CATCHING UP WITH CORRUPTION
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CATCHING UP WITH CORRUPTION

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Nombre de lectures 49
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MONEY
-
GO
-
ROUND
CATCHING UP WITH CORRUPTION
RAYMOND
BAKER
,
JOHN
CHRISTENSEN
&
NICHOLAS
SHAXSON
n the 1990s, mainstream development theorists and aid agencies finally began to accept the
reality that if they wanted to know why some states fail, or why so many countries are
tormented by persistent poverty, they needed to factor corruption into their equations. The
Berlin-based Transparency International (TI), founded in 1993, deserves much of the credit
for this shift. TI launched the first of its famous Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) series in
1995, and the
Financial Times
took the cue by nominating that year as the International Year
of Corruption. The World Bank, which had previously all but banished the “c” word from its
policy documents, followed TI’s lead after its President, James Wolfensohn, accepted in a
landmark 1996 speech that the Bank needed to deal with “the cancer of corruption.” Now the
Bank considers corruption to be the single greatest obstacle to economic and social
development in the world. The ripple effect from this change of heart has magnified the profile
of the problem throughout the diverse fields of international development policy.
By any measure, this is good news. As many iconoclastic critics of business-as-usual
development policy argued as long as half a century ago, ignoring the broad social and
political frameworks within which economic policy exists is like expecting a fish tank to hold
water without a bottom or sides.
1
Corruption is universal, but its forms vary considerably
across different societies. One would have thought, therefore, that serious social scientists and
practitioners of economic development policy would have factored it into their understanding
early on.
They did not, however, thanks in large part to the way that academic economics shifted
theoretical gears and methodologies after World War II. What had always been called political
economy solidified its separation into political science and an economics profession, which
was driven toward macro approaches in an effort to “harden” itself methodologically. The
result was a sharp positivist, quantitative bias that by definition ruled out serious consideration
of factors that could not be readily measured—corruption being, almost by definition, such a
factor. To this bias was soon added what can only be called a condescending deference to
newly independent countries: It was considered impolite, as well as unhelpful to certain
parochial institutional interests, to delve too deeply into untoward behavior by the elites of
newly sovereign and proud countries.
This explains, at least to some degree, the otherwise astonishing fact that it took half a century
to acknowledge the role corruption plays in the dysfunctional economies of so many poor
countries. It explains why the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention entered into force only in
1999, and the UN Convention against Corruption not until 2003. In many developed countries,
bribes were tax-deductible until just a few years ago. Whether it was grasping kleptocrats
stealing billions from the state or disheveled policemen extorting bribes at roadblocks, the
problem should have been diagnosed and dealt with decades earlier.
Not only has the world been slow to wake up to the problem of corruption in development, the
I
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