THE SONG OF THE BIRD - ArvindGuptaToys Books Gallery

Audra R. Diers

Description

I have a sister My sister is deaf By Jeane Whitehouse Peterson I have a sister My sister is deaf. She is special. There are not many sisters like mine. My sister can play the piano. She likes to feel the deep rumbling chords. But she will never be able to sing. She cannot hear the tune. My sister can dance with a partner or march in a line. She likes to leap, to tumble, to roll, to climb to the top of the monkey bars.

• sweet tones of the wind chimes
• little sister sleeps
• bunch of bananas from the fruit bowl on the table
• quick clap-clap of the shutters
• sister
• wind

Sujets

• Whitehouse
• Sister
• Bananas
• Little

Informations

• Publié par: edwui
• Nombre de lectures: 519
• Langue: English

Extrait

Drawing the Line in the Sand:
Re-grounding the Theory and Practice of Topicality Debate

Audra R. Diers, Ph.D., Marist College

Abstract
Topicality is often one of the most frustrating positions run in NFA LD—
regardless of whether it is topicality, effects topicality, or extra topicality because
there is a substantial variance in the approach, structure, and theoretical grounding
of the positions. From both a communication scholar and debate theorist’s
perspective, many of the emergent trends are disturbing because: (a) they are
pervasive; (b) they move away from good argumentation theory; (c) they make
the position less appealing, less critical, and less effective; and (d) they are poor
applications of debate contexts. Therefore, this paper will: (a) address the concept
of resolutional interpretation, identifying the fundamental tensions in the purpose
of topicality; (b) argue for the necessity of good structure, identifying the
preferred structure for topicality; and (c) offer a deep analysis of each component
of a topicality position.

28

“When you have no basis for an argument, abuse the plaintiff.” Cicero
“Abuse of words has been the great instrument of sophistry and chicanery, of
party, faction, and division in society.” John Adams
Rationale
“Abuse is the only reason to run ‘T’.” A portion of the Lincoln Douglas
(LD) community will read that statement and say a collective, “Yep.” Another
portion of the LD community will read that statement and cringe in utter dismay.
There have been substantial changes in the ways that topicality has been run in the
last couple of generations of debaters. Based on the literature discussed in this
paper, this trend seems to have emerged in high school cross-examination debate
and has leaked into the college circuit—in seemingly all styles of policy debate.
But this ideological split in policy debate is important as it is manifested in
coaching, judging, and certainly the ways that debaters approach rounds,
violations, and responses. It is an ideological split indicative of some of the
divisions in LD community itself as we hear portions of the community arguing
more kritiks, doomsday case and disadvantage scenarios, and debating whether
either side can win by merely having ‘defensive’ versus ‘offensive’ arguments.
No matter whether we see ourselves as an educator, a referee, or a trustee
as we judge rounds (see Bartanen, 1994) and/or coach students, we have a
responsibility to the event, to good argumentation, and to our competitors’
growth. If, over time, there are more and more espoused preferences for a-
theoretical and poor argumentation advocated both before and after the round by
judges, competitive norms will change and will change for the worse—as we are
29

presently seeing in LD. Instead of consistently seeing ballot comments like, “On
T, I do think neg wins on sources T. The 1AR never contends the violation. At the
point that the 1AR never explains how his education and depth standards interact
with neg’s standards of resolutional integrity and grammar, I err neg on T”, we
seem to see more and more comments like, “Why run topicality without abuse
standards? You had plenty of evidence on case. There is clearly no abuse in
1round!!! ” The first is an example of not only a more theoretically grounded
evaluation of the round, but also an evaluation of the position on the merits of the
argumentation in the round. The second comment, unfortunately, is an example of
a seeming growing and infectious trend away from topicality theory and towards
intervention based on poor conceptualizations of what topicality ought to be.
My central argument is very simple—pop topicality, or the common way
that topicality is argued today, is a-theoretical and ultimately a poor way to argue
topicality. I will also advocate that a more traditional and resolutional-based
model of topicality grounding itself in good research and validity is a far superior
model for argumentation on topicality positions. I will do so by first analyzing the
competing models for interpreting the resolution and then building a case for the
resolution as the center of debate.
Resolutional Interpretation
Ryan (2004) argues that the interpretation of the resolution is a critical
component in debate because with stable interpretations come grounds for either
justifying or de-justifying change and affirmative advocacy. As such, any
discussion of topicality theory ought to begin with the underlying assumptions

1
Examples of comments taken from competition ballots.
30

regarding how to interpret the resolution. By understanding differences in the
approach to the resolutional burdens, the question of how to best argue topicality
becomes a function of understanding the implications of the guiding assumptions
of what topicality ought to be.
Two Competing Approaches to Interpreting the Resolution
The judges’ comments highlighted above reflect the two primary
ideological approaches to resolutional interpretation in LD: the ground and
resolutional approaches. This section will develop the rationale and theoretical
background for each approach and then argue that the resolutional approach
provides the best guiding assumptions for topicality.
The Ground Approach
Today, the dominant ideological approach to arguing topicality
approaches the interpretation of the resolution as a means of equitably dividing
ground so that academic debate can take place. If the ground is relatively equal
for both the affirmative and negative, then topicality should fall away so that the
debate can focus on more substantive issues (Dudczak, 1989; Herbeck &
Katsulas, 1992; Kerpen, 1999; Parson & Bart, 1992; Ryan, 2004; Unger, 1992;
Voight, 1993). Underlying this means of interpreting the resolution is the
assumption that the resolution’s function is to enable an academic debate to
occur—that if there is no way to have a reasonable debate over the issue then the
affirmative ought to be penalized. In part, the advocates of the ground approach
argue that because of the absolute nature of topicality’s consequences (i.e., losing
31

the round), if the affirmative proves equal ground that should be sufficient for the
rest of the debate to continue (Ryan, 2004).
In practice, as Madsen and Louden (1987) argue, the resolution places fair
limits on the sheer number of possible interpretations from which an affirmative
may choose a case and the size of the boundary comes from argumentation about
the definitions. Murphy (1994) points out that this approach, “…places no
constraints on the typicality or representativeness of the affirmative example; the
affirmative need only fall within the boundary to be judged as topical” (p. 2).
Therefore, a topicality position emphasizing a ground approach would present a
definition, a violation of the definition, reasons to prefer the negative definition,
and then argue that because the affirmative violates the fair limits of the
resolution, the negative should be chosen in the round (Murphy, 1994).
Presumably, when the affirmative responds to such a violation they either counter
define or argue that they meet. As such, the question for the round because which
definition or interpretation should the judge prefer? The implication is then that
the debate, and consequently the judge, focuses on the reasons to prefer and
accordingly arguments about the question of fair limits, ground abuse, educational
benefit, and the like as reasons to prefer one interpretation to the other.
The Resolutional Approach
The other primary approach to topicality argumentation articulates a
‘truth’ philosophy in that it is grounded with the belief that the resolution is
simply a claim that is either defended or opposed in a round of debate. Therefore,
the best way to establish the truth of the claim is to have concrete comparison of
32

the affirmative advocacy to the evidentiary burdens established by the claim.
Advocates for this approach argue that a ground approach is to subjective and
invites unnecessary intervention by a judge’s own preconceptions about the topic;
that ultimately topicality argumentation becomes an issue of dueling definitions
with the judge left to pick based on their own preconceptions (Lichtman, Rohrer,
& Corsi, 1992; Murphy, 1994).
This approach emphasizes that the resolution is the starting point of the
debate, so any critique of topicality, “should begin with an inquiry into how the
argument [affirmative case] represents the resolution-focus orientation” (Murphy,
1994, p. 3). This means that standards, instead of subjectively representing an
argument for a particular definition, establish a model for determining whether the
affirmative case fits the requirements of the resolution. Murphy (1994) argues that
this effectively and directly emphasizes the objectives of a debate, which are to
determine whether the resolution is true and action ought to be taken in support of
the truth of the resolution (i.e., implement a plan of action). There are three direct
implications of this approach on topicality argumentati