the dead, for the dead lack phenomenality. Genuine phenomenality requires embodiment, which the dead lack (although the existence of embodied humans who have phenomenality but lack the capacity for reciprocation shows that phenomenality is not a sufficient condition for reciprocity).
So how, then, can a dead person be a true object of a legitimate duty of remembrance? Allen considers three modes of grief: wish (which posits that the dead continue to exist, but disconnects the dead individual from the ground of mutual recognition and ontological interdependence that gave it its identity in the first place), resignation (a renunciation of the finite world, which entails renouncing the person we love before they are dead , violating our duty to love the people we see), and faith. Both the wish and resignation approaches ultimately turn out to be strategies for evading the death of the other. Faith, however, fully accepts the loss of the other, but holds out hope of getting the lost one back. Drawing on work by Davenport and Mooney, Allen argues that it s the prospect of an absurd, divinely actuated awakening of the deceased that makes sense of our ethical beholdenness to the dead. To love the dead is to remember them in the hope that in some future eschatological scenario we shall encounter them again in their full phenomenality.
Stokes, by contrast, argues that for Kierkegaard, the dead retain their status as moral patients by virtue of our capacity to recollect them with a phenomenal sense of co-presence (thus rejecting Allen s claim that the dead lack phenomenality altogether). His chapter Duties to the Dead? Earnest Imagination and Remembrance defends the claim that Kierkegaard s injunction to love the dead is indeed a direct duty to the dead, rather than an indirect duty to the living -which connects the penultimate chapter of Works of Love to the ongoing question of whether the dead can be harmed or benefited. Both At a Graveside and Works of Love seem to endorse the Epicurean claim that the dead are nonexistent. But in the later work, Kierkegaard echoes another Epicurean, Lucretius, 15 in drawing a parallel between the dead and the as-yet unborn: neither are capable of reciprocating love, yet both, according to Kierkegaard, are nonetheless genuine and nonfungible objects of loving duty. Stokes explains how this is possible by appealing to At a Graveside s claim that we can become phenomenally co-present with our death, via an earnest self-reflexive mode of contemplation. In At a Graveside this property of co-presence allows me to envisage my own dead self in such a way that I see what I imaginatively contemplate as conferring normative obligation directly upon me.
Applying this thought to Works of Love yields the claim that recollecting the dead allows the dead to appear to us as enjoining us morally . Our grief at the loss of another discloses to us what has been lost from the world-but if this insight into the uniqueness and preciousness of the deceased is to be preserved, the psychological state of grief must be transfigured into the morally enjoined practice of remembrance, which lets the dead continue to exist as distinctive others. Thus, in a curiously circular fashion, the dead persist as neighbors (and thus put us in the Levinasian infinite debt ) because in discharging our duty to remember them, we give them the very phenomenality that makes them objects of duty. They remain objects of love even though they cannot impress themselves upon the living or engage with us in any kind of reciprocal or communicative relationship. 16
So much for how the dead might appear to the living; what about the dead themselves? As a Lutheran author with a concern for orthodoxy, Kierkegaard could be expected to endorse the Christian doctrine of personal immortality-which was among the most ferociously contested topics of the immediate post-Hegelian context in which Kierkegaard was educated. 17 And such doctrines seem to demand some sort of posthumous survival more robust than the dead simply persisting in the loving recollection of the living (let alone the Hegelian sublation of the individual consciousness into the world-spirit). Yet one searches Kierkegaard s work in vain for any account of what the afterlife might be like . Kierkegaard avoids such explicit discussions of life after death, and for stridently articulated reasons: he views the question of whether there is such a thing as posthumous survival, and what form it might take, as a distraction from the ethical task conferred upon us by the thought of the afterlife. Like Heidegger, Kierkegaard takes it that the question death presents to us existentially is a thoroughly this-worldly one, concerned with how we comport ourselves now to the fact of our own finitude.
Yet Kierkegaard s choice for his epitaph, the final lines from Brorson s hymn Hallelujah! I Have Found My Jesus, is curious for its vision of the afterlife as the setting for a sort of Christianized version of Aristotelian eternal contemplation: Then I may rest / In bowers of roses / And unceasingly, unceasingly / Speak with my Jesus. 18 And Kierkegaard, as Tamara Monet Marks demonstrates in our final chapter, Kierkegaard s Understanding of the Afterlife, took the orthodox Christian account of the afterlife, with its insistence on personal immortality, judgment, and resurrection, very seriously indeed. Turning once more to the wise man of old, Marks provides a thorough account of the twists and turns that Kierkegaard s authorship takes with respect to Socrates on the topic of belief in the afterlife. Beyond the famous portrayal of Socrates as an exemplary figure in the discussion of the subjective appropriation of the afterlife in Postscript (which Possen discusses), Marks points out that the appraisal of Socrates s views is less complimentary in Kierkegaard s dissertation The Concept of Irony . Furthermore, in the early upbuilding discourses, Socratic irony seems an inappropriate way to approach the issue of the afterlife; hence, Socrates is absent from the discussion. By the time Kierkegaard gets to the late Christian Discourses , where he most clearly espouses his belief in something like a traditional Christian afterlife, Marks argues that Socrates cannot help Christians concerned with their eternal salvation. The problem is that while the Socrates of the Postscript is a paragon of the virtue of subjectivity, the explicitly Christian notion of the afterlife also depends heavily on objective, specific, historically revealed content. Providing content like Jesus Christ was raised from the dead and so shall I be is obviously not something that the Socratic view of immortality is capable of. For the Christian believer, the afterlife presents itself as an unavoidable certainty, one that, contra the prevailing attitudes of the post-Hegelian philosophical environment, cannot be separated from the question of personal judgment. Hence, from the Christian perspective, the question of immortality ceases to be a question at all: Fear it, it is only all too certain; do not doubt whether you are immortal-tremble, because you are immortal (CD, 203/SKS 10, 212).
We reach, then, a dead end in which we are confronted, as so often in Kierkegaard, with a stark choice between faith and offense. Yet this is not the last word on Kierkegaard and the subject of death-far from it. We hope that, taken together, the chapters assembled here provide a comprehensive jumping-off point for future exploration of Kierkegaard s thought on this important subject. After all, he reminds us that there is often no telling when our dealings with death will be concluded, and in the meantime, there is much that can be learned at the feet of this great educator -if we are willing to be taught. Kierkegaard asserts that death is the schoolmaster of earnestness, but in turn its earnest instruction is recognized precisely by its leaving to the single individual the task of searching himself so it can then teach him earnestness as it can be learned only by the person himself (TDIO, 75-76/SKS 5, 446). And yet, beyond the lessons that he sees in death, there remains something about death itself that always seems to call for more work. It is an enigma, a never-ending source of wonder to inquire about. Just before Kierkegaard concludes his graveside discourse, he tells the reader, here again earnestness is: that we should not be overhasty in acquiring an opinion with regard to death . Therefore, the discourse will refrain from any explanation. Just as death is the last of all, so this will be the last thing said about it: It is inexplicable (TDIO, 100/SKS 5, 468).
NOTES
1 . Joakim Garff, S ren Kierkegaard: A Biography , trans. Bruce H. Kirmmse (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 136-37.
2 . Garff, S ren Kierkegaard , p. 505.
3 . There is still no consensus as to the exact nature of Kierkegaard s final illness; Guillain-Barr Syndrome, Geschwind Syndrome, Scheuermann s Disease, and Pott s Disease have all recently been advanced as candidates. See Ib S gaard, What Does the Doctor Really Know? Kierkegaard s Admission to Frederik s Hospital and His Death There in 1855, trans. Bruce Kirmmse, in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2007 , ed. Niels J rgen Capperl rn, Herman Deuser, and K. Brian S derquist, pp. 381-400 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007); and Joseph Brown, The Health Matter Briefly Revisited: Epilepsy, Hunchback, and That Tiny Word (Tubercl?), S ren Kierkegaard Newsletter 49 (August 2005): pp. 13-17.
4 . Garff, S ren Kierkegaard , pp. 782-83.
5 . Martyrdom becomes a recurrent and significant theme in Kierkegaard s journals and published writings in the late 1840s; see Garff, S ren Kierkegaard , pp. 625-36. For recent discussions of Kierkegaard s own martyrdom in the context of his essay Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth? see Lee C. Barrett, Kierkegaard on the Problem of Witnessing while Yet Being a Sinner and Andrew J. Burgess, Kierkegaard, Moravian Missions, and Martyrdom, both in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Without Authority , ed. Robert L. Perkins, pp. 147-75 and 177-201, respectively (Macon, Ga.: Mercer, 2007).
6 . On Kierkegaard s philosophical impact in Japan, see Finn Hauberg Mortensen, Kierkegaard: Made in Japan (Odense: Odense University Press, 1996); and James Giles, ed., Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2008). On the specific topic of death in that context, see Adam Buben, Living With Death: Kierkegaard and the Samurai, in Giles, Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought , pp. 141-58; and Background for a Comparison: Kierkegaard and the Samurai, in Kierkegaard and Religious Pluralism , ed. Andrew Burgess, pp. 16-30 (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf and Stock, 2007). For an example of discussion relating Kierkegaard to other Eastern philosophical traditions, see Karen L. Carr, Sin, Spontaneity, Nature, and God: Comparative Reflections on Kierkegaard and Zhuangzi, in Kierkegaard and Religious Pluralism , ed. Andrew Burgess, pp. 1-15 (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf and Stock, 2007); and Karen L. Carr and Phillip J. Ivanhoe, The Sense of Anti-Rationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard (New York and London: Seven Bridges, 2000).
7 . For a recent discussion of this boundary (and many other issues in the philosophy of death) see Christopher Belshaw, Annihilation (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008).
8 . See for example John Martin Fischer s Introduction: Death, Metaphysics, and Morality, in the seminal collection The Metaphysics of Death , ed. John Martin Fischer, esp. pp. 3-8 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
9 . See George Connell, Four Funerals: The Experience of Time By the Side of the Grave, in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Prefaces/Writing Sampler and Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions , ed. Robert L. Perkins, pp. 419-38 (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2006).
10 . [T]he one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death ; Phaedo , 64a, in Plato, Five Dialogues , trans. G. M. A. Grube and John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 2002). On the role of Socrates in Kierkegaard s thinking, see Jacob Howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Edward F. Mooney, On S ren Kierkegaard: Dialogue, Polemics, Lost Intimacy, and Time (Surrey: Ashgate, 2007).
11 . This is among the topics of the seminal collection edited by John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd, Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue (Chicago: Open Court, 2001).
12 . E.g., Jeff Malpas, Death and the Unity of a Life, in Death and Philosophy , ed. Jeff Malpas and Robert C. Solomon, pp. 120-34 (London: Routledge, 1998).
13 . Daniel W. Conway has recently argued that Kierkegaard overdraws (in instructive ways) the silence of the akedah narrative, for the Abraham presented in Genesis actually says far more than Johannes de silentio presents him as saying; see his Abraham s Final Word, in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard , ed. Edward F. Mooney, pp. 175-95 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
14 . Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, in The Philosophy of Epicurus , trans. and ed. George K. Strodach (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 180.
15 . Titus Lucretius Carus, The Way Things Are , trans. Rolfe Humphries (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), pp. 110, 114.
16 . Interestingly, in the last half-decade of Kierkegaard s life, the dead suddenly did appear to communicate with the living, as the table-turning craze of the 1850s swept up such eminent Copenhageners as Hans Lassen Martensen and Johan Ludvig Heiberg. See Thomas Overskou, Om Mit Liv og Min Tid 1819-1878 , edited with a postscript by Robert Neiindam (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, 1962), pp. 194-97; and Patrick Stokes, The Science of the Dead: Proto-Spiritualism in Kierkegaard s Copenhagen, in Kierkegaard and the 19th Century Crisis of Culture (Acta Kierkegaardiana Vol . 4), ed. Roman Kralik, Abrahim H. Khan, Peter Sajda, Jamie Turnbull, and Andrew J. Burgess, pp. 132-49 ( a a, Slovakia: Kierkegaard Society of Slovakia/Kierkegaard Circle, University of Toronto, 2009).
17 . On the post-Hegelian debate on personal immortality, see Istv n Czak , Becoming Immortal: The Historical Context of Kierkegaard s Concept of Immortality, in Kierkegaard and Christianity (Acta Kierkegaardiana Vol. 3) , ed. Roman Kr lik, Abrahim H. Khan, Peter ajda, Jamie Turnbull, and Andrew J. Burgess, pp. 58-71 ( a a, Slovakia: Kierkegaard Society of Slovakia/Kierkegaard Circle, University of Toronto, 2008); Jon Stewart, A History of Hegelianism in Golden Age Denmark Tome I: The Heiberg Period: 1824-1836 (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 2007), pp. 37-53, 222-27, 542; and Tamara Monet Marks, Kierkegaard s New Argument for Immortality, Journal of Religious Ethics 38, no. 1 (January 2010): pp. 143-86.
18 . Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 418.
1.
Knights and Knaves of the Living Dead: Kierkegaard s Use of Living Death as a Metaphor for Despair
George Connell

Despair is the sickness unto death, this tormenting contradiction, this sickness of the self, perpetually to be dying, to die and yet not to die, to die death. For to die signifies that all is over, but to die death means to experience dying, and if this is experienced for one single moment, one thereby experiences it forever.
-KIERKEGAARD, THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH



For some time now the impression has been growing on me that everyone is dead.
It happens when I speak to people. In the middle of a sentence it will come over me: yes, beyond a doubt, this is death. There is little to do but groan and make an excuse and slip away as quickly as one can. At such times it seems that the conversation is spoken by automatons who have no choice in what they say. I hear myself or someone else saying things like: In my opinion the Russian people are a great people, but- or Yes, what you say about the hypocrisy of the North is unquestionably true. However- and I think to myself: this is death.
-WALKER PERCY, THE MOVIEGOER
Among the endlessly repeated motifs of the horror genre, none more reliably evokes a shudder than the idea of the undead, of humans doomed to wander between life and death. This response has a variety of deep psychological sources. Our anxiety in the face of our own mortality plays a part, as does a physiological revulsion to decaying bodies. Further, the sense of the living dead as ontologically other evokes in us a sense of numinous dread. Following Mary Douglas, the way such beings transgress the boundary separating life and death renders them both dangerous and impure. 1
Given the resonances such imagery evokes, it is significant that Kierkegaard s pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, frames his discussion of despair in The Sickness unto Death in terms of living death. This, however, has not figured large in scholarly discussions of the book. This scholarly silence is perhaps largely explained by the way Anti-Climacus makes little explicit use of death as a metaphor for despair after the opening sections of the book. There is also, no doubt, a tendency for literal-minded philosophers to dismiss talk of living death as either mere metaphor or bald contradiction. Still, the despair-death identification is central in the Preface, Introduction, and Part One, A of The Sickness unto Death . What sense, then, can we make of the idea that despair is a sort of living death? What agendas lead Anti-Climacus to evoke this imagery in his analysis of despair? Since Anti-Climacus is a different sort of pseudonym from all others in the authorship, addressing these questions stirs up major questions concerning Kierkegaard s overall project and how we should place it in the context of contemporary thought and culture. 2 Specifically, Kierkegaard s analysis of despair as living death highlights his ambiguous relation to contemporary consciousness. One aspect of his analysis, his account of conscious despair as living death, is profoundly resonant with contemporary ideas and fears. But alongside the Kierkegaard who surprises readers by his preternatural contemporaneity stands another, antimodern Kierkegaard. This other Kierkegaard is nowhere more evident than in his analyses of unconscious despair. I will argue that his idea of unconscious despair as living death sets Kierkegaard in sharp opposition to irony as described by Richard Rorty, liberalism as described by Alasdair MacIntyre, and secularism as described by Charles Taylor. Since irony, liberalism, and secularism are defining features of the contemporary scene, this second aspect of his analysis of despair as living death starkly highlights the antimodern Kierkegaard. Having shown the countercultural spirit of Kierkegaard s analysis of unconscious despair, I conclude by examining the basis of his judgment: from what vantage point, in terms of what evidence, and by what authority does he pronounce the apparently contented lives of ordinary people to be forms of living death?
Living Death: A Plausible Notion?
Before we can appreciate the simultaneous timeliness and untimeliness of Kierkegaard s analyses of despair, it is crucial to establish the coherence of the idea of living death in the first place. On its face, the notion of living death seems contradictory. There are, however, a variety of ways in which we can make good sense of it. First, the notion of despair as living death has the deepest possible roots in Kierkegaard s development as a thinker. One of his first significant intellectual undertakings was an analysis of the three great ideas, Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasverus, who represent to the Middle Ages three forms of existence outside of faith: sensuality, doubt, and despair. Ironically, Ahasverus, who represents despair, is doomed to a living death precisely by being condemned to a deathless life.
Kierkegaard s investigations of the three great ideas eventually bear fruit in the first volume of Either/Or . There, the linkage of despair and living death is emphatic, both in the name of A s morbid confraternity, the Symparanekromenoi (the society of the already dead), and especially in A s essay, The Unhappiest One. There, A identifies the winner of a contest for that dubious title specifically as the one who cannot die, the one whose grave is empty not because he rose from the dead, but because his curse denies him the peace of death. 3 Additionally, one can see Johannes the Seducer as a vampire who must repeatedly parasitize the immediate desire of his female victims to sustain his own jaded interest in life. Clearly, Kierkegaard s analysis in The Sickness unto Death of despair as living death needs to be read against the backdrop of his early explorations of that theme.
Showing that the notion of despair as living death is deeply rooted in Kierkegaard s thought does not suffice to render it plausible. We need to unpack this metaphor to discern its phenomenological basis, its experiential cash value. If we try to take it literally, we run into several problems. First, to speak of a form of life that is simultaneously death seems to violate the principle of noncontradiction. Further, despair typically designates a form of suffering, while death designates the cessation of awareness. Kierkegaard points a way beyond these dead ends when he writes, For to die signifies that all is over, but to die death means to experience dying (SUD, 18/SKS 11, 133). In this passage, Kierkegaard distinguishes between the idea of death as the end of all experience and dying as the experience of the movement from life to death. But if dying is what he means when he speaks of living death, then doesn t his preference for paradoxical metaphors simply muddy the waters? Wouldn t it be better to keep the terms death and dying clearly distinct from each other? By sharply demarcating the two terms, one implies that dying is a process that leads to a result that is entirely separate from the process itself. Epicurus is, no doubt, the thinker who most starkly draws out the consequences of this sharp demarcation when he argues that as long as I am, death isn t, and as soon as death is, I no longer am. 4 Since death and I can never be co-present, it need not concern me. Against this Epicurean thinking, Kierkegaard invokes the idea of dying as living death to say that death is not sharply demarcated from life, that it can encroach upon life so that it becomes experientially present. 5
While Kierkegaard himself describes this blurring of lines between life and death, a brief look at Leo Tolstoy s The Death of Ivan Ilyich serves to show the variety of forms such encroachment takes. 6

a. Death as failure of the body: At the most basic level, death is the breakdown and failure of the body to carry out the physiological processes of life. During the dying process, that breakdown and failure are often vividly present to the one dying, resulting in a fundamentally altered experience of one s embodiment. Tolstoy captures this powerfully in a scene late in Ivan s illness by juxtaposing the ways Ivan and his daughter experience their bodies. Ivan s body is weak and wasting, already showing the pallor of death. Each new pain and each lost capacity carries with it a message of his imminent death. In contrast, his daughter lives her body exultantly as the locus of her youthful flourishing: His daughter came in all decked out in a gown that left much of her young flesh exposed; she was making a show of that very flesh which, for him, was the cause of so much agony. Strong, healthy, obviously in love, she was impatient with illness, suffering, and death, which interfered with her happiness. 7
b. Death as impotence and dependency: The failure of the dying body is closely associated with a more general impotence associated with death. To be dead is to lose one s capacity to effect one s will in the world. Even when one leaves a last will and testament, disposing of one s assets and imposing one s intent on the living, one depends radically on others to see that those wishes are carried out. Ivan experiences this impotence and dependency already in his illness. Tolstoy sensitively portrays Ivan s dependency on Gerasim, a peasant boy assigned to care for him. While Ivan does move from embarrassment and resentment at such dependency to gratitude and a sense of connection, Tolstoy shows that the impotence and dependency of death already pervade the consciousness of the dying Ivan.
c. Death as isolation: One of the most terrifying features of death for both the dying and for their surviving loved ones is the thought of severed ties and resulting isolation. While Ivan does establish a connection with Gerasim, Tolstoy portrays him as increasingly isolated from his wife, children, friends, and co-workers as his illness progresses. Clearly, the loneliness of the grave is already experienced in the isolation of the sickbed. Tolstoy writes, During the last days of the isolation in which he lived, lying on the sofa with his face to the wall, isolation in the midst of a populous city among numerous friends and relatives, he experienced an isolation that could not have been greater anywhere, either in the depths of the sea or the bowels of the earth. 8
d. Death as closing the future: Tolstoy presents Ivan as an ambitious social climber, always looking for the main chance to advance in the bureaucracy and associated social world that are the limits of his imagination. As such, he is constantly projecting ahead of himself, living vicariously in an anticipated (and idealized) future. Just as death slams the door on the future, the dying Ivan experiences this closure already in his illness as the anticipation of death displaces all other hopes and plans for the future.
e. Death as emptying the present: Death doesn t just close the future; it obliterates the present. Before Ivan s illness, he delighted in losing himself in the present moment of inconsequential amusements such as card games, but the ill Ivan loses this ability. The proximity of his death, the nearing moment when he will have no present moment, prevents him from fully living in the present moments he still has left. The resulting vacuity of the actual present gives rise to boredom and restlessness, just as his incessant pain makes the present an ordeal to escape rather than a precious fleeting moment to savor.
f. Death as re-evaluating the past: Because we understand human lives in terms of their narrative unity, there is something necessarily provisional about all evaluations of lives that are still running their courses. 9 Solon captures this provisional quality in his famous dictum that we should judge no one happy prior to his or her death. Death, however, reduces this indeterminacy in two ways: first, it fixes the set of events and experiences with which the interpreter must potentially deal, and second, the manner of the end of a life retroactively influences the significance and meaning of earlier moments of life. 10 Typically, as mourners gather at a funeral, they endeavor to fit together their memories of the deceased life into a coherent sense of who the deceased fundamentally was. Once again, this feature of death is already very much part of the dying process. Tolstoy writes, D uring the last days of that terrible isolation, Ivan Ilyich lived only with memories of the past. One after another images of his past came to mind. His recollections always began with what was closest in time and shifted back to what was most remote, to his childhood and lingered there. 11 Ivan s death struggle increasingly becomes a struggle to reassess his life in a manner radically different from the complacent self-image of his adult years. He cries out in moral agony the question, What if my entire life, my entire conscious life, simply was not the real thing? 12 Only when he manages to accept a radical renarration of his life, one that holds up as true even in the harsh light of imminent death, does Ivan find peace.
These six parallels between death and dying suffice to show that the metaphor of living death has a solid experiential basis. Death is not just a result that ensues upon the completion of the dying process; it encroaches upon life, making itself manifest in a variety of ways. While Tolstoy s classic literary exploration of dying establishes the bona fides of the notion of living death, Kierkegaard uses the notion as a way to characterize despair. How apt is this use?
Despair as Living Death
While much of The Sickness unto Death shows a passion for taxonomy that seems more like Linnaeus than Kierkegaard, Part One, A: Despair Is the Sickness unto Death speaks of despair in an encompassing way. Before viewing it from multiple perspectives and in its multiple forms, Anti-Climacus says that all despair is a sickness of the spirit, a failure of the self to relate properly to itself and to the power that created it. It is overwhelmingly in this brief opening section of the book that Anti-Climacus identifies despair as living death. The penultimate paragraph of this section reads:

Such is the nature of despair, this sickness of the self, this sickness unto death. The despairing person is mortally ill. In a completely different sense than is the case with any illness, this sickness has attacked the most vital organs, and yet he cannot die. Death is not the end of the sickness, but death is incessantly the end. To be saved from this sickness by death is an impossibility, because the sickness and its torment-and the death-are precisely this inability to die (SUD, 21/SKS 11, 136).
By following this encompassing diagnosis of the universal human malady with differentiated and even counterposed analyses of specific forms of despair, Anti-Climacus unavoidably opens himself to the possibility that the living death metaphor will seem more apt when applied to some forms of despair than others. Of Anti-Climacus s differentiations, none is more significant than his contrast between conscious despair ( The Despair that is Conscious of Being Despair ) and unconscious despair ( The Despair that is Ignorant of Being Despair ). Conscious despair involves felt psychological pain and some level of cognitive awareness of one s condition. Unconscious despair, in contrast, is either oblivious to its pathology, mistakenly regarding itself as thriving, or it radically misconstrues its felt suffering so as not properly to recognize it as despair. Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard consistently admires great passion and penetrating awareness while expressing contempt for meager lives of dull contentment and dim awareness, so it is no surprise that in The Sickness unto Death he presents conscious despair rather grandly, in the forms of romantic figures, whose greatness shines through even in their misery. In contrast, he writes contemptuously of unconscious despair, calling into question whether such persons fully qualify as human. Since Kierkegaard uses the term knight as a generic category for various sorts of aristocracy of spirit (knights of infinite resignation and knights of faith), my title reference to knights of the living dead (apologies to George Romero) is to those who suffer conscious despair. I allude to Kierkegaard s contemptuous attitude toward those whose despair is unconscious by labeling them knaves.
Implicit in this juxtaposition of knights and knaves, of conscious and unconscious despairers, is the challenge of coming to terms with Kierkegaard s notion of despair as living death. For contemporary readers, it is plausible and even compelling to describe anguished sufferers as enduring a living death. But Anti-Climacus s description of people living contented but spiritually inadequate lives as the living dead shocks contemporary sensibilities. In what follows, I will focus on the sharply contrasting plausibilities of the two different ways of using the metaphor of living death.
The Contemporary Plausibility of Conscious Despair as Living Death
Despite the apparent contradiction involved in the idea of living death, this notion fascinates us in ways that bespeak a certain resonance: it taps into fears that are psychologically real and imaginatively plausible. The specific form of these fears varies historically and culturally. Kierkegaard s discussions of living death are rooted in fears of a postmortem outer darkness, of a continued conscious existence as a self in a state of unalterable separation from God. Kierkegaard s imaginative handle on the idea of living death is clearly traditional, rooted in a European religious imagination that was already giving way to a secularized imagination in Kierkegaard s own day. Edgar Allan Poe, a rough contemporary of Kierkegaard, reflects this secularization in his dark imaginings of living death when he plays on powerful nineteenth-century fears of being buried alive. Though we still get a shiver from supernaturalist renditions of the notion of living death and are still horrified by Poe s claustrophobic nightmares, as citizens of the developed world our own deep-seated fears of living death concentrate on the prospect of high-tech medical interventions keeping us alive in a radically diminished state. Two recent films, Alejandro Amen bar s The Sea Inside (2004) and Julian Schnable s The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (2007), both based on actual cases, are powerful and sensitive explorations of contemporary fears of living death.
In both films, healthy and thriving men are abruptly rendered almost entirely paralyzed by unforeseen events, a diving accident resulting in spinal injury in The Sea Inside, and a stroke in The Diving Bell and the Butterfly. Without modern medical interventions, both men would have quickly died, but both experience their medically prolonged lives as living deaths. Ramon Sampedro s campaign to die is the focus of The Sea Inside, and one of Jean-Dominique Bauby s first messages when he establishes communications by blinking his eyelid is to ask to die.
Why this shared sense that life as a paralytic is worse than death? Part of the answer is their exuberant love of their prior active, creative, connected, and (by very different standards) successful lives. The contrast between their current diminished lives and their prior flourishing lives follows closely the six parallels between death and dying identified above: (1) they experience their bodies as inert, unresponsive matter; (2) they are radically impotent and dependent; (3) their paralysis isolates them from others; (4) they lose a sense of the future as an open horizon as it becomes clear that their paralysis is permanent; (5) their ability to savor the present, while not wholly extinguished, is dramatically reduced; and (6) both replay events in their pasts, renarrating them in ways deeply influenced by their current conditions.
These films warrant special attention for several reasons. First, they render the problematic notion of living death horrifically plausible by making it imaginatively gripping. Second, they point to the equivocality of the word life. Philosophers have often fixated on the idea that life and death are logical opposites. To be alive is for the requisite complement of physiological processes (heartbeat, neurological activity, digestion) to continue; to be dead is for them to cease. To speak of living death is thus to utter a contradiction. These films bring home that mere prolongation of minimal physiological processes is a mockery of what we really have in mind when we speak of life: the repertory of characteristically human activities. Once we appreciate these two senses, we can construe living death as prolongation of the first, biological sense of life when the possibility of the second, Aristotelian sense of characteristic activities disappears. Third, and most importantly for this chapter, the films show us living death as an excruciatingly self-aware phenomenon. The dramatic impact of the films derives from the overwhelming sense of loss and frustration felt by Ramon Sampedro and Jean-Dominique Bauby. In both cases, this sense is intensified by the abrupt and unexpected transition from flourishing life to total incapacity. More typically, incapacitating illnesses and normal aging steal capabilities away gradually, so that awareness of loss is attenuated. Often, the very processes that remove capabilities also diminish awareness of the losses. In the two films, we encounter worst-case scenarios of radical loss of physical capability combined with undiminished awareness, resulting in maximal anguish. It is precisely this mismatch of able mind and impotent body that makes the label living death so apt: only an oxymoron can capture the paradoxical juxtaposition of full ability in one dimension of life and complete disability in another.
These two films have strong but problematic resonances with Kierkegaard. Just as the undiminished awareness of Ramon Sampedro and Jean-Dominique Bauby is key to their status as paradigms of living death, so Kierkegaard ties degree of awareness to depth of despair:

The ever increasing intensity of despair depends upon the degree of consciousness or is proportionate to its increase: the greater the degree of consciousness, the more intensive the despair. This is everywhere apparent, most clearly in despair at its maximum and minimum. The devil s despair is the most intensive despair, for the devil is sheer spirit and hence unqualified consciousness and transparency; there is no obscurity in the devil that could serve as a mitigating excuse. Therefore his despair is the most absolute defiance. This is despair at its maximum (SUD, 42/SKS 11, 157).
While there is a shared focus on conscious despair as living death in the two films and Kierkegaard, significant differences quickly emerge on closer inspection. First, Kierkegaard and the two films construe consciousness in sharply different ways. For Kierkegaard, the relevant consciousness is theological: one s awareness of oneself as defying God. In the two films, the relevant consciousness is of lost capacity and connection. (When a paraplegic priest tries to persuade Ramon Sampedro to construe his situation in theological terms, he brusquely dismisses the priest.) Further, in my reading of the films, I have argued for a notion of living death that is essentially for-itself, that necessarily involves a moment of subjectivity that is by its nature self-aware. In contrast, Kierkegaard wavers between similarly treating awareness as an essential feature of despair and seeing it simply as an intensifying factor. The above passage continues:

Despair at its minimum is a state that-yes, one could humanly be tempted almost to say that in a kind of innocence it does not know that it is despair. There is the least despair when this kind of unconsciousness is greatest; it is almost a dialectical issue whether it is justifiable to call such a state despair (SUD, 42/SKS 11, 157).
We can discern in Kierkegaard s ambivalence two conflicting impulses. As a dialectician and a phenomenologist, he grasps the close connections between despair and consciousness. He writes that despair is the most terrifying of dangers because it is a sickness of the self and the self is unavoidably and eternally an awareness of itself. 13 Further, he draws on his own experience of unrelenting self-awareness in depicting the restless despair of reflective aesthetes. These reflective aesthetes are his knights of living death, patterned after Faust and Ahasverus, grand in their self-awareness, their suffering, their dignity, and their style. But as an observer of the human condition, Kierkegaard sees himself surrounded by people living pathetic, banal lives. His distaste for such lives leads him to see them as forms of despair. But many of these people seem quite content with their lives. Out of a complex mixture of aristocratic contempt and Christian compassion, Kierkegaard dismisses the self-consciousness of these knaves of the living dead as deeply false, writing, That this condition unconscious despair is nevertheless despair and is properly designated as such manifests what in the best sense of the word may be called the obstinacy of the truth (SUD, 42/SKS 11, 157). It is this second impulse that raises difficult conceptual issues and sets Kierkegaard deeply at odds with major currents of the contemporary cultural scene.
Unconscious Despair as Living Death: A Contemporary Stumbling Block
As contemporary readers struggle to make sense of Kierkegaard s analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death , they almost inevitably turn to the familiar contemporary concept, depression, to get their bearings. While this assimilation seems to work well for some of the specific forms of despair described by Kierkegaard, it spectacularly fails in the case of his discussion of unconscious despair. Andrew Solomon offers a useful statement of our current understanding of what it is to be depressed:

The only way to find out whether you re depressed is to listen to and watch yourself, to feel your feelings and think about them. If you feel bad without reason most of the time, you re depressed. If you feel bad most of the time with reason, you re also depressed, though changing the reasons may be a better way forward than leaving circumstance alone and attacking the depression. If the depression is disabling to you, then it s major. If it s only mildly distracting, it s not major. 14
Solomon pokes fun at the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th Edition (DSM-IV) for listing nine characteristic symptoms of depression and classifying anyone with five or more symptoms as depressed while anyone with four or fewer not, but both Solomon and DSM-IV make depression a function of two main factors: psychological pain and impaired function .
In contrast, Kierkegaard describes unconscious despair as perfectly consistent with a robust sense of psychological well-being and exemplary performance in all one s social roles:

Just by losing himself in this way, such a man one in finitude s despair has gained an increasing capacity for going along superbly in business and social life, indeed, for making a great success in the world. Here there is no delay, no difficulty with his self and its infinitizing; he is as smooth as a rolling stone, as courant passable as a circulating coin. He is so far from being regarded as a person in despair that he is just what a human being is supposed to be. As is natural, the world generally has no understanding of what is truly appalling. The despair that not only does not cause one any inconvenience in life but makes life cozy and comfortable is in no way, of course, regarded as despair (SUD, 34/SKS 11, 149-50).
It is amusing to consider the response of a psychologist or psychiatrist to a client who reports enjoying life, functioning well as spouse, parent, employee, and citizen, but who nonetheless claims to be in despair. Surely the client would meet blank incomprehension followed by speedy dismissal. Similarly, many philosophers will find the idea of unconscious despair incoherent. Despair is psychological pain and pain is necessarily felt, so the idea of unconscious despair appears manifestly incoherent. Merold Westphal nicely captures this view:

The customary or common view assumes that I am the criterion of my own spiritual health. Despair is a psychic state just like the raw feelings that have become so prominent in recent philosophy of mind. For such states the difference between appearance and reality is inoperative. I cannot feel that I have a pain or an itch and then discover that I didn t have one after all. If it felt like it hurt, it hurt (even if I can find no adequate physical cause of the pain). My own reports about these matters are either incorrigible, or, if not, the closest approximation to incorrigibility about empirical fact one could hope for. 15
Just as, on this view, the experience of pain is incorrigible, so is one s nonexperience of pain, including psychological pain. If I don t experience myself as in despair, then I m not.
Westphal, of course, states this view in order to discredit it. His essay Kierkegaard s Psychology and Unconscious Despair explains and defends Kierkegaard s problematic notion so effectively that I will briefly summarize what I take to be key points of his analysis. To explain Kierkegaard s refusal to identify mind or spirit with the surface of consciousness that is the domain of raw feelings, 16 Westphal places him in reference to three major figures from the history of philosophy: Aristotle, Descartes, and Hegel. Given that people can and do have erroneous conceptions of human virtue, Aristotle s notion of happiness as a life of virtuous activity implies that people may misjudge their own conditions. For example, a hedonist s self-satisfaction over a life rich in sensual indulgence is, on Aristotle s view, erroneous. Similarly, Kierkegaard believes many people have fundamentally distorted views of what their genuine good is and so are ill-placed to judge their own spiritual health.
There is nonetheless a Cartesian dimension to Kierkegaard s psychology: at a fundamental level the self is its awareness of itself. Kierkegaard defines the self as a relation that relates itself to itself and this relation is, at least initially, an awareness of self. Where Descartes sees this self-awareness as immediate, Kierkegaard joins Hegel in seeing it as mediated by the other: the self comes to know itself by seeing itself mirrored in the eyes of the other. But who is the relevant other whose view confers identity on one? For Hegel, it is the human other, both the particular others of our immediate circle and the more generalized other of the social world. But for Kierkegaard, God is the crucial other, the mirror whose view of one reflects one truthfully. Since people can all too easily forget this divine other, focusing entirely on achieving a favorable image in the mirror of the social realm, it is entirely coherent and dreadfully common for them to have radically distorted understandings of their own well-being. They can, in short, be in despair and not know it.
I take Westphal to have succeeded thoroughly in defending the conceptual coherence of unconscious despair, but I believe he needs to qualify his claim that that analysis establishes Kierkegaard as a true contemporary. 17 I grant Westphal s point that readers in an era overflowing with theories of false consciousness, Marxian, psychoanalytic, hermeneutical and structuralist 18 will recognize Kierkegaard s suspicion of the subject s sense of itself as part of a more general anti-Cartesian tendency. 19 As Charles Taylor puts it, a broadly Freudian sense of the self as opaque to itself represents the surrounding context of understanding that is very deeply entrenched and intuitively understandable to almost everyone. 20
But, as Taylor sees it, this contemporary sense that there are as yet unsaid depths in us is qualitatively different from the sense of depth characteristic of the premodern era. Taylor writes, Under the old cosmos notions, particularly the Platonic cosmos defined by Ideas, the nature of a thing was in a sense not within it, but belonged to the structure of the cosmos. 21 A self within such an order has depth (= is not transparently available to itself) because the discovery of what I really am requires that I come to grasp this nature by studying the orders of human social life and the cosmos. 22 In contrast, Taylor sees the post-Cartesian self s depth as a function of its dark genesis : its sense of its identity as rooted in the abysses of evolutionary time, in the contingencies of personal history, and in the too, too solid flesh of its material embodiment. 23
Taylor is uncharacteristically terse in sketching out this fascinating contrast between two contrasting versions of the self s depth, but what he says is full of significance for this inquiry. In Taylor s terms, Kierkegaard s analysis of unconscious despair is rooted in a sense of cosmos rather than of universe. In The Sickness unto Death , Kierkegaard does not sound the self s depths by plumbing its dark genesis but by understanding the structures of its relations to itself, to its surrounding reality, and to God. In declaring that ultimately despair is sin, that it designates a misrelationship between the self and the transcendent source of its being, that it represents a failure by the self to fulfill its ontologically grounded destiny, and thus constitutes a living death, Kierkegaard connects himself to the cosmic outlook Taylor associates with premodernity.
To highlight the antimodern dimensions of Kierkegaard s analysis of unconscious despair, I will briefly set that analysis over against key aspects of modernity discussed by Richard Rorty, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor: irony, liberalism, and secularity. In many ways, Kierkegaard lines up nicely with all three of these modernist trends, and all three thinkers have used Kierkegaard as a case study in their articulations of the modern condition. When, however, we view Kierkegaard s account of unconscious despair alongside these three salient features of modernity, the untimeliness of that account is striking.
Rorty on Irony
For Rorty, as for Kierkegaard, irony designates not just a literary trope, but more fundamentally, an existential stance. In Rorty s case, it involves self-consciousness about our radical contingency, especially the contingency of our ways of describing the world.

I shall define an ironist as someone who fulfills three conditions: (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. 24
Over against the ironist stands the theologian or metaphysician, who believes there is an order beyond time and change which both determines the point of human existence and establishes a hierarchy of responsibilities. 25
However ubiquitous irony is in Kierkegaard s authorship, his judgments concerning unconscious despair in The Sickness unto Death are unmistakably theological and metaphysical in Rorty s senses of the words. He writes, I f a man is presumably happy, although considered in the light of truth he is unhappy, he is usually far from wanting to be wrenched out of his error (SUD, 43/SKS 11, 158, my italics). Note the contrast is not between the way a Christian would judge the man s life and the way he himself sees it; the contrast is between false self-understanding and the hard reality revealed by the light of truth.
A Rortean ironist cannot but be offended at Kierkegaard s insistence on the ultimacy of the Christian standard of evaluating what is real life and what is self-deluded living death.
MacIntyre on Liberalism
Given Kierkegaard s final assault on official Christianity, one would naturally expect him to be broadly sympathetic to liberal political arrangements. Alasdair MacIntyre describes such a political order in After Virtue as any society where government does not express or represent the moral community of the citizens, but is instead a set of institutional arrangements for imposing a bureaucratized unity on a society which lacks genuine moral consensus. 26 Obviously, Kierkegaard nowhere speaks in favor of imposing a bureaucratized unity, but this minimalist state does seem implicit in Kierkegaard s push for individual responsibility in ethical and religious matters. But as MacIntyre shows in his later Whose Justice? Which Rationality? , an irony at the heart of the liberal political order makes it no neutral arbiter but rather a substantive tradition with its own overriding values and corresponding aversions. Unsurprisingly, the liberal social and political order takes its own perpetuation as an ultimate good and educates a citizenry of liberal individuals to this end. These liberal individuals move easily in a world where it appears normal that a variety of goods should be pursued, each appropriate to its own sphere, with no overall good supplying any overall unity to life. 27 Not only are goods plural, they also vary from person to person: For in the liberal public realm individuals understand each other and themselves as each possessing his or her own ordered schedule of preferences. 28 These preferences are the determinants of the pluriform, shifting, and individualized goods of the population.
For such a liberal individual, Kierkegaard s judgment of many apparently satisfactory lives as living death is offensive and paradoxical. First, it represents an inappropriate imposition of one person s schedule of preferences on others; second, its insistence on a single overriding good (in Kierkegaard s case, right relation to God) is profoundly out of step with liberalism s tendency to diversify its existential investments. MacIntyre quotes John Rawls: Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous. Although to subordinate all our aims to one end does not strictly speaking violate principles of rational choice it still strikes us as irrational or more likely mad. The self is disfigured. 29 Apart from his conception of right relation to God as the single, ultimate human telos, Kierkegaard s analysis of unconscious despair as a living death makes no sense. Clearly, that analysis is out of step with the liberal social and political order described by MacIntyre.
Taylor on Secularism
Charles Taylor s monumental A Secular Age locates the distinguishing feature of modernity in the radically changed situation of religious belief from premodern times. Taylor s narration of the West s spiritual itinerary from 1500 to the present identifies three distinct senses of secularization: (1) disentangling religion from the institutions of political power, (2) the falling off of religious belief and practice, and (3) a transition from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others. 30 Given his final attack on official Lutheranism and his persistent emphasis on personal choice in matters ethical and religious, the first and third seem not just compatible with Kierkegaard but thoroughly laudable from his point of view. At the most heated moments of his battle with the state church, Kierkegaard even called for secularism in the second sense, labeling participation in public worship a mockery of God.
Despite these genuine sympathies with dimensions of secularization, Kierkegaard s analysis of unconscious despair runs directly counter to major currents in secularization as described by Taylor. As Taylor sees it, secularization did not and could not take the form of a direct transition from belief to disbelief but proceeded via the intermediary of Deism. In the wake of the devastating religious wars of the seventeenth century, European intellectuals turned for relief to a religion of reason. This attenuated version of religious belief largely drops its transcendent aspirations, reducing God s will for humankind to purely immanent thriving. 31
Whereas traditional Christianity (like the other great postaxial religions) held in tension the goals of worldly flourishing and of attaining a higher good beyond such immanent well-being, Deism gives rise to what Taylor labels the modern moral order through its purely immanent conception of the human good. And once this order is in place, traditional religious admonitions to reach higher are met not just with incomprehension but outright hostility. 32
Kierkegaard s analysis of despair is utterly at odds with such a purely immanent conception of the human good, and, unsurprisingly, his analysis has drawn just the sort of wrath described by Taylor. In the introduction to The Sickness unto Death , Kierkegaard speaks almost dismissively of earthly and temporal suffering: need, illness, misery, hardship, adversities, torments, mental sufferings, cares, grief (SUD, 8/SKS 11, 124) as minor matters compared to the ultimate danger, despair (i.e., failure to achieve the transcendent good of right relation to God). Later, he uses an architectural metaphor to deride those whose lives are consumed with temporal goods, likening them to people who inhabit a grand multistory house but who prefer to live in the basement (SUD, 43/SKS 11, 158), i.e., the realm of the sensate. Once again, it is evident that Kierkegaard s analysis of despair places him athwart main currents of modernity.
Knavery as Living Death
By setting Kierkegaard over against Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor, I seek to highlight the startling character of his diagnosis of despair: the knaves, who may think they are doing fine, as well as the knights, who suffer grandly, are the living dead. While we readily accept living death as a way to describe self-conscious impotence, isolation, and hopelessness, Kierkegaard applies that epithet to the hosts of us who muddle through from day to day, playing our social roles, taking little satisfactions, and evading disturbing thoughts of death, responsibility, and all things ultimate.
This judgment about the knaves is phenomenologically ambiguous. On the one hand, it carries clear phenomenological import; the lived experience of the knaves is qualitatively other than a real experience of life. On the other hand, this judgment discounts the knaves sense of themselves. Their lives are judged to be a sort of death even though they would vigorously protest such a description.
Kierkegaard s judgments about knights and knaves parallel the distinction between lucid dreaming and ordinary dreaming. Dreaming is (presumably) a deficient state of consciousness as compared to waking awareness, just as despair is a deficient spiritual condition. Like the lucid dreamer, Kierkegaard s knights recognize their condition as deficient, but Kierkegaard s knaves are as captivated by their living death as dreamers are by their dreams. To invoke another philosophically resonant metaphor, they are dwellers in Plato s cave who don t have a clue about a world beyond the cave.
By setting Kierkegaard against Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor, I ve highlighted the ways such a judgment about the knaves presumes a privileged vantage point, postulates a single ultimate good, and identifies that good as transcendent. While the judgment that the knights are in despair appeals directly to their own anguished senses of themselves, the judgment about the knaves challenges and even dismisses their self-experience. Clearly this judgment regarding the knaves raises epistemological questions of a completely different order than those raised by Kierkegaard s parallel judgment of his knights.
In the light of truth : The Epistemological Basis of Kierkegaard s Analysis of Despair
From what vantage point, in terms of what evidence, and with what authority does Kierkegaard pronounce the apparently contented lives of ordinary people to be forms of living death? What is the light of truth he cites as revealing a truth at odds with these people s subjective sense of themselves? While Kierkegaard never takes this issue on directly in The Sickness unto Death , the text suggests at least three main ways of answering this challenge: (1) an appeal to expertise, (2) an appeal to repressed dimensions of lived experience of those in despair, and (3) retrospective judgment.
Appeal to Expertise
From the first paragraph of the preface to The Sickness unto Death , Kierkegaard invokes medical metaphors to orient his discussion, saying that Christian accounts of despair must always bear a resemblance to the way a physician speaks at a bedside (SUD, 5/SKS 11, 117). In the first instance, this metaphor serves to emphasize that the discourse is practically concerned and the stakes are profound, so that the typical disinterested stance of academic discourse is inappropriate. But inherent in the metaphor of the physician at the bedside is the additional notion of the expert attending to the nonexpert. Kierkegaard uses the superior epistemological perspective of the physician as compared to the patient to undermine our sense that we are competent judges of our own spiritual health (SUD, 23/SKS 11, 139).
Merold Westphal emphasizes this motif of expert perspective in his analysis of Kierkegaard on unconscious despair:

Just as we take it for granted in the physical realm that a person with a serious problem of high blood pressure or cancer may at a given time feel perfectly comfortable and well, so Kierkegaard wants to claim that in the realm of the spirit the patient s report that all is well stands open to correction by the physician whose knowledge makes for a more reliable judgment. 33
Appeal to Repressed Dimensions of Experience
While Kierkegaard says that unconscious despair is the most common in the world (SUD, 45/SKS 11, 160) and describes that despair as potentially cozy and comfortable (SUD, 34/SKS 11, 150), a number of passages in The Sickness unto Death indicate that despair, even unconscious despair, always manifests itself somehow in the conscious life of the one in despair. One of the most important ways in which unconscious, repressed despair shows up is in the form of anxiety:

Just as a physician might say that there very likely is not one single living human being who is completely healthy, so anyone who really knows mankind might say that there is not one single living human being who does not despair a little, who does not secretly harbor an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, an anxiety about an unknown something or a something he does not even dare to know, an anxiety about some possibility in existence or an anxiety about himself, so that, just as the physician speaks of going around with an illness in the body, he walks around with a sickness, carries around a sickness of the spirit that signals its presence at rare intervals in and through an anxiety he cannot explain (SUD, 22/SKS 11, 138).
In saying that despair always signals its presence, even if only episodically and indirectly, Kierkegaard identifies an epistemological basis for his assertion that in the light of truth apparently contented lives can be seen as despair, as living death.
Appeal to Retrospective Judgment
In cases where empirical evidence is ambiguous and claims to expertise are disputed, parties to a disagreement often appeal to an imagined future judgment of the case that will settle it decisively. The words You ll be sorry! that are often thrown out in the heat of argument invoke a future state of the self against whom one is arguing who will have come to share one s judgment on the matter. Similarly, martyrs for progressive causes often appeal to the judgment of history for their vindication.
Kierkegaard makes a strikingly eschatological appeal to retrospective judgment in support of his analysis of unconscious despair:

And to me an even more horrible expression of this most terrible sickness and misery is that it is hidden-not only that the person suffering from it may wish to hide it and may succeed, not only that it can so live in a man that no one, no one detects it, no, but that it can be so hidden in a man that he himself is not aware of it! And when the hourglass has run out, the hourglass of temporality, when the noise of secular life has grown silent and its restless and ineffectual activism has come to an end, when everything around you is still, as it is in eternity, then eternity asks you and every individual in these millions and millions about only one thing: whether you have lived in despair or not (SUD, 27/SKS 11, 143).
Here, Kierkegaard imagines eternity as a doubly privileged vantage point. First, it is free of the distractions of temporal existence. Second, by personifying eternity as a questioner, Kierkegaard renders the reader starkly aware of his or her being-for-another, here before an ideal other whose penetrating gaze lays us bare, banishing all self-deception.
A Hybrid Approach
Having reviewed three distinct epistemological bases for Kierkegaard s claim that in the light of truth apparent contentment can be seen to be unconscious despair, I venture that none by itself is compelling. Socrates long ago taught us to be wary of so-called experts; if personal experience were a clear signal of despair, Kierkegaard would not have any need for the category of unconscious despair; the bare possibility of a radically different assessment of my present condition at some future moment can hardly override the evidence of how my condition seems to me now.
Though subject to challenge when considered alone, these three epistemological themes make a much more compelling case when combined. One version of such a combination occurs in a psychotherapeutic situation. The analysand, guided by an expert, the analyst, reflects on present and past experience to achieve enlightened self-understanding. Read in this way, The Sickness unto Death creates a vicarious therapeutic situation for his readers. The pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, represents himself as an expert as he discusses the forms and sources of despair. Insofar as his anthropological theory and taxonomic discussions of despair allow readers greater insight into their own murky struggles toward selfhood, his self-presentation as expert will win acceptance.
The Freudian echoes of this way of combining the three approaches seems strikingly modernist and much more in keeping with a dark genesis sense of the self s depths. Truer to Kierkegaard s actual project is the metaphor of a spiritual guide or confessor. (This is evident in the subtitle of The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening .) Here, the authority of the spiritual physician is not simply a function of the analysand s felt satisfaction over insight achieved. That authority is also, even primarily, a function of the revealed truth about the cosmic order in whose name the confessor speaks. The dialectical interplay between insight and authority is at the heart of much of Kierkegaard s authorship, so it is not surprising to find it implicit in his analysis of despair as living death.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I ve shown that a central element in Kierkegaard s analysis of despair is his use of the metaphor of living death. While that metaphor has strong resonance and wins easy acceptance in the case of conscious despair, his use of it in the case of unconscious despair runs counter to a number of main currents of modernity and cannot but offend and perplex many contemporary readers. Given that Kierkegaard s aim is to jolt readers into radical reappraisals of their own spiritual condition, it makes perfect sense that he would employ jarring metaphors in his project. Whether we are ultimately convinced that this metaphor is apt or not, our reaction to it serves as an occasion for the sort of self-examination Kierkegaard attempted to provoke throughout his authorship.
NOTES
The first epigraph is from SUD, 18/SKS 11, 133. The second epigraph is from Walker Percy, The Moviegoer (New York: Vintage, 1998), pp. 99-100.
1 . Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (New York: Routledge, 1991).
2 . After initially planning to publish The Sickness unto Death under his own name, Kierkegaard attributed the book to Anti-Climacus in recognition of his personal failure to meet the ideal demands laid out there. Rather than using pseudonymity to back away from the bold claims of the text, Kierkegaard uses it to underline how seriously he takes the diagnosis of the human condition offered by Anti-Climacus: The difference from the earlier pseudonyms is simply but essentially this, that I do not retract the whole thing humorously but identify myself as one who is striving (SUD, xx/SKS 22, 151).
3 . I discuss The Unhappiest One in Four Funerals: The Experience of Time by the Side of the Grave, in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Prefaces and Writing Sampler and Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions , ed. Robert L. Perkins, pp. 425-31 (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2006).
4 . Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers , trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979-80), vol. II, p. 650.
5 . Patrick Stokes carefully works out the exact nature of Kierkegaard s disagreement with Epicurus in The Power of Death: Retroactivity, Narrative, and Interest, in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Prefaces and Writing Sampler and Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions , ed. Robert L. Perkins, pp. 387-417 (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2006).
6 . Stokes also uses Tolstoy s novel to shine light on Kierkegaard s understanding of death and dying. Stokes, The Power of Death, p. 412.
7 . Leo Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich , trans. Lynn Solotaroff (New York: Bantam, 1981), p. 114.
8 . Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich , p. 122.
9 . The relevance of narrative unity to Kierkegaard s thought is the topic of a series of exchanges between Anthony Rudd, John Davenport, and John Lippitt. In their introduction to Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue (Chicago: Open Court, 2001), John Davenport and Anthony Rudd describe MacIntyre s understanding of human life in narrative terms as particularly Kierkegaardian. John Lippitt critiques that linkage in Telling Tales: Johannes Climacus and Narrative Unity, in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2005 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn and Herman Deuser, pp. 71-89 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005); and Getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard, MacIntyre and Some Problems with Narrative, Inquiry 50, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): pp. 34-69. Rudd has responded with Kierkegaard, MacIntyre and Narrative Unity-Reply to Lippitt, Inquiry 50, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): pp. 541-49; Reason in Ethics Revisited: Either/Or , Criterionless Choice and Narrative Unity, in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2008 , ed. Niels J rgen Cappel rn and Herman Deuser, pp. 179-99 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008); and In Defence of Narrative, European Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): pp. 60-75. See also John J. Davenport s contribution to this volume, Life-Narrative and Death as the End of Freedom: Kierkegaard on Anticipatory Resoluteness.
10 . For a sustained discussion of this theme, see Stokes, The Power of Death.
11 . Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich , p. 122.
12 . Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich , p. 126.
13 . The person in despair cannot die; no more than the dagger can slaughter thoughts can despair consume the eternal, the self at the root of despair, whose worm does not die and whose fire is not quenched (SUD, 18/SKS 11, 134).
14 . Andrew Solomon, The Noonday Demon: An Atlas of Depression (New York: Scribner, 2001), pp. 19-20.
15 . Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard s Psychology and Unconscious Despair, in International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness unto Death , ed. Robert L. Perkins, p. 50 (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1897).
16 . Westphal, Kierkegaard s Psychology and Unconscious Despair, p. 51.
17 . Westphal, Kierkegaard s Psychology and Unconscious Despair, p. 51.
18 . Westphal, Kierkegaard s Psychology and Unconscious Despair, p. 51.
19 . See Merold Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999).
20 . Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 348.
21 . Taylor, A Secular Age , p. 348.
22 . Taylor, A Secular Age , p. 348.
23 . Taylor, A Secular Age , p. 349. Taylor offers a parallel analysis, also quite brief, in The Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 189-90.
24 . Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 73.
25 . Taylor, Sources of the Self , p. xv.
26 . Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory , 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 254.
27 . Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 336.
28 . MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? , p. 338.
29 . John Rawls, A Theory of Justice , 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 486.
30 . Taylor, A Secular Age , pp. 1-3.
31 . Taylor, A Secular Age , p. 242.
32 . Taylor, A Secular Age , p. 262.
33 . Westphal, Kierkegaard s Psychology and Unconscious Despair, p. 50.
2.
To Die and Yet Not Die: Kierkegaard s Theophany of Death
Simon D. Podmore
Introduction: Knowing Death and Knowing Thyself

Periissem, nisi periissem I would have perished, had I not perished still is and will be my life motto. This is why I have been able to endure what long since would have killed someone else who was not dead. 1
-KIERKEGAARD, S REN KIERKEGAARD S JOURNALS AND PAPERS
Confessing in this journal entry from 1848 that, without dying willingly, death would have prevailed over him, Kierkegaard discloses how a life of suffering has prevented death from laying its claim to one who was already dead. Kierkegaard s appropriation of the Latin aphorism further expresses an integral spiritual dialectic at the heart of Lutheran Christian subjectivity, that is, the power of a metaphorical or symbolic death to deliver the soul from the prospect of its actual eternal death. Or, more existentially, the voluntary death to oneself by which the self is delivered from its own living spiritual death: an undead condition of the self-articulated by Kierkegaard through the rubric of despair-that anticipates or forebodes its final, absolute death at the conclusion of a life unconscious, or defiant, of the recognition that it exists inexorably before God .
Kierkegaard s life motto can thus be read as evoking the themes of this present chapter in two important respects. First, the notion that it is via a metaphorical submission to death that the self will transcend the reach of absolute death. Secondly, that dying to is a process , which causes the self to be negated, to vanish, to become as nothing before God . And it is precisely by this disappearing -or by coming to what The Sickness unto Death calls a self-resting transparently gjennemsigtigt - see-through in the power that established it (SUD, 14/SKS 11, 130)-that the self will not be annihilated before God, even though the thought of existing before God is fraught by the anxious prospect of the biblical injunction that to see God is to die (Exod. 33:20).
At the dialectical axis of the self s relation to death, therefore, resides a characteristically ambivalent anxiety , a relation that Vigilius Haufniensis informs us is always sympathetic and antipathetic, an ambivalent serpentine dance of fascination and revulsion (CA, 103/SKS 4, 405). In this sense, death constitutes a mysterium tremendum et fascinans , a mystery to be both feared and desired. Death is the secret unknown that simultaneously holds the key to self-knowledge, and also to the self s own destruction. Furthermore, it is precisely the God-given eternity of the soul-described by Anti-Climacus in terms of eternity s claim upon the self (SUD, 21/SKS 11, 137)-which grounds the self s meditations upon the paradoxical meaning and mystery of its own death. In other words, it is from the purportedly divine ground ( grund ) of being that the soul contemplates the abyss ( Afgrund ) of its nonbeing.
Such a theological vision of death-a vision that potentially mystifies the boundaries between immortality and mortality, being and nonbeing, annihilation and salvation-is contaminated by an anxiety from whose numinous clutches more materialistic philosophy has sought to emancipate the human subject. Why should I fear death? as the Hellenistic philosopher Epicurus (c. 341-271 bce) famously reflected. If I am, death is not. If death is, I am not. Why should I fear that which cannot exist when I do? 2 Stemming from an organic belief in the mortality and materiality of the soul, Epicurus thus asserts what in subsequently Kierkegaardian terms one might call an epistemological infinite qualitative difference between death and life. Death cannot coexist alongside the mortal soul, thus there is no need to contemplate the anxious prospect of experiencing death, or annihilation-let alone the scrupulous anxiety of judgment, damnation, or salvation. If there is an ineffable abyss of unknowing between life and death, then any contemplation of death is destined to fail to yield any greater knowledge of the soul.
Such Epicurean reflections upon death are clearly distinguished from the Christian vision of death as a gateway to knowledge of God and the true immortal self. Death as unknowable annihilation, or nothingness, is in sharp ostensible contrast to the biblical notion that fear of death (which, according to Hegel, is signified by the Absolute Lord or Master) is the beginning of all wisdom (Prov. 1:7; 9:10; Psalm 111:10). 3 Insofar as Kierkegaard s vision of the self can be described as a modern inheritor of the Christian belief in the immortality or eternity of the soul, his writings relate a consequent rhetorical blurring of any absolute distinction (or difference) between life and death-particularly where the struggle for subjectivity is described. The contemplation of death in all its poetic, spiritual, and visceral forms thereby becomes a mysterious and fecund wellspring of hidden self-knowledge and knowledge of the divine. And yet, as Kierkegaard s rhetoric of the self before God recognizes only too well, such a conviction concerning the eternity of the soul also implicitly opens the way for the most dreadful spiritual and existential possibilities of a living death: despair, the melancholy fear of damnation, and the most dreadful living death of all (a living death that foreshadows the eternal death of the soul), the spiritual trial (Anf gtelse) of God-forsakenness.
Confirming this realization, it quickly becomes clear that when one immerses oneself in Kierkegaard s writings one is confronted by a relation between self and God that finds its most arresting descriptions in terms of a sickness unto death, a desire to behold a God whose face (panim -presence) brings the fear of annihilation and an inescapable death struggle (JP, 4:438/SKS 26, 238), a mortal conflict in which the individual strives paradoxically to be over 70,000 fathoms and yet be joyful (SLW, 477/SKS 6, 439). This anxious ambivalence between fear and desire, life and death, conveys a dialectical tension repeatedly evoked throughout the imagery of Kierkegaard s vision of selfhood. In order to know thyself according to one of Kierkegaard s earliest injunctions, for instance, one must become willing to undergo what Johannes Climacus succinctly calls the autopsy of faith (PF, 70/SKS 4, 270). By faith s dissection of one s most interior spaces, the self becomes able to see itself (Greek: autos -self; optos -seen) and therefore to begin to know itself through an initial anatomy of its own disintegration. Of course, it is only postmortem that an autopsy is performed, and so it is that one must die to oneself in the autopsy of faith. And yet this is no meager undertaking. It is well known that men are afraid to see themselves physically, that superstition thought that to see oneself was an omen of death Kierkegaard explains, And so it is spiritually: to see yourself is to die, to die to all illusions and all hypocrisy-it takes great courage to dare look at yourself-something which can only take place in the mirror of the Word (JP, 4:40/SKS 24, 425).
It is via such dialectical junctures that the positive is revealed in the negative-that life is revealed in death and death in life. For example, it is, according to Anti-Climacus s diagnosis, the very recognition of primal despair, the sickness unto death, that actually reveals to the individual the eternal life of the self, the initial presentiment of an inner hellfire that burns but does not devour the soul. Therefore, it could be discerned that it is not so much the fear of death as the material annihilation of the body, or the inevitable decay of being to nonbeing, that is central to Kierkegaard s vision of self-knowledge. Rather it is the self s reconciliation to the unrealizable prospect of its own metaphorical living death that is primary to knowing the self-specifically the self as it is known before God. It is to this emerging recognition that attention now turns. By coming to terms with this existential reality, therefore, the ground will be laid for the notion that while Kierkegaardian selfhood is initially fraught with the melancholy and despair of a metaphorical living death, it is ultimately the self as it is known before God that promises deliverance from the abyss of the fear of death and judgment 4 via the infinite qualitative difference of divine forgiveness. However, before contemplating the prospect of this theophany of death (the second sphere) and the subsequent death to self (the third sphere) that the divine mirror requires of the individual, one must first anatomize the primal sickness unto death of the human condition, the first sphere of the living death of despair.
First Sphere: Not Buried, Yet Dead : The Living Death of Despair
In 1836 a lyrically precocious young Kierkegaard formulated the dramatically all-embracing diagnosis that t he present age is the age of despair, the age of the wandering Jew (many reforming Jews) (JP, 1:343/SKS 27, 207). According to Kierkegaard s assessment, it is the melancholic iconography of the Semitic exile, Ahasverus, the Wandering Jew-a memorial figure of God-forsakenness, alienation, nihilism, and estrangement-that typifies the modern consciousness. This melancholy archetype can be traced from the Adamic banishment, via the homelessness of Cain, to the medieval legends and Romantic literary myths of the Jew who spurned Christ and was cursed to wander the earth, a fugitive from redemption, until judgment day. But more than being a thread of alienation woven through the tapestry of human history, the Wandering Jew, as George Pattison summarizes, symbolizes for Kierkegaard the despair of the present age, a despair rooted in its separation from its substantial ground of religion and manifesting itself in both political reform movements and philosophical nihilism. 5 One might therefore say that the Wandering Jew of Kierkegaard s nineteenth century is the illegitimate son of a modern humanism whose tragedy can be traced to his severance from the lifegiving light of soteriological hope. His despair is thus, in Kierkegaardian terms, an eternal sickness unto death, without alleviation and without relation to a lifegiving creator, a half-life endured within the lacuna of a vanishing Absolute. The Wandering Jew, as Kierkegaard therefore muses, seems to have his prototype in the fig tree Christ commanded to wither away Matt. 21:19 (SKS 19, 95). The Wandering Jew is therefore taken to be an icon of God-forsaken existence, seeking an elusive redemption in the soul-withering twilight between life and death.
For Kierkegaard, this Romantic motif of the Wandering Jew, by conveying the undead and perennially abyssal elements of the human condition, provides an apposite and evocatively hubristic image for the living death of the modern melancholy self. What is more, the Wandering Jew s melancholic motif of abject immortality is further reminiscent of an expressly Romantic meditation from Kierkegaard s young aesthete A: namely Either/Or s reflection upon the pitiable plight of The Unhappiest One. 6 The phrase itself consciously recalls Hegel s numerous considerations of the Unhappy Consciousness, but in Kierkegaard s poetic reflection the title refers directly to the mysterious adornment on a gravestone in England. A, in this address, considers the meaning of the legend in light of the apparently ironic supposition that the tomb itself is mysteriously empty. Could this absence mean that there is no such person as the Unhappiest One? Or is this tombstone essentially a monument to a secret and melancholy truth? Then why the tomb was empty could be explained, he conjectures, namely, to indicate that the unhappiest one was the one who could not die, could not slip down into a grave (EO, 1:220/SKS 2, 214). As such, the Unhappiest One is one who is consigned to wander perpetually in his longing to rest in the grave that awaits and yet remains continually elusive to him.
This despair is later conceptually paralleled by Anti-Climacus s survey in The Sickness unto Death that the torment of this despair is precisely this inability to die to be sick unto death is to be unable to die (SUD, 18/SKS 11, 133). And so Kierkegaard returns us stylistically to the despair of the present age, the despair of the age of the Wandering Jew, the withering fig tree: the sickness unto death, this tormenting contradiction, this sickness of the self, perpetually to be dying, to die and yet not die, to die death (SUD, 18/SKS 11, 134).
Yet A s discourse is also a commentary on Hegel s Unhappy Consciousness:

In all of Hegel s systematic works there is one section that discusses the unhappy consciousness. One always comes to the reading of such investigations with an inner uneasiness and palpitation of the heart, with a fear that one will learn too much or too little . Ah, happy is the one who has nothing more to do with the subject than to write a paragraph about it; even happier the one who can write the next. The unhappy one is the person who in one way or another has his ideal, the substance of his life, the plenitude of his consciousness, his essential nature, outside himself. The unhappy one is the person who is always absent from himself, never present to himself (EO, 1:222/SKS 2, 215-16).
This reference further reinforces the latent connection between the living death of despair and the anxiety over the loss or death of God to which the Wandering Jew had also alluded. Hegel had explicitly identified the relation between loss of self and loss of God in terms of the alienation expressed by the Unhappy Consciousness. The Unhappy Consciousness, as it experiences the conscious loss of itself and the alienation of its knowledge about itself, expresses its anguish in the hard saying that God is dead. 7 In this lament over the death of God, the Unhappy Consciousness implicitly testifies to a loss of hope in the triumph of life over death-a despair before the horrifyingly visceral vision of the crucified God at Golgotha as well as over the more symptomatically modern horror vacui of the absence of God-and consequently a potential despair over salvation, which Anti-Climacus shall render in more explicit terms in The Sickness unto Death.