Introduction Assumptions On Shoup's lemma The proof To do Conclusion

Bruno Blanchet

Description

Introduction Assumptions On Shoup's lemma The proof To do Conclusion Automatic, computational proof of EKE using CryptoVerif (Work in progress) Bruno Blanchet Joint work with David Pointcheval CNRS, Ecole Normale Superieure, INRIA, Paris May 2010 Bruno Blanchet (CNRS, ENS, INRIA) EKE in CryptoVerif May 2010 1 / 20

• eke using


• precisely evaluated


• computational diffie-hellman


• password- based key


• trivial protocol


• sku ?

Sujets

• Blanchet

Informations

• Publié par: pefav
• Nombre de lectures: 10
• Langue: English

Extrait

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´ CNRS, Ecole Normale Superieure, INRIA, Paris ´

Bruno Blanchet [e-mail] Joint work with David Pointcheval

May 2010

Automatic, computational proof of EKE using CryptoVerif (Work in progress)

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Motivation

EKE (Encrypted Key Exchange): A password-based key exchange protocol. A non-trivial protocol. It took some time before getting a proper computational proof of this protocol. Our goal: Mechanize, and automate as far as possible, its proof using the automatic computational protocol verifierCryptoVerif. This is an opportunity forseveral interesting extensionsof CryptoVerif. This work is still in progress.

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