Gao 08 141 maritime security federal efforts needed to address

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United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters GAO December 2007 MARITIME SECURITY Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers GAO-08-141 December 2007 MARITIME SECURITY Accountability Integrity Reliability Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Highlights Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Highlights of GAO-08-141, a report to Energy Commodity Tankers Congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found U. S. energy needs rest heavily on The supply chain faces three main types of threats—suicide attacks such as ship-based imports. Tankers bring explosive-laden boats, “standoff” attacks with weapons launched from a 55 percent of the nation’s crude oil distance, and armed assaults. Highly combustible commodities such as supply, as well as liquefied gases liquefied gases have the potential to catch fire or, in a more unlikely scenario, and refined products like jet fuel. explode, posing a threat to public safety. Attacks could also have This supply chain is potentially environmental consequences, and attacks that disrupt the supply chain could vulnerable in many places here and have a severe economic impact. abroad, as borne out by several successful overseas attacks on Much is occurring, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and ships and facilities. GAO’s review facilities, but significant challenges remain. Overseas, despite international addressed (1) the types of threats agreements calling for certain protective steps, substantial disparities exist in to tankers and the potential consequences of a successful implementation. The United States faces limitations in helping to increase attack, (2) measures taken to compliance, as well as limitations in ensuring safe passage on vulnerable protect tankers and challenges transport routes. Domestically, units of the Coast Guard, the lead federal federal agencies face in making agency for maritime security, report insufficient resources to meet its own self these actions effective, and (3) imposed security standards, such as escorting ships carrying liquefied natural plans in place for responding to a gas. Some units’ workloads are likely to grow as new liquefied natural gas successful attack and potential facilities are added. Coast Guard headquarters has not developed plans for challenges stakeholders face in shifting resources among units. responding. GAO’s review spanned several foreign and domestic ports, Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but and multiple steps to analyze data stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work. First, plans for and gather opinions from agencies and stakeholders. responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans simultaneously to see What GAO Recommends if they work effectively together. Second, ports generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as prioritizing the movement of vessels GAO recommends that cognizant after a port reopens. The President’s maritime security strategy calls for such agencies (1) plan for meeting a plans. Third, some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to growing security workload for carry out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been protecting liquefied natural gas directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more shipments, (2) help ensure that comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed. Decisions about the ports plan for dealing with economic consequences of an need for more response capabilities are hindered, however, by a lack of attack, (3) integrate terrorism and performance measures tying resource needs to effectiveness in response. spill response plans at the national and (4) local level, and (5) work to Tanker Limburg after Terrorist Attack near Yemen develop performance measures for emergency response. The agencies generally agreed with our recommendations, but the Department of Homeland Security took the final recommendation under advisement. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on GAO-08-141. For more information, contact Stephen Caldwell at [phone] or [e-mail] or Mark Gaffigan at Source: AFP. 202-512-3841 or [e-mail] United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Results in Brief 7 Background 11 Energy Commodity Shipments Face Varied Threats, and a Successful Attack Could Have Substantial Consequences 23 Although Stakeholders Are Taking Protective Measures, Implementation Challenges Pose Difficulty Both Abroad and at Home36 Stakeholders Have Developed Spill and Terrorism Response Plans but Face Several Challenges in Integrating Them 53 Conclusions77 Recommendations for Executive Action 79 Agency Comments 80 Appendix I Objective, Scope, and Methodology 84 Appendix II Selected Energy Commodities Transported by Tanker into United States 87 Appendix III Recent High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers and Energy Infrastructure 89 Appendix IV Assessing and Managing Risks Using a Risk Management Approach 90 Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 93 Appendix VI Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 97 Page i GAO-08-141 Maritime Security  Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Defense 100 Appendix VIII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 101 Related GAO Products 102 Tables Table 1: Selected International Stakeholders with Maritime Security Activities 12 Table 2: Selected Domestic Stakeholders with Maritime Security Activities 13 Table 3: Federal and Port-level Plans and Agreements Governing Response to Spills on Water and Terrorist Attacks 56 Table 4: High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers and Energy Infrastructure by Target and Attack Method since 2002 89 Figures Figure 1: Oil Tanker at Al-Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal, Persian Gulf 15 Figure 2: Tanker with Insert of Double Hull 16 Figure 3: Top Exporters of Petroleum to the United States in 2005 (Millions of barrels per day) 17 Figure 4: Top Exporters of Natural Gas to United States in 2005 cubic feet per day) 18 Figure 5: Regional Significance of Petroleum Commodities 19 Figure 6: Oil Flows and Strategic Shipping Chokepoints 20 Figure 7: Tanker Limburg after Terrorist Attack near Yemen 26 Figure 8: Tanker Approaching an Iraqi Oil Loading Terminal as U.S. Warship Patrols Nearby 39 Figure 9: U.S. Warship Engaging Suspected Pirate Vessel near Somalia 41 Figure 10: Safety and Security Escort for LNG Tanker 44 Figure 11: Coast Guard Enforcing Security Zone around Moored LNG Tanker 45 Page iiGAO-08-141 Maritime Security  Figure 12: Location of Operating, Planned, and Proposed LNG Marine Terminals by U.S. Coast Guard District 50 Figure 13: Relationship of Spill and Terrorism Response Plans and Agreements 54 Figure 14: Incident Response Sequence When an Attack Occurs Resulting in a Spill59 Figure 15: Potential Actions Taken to Respond to an Attack on an Energy Commodity Tanker 61 Figure 16: Firefighters Preparing for a Maritime Terrorism Training Exercise68 Figure 17: Examples of Marine Firefighting Response 71 Figure 18: Firefighters Training to Combat an Aviation Fuel Fire 74 Figure 19: Risk Management Framework 90 Page iii GAO-08-141 Maritime Security  Abbreviations ACP Area Contingency Plan AMSC Area Maritime Security Committee AMSP Plan BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion CBP Customs and Border Protection CDC certain dangerous cargo COTP Captain of the Port CSF Critical Skill Factor DHS Department of Homeland Security DOD Department of Defense DOJ Department of Justice EPA Environmental Protection Agency FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation ICS incident command system IMO International Maritime Organization ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Code LNG liquefied natural gas LOOP Louisiana Offshore Oil Port LPG liquefied petroleum gas MARSEC Maritime Security Condition System MIRP Maritime Incident Recovery Plan MLA Maritime Liaison Agent MOTR Marine Operational Threat Response Plan MTR Maritime Transportation Response MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan NIMS National Incident Management System NRP National Response Plan NSFCC National Strike Force Coordination Center ONS Operation Neptune Shield OPA 90 Oil Pollution Act of 1990 SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 SONS Spill of National Signficance USCG United States Coast Guard This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page iv GAO-08-141 Maritime Security  United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548 December 10, 2007 The Honorable John D. Dingell Chairman The Honorable Joe Barton Ranking Member Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson Chairman The Honorable Peter King Ranking Member Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives The Honorable Edward J. Markey s This is a public versio