Investment, Unbundling, and Vertical Governance in Electric Power Systems [Elektronische Ressource] / Nele Friedrichsen. Gutachter: Marco Verweij ; Rolf Künneke. Betreuer: Gert Brunekreeft

universitat_bremen - Nele Friedrichsen

Découvre YouScribe en t'inscrivant gratuitement

Je m'inscris

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne
En savoir plus

137 pages

Deutsch

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne
En savoir plus

A propos
Informations
Extrait

Description

Investment, Unbundling, and Vertical Governance inElectric Power Systemsthesis submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the degree ofDoctor of Philosophy in EconomicsSchool of Humanities and Social SciencesJacobs University BremenbyNele Friedrichsen,n.friedrichsen@jacobs-university.deDefense: December 19, 2011Supervisors:Prof. Dr. Gert Brunekreeft, Jacobs University BremenProf. Dr. Marco Verweij, Jacobs University BremenDr. Rolf Ku¨nneke, Delft University of TechnologyAcknowledgementsThis work would not have been possible without the help of many others. I would like toexpress my special gratitude to Gert Brunekreeft for inspiring discussions, constructivecriticism, and support. I greatly enjoyed the joint work. I would also like to thank MarcoVerweijandRolfKu¨nnekeforbeingavailabletodiscussmyworkandgivingan“outside”perspective.I appreciate ﬁnancial support from the Dutch Next Generation Infrastructures Foun-dation within the research project UNECOM and from the German Federal Ministry ofEconomics within the research project IRIN.Furthermore, a big thank you goes to my colleagues at Jacobs University and BremerEnergie Institut.

Informations

Publié par	universitat_bremen
Publié le	01 janvier 2011
Nombre de lectures	43
Langue	Deutsch
Poids de l'ouvrage	3 Mo

Extrait

Investment,Unbundling,andVerticalGovernancein
ElectricPowerSystems

thesissubmittedinpartialfulﬁllmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof
DoctorofPhilosophyinEconomics
SchoolofHumanitiesandSocialSciences
JacobsUniversityBremen
byNeleFriedrichsen,
n.friedrichsen@jacobs-university.de

Defense:December19,2011

Supervisors:
Prof.Dr.GertBrunekreeft,JacobsUniversityBremen
Prof.Dr.MarcoVerweij,JacobsUniversityBremen
Dr.RolfKu¨nneke,DelftUniversityofTechnology

Acknowledgements

Thisworkwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthehelpofmanyothers.Iwouldliketo
expressmyspecialgratitudetoGertBrunekreeftforinspiringdiscussions,constructive
criticism,andsupport.Igreatlyenjoyedthejointwork.IwouldalsoliketothankMarco
VerweijandRolfKu¨nnekeforbeingavailabletodiscussmyworkandgivingan“outside”
perspective.
IappreciateﬁnancialsupportfromtheDutchNextGenerationInfrastructuresFoun-
dationwithintheresearchprojectUNECOMandfromtheGermanFederalMinistryof
EconomicswithintheresearchprojectIRIN.
Furthermore,abigthankyougoestomycolleaguesatJacobsUniversityandBremer
EnergieInstitut.IwouldliketomentioninparticularMartin,Marius,andSabinefor
theagradablecompanyandco-workership;RolandandChristineforcountlessfruitful
andfundiscussionsandcookingsessions;Nadineforalltheco↵eeandcampuswalks;
andalltheUEACmembersforthemeaningfulprocrastinationopportunity.
Last,notleast,Iwouldliketothankmyfriendsandfamilyfortheirendlesssupport
andencouragement.

Abstract

Unbundling,theverticalseparationofelectricitynetworksfromgenerationandretail,
andliberalizationhavebeencommonfeaturesofelectricitymarketreformaroundthe
world.Asaconsequence,thestructureofelectricpowersystemsisbecomingincreasingly
decentralized.Electricitysupplyisaninterrelatedsystemthatrequirescarefulcoordina-
tionbetweensupplyanddemand.Thisappliesespeciallytosystemoperation.Butalso
inthelongtermcoordinationexhibitsconsiderablebeneﬁtsincethesitingofgenerators
hasconsiderableinﬂuenceonthenetworkandmaydefer/orincreaseinvestmentneed.
Withunbundling,ﬁrm-internalcoordinationacrosstheentiresupplychainisnolonger
possible.Coordinationproblemscanarisebecauseoflackinginformationorbecauseof
incentiveproblems.Sincelackofcoordinationcancauseeciencylosses,alternative
governancemechanismsareneededtorestorecoordinationinamarketenvironment.
ThisPhDthesisexploresthecoordinationproblemandpossiblesolutionsinﬁvere-
latedarticles.Theﬁrstpaperfocusesonoperationalcoordinationandanalysestheoption
ofanindependentsystemoperatorasagovernanceformforfutureactivelymanaged
smartdistributionnetworks.Thesecondpaperexamineswhethercostlessinformation
exchange(”cheaptalk”)canachievecoordinationofinvestmentdecisions.Cheaptalk
mayfailbecauseofincentivesproblems.However,deepchargingcanservetorestore
incentivecompatibility.Thethirdpaperstudieslocationalchargingaspricemechanism
tocoordinatedistributionnetworkandnetworkusersanalytically.Thefourthpaperex-
tendsthetheoreticalanalysiswithamorein-depthinvestigationofthepossibilitiesfor
locationalpricinginGermanybasedoncontractualsolutionsbetweennetworkoperator
anduser.Theﬁfthpapershowsthatsuchoptionalandvoluntarycontractscanachieve
apareto-improvement.

iii

DeclarationonJointAuthorship

Thisthesiscontainsseveralarticleswhicharejointwork.Thefollowingparagraphslay
outforeacharticlethecontributionsoftheseveralauthors.
Theﬁrstarticle“GoverningSmartGrids-thecaseforanIndependentSystemOper-
ator”issingle-authoredbyNeleFriedrichsen.
Thesecondarticle“Verticalunbundlingandthecoordinationofinvestment–can
“cheaptalk”alonesolvetheproblemordoweneed“deepcharging”?”isjointwork
withGertBrunekreeft.Theauthorsdevelopedthetopicofthearticleandthesetup
ofthecheaptalkgameininteractivediscussionbasedonanideabyGertBrunekreeft.
NeleFriedrichsenwasinchargeofthemodelandthecalculations.Whenwritingupthe
article,GertBrunekreeftdraftedaﬁrstversionofthepaperconsistingofthedescription
ofthemodelandtheresults.NeleFriedrichsencontributedthebackgroundoncheap
talk,thecoordinationprobleminliberalizedelectricitymarkets,andnetworkcharging.
Therevisionsofthepaperwererealizedjointlybyalternatingthedraftbetweenboth
authors.
Thethird,fourthandﬁftharticleareworkrealizedaspartoftheprojectIRIN-inno-
vativeregulationforintelligentnetworks-fundedbytheGermanfederalministryofeco-
nomics.AllthreepapersarejointworkwithChristineBrandst¨attandGertBrunekreeft.
Thecontentofthepaperswasdevelopedinteractivelyindiscussionamongthethreeau-
thorswithintheproject.
Forthethirdpaper“Locationalsignalstoreducenetworkinvestmentsinsmartdistri-
butiongrids:whatworksandwhatnot?”NeleFriedrichsendraftedaﬁrstsummaryof
themaindiscussionpointsofthedi↵erentpricingschemes.Thepaperwasthenjointly
writtenbythethreeauthorsandtheargumentationwasreﬁnedbasedoninteractive
discussion.NeleFriedrichsencontributedthebackgroundoncoordinationneedinelec-
tricitysupplyandthegrowingdemandforlocationalpricingascoordinationdevice.
Furthermore,shecontributedthebackgroundonsmartgrids.
Forthefourtharticle“Smartpricingtoreducenetworkinvestmentinsmartdistri-
butiongrids-experienceinGermany”NeleFriedrichsencontributedthecountryexpe-
riencesfromNewZealandandtheUS.Shewasalsoresponsibleforthedetailsofthe
Germanframework.Thepaperwasthenjointlywrittenbythethreeauthorsandthe
argumentationwasreﬁnedbasedonseveraldiscussionsessions.
Fortheﬁfthpaper“Improvinginvestmentcoordinationinelectricitynetworksthrough
smartcontracts”NeleFriedrichsendevelopedthemodelinclosediscussionwithChristine
Brandst¨att.Thereﬁnementsofthecaseshavebeendevelopedindiscussionamongthe
threeauthors.NeleFriedrichsenalsocontributedmajorpartstowritingtheﬁrstdraftof
thepaper.Reﬁnementandimprovementswererealizedbycirculatingthedraftamong
thethreecollaboratingauthors.

Contents

Acknowledgementsi
Abstractiii
DeclarationonJointAuthorshipv
1Introduction1
1.1Background...................................1
1.2Methodology..................................6
1.3Motivation...................................7
1.4ContentsoftheThesis.............................9
1.5MainContributions...............................15
2GoverningSmartGrids-theCaseforanIndependentSystemOperator19
2.1Introduction...................................20
2.2Background:VerticalIntegrationandUnbundling..............21
2.3SmartGrids...................................24
2.4GovernanceinSmartGrids:theCaseforanISO..............25
2.5Conclusions...................................31
3VerticalUnbundlingandtheCoordinationofInvestment39
3.1Introduction...................................40
3.2Literature....................................41
3.3TheModel...................................43
3.4ShallowPricingandCheapTalk.......................49
3.5LocationalPricingandDeepCharging....................51
3.6DissussionandConcludingRemarks.....................54
3.7Appendix....................................56
4LocationalSignalstoReduceNetworkInvestmentsinSmartDistribution
61Grids4.1Introduction...................................62
4.2Background...................................64
4.3NetworkandEnergyPricing..........................67
4.4AnalysisofDi↵erentPricingMethods....................73
4.5Conclusions...................................77

vii

Contents
5SmartPricing–ExperienceinGermany83
5.1Introduction...................................84
5.2LocationalPricing...............................86
5.3LocationalDistributionPricinginGermany.................91
5.4Conclusions...................................100
6ImprovingInvestmentCoordinationinElectricityNetworksThroughSmart
Contracts107
6.1Introduction...................................108
6.2LocationalPricinginDistributionNetworks.................109
6.3Model......................................111
6.4Discussion....................................121
6.5Conclusions...................................123
Declaration127
viii

1Introduction

Unbundling,theverticalseparationofelectricitynetworksfromgenerationandretail,
andliberalizationhavebeencommonfeaturesofelectricitymarketreformaroundthe
worldwithclearbeneﬁtsforcompetitionandeciency.However,theforcedseparation
oftheverticalsupplychainmayleadtocoordinationproblems.Lackingcoordinationcan
causeeciencylosses.Negativee↵ectscanoccurforexamplewithrespecttonetwork
investmentortheintegrationofrenewablegeneration.Hence,coordinationproblems
mayhinderthenecessarydecarbonizationofelectricitysupply.New,ﬁrm-external,gov-
ernancemechanismsareneededtorestorecoordinationinamarketenvironment.
Thefollowingparagraphspresentintroductoryinformationonelectricitymarketsand
possiblecoordinationproblemsinelectricitysupply.Section1.2presentstheframe-
workofanalysisandtheresearchapproach.Section1.3)outlinesthemotivationfor
theresearch.Section1.4presentsasummaryofthecontentofthethesisandthemain
conclusions.Section1.5summarizesthemaincontributionsmadeinthisthesis.

1.1Background
1.1.1StructureofElectricitySupply
Electricitysupplycanbeseenasafourstageindustry:generation,transmission,dis-
tributionandretail.Generationcanbelargecentralizedpowerplantssuchasnuclear,
coal,orgasstationsthatfeedintohighvoltagenetworks.Increasinglygenerationisalso
providedbysmallerdecentralizedgenerators.Thesegeneratorsaretypicallyconnected
atlowervoltages.Transmissionanddistributionnetworksformthenetworkinfrastruc-
ture,whichisanessentialcomponen