Militia politics [Elektronische Ressource] : the formation and organisation of irregular armed forces in Sudan (1985 - 2001) and Lebanon (1975 - 1991) / Jago Salmon

Jago Salmon

Sujets

• Militar

Informations

• Publié par: humboldt-universitat_zu_berlin
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2008
• Nombre de lectures: 13
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 3 Mo

Extrait

INTRODUCTION
Humboldt – Universität zu Berlin
Dissertation
MILITIA POLITICS

THE FORMATION AND ORGANISATION OF IRREGULAR ARMED
FORCES IN SUDAN (1985-2001) AND LEBANON (1975-1991)
Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil)
Philosophische Fakultät III der Humbold – Universität zu Berlin
(M.A. B.A.) Jago Salmon; 9 Juli 1978; Canberra, Australia
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Gert-Joachim Glaeßner
Gutachter: 1. Dr. Klaus Schlichte
2. Prof. Joel Migdal

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 18.07.2006



INTRODUCTION
You have to know that there are two kinds of captain praised. One is those who have
done great things with an army ordered by its own natural discipline, as were the
greater part of Roman citizens and others who have guided armies. These have had
no other trouble than to keep them good and see to guiding them securely. The other is
those who not only have had to overcome the enemy, but, before they arrive at that,
have been necessitated to make their army good and well ordered. These without
doubt merit much more praise…

Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War (2003, 161) INTRODUCTION
Abstract
This thesis provides an analysis of the organizational politics of state supporting armed groups, and
demonstrates how group cohesion and institutionalization impact on the patterns of violence witnessed
within civil wars. Using an historical comparative method, strategies of leadership control are
examined in the processes of organizational evolution of the Popular Defence Forces, an Islamist
Nationalist militia, and the allied Lebanese Forces, a Christian Nationalist militia. The first group was a
centrally coordinated network of irregular forces which fielded ill-disciplined and semi-autonomous
military units, and was responsible for severe war crimes. Equally responsible for war crimes, such as
the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Shi'a and Palestinian civilians in 1982, the second group,
nonetheless, became an autonomous military formation with an established territorial canton with a
high degree of control over military units. After first analysing the political and institutional context of
formation of these two groups, detailed case study analysis illustrates how political-military leaderships
consolidated internal authority over combat units. At first, this authority relied on a bricolage of norms,
motivations and institutions, as highly diverse, loosely coordinated actors mobilised in response to
insecurity. As key leadership figures emerged, these groups evolved into hybrid organisations, divided
between central organisations and locally embedded units operating according to localised security
arenas decoupled from central military or political strategy. Central authority was then consolidated
through a process of progressive institutionalisation and expansion, as centralised control was
established, often violently, over resources, recruitment and discipline. This thesis shows, how militias,
formed in allegiance with the state evolved into organizations rivalling state sovereignty and exploiting
the communities which they claimed to defend.

Sudan
Lebanon
armed forces
formation
organisaition
militia politics
civil war
armed conflict
violence
state
guerrilla warfare
tribal mobilisation INTRODUCTION

Abstract (German)
Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, zwei Forschungslücken in der Literatur über Bürgerkriege zu
schließen. Erstens, die Analyse der Strukturen nicht-staatlicher bewaffneter Gruppen. Zweitens, die
Untersuchung der Politik von Milizen, als Form nicht-staatlicher Gruppen, denen in gegenwärtigen
Bürgerkriegen eine zunehmende Bedeutung zukommt. Diese beiden Bereiche werden mit Hilfe einer
historisch vergleichenden Analyse am Beispiel von zwei Milizen, die im sudanesischen und
libanesischen Bürgerkrieg kämpften, untersucht. Die "Popular Defense Forces", 1989 von der
Regierung des Sudan mobilisiert, wurden zum Sammelbecken für undisziplinierte und teilautonome
militärische Einheiten, die schwerste Kriegsverbrechen begingen. Die "Lebanese Forces", eine
maronitisch-nationalistische Miliz, wurde von einer Koalition konservativer christlicher Parteien
gegründet. Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Staates 1975-6 wurde diese Miliz zu einer autonomen
politischen Einheit mit einem territorial abgegrenzten Kanton im Osten von Beirut. Die vorliegende
Arbeit untersucht die Prozesse und Strategien, die diesen Milizen die Etablierung von Herrschaft
ermöglichte. Die beiden Gruppen entwickelten sich zu Organisationen, die die zu verteidigenden
Gebiete beherrschten und mit staatlichen Geldgebern verbündet waren, aber auch in Konkurrenz zu
ihnen standen. Diese Arbeit identifiziert drei Mechanismen, die die Entwicklungen von Milizen im
Laufe ihrer Zeit bestimmen. Der Erste erklärt die Formierung von Milizen als ein Bricolage von
politischen und nicht-politischen Antworten auf Unsicherheit. Der Zweite erklärt, wie sich Milizen in
hybride Organisationen, von zentraler Mobilisierungseinheit und lokal eingebettete Organisationen,
entwickeln. Der Dritte führt die Kontrolle des Zentrums über die lokalen Organisationen auf die Macht
über Ressourcen zurück. Die Arbeit schließt mit dem Entwurf eines alternativen analytischen Modells
für die Untersuchung von Bürgerkriegen.

Sudan
Lebanon
bewaffnete Einheiten
Entwicklung
Organisation
Miliz
Bürgerkrieg
Konflikt
Gewalt
Staat
Guerilla
Stamm INTRODUCTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................3
ABSTRACT (GERMAN) ...................................................................................................4
TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................................8
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION ........................................................................................9
ABBREVIATIONS ..........................................................................................................10
FIGURES.......................................................................................................................11
TABLES ........................................................................................................................11
MAPS............................................................................................................................11
PICTURES .....................................................................................................................11
1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................12
1.1 Armed Conflict and Organisations .........................................................................................13
1.2 Methodology...........................................................................................................................14
1.3 Case Selection ........................................................................................................................15
1.4 Definitions ..............................................................................................................................16
1.5 Structure of the Thesis............................................................................................................18
2 LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................19
2.1 Militias....................................................................................................................................19
2.2 ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Wars: ...........................................................................................................24
2.3 The Economy and the Econometry of War.............................................................................25
2.4 Response..28
2.5 Conclusion32
3 DELEGATED VIOLENCE: BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY................................33
3.1 Militia Formation....................................................................................................................34
3.1.1 The State in Society.........................................................................................................34
3.1.2 The Privatisation of the State..........................................................................................35
3.1.3 The Informalisation of the State......................................................................................36
3.1.4 Two Ideal Types of Militia Formation............................................................................37
3.1.5 Intermediaries and Militia Formation38
3.2 Militia Organisation................................................................................................................39
3.2.1 Violence in Civil War......................................................................................................39 <